Jackson v. CN Worldwide Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHEILA JACKSON, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-4763

CN WORLDWIDE, INC., ET AL. SECTION “R” (1)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2) filed by defendant CN Worldwide, Inc. (“CNWW”).1 Plaintiffs

do not oppose the motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants

the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a train derailment in Paulina, Louisiana, on

November 2, 2022, which caused hydrochloric acid to be released into

the environment.2 On November 30, 2022, CNWW was sued in the 23rd

Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. James by plaintiffs,

purported representatives of a putative class of individuals that reside

in and around Paulina.3 CNWW then removed the case to this Court on

1 R. Doc. 6.

2 R. Doc. 1-1 at 4 (Complaint ¶ 2).

3 Id.

December 2, 2022.4 Further, Illinois Central Railroad Company

(“Illinois Central”) has intervened in this matter and contends that its

employees operated the train that derailed.5 CNWW now moves to

dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.6 CNWW

asserts that: (1) it is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in

Louisiana, and (2) because it did not own or operate the train that

derailed on November 2, there are no “minimum contacts” with

Louisiana relevant to this matter such that it is subject to specific

personal jurisdiction in this state.7 Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion.

The Court considers the motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Personal jurisdiction “is an essential element of the jurisdiction of

a district court, without which it is powerless to proceed to an

adjudication.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583

(1999) (internal citation omitted). When a nonresident defendant

4 R. Doc. 1.

5 R. Doc. 5.

6 R. Doc. 6.

7 R. Doc. 6-1 at 1-6.

moves the court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden to show that personal

jurisdiction exists. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir.

1985). When the court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in the present

case, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing.

Godhra v. United States Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir.

1999). The allegations of the complaint, except as controverted by

opposing affidavits, must be taken as true, and all conflicts in the facts

must be resolved in favor of plaintiffs. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors

Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985).

A court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if

(1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over

that defendant, and (2) the forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction

complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Latshaw v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). Because

Louisiana’s long-arm statute, La. R.S. § 13:3201, et seq., extends

jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court’s focus is solely

on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case satisfies federal

due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179

F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)(citing La. R.S. § 13:3201(B)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed

itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing

“minimum contacts” with that state, and (2) exercising personal

jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend “traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int’l

Shoe Co. v. Wa., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

There are two ways to establish minimum contacts: specific

jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647

(5th Cir. 1994). General jurisdiction will attach, even if the act or

transaction sued upon is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum state, if the defendant has engaged in “continuous and

systematic” activities in the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984); Wilson, 20 F.3d at

647. Contacts between a defendant and the forum state must be

“extensive” to satisfy the “continuous and systematic” test. Submersible

Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419 (5th

Cir.2001). See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum

for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a

corporation it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is

fairly regarded as at home.”).

Specific jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant “has

purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation

results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.”

Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,

867 (5th Cir. 2001); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. Minimum

contacts may be established by actions, or even just a single act, by the

nonresident defendant that “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits

and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 475 (1985).

“When the cause of action relates to the defendant’s contact with

the forum, the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement is satisfied, and

‘specific’ jurisdiction is proper, so long as that contact resulted from the

defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activity of the

plaintiff.” Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th

Cir.1987); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The

unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a

nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with

the forum State.”). This restriction on the minimum contacts inquiry

ensures that the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the benefits

of the forum state such that it could “reasonably anticipate being haled

into court there.” Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214

(5th Cir. 2000)(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Burger King, 471

U.S. at 474); see also Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs do not oppose CNWW’s motion to dismiss. The Fifth

Circuit has not explicitly addressed how district courts should consider

unopposed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., No. 13-6656, 2014 WL

4450427, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014). District courts in the Fifth

Circuit have generally resolved unopposed motions to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction by asking whether the plaintiff’s complaint

alleges a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See id. (collecting

cases). But the Fifth Circuit has explained that in deciding a 12(b)(2)

motion to dismiss, the district court may consider “the entire record”

and may receive “affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony,

or any combination of recognized methods of discovery.” Thompson v.

Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court

is afforded “considerable leeway” in resolving the motion. Marine

Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 1981). Here,

the Court considers uncontroverted record evidence where it adds color

to the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint.

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege a prima facie case of general

personal jurisdiction. To establish general personal jurisdiction,

plaintiffs must show “continuous and systematic” contacts such that

CNWW is “essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919. Plaintiffs have not alleged such

contacts. See Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 610

(5th Cir. 2008) (“[V]ague and overgeneralized assertions that give no

indication as to the extent, duration, or frequency of contacts are

insufficient to support general jurisdiction.”). The Fifth Circuit has

stated that it is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a

forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of

business.” Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) L.L.C., 947 F.3d 331, 336 (5th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429,

432 (5th Cir. 2014)). Here, plaintiffs merely allege that CNWW is “an

entity authorized to and doing business in the state of Louisiana.”8

Further, CNWW points to a sworn affidavit by, Jody Evely—Assistant

Vice President and General Counsel for the U.S. companies that are

indirect subsidiaries of Canadian National Railway Company, including

Illinois Central—attesting that CNWW is a Canadian corporation

organized under the Canadian Corporations Act, and that its principal

place of business is located in the Canadian province of Ontario.9

Accordingly, CNWW is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in

Louisiana.

8 R. Doc. 1-1 at 4 (Complaint ¶ 1).

9 R. Doc. 6-3 at 1 (Declaration of Jody Evely ¶ 7).

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

The Court finds that CNWW is not subject to specific personal

jurisdiction, either. Because the Louisiana Long Arm Statute is

coextensive with constitutional due process, “the Court need only

determine if a non-resident party has the requisite contacts with the

State of Louisiana necessary to satisfy the due process requirements of

the Constitution of the United States for the assertion of in personam

jurisdiction.” Gulf S. Med. & Surgical Inst. v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No.

91-4649, 1992 WL 202346, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1992). “The exercise

of personal jurisdiction comports with due process where: (1) the

defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections

of the forum state by establishing ‘minimum contacts’ with that state;

and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Choice Healthcare, Inc. v.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 615 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 2010).

Further, the litigation must arise out of the defendant’s contacts with

the forum state. Panda Brandywine Corp., 253 F.3d at 867.

Here, CNWW once again points to the Evely affidavit, in which she

attests that CNWW is not a railroad company and does not own or

operate trains.10 Evely, in her sworn affidavit, states that: (1) CNWW is

a corporate affiliate of Canadian National Railway Company, but

CNWW itself is not a railroad company and is not in the business of

operating railroads; (2) CNWW and Illinois Central are wholly separate

and distinct corporations; (3) neither CNWW nor any of its employees

were operating the train that derailed on November 2, 2022; (4) neither

CNWW nor any of its employees were responsible for or performed any

maintenance or repair on the line of track that runs through Paulina,

Louisiana; and (5) CNWW did not own or maintain any railroad cars on

the train that derailed.11 Therefore, CNWW contends that it has no

purposeful “minimum contacts” with Louisiana giving rise to plaintiffs’

claims and is not subject to personal jurisdiction. As plaintiffs do not

contest CNWW’s argument and evidence as to why it is has no

purposeful contacts with Louisiana, the Court grants CNWW’s motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

10 R. Doc. 6-3 at 2 (Declaration of Jody Evely ¶ 11).

11 Id. at 2 (Declaration of Jody Evely ¶¶ 8-16).

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ claims against CNWW are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of March, 2023.

derok Vanes

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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