Beacham v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LATHADDEUS BEACHAM CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 17-3038

BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, SECTION: D (4)

INC., ET AL.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is BP’s Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony

of Plaintiff’s Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook1 filed by Defendants BP Exploration &

Production Inc., BP America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. as well as

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.2 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.,

Transocean Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore

Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”) have joined in both motions.3

Plaintiff Lathaddeus Beacham (“Plaintiff”) opposes both Motions.4 Defendants have

filed Replies in support of their Motions and Plaintiff has filed a Supplemental

Memorandum in Opposition to BP’s Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation

Testimony of Plaintiffs’ [sic] Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook.5

After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the

applicable law, the Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED.

1 R. Doc. 72.

2 R. Doc. 73.

3 See R. Doc. 72 n.1; R. Doc. 73 n.1.

4 R. Doc. 74; R. Doc. 75.

5 Defendants’ Replies, R. Doc. 82 and R. Doc. 83. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum, R. Doc. 87.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in

2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf Coast. On January 11, 2013,

United States District Judge Carl J. Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict

litigation arising out of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater

Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”).6

However, certain individuals, referred to as “B3” plaintiffs, either opted out of or were

excluded from the MSA.7 Plaintiff Lathaddeus Beacham opted out of the MSA and,

accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.8

Plaintiff filed this individual action against Defendants on April 9, 2017 to

recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the oil spill.9 For approximately

eighteen months in 2010 and 2011, Plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker, tasked with

cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from clean-up equipment in Pensacola, Florida,

Venice, Louisiana, and Gulf Shores, Alabama.10 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’

negligence and recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently failing

to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused him to suffer myriad

injuries including dental pain, shortness of breath, dizziness, nausea, rashes, eye

burning and irritation, migraines, headaches, and moderate restriction result from a

6 See Brown v. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., Civ. A. No. 18-9927, 2019 WL 2995869, at *1 (E.D. La. July 9,

2019) (citation omitted) (Africk, J.).

7 See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179,

2021 WL 6053613, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021).

8 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 5.

9 Id.

10 R. Doc. 72-2 at p. 5.

pulmonary function test.11 Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,

personal injury damages—including damages for past and future medical expenses

and for pain and suffering—punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and

expenses.12

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present in the oil

spilled by Defendants caused his particular health symptoms, Plaintiff offers the

report (“Report”) and testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook.13 Dr. Cook is a retired Navy

physician with expertise specifically as an occupational and environmental

physician.14 Dr. Cook’s Report is not tailored directly to Plaintiff’s claims; rather, Dr.

Cook’s generic causation Report has been utilized by numerous B3 plaintiffs,

including many plaintiffs currently before this Court as well as in other cases before

other sections of this court.15 Accordingly, Dr. Cook’s Report pertains only to general

causation and not to specific causation.16

Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for Summary

Judgment on September 2, 2022. In their Motion in limine, Defendants contend that

Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook’s failure to

identify the harmful level of exposure capable of causing Plaintiff’s particular injuries

for each chemical that Plaintiff alleges to have been exposed to. Because Dr. Cook

11 See R. Doc. 72-3.

12 R. Doc. 1 at pp. 5–6.

13 R. Doc. 72-4.

14 Id. at p. 5.

15 See Johns v. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., No. CV 17-3304, 2022 WL 1811088, at *2 (E.D. La. June 2, 2022)

(Ashe, J.) (“Cook issued an omnibus, non-case specific general causation expert report that has been

used by many B3 plaintiffs.”).

16 R. Doc. 75 at p. 4 (“[P]laintiffs had Dr. Cook prepare a report with his general causation opinions[.]”).

should be excluded from testifying, Defendants argue, the Court should grant their

Motion for Summary Judgment as Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation

through expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit

precedent. Plaintiff opposes both Motions, arguing that Dr. Cook’s Report satisfies

the Daubert standards for reliability and relevancy and, therefore, that summary

judgment is inappropriate.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion in Limine

The district court has considerable discretion to admit or exclude expert

testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702,17 and the burden rests with the party seeking to

present the testimony to show that the requirements of Rule 702 are met.18 Rule 702

provides that an expert witness “qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience,

training or education may testify in the form of an opinion” when all of the following

requirements are met:

(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and

(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods

to the facts of the case.19

17 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138–39 (1997); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200

F.3d 358, 371 (5th Cir. 2000); Tajonera v. Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC, Civ. A. No. 13-

0366 c/w 13-0550, 13-5137, 13-2496, 13-5508, 13-6413, 14-374, 14-1714, 2016 WL 3180776, at *8 (E.D.

La. June 7, 2016) (Brown, J.) (citing authority).

18 Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998).

19 Fed. R. Evid. 702; Tajonera, 2016 WL 3180776, at *8.

Rule 702 codifies the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which charges district courts to act as “gatekeepers” when

determining the admissibility of expert testimony.20 “To be admissible under Rule

702, the court must find that the evidence is both relevant and reliable.”21 According

to the Fifth Circuit, reliability is determined by assessing whether the reasoning or

methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, while relevance depends

on whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony can be properly

applied to the facts at issue.22 The purpose of the reliability requirement is to exclude

expert testimony based merely on subjective belief or unsupported speculation.23

To satisfy the reliability prong of the Daubert/Rule 702 analysis, a “party

seeking to introduce expert testimony must show (1) the testimony is based upon

sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the

facts of the case.”24 To prove reliability, the proponent of the expert testimony must

present some objective, independent validation of the expert’s methodology.25 The

objective of this Court’s gatekeeper role is to ensure that an expert “employs in the

20 United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

21 United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 139 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d

389, 423 (5th Cir. 2010)).

22 Ebron, 683 F.3d at 139 (citing Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2002)).

23 Tajonera, 2016 WL 3180776, at *8 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).

24 Recif Res., LLC v. Juniper Cap. Advisors, L.P., Civ. A. No. H-19-2953, 2020 WL 5623982, at *2 (S.D.

Tex. Sept. 18, 2020) (quoting Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

25 Recif Res., LLC, 2020 WL 5623982, at *2 (citing Brown v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 705 F.3d 531, 536

(5th Cir. 2013)).

courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an

expert in the relevant field.”26

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”27 When assessing whether a

genuine dispute regarding any material fact exists, the Court considers “all of the

evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence.”28 While all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of

the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory

allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or “only a scintilla of evidence.”29 Instead,

summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.30

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”31 The

non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence

26 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); Hodges v. Mack Trucks Inc., 474 F.3d 188,

194 (5th Cir. 2006).

27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

28 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted).

29 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

30 Delta & Pine Land Co., 530 F.3d at 399 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

31 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991).

sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, or by

“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”32 If, however,

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in

the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim.33 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond

the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’”34

III. ANALYSIS

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that “the legal cause of the

claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the

response.”35 To prove causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable

expert testimony.36 “A plaintiff in such a case cannot expect lay fact-finders to

understand medical causation; expert testimony is thus required to establish

causation.”37

Courts use “a two-step process in examining the admissibility of causation

evidence in toxic tort cases.”38 First, a court must determine whether general

32 Id. at 1265.

33 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

34 Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

35 In re Oil Spill, 2021 WL 6053613, at *11.

36 See, e.g., Seaman v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 326 Fed. Appx. 721, 723 (5th Cir. 2009).

37 Id. (citing Allen v. Penn. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996)).

38 Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007).

causation exists.39 “General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a

particular injury or condition in the general population.”40 Second, if the court finds

that there is admissible general-causation evidence, “the district court must

determine whether there is admissible specific-causation evidence.”41 “[S]pecific

causation is whether a substance caused a particular individual’s injury.”42 If the

court finds that there is no admissible general causation evidence, it need not

consider the issue of specific causation.43

To establish general causation, a causation expert must identify “the harmful

level of exposure to a chemical” at which physical symptoms manifest.44 As explained

by Dr. Cook, nearly every chemical on Earth may be toxic or even fatal at a certain

level of exposure.45 Thus, causation experts determine not only whether a chemical

is capable of causing certain health effects, but at what level of exposure do those

health affects appear. Experts, such as Dr. Cook, refer to this inquiry with the

maxim, dosis sola facit venenum, or “the dose determines the poison.”46 This analysis

is also referred to in the Bradford Hill factors as the dose-response relationship.47

39 Id.

40 Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997)).

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 Id. (“Evidence concerning specific causation in toxic tort cases is admissible only as a follow-up to

admissible general-causation evidence.”).

44 Allen, 102 F.3d at 199.

45 R. Doc. 72-4 at pp. 27–28; see also English v. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., No. CV 13-1033, R. Doc. 48-6

(Deposition of Dr. Jerald Cook) at 150:14–16 (E.D. La. September 26, 2022) (Vitter, J.) (“Like I said,

something not very harmful, such as water, can become harmful at a high enough dose.”).

46 R. Doc. 72-4 at p. 27. Such knowledge dates back to at least the time of Paracelsus, the great

sixteenth-century Swiss philosopher and scientist, who remarked that “[s]olely the dose determines

that a thing is not a poison.” See Joseph Borzelleca, Paracelsus: Herald of Modern Toxicology, 53

Toxicological Scis. 2, 4 (1999).

47 R. Doc. 72-4 at p. 27.

In recognition of the importance of this step of the causation analysis, the

American Medical Association’s Guide to the Evaluation of Disease and Injury

Causation states that determining “whether the estimated dose was sufficient to

explain observed clinical effects known to be associated with the agent in question”

is the “most critical phase of the hazard evaluation process.”48 Relatedly, the Fifth

Circuit states that this detail is one of the “minimal facts necessary to sustain the

plaintiff’s burden in a toxic tort case.”49 Plaintiffs must provide reliable expert

testimony establishing the requisite level of exposure necessary to cause each alleged

physical harm.50 Accordingly, failure to properly identify the level of exposure to a

particular chemical at which harmful effects occur necessarily renders a general

causation opinion unreliable and, thus, inadmissible.51

This Court has not previously considered the May 31, 2022 version of Dr.

Cook’s Report offered here by Plaintiff. However, the Court has previously addressed

the June 21, 2022 version of Dr. Cook’s Report, finding that that subsequent version

fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and helpfulness to the trier of fact.52

48 R. Doc. 72-6 at pp. 6–7. Dr. Cook testified that he regularly consults the AMA Guide. See English,

R. Doc. 48-6 (Deposition of Dr. Jerald Cook) at 59:22–60:1.

49 Allen, 102 F.3d at 199; accord McGill v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 830 Fed. Appx. 430, 433 (5th Cir.

2020) (affirming exclusion of expert’s opinions where “none [of the studies on which the expert relied]

provide conclusive findings on what exposure level of Corexit is hazardous to humans.”).

50 Allen, 102 F.3d at 195; see also McGill, 830 Fed. Appx. at 433 n.1 (excluding expert testimony where

the studies relied upon by expert “did not address what level of exposure would be unsafe for humans

or what specific illnesses that exposure may cause.”) (emphasis added).

51 See Dawkins v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. CV 17-3533, 2022 WL 2315846, at *6 (E.D. La. June 28,

2022) (Vance, J.), reconsideration denied, No. CV 17-3533, 2022 WL 4355818 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2022)

(“Accordingly, if the Court finds that plaintiff cannot ‘prove, at [a] minimum, that exposure to a certain

level of a certain substance for a certain period of time can cause a particular condition in the general

population,’ then the Court’s inquiry into general causation is complete.” (quoting Williams v. BP Expl.

& Prod., Inc., No. 18-9753, 2019 WL 6615504, at *8 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2019) (Morgan, J.)).

52 See Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter, J.).

The Court now reviews the earlier May 31, 2022 version of Dr. Cook’s Report and

finds that it too suffers from the same flaws as the later version.53 For the same

reasons set forth in detail in the Order and Reasons discussing the June 21, 2022

Report, the Court determines that Plaintiff has failed in his burden of establishing

the reliability and relevance of his expert’s report and finds it appropriate to grant

Defendants’ Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook’s Report. Plaintiff accordingly lacks

expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony, which is required

to prove general causation,54 Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact regarding his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil.

“When a plaintiff has no expert testimony to prove his medical diagnosis or causation

at trial, the plaintiff’s suit may be dismissed at the summary judgment stage.”55

Thus, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as Defendants

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to Plaintiff’s failure to establish

general causation.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Daubert Motion to Exclude the

Causation Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook56 is GRANTED.

53 The only differences between the June 21, 2022 Report and the May 31, 2022 Report appear to be a

new section 3.4.1.1 included in the June 21, 2022 Report and minor textual changes.

Importantly, for consideration of the motions before the Court in this matter, the entire substance of

the May 31, 2022 report is included in the expanded June 21, 2022 report.

54 See, e.g., Perkins v. BP Expl. & Prod., No. 17-4476, 2022 WL 972276, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2022)

(Milazzo, J.) (“In a toxic tort suit such as this one, the plaintiff must present admissible expert

testimony to establish general causation as well as specific causation.”).

55 Williams, 2019 WL 6615504, at *11.

56 R. Doc. 72.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment®” is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants are

DISMISSED with prejudice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, January 19, 2023.

WENDY B. fits

United States District Judge

57 R. Doc. 73.