“Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause, and that Clause is not an independent grant of legislative power to Congress.”
How later courts described this case
- “Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause, and that Clause is not an independent grant of legislative power to Congress.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ABRYANT WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 22-220
AMANDA TROSCLAIR et al. SECTION: “G”
ORDER
Pending before the Court are several motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Kendra Davis
(“Davis”), Mary T. Strahan (“Strahan”), and the Louisiana Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”).1 In this litigation, Plaintiff Abryant Williams (“Plaintiff”) alleges that several
Louisiana state employees and agencies violated his civil rights in the course of child support
enforcement proceedings.2
Plaintiff argues that any state child support order imposed on him violates his rights and
the doctrine of preemption by attempting to unlawfully “extract money from him or his VA
benefits.”3 Four of the named Defendants in this action have filed motions to dismiss.4 In their
individual motions, DCFS, Davis, Strahan, and Amanda T. Trosclair (“Trosclair”) have argued
that absolute or judicial immunity, Rooker-Feldman, and Younger abstention apply to bar this suit.
In an Order dated September 14, 2022, this Court determined that the Rooker-Feldman,
1 Rec. Docs. 22, 23, 30.
2 Rec. Doc. 8 at 1–5.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Rec. Docs. 17, 22, 23, 30.
Younger abstention, and judicial immunity doctrines bar Plaintiff’s request for declaratory and
injunctive relief from the state court enforcement proceedings.5 In another Order dated October
21, 2022, this Court determined that Plaintiff cannot maintain his claims to vacate the state child
support order because it sought to “review, modify, or nullify” a final state court order pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.6 However, the Court noted that Plaintiff may be able to maintain a
genuine claim that “the defendants violated their constitutional rights in an effort to enforce the
state child support judgment.”7 This Court further stated:
It is unclear to the Court whether Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights in an effort to enforce the child support judgment. Therefore,
this Court finds it appropriate to deny Davis’s motion to dismiss and to allow
Plaintiff fourteen days from the date of this Order to amend his Complaint to cure
these deficiencies, if possible. If Plaintiff fails to amend the Complaint, or if
Plaintiff amends the Complaint and the amendments do not cure the deficiencies
identified in this Order, Defendants are granted leave to file responsive motions if
necessary. Considering these ambiguities, the Court will reserve ruling on the other
issues identified by Davis until after the Amended Complaint is filed.8
Plaintiff has failed to amend the Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff filed a “Ex Parte Motion for
Answer to Federal Question” in response to this Court’s Order.9 That “motion” states that he will
not file a Second Amended Complaint because “[t]his Court already has everything needed” to
decide on his claims and the pending motions to dismiss.10 Plaintiff further reasserts his
misconceived notions that the doctrine of preemption applies here to invalidate established
5 Rec. Doc. 29 at 14, 16–17.
6 Rec. Doc. 31 at 12–13.
7 Id. at 13.
8 Rec. Doc. 31 at 13.
9 Rec. Doc. 32.
10 Id. at 3.
jurisprudence binding upon this Court with respect to the review and nullification of final state
court orders.11 This Court has already rejected these arguments with respect to the review of the
state child support orders.12
Considering Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the directives of this Court to file a Second
Amended Complaint and the reasoning of this Court’s September 14, 2022 Order13 and October
21, 2022 Order,14 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention,
judicial immunity, and/or absolute immunity doctrines. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Davis’s Motion to Dismiss15 is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
claims against Davis are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that DCFS’s Motion to Dismiss16 is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against DCFS are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Strahan’s Motion to Dismiss17 is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against Strahan are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Ex Parte Motion for Answer to Federal
Question”18 is DENIED.
11 See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479–80 (2018) (“Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause,
and that Clause is not an independent grant of legislative power to Congress.”).
12 Rec. Doc. 31 at
13 Rec. Doc. 29.
14 Rec. Doc. 31.
15 Rec. Doc. 23.
16 Rec. Doc. 22.
17 Rec. Doc. 30.
18 Rec. Doc. 32.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 5th — day of December, 2022.
NANNETTE Nhu BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT