Opinion

Haley v. American Security Insurance Company

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Nov 29, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOHN HALEY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-1728

AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE SECTION: “G”(5)

COMPANY

ORDER AND REASONS

In this litigation, Plaintiff John Haley (“Plaintiff”) brings breach of insurance contract and

bad faith claims against Defendant American Security Insurance Company (“Defendant”).1 Before

the Court is Defendant’s unopposed “Motion for Summary Judgment.”2 The instant motion for

summary judgment was filed on August 19, 2022 and set for submission on September 21,

2022.3 Under Local Rule 7.5, an opposition to a motion must be filed eight days before the

noticed submission date. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the instant motion and therefore

the motion is unopposed. A federal district court may grant an unopposed motion if the motion

has merit.4 Considering the motion, memorandum in support, record, and applicable law, this

Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue under the insurance contract and grants

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

1 Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4.

2 Rec. Doc. 10.

3 Id.

4 See Braly v. Trail, 254 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 2001).

I.Background

On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in the Twenty-Fourth

Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana.5 On June 13, 2022, Defendant

removed the case to this Court.6 According to the Petition, Defendant issued an insurance policy

(the “Policy”) covering Plaintiff’s home and surrounding structures at 5808 Rosalie Court in

Metairie, Louisiana (the “Property”).7 Plaintiff alleges that Hurricane Ida damaged the Property

on or about August 29, 2021.8 On or about December 15, 2021, Plaintiff purportedly notified

Defendant of the loss.9 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant underreported the property damage in the

estimate on the claim and that Defendant’s adjustment of the claim was unrealistic.10 Plaintiff

asserts that he hired an expert adjuster to inspect his property who opined that the Property was

damaged in the amounts of $176,110.00 and $8,946.17, respectively.11

On August 19, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment asserting

that Plaintiff cannot assert valid claims of breach of insurance contract or bad faith under Louisiana

law.12 The motion for summary judgment was set for submission on September 21, 2022.13

Under Local Rule 7.5, an opposition to a motion must be filed eight days before the noticed

submission date.

5 Id.

6 Rec. Doc. 1.

7 Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4.

8 Id. at 5.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 6.

12 Id. at 3-6.

13 Id.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion. Therefore, the motion is

deemed unopposed.

II. Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant makes two arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment.14 First,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the policy.15 Defendant contends that only

the insured, additional insured, or a third-party beneficiary to a policy can sue its issuer for breach

of an insurance contract under Louisiana law.16 Defendant points out that Plaintiff is listed on the

Policy’s declarations page as a Borrower and not as the insured party.17 Defendant asserts that

Plaintiff’s mortgage lender Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“Select”) is the only named insured,

and therefore only Select may sue Defendant to enforce the policy.18 Defendant further argues that

Plaintiff is not a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract and “all policy benefits are

payable to the named insured lender, Select.”19 Thus, Defendant argues that summary judgment is

proper because “[P]laintiff has no legally cognizable claim for relief to enforce the policy of

insurance.”20

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot assert a bad faith claim under Louisiana law

because he “does not have a cognizable claim for insurance coverage.”21 Defendant asserts that “a

14 Rec. Doc. 10 at 1.

15 Rec. Doc. 10-2 at 4.

16 Id. at 4–5.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 1.

21 Id. at 6.

plaintiff must have a valid underlying claim upon which insurance coverage is based” to “maintain

an insurance bad faith claim under” Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973.22

Defendant refers to its argument that a borrower whose mortgage lender is the named insured on

an insurance policy lacks standing to sue for a breach of insurance contract claim.23 Therefore,

Defendant argues that summary judgment is proper because Plaintiff is not entitled to assert a bad

faith claim under Louisiana law.24

III.Legal Standard

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

demonstrate “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.”25 To decide whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court

considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence.”26 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.

Yet “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and

conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”27

If the entire record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then

no genuine issue of fact exists and, consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

26 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).

27 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

matter of law.28 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings.29 Instead, the nonmoving

party must identify specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that

evidence establishes a genuine issue for trial.30

The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of showing the

basis for its motion and identifying record evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.31 “To satisfy this burden, the movant may either (1) submit evidentiary

documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent’s claim or defense,

or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at

trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the

opponent’s claim or defense.”32 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to

the nonmoving party to “identify specific evidence in the record, and to articulate” precisely how

that evidence supports the nonmoving party’s claims.33 The nonmoving party must set forth

“specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component

of its case.”34

The nonmovant’s burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied

merely by creating “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by conclusory

28 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

29 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

30 See id.; Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).

31 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

32 Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted).

33 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Morris

v.Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).

34 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012).

allegations,” by “unsubstantiated assertions,” or “by only a scintilla of evidence.”35 Moreover, the

nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.36 Hearsay

evidence and unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in

evidence at trial do not qualify as competent opposing evidence.

B. Legal Standard for Interpreting Insurance Contracts under Louisiana Law

Under Louisiana law, “an insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be

construed by using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil

Code.”37 “The Louisiana Civil Code provides that ‘[t]he judiciary’s role in interpreting insurance

contracts is to ascertain the common intent of the parties to the contract’ by construing words and

phrases ‘using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing meaning.’”38 “Interpretation of an

insurance contract generally involves a question of law.”39

If the contract is clear and unambiguous and does not have absurd consequences, the court

applies the ordinary meaning of the contractual language.40 If the insurance policy contains

ambiguous provisions, the ambiguity “must be resolved by construing the policy as a whole.”41

35 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal citations omitted).

36 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380.

37 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cadwallader v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 2002-1637 (La. 6/27/03); 848 So. 2d 577, 580). Wisznia Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 759 F.3d 446,

448 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Mayo v. State farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-1801, at 3 (La. 2/25/04); 869 So.

2d 96, 99) (quotation marks omitted).

38 Wisznia Co., 759 F.3d at 448–49 (quoting Mayo, 869 So. 2d at 99).

39 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 206 (citing Bonin v. Westport Ins. Corp., 930 So. 2d 906,

910 (La. 2006)).

40 Prejean v. Guillory, 2010-0740, at 6 (La. 7/2/10); 38 So. 3d 274, 279; see also Sapp v. Wood Grp. PSN,

Inc., No. 15-3, 2016 WL 6995897, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2016) (Brown, J.).

41 Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 763 (La. 1994) (citing LA. CIV.

CODE art. 2050).

Yet an insurance contract “should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner under

the guise of contractual interpretation to enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably

contemplated by unambiguous terms or achieve an absurd conclusion.”42 “Courts lack the

authority to alter the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual interpretation when

the policy’s provisions are couched in unambiguous terms.”43

IV.Analysis

Defendant contends that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue for breach of insurance contract and

bad faith because he is not a named insured, an additional named insured, or a third-party

beneficiary under the Policy.44 Defendant argues that the Court should grant summary judgment

in its favor because Plaintiff lacks standing.45 Considering the uncontroverted evidence before the

Court, Defendant has demonstrated that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue under the Policy.

Prior jurisprudence indicates that “[t]o state a claim under an insurance policy, the plaintiff

must be a named insured, an additional insured, or an intended third-party beneficiary of the

policy.”46 Here, Plaintiff is not a named insured or an additional insured under the Policy because

his mortgage lender, Select, took out the Policy.47 The Policy does not designate Plaintiff as an

42 Cadwallader, 848 So. 2d at 580.

43 Id.

44 Rec. Doc. 10-2 at 1.

45 Id.

46 James v. Am Sec. Sec. Inc., 2021 WL 5795292, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 2021) (Feldman, J.); see also

Williams v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 398 F. App’x 44, 48–49 (5th Cir. 2010).

47 Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 2 & 4. Specifically, Select sent Plaintiff a “Notice of Placement of Insurance” on

September 14, 2021 stating that “[e]nclosed is an insurance policy/certificate we have obtained in accordance

with your mortgage documents and/or Deed of Trust.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added); see also James, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 233769, at *2 (granting motion to dismiss finding that homeowner lacked standing to sue on an

insurance contract where the mortgage lender purchased the policy and was the only named insured).

additional insured party.48 Therefore, Plaintiff only has standing to bring this suit if he is an

intended third-party beneficiary.

Under Louisiana law, a contracting party may stipulate a benefit for a third person called a

third-party beneficiary.49 Louisiana courts have termed this stipulation as a stipulation pour

autrui.50 The Louisiana Supreme Court has articulated that the contract must “manifest a clear

intention to benefit the third party,” and that “absent such a clear manifestation, a party claiming

to be a third-party beneficiary cannot meet his burden of proof.”51 There are three key criteria

under Louisiana law for determining whether such stipulation exists in a contract: (1) the

stipulation must be “manifestly clear;” (2) the benefit to the third party must be certain; and (3)

the benefit may not be a “mere incident” of the contract.52 Further, a stipulation pour autrui is

never presumed, and the party claiming the benefit bears the burden of proof.53

In James v. American Security Insurance Co., another judge in the Eastern District of

Louisiana found that a homeowner-borrower cannot prove a stipulation pour autrui unless the

insurance contract’s language indicates that the borrower receives proceeds under the policy’s

terms or has some right to report damage to the insurance company.54 The homeowner-borrower

brought breach of contract and bad faith claims under the insurance policy on his home against the

48 See Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 2 & 4.

49 La. Civ. Code art. 1978.

50 James, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233769, at *2 n.2 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 2021) (Feldman, J.).

51 Id. at 2.

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 Id. at *4–7.

insurance company.55 The James court dismissed the homeowner-borrower’s claims against the

insurance company, stating that “there is no ‘manifestly clear’ stipulation for the benefit of a third

party in the insurance policy” because the loss payment provisions of the contract stated that any

payment was due to the named insured, the lender.56 Notably, the district court dismissed the

homeowner-borrower’s claims for a lack of standing even where the policy listed both the

homeowner-borrower and the named insured lender as recipients of specific proceeds under the

policy.57

Here, Plaintiff brings the exact same claims as the borrower-plaintiff in James. Plaintiff is

listed on the Policy merely as “Borrower,” not as insured, and Plaintiff pays his premiums through

his lender, Select.58 Further, the plain language of the Policy only provides benefits or rights to

Select as the named insured.59 Prior jurisprudence establishes that even where a borrower is listed

on the homeowner insurance policy and pays premiums through the lender, such designation is

nonetheless “insufficient to create third-party beneficiary status unless the borrower is also due

some sort of benefit under the policy.”60

In Lee v. Saefco Insurance Co., another judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana found

that a plaintiff listed solely as a “Borrower” on the insurance policy can be found as a third-party

55 Id. at *1.

56 Id. at *6.

57 Id. at *5 (“[A]n endorsement to the policy states that ‘you’ in that phrase (and throughout the policy) is

understood to mean ‘the financial institution as named insured and the borrower shown in the

[d]eclarations.’”).

58 See id.; see also Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 13.

59 Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 6.

60 Turner v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41349, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 8, 2022).

beneficiary where the policy expressly provides for payment to the Borrower.61 The Loss Payment

provision stated that “[a]mounts payable in excess of [the lender’s] interest will be paid to the

‘borrower’ unless some other person is named by the ‘borrower’ to receive payment.”62 The Lee

court found that this language “manifests a clear intent to benefit the borrower.”63

Unlike the policy at issue in Lee, here, the Policy insures Plaintiff’s property but only

designates Plaintiff as a borrower.64 Additionally, the Policy contains no express provisions

conferring any payment or benefits to Plaintiff. The Loss Payment section of the Policy states that

Defendant “will adjust all losses with the named insured. Loss will be made payable to the named

insured.”65 Under this Policy, there is only one named insured—Select.66 There is no language

indicating an intent to confer benefits to Plaintiff. The Definitions provision of the Policy states

that the term borrower “refers to the person or persons who have entered into a lien or mortgage

agreement with the named insured for the property shown as the described property in the

Declarations.”67 Plaintiff has not opposed this motion or presented any argument or evidence to

show that the insurance contract manifests a clear intention to benefit Plaintiff as a third party.

Because the Policy states that all losses will be adjusted and made payable to the named

insured, and because Plaintiff is not the named insured,68 this Court cannot find that the Policy

61 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69817 at *10–*11 (E.D. La. July 2, 2008) (Africk, J.).

62 Id. at *11.

63 Id.

64 Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 4.

65 Id. at 12.

66 Id. at 4.

67 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

68 Id. at 4, 12.

confers a manifestly clear and certain benefit onto Plaintiff. Therefore, this Court cannot find that

Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary under the Policy because the Policy fails to confer a manifestly

clear and certain benefit onto Plaintiff. As such, summary judgment is proper because Plaintiff

cannot be found to be a named insured, an additional named insured, or a recipient of a stipulation

pour autrui under the Policy.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary

judgment because there is no genuine dispute to any material fact regarding Plaintiff’s standing to

sue under the Policy. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant American Security Insurance Company’s

“Motion for Summary Judgment”® is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are

dismissed for lack of standing.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 28th day of November, 2022.

NANNETTE JOLYYETTE BROWN (or

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

® Rec. Doc. 10.

1]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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