Opinion

Henry v. Southwest Airlines

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Aug 31, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.4%

internal quote from Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999

How later courts described this case

  • internal quote from Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999
  • finding the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining supplemental jurisdiction after plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed.
  • holding that “[a]ir carriers are not liable under [the ADA] for disability discrimination in the provision of services related to air transportation.”
  • holding that “public transportation terminals, depots, or stations used primarily to facilitate air transportation are not ‘public accommodation[s]’ for purposes of Title III of the ADA”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LOUIS HENRY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-0944

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. SECTION “B”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are plaintiff’s complaint (Rec. Doc. 1),

defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 6), plaintiff’s

opposition (Rec. Doc. 11), and defendant’s reply (Rec. Doc. 17).

For the following reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc.

6) is GRANTED, dismissing plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Title III

of the Americans with Disabilities Act(“ADA”); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than September 13, 2022

parties shall file memoranda on whether or not diversity

jurisdiction exists based upon citizenship of the parties, with

reply memoranda thereafter due within 5 days of receipt.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This lawsuit arose from an incident at the Louis Armstrong

International Airport on April 7, 2021. Rec. Doc. 1 (Complaint).

During the Spring of 2021, Louis Henry (“Plaintiff”) purchased a

roundtrip plane ticket from Houston, Texas to New Orleans,

Louisiana on Southwest Airlines (“Defendant” or “Southwest”). Id.

Plaintiff requested wheelchair assistance at the time of purchase

due to pre-existing physical injuries that combined to render him

disabled. Id. However, when he arrived at the Louis Armstrong

International Airport for his return flight to Houston, Southwest

did not provide him with a wheelchair. Id. Plaintiff made multiple

requests to Southwest from when he arrived at the airport to when

his plane boarded, but Southwest did not provide him with a

wheelchair. Id.

Attempting to board the plane without the aid of a wheelchair,

plaintiff fell forward, hitting his head, should, and neck. Rec.

Doc. 1. Paramedics responded to the plaintiff’s fall, and a

customer service representative informed him that an incident

report and report number would be provided to him. Id. Plaintiff

asserts he has yet to receive the incident report or report number

from Southwest. Id. As a result of his fall, plaintiff claims he

has sustained injuries to his knees, neck, back, and wrist. Id.

On April 7, 2022, plaintiff filed suit in this Court, seeking

to recover damages he sustained in the above-described incident.

Rec. Doc. 1. He alleged six causes of action, including federal

claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) and a claim under the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”).

Id. On July 26, 2022, Southwest filed a motion to dismiss the ACAA

claim. Rec. Doc. 7. That motion was granted on August 16, 2022.

Rec. Doc. 19. Plaintiff asserts supplemental and diversity

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

On July 26, 2022, Southwest filed the instant motion to

dismiss, seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Title

III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Rec. Doc. 6.

Mr. Henry filed a timely opposition on August 9, 2022. Rec. Doc.

11. Thereafter, Southwest filed a reply in support of its motion

on August 15, 2022. Rec. Doc. 17.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. 12(b)(6) Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Varela v. Gonzalez, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)

(internal quotes omitted)). A claim is facially plausible when the

plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true

and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th

Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

However, the court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions

masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a

motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376,

378 (5th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, a complaint may be dismissed when

it appears “beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of

facts” that would entitle him to prevail. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

560–61, 127 S.Ct. 1955; First Am. Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Bus.

Tech., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399 (E.D. La. 2016). However,

the Fifth Circuit has stated that motions to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are “viewed with disfavor and

[are]...rarely granted.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d

228, 232 (5th Cir.2009).

B. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination under Title III

of the ADA. Rec. Doc. 1. He contends the Act prohibits

discrimination based on disability in places of public

accommodation, including airport terminals. Id.

Title III prohibits “any person who owns, leases …, or

operates a place of public accommodation” from discriminating on

the basis of disability in “any place of public accommodation.” 42

U.S.C.A. § 12182(a). The ADA also enumerates twelve categories of

“private entities” that are places of “public accommodation.” 42

U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L). Pursuant to the ADA, a “public

accommodation” includes “a terminal, depot, or other station used

for specified public transportation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(G)

(emphasis added). The ADA further defines “specified public

transportation” as “transportation by bus, rail, or any other

conveyance (other than by aircraft) that provides the general

public with general or special service (including charter service)

on a regular and continuing basis.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) (emphasis

added). Read in conjunction, these statutory provisions clearly

establish that airplanes and terminals used for air travel are

excluded from coverage under Title III of the ADA. See Texas

Workforce Comm'n v. United States Dep't of Educ., 973 F.3d 383

(5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.

249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“When the words

of a statute are unambiguous ... judicial inquiry is complete.”));

Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 2011)

(holding that “[a]ir carriers are not liable under [the ADA] for

disability discrimination in the provision of services related to

air transportation.”).

Plaintiff contends disability discrimination occurred at the

Louis Armstrong International Airport, which undoubtably is a

“facility primarily devoted to air travel.” Lopez, 662 F.3d at

599. His allegation that he was subject to discrimination at the

airport terminal is also unpersuasive as this area has been

construed as exempt under Title III of the ADA. See id. at 598-99

(holding that “public transportation terminals, depots, or

stations used primarily to facilitate air transportation are not

‘public accommodation[s]’ for purposes of Title III of the ADA”);

see also Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1003

(9th Cir. 2013) (same). While Plaintiff's allegations, taken as

true, raise valid concerns regarding his treatment, the Court

cannot rely on such circumstances to justify expanding the scope

of the ADA beyond what Congress has stated. Therefore, there can

be no liability under the ADA on this theory, and plaintiff’s claim

against Southwest is dismissed.

C. Remaining State Law Claims

With dismissal of aforementioned federal claims, federal

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims may exist under

28 U. S. C. §1367 (supplemental) or 28 U. S. C. §1332 (diversity).

See Rec. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 4-5.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction.” “District courts enjoy

wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental

jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal claims are

dismissed.” Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., Texas, 826 F.3d 861 (5th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.

1993)); see also Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th

237, 246 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding the district court did not abuse

its discretion by declining supplemental jurisdiction after

plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed.).

Because this matter is still in its stages, any trial is a

distant possibility. Therefore, the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction would be declined. See Manyweather, 40 F.4th at 246.

Plaintiff has also asserted “28 U. S. C. §1332”, the diversity

jurisdiction statute, as a separate basis for federal jurisdiction

over state-based claims. Rec. Doc. 1, ¶5. However, diversity of

citizenship between Mr. Henry and Southwest is drawn into question

from the face of the complaint.

Federal subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can

be raised sua sponte at any stage. “All issues of subject matter

jurisdiction, including whether a party is improperly joined, are

questions of law reviewed de novo. We may consider subject matter

sua sponte, as ‘subject-matter delineations must be policed by the

courts on their own initiative.’ Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.

Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2007)(internal quote from Ruhrgas

AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143

L.Ed.2d 760 (1999).

Plaintiff Henry is referenced in the complaint as a “person

domiciled in the State of Texas…and all times relevant…was a

resident of Houston, Texas.” Rec. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1&6. Defendant

Southwest is alleged to be “a corporation that has its principal

place of business in the State of Texas and is authorized to do

and doing business in the State of Louisiana…[and] headquartered

in the State of Texas….” Id. at ¶¶ 2&7.

Accordingly, since the issue of diversity jurisdiction is

raised sua sponte by the court, parties will be given as ordered

above an opportunity to file memoranda on whether diversity

jurisdiction exists under the foregoing circumstances.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 29th day of August, 2022

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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