The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LOUISIANA FAIR HOUSING CIVIL ACTION
ACTION CENTER INC.
VERSUS CASE NO. 20-2339
PLANTATION MANAGEMENT SECTION: “G”(3)
COMPANY LLC et al.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Moving Defendants St. Jude Management #2, LLC and Lawrence
Stansberry (collectively, “Movants”) “12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and,
in the Alternative, 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement.”1 In this litigation, Plaintiff
Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (“Plaintiff”) alleges that several assisted living facilities
and nursing homes in Southeast Louisiana, including one facility allegedly owned, operated, and
managed by Movants, have engaged in discriminatory practices against individuals who are deaf.2
Plaintiff asserts claims against Movants for violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), the
Rehabilitation Act, the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Louisiana law.3 Having considered the motion, the memoranda in
support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion.
1 Rec. Doc. 92.
2 Rec. Doc. 70.
3 Id.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On August 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against Movants, Commcare
Corporation, Commcare Management Corp., Lucy Garner, William Garner, Ronald A Goux,
Jeremy Goux, Timothy Goux, Highpoint Healthcare LLC, Metairie Operations, LLC, Notre Dame
Health System, Plantation Management Co., LLC, and Medico, LLC.4 With leave of Court,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 12, 2021,5 and a Second Amended Complaint on
June 2, 2021.6
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Movants are owners, operators,
or “an individual with operational or managerial control” of St. Luke’s Living Center (the
“Facility”).7 Plaintiff avers that during the course of a years-long investigation into nursing homes
and assisted living facilities in Southeastern Louisiana, Plaintiff discovered that employees of the
Facility engaged in acts of discrimination against individuals who are deaf.8 Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts that staff at the Facility “refused interpretive assistance notwithstanding receipt of generous
federal funds that not only presume and require non-discrimination in services, but affirmatively
mandate that necessary methods to enable effective communication be provided to deaf
individuals.”9 According to Plaintiff, four entities have direct ownership interests in the Facility:
4 Rec. Doc. 1.
5 Rec. Doc. 43.
6 Rec. Doc. 70.
7 Id. at 6.
8 Id. at 10–12.
9 Id. at 2.
Lawrence Stansberry (“Stansberry”), Lucy Garner, William Garner, and St. Jude Management #2,
LLC (“St. Jude”).10
Plaintiff is a nonprofit fair housing advocacy organization that investigates alleged or
suspected discriminatory housing practices and litigates enforcement actions.11 Plaintiff sends
testers to simulate housing transactions and evaluate a provider’s treatment of prospective tenants
to determine if the provider is engaging in discriminatory housing practices.12 Plaintiff states that
upon learning of possible discrimination in area nursing homes and assisted living facilities, it
launched an investigation and testing process which initially included sixty such homes and
facilities.13 As part of this investigation, Plaintiff explains that its testers contacted housing
providers and made inquiries on behalf of a fictitious prospective deaf resident.14
Plaintiff conducted the investigation in three phases.15 Plaintiff avers that during “Phase 1”
of the investigation, one of Plaintiff’s testers contacted the Facility to inquire about long-term
placement for a prospective deaf resident who could communicate only through American Sign
Language (“ASL”).16 Plaintiff asserts that the Facility employee with whom the tester spoke
indicated that the Facility “‘would be unable to meet [a deaf resident’s] needs because we have no
one on staff to interpret what she is saying.’”17 Plaintiff further alleges that when the tester asked
10 Id. at 6–7.
11 Id. at 3.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 10.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 10–12.
16 Id. at 22.
17 Id.
if the Facility would “make an exception, such as hiring a certified interpreter,” the Facility
employee suggested a different facility and reiterated that the Facility could not offer interpretive
services for deaf residents.18
During “Phase 2” of the investigation, Plaintiff avers that one of its testers again contacted
the Facility.19 According to Plaintiff, the tester asked “Janis in the Admissions Department” what
accommodations the Facility offered for deaf residents.20 Plaintiff asserts that Janis informed the
tester that the Facility could provide a deaf resident with a white board to facilitate communication,
but that no VRI services would be made available.21 Janis allegedly explained that VRI would be
difficult to implement because the staff were “unfamiliar” with it and the Facility “did not have
internet at the nursing stations.”22
Plaintiff conducted further investigation in July 2020, referred to as “Phase 3.”23 Plaintiff
asserts that during Phase 3, one of its testers again contacted the Facility on June 18, 2020, this
time speaking to “Kelly in the Admissions Department.”24 Plaintiffs alleges that Kelly told the
tester that the Facility had “no specific programs for deaf residents and no one on staff that speaks
sign language.”25 Plaintiff explains that when the tester inquired about VRI, Kelly offered to
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 23.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 11.
24 Id. at 23.
25 Id.
contact the Facility’s Chief Operating Officer to ask whether the Facility could offer the service.26
The following day, Kelly allegedly left a voicemail with the tester explaining that the Facility
“wouldn’t be able [to] purchase the interpreter service,” but if the prospective deaf resident were
to bring her own equipment to the Facility and pay for the VRI service, then the Facility “would
be able to set it up with their internet service provider.”27
Plaintiff brings five claims against Movants: (1) a violation of the FHA, (2) a violation of
the Rehabilitation Act, (3) violations of Section 1557 of the ACA, (4) a violation of the ADA, and
(5) a negligent supervision and training claim under Louisiana law.28 Plaintiff seeks declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.29
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Movants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion to Dismiss
Movants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing and that
Plaintiff fails to plead facts upon which relief could be granted.30
Movants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing.31 Movants contend that Plaintiff is not an
“aggrieved person” under the Rehabilitation Act, the ACA, the ADA, or Louisiana law because it
is not a prospective resident or a current disabled resident who has been subjected to discriminatory
behavior on the basis of a known disability.32 Although Movants acknowledge that the FHA
26 Id. at 24.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 26–31.
29 Id. at 32–33.
30 Rec. Doc. 92 at 1–2.
31 Rec. Doc. 92-1 at 4.
32 Id. at 4.
extends standing to “testers,” they aver that the testers referenced in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint are not parties to this litigation.33 Movants contend that the FHA extends standing to a
person “who (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes
that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.”34
Movants conclude that “[t]here is simply no such plaintiff in this litigation.”35
Next, Movants challenge the sufficiency of the allegations included in the Second
Amended Complaint for four reasons.36 First, Movants argue that the Second Amended Complaint
does not clarify its allegations against Movants.37 Movants assert that the allegations still fail to
demonstrate how they have violated any laws.38 Second, Movants argue that the allegations do not
“adequately describe [the] relationship” between the Facility and Movants.39 Relatedly, Movants
aver that the allegation that the Facility receives federal assistance to engage in a health program
fails to mention Stansberry.40 Third, Movants contend that Plaintiff’s testing allegations do not
allege claims against Movants.41 Rather, Moving Defendants assert that the description of
Plaintiff’s testing “consists of factual allegations . . . [containing] vague and ambiguous statements
33 Id.
34 Id. at 5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 6.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 7.
40 Id.
41 Id.
which do not require a response from” Movants.42 Fourth, Movants argue that Plaintiff does not
identify the injury that Movants allegedly caused.43 Movants contend that Plaintiff’s allegation
that it suffered an injury is a legal conclusion couched as fact, and as such, the Court may not
accept it as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.44
In the alternative, Movants move for a more definite statement.45 Movants reiterate that
Plaintiff has not specifically described how they violated any federal law and did “not allege how
[Movants] were negligent in training any employees.”46 Thus, Movants conclude that the Second
Amended Complaint fails to place them on notice of the charges against them, and they are unable
to respond to such vague allegations.47
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that it is settled law that organizations have standing to bring
discrimination claims.48 Plaintiff asserts that to establish organizational standing it must plead that
a “defendant’s actions frustrate the organization’s mission[] and force[s] the organization to ‘divert
significant resources to counteract the defendant’s conduct.’”49 Plaintiff avers that it “suffered
precisely this type of injury” and “pled so in its Second Amended Complaint.”50
42 Id. at 7–8.
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 9–10.
46 Id. at 10.
47 Id. at 10–11.
48 Rec. Doc. 100.
49 Id. at 6 (quoting OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 612 (5th Cir. 2017)).
50 Id. at 7.
Plaintiff further argues that it has sufficiently pled its claims against Movants.51 As to its
FHA claims, Plaintiff explains that the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Movants are
owners and operators of the Facility, and that the Facility’s employees were agents acting on behalf
of the owners and operators.52 Plaintiff contends that it has stated a claim under the FHA because,
under the FHA, Movants are liable for the actions of their agents under “traditional theories of tort
liability.”53 Further, Plaintiff asserts that it pled that Movants owned, operated, or had managerial
control of the Facility; that the Facility is a dwelling under the FHA; and that the Facility “refused
to make reasonable accommodations to prospective deaf residents.”54 Plaintiff argues these
allegations are “sufficient to adequately plead vicarious liability” of Movants.55
Next, Plaintiff contends that it has stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ACA.56 Plaintiff avers that, to state a claim under these statutes, it must allege (1) a qualifying
disability, (2) eligibility for a program, (3) denial of benefits in that program by reason of that
disability, and (4) the program receives federal financial assistance.57 Plaintiff asserts that it
adequately alleged that its testers requested accommodations for prospective deaf residents, that
those prospective residents are otherwise qualified to reside at the Facility, that the Facility failed
51 Id. at 7–8.
52 Id. at 8.
53 Id. at 8–9 (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)).
54 Id. at 9.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 9–10 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 764(a)) (quoting Francois v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 8 F.4th 370,
378 (5th Cir. 2021)) (“For disability-discrimination claims, the ACA incorporates the substantive analytical
framework of the [Rehabilitation Act].”).
to provide benefits on the basis of that disability, and that the Facility receives federal financial
assistance.58
Plaintiff also argues it has stated a claim under the ADA.59 Plaintiff asserts that
Rehabilitation Act claims and ADA claims are analyzed under the same standard.60 Thus, Plaintiff
contends that, for the same reasons stated above, “because of [Movants]’ ownership, management,
or operation of [the Facility], [Movants] may be liable for the discriminatory conduct of [their]
employees.”61 Further, Plaintiff argues that it has stated a claim for negligent hiring and
supervision under Louisiana law.62 Plaintiff asserts that, to state such a claim, it must show “a
duty, a breach of the duty, the substandard conduct was a substantial factor or the cause-in-fact of
the harm, and the substandard conduct is the legal cause.”63 Plaintiff contends that it has alleged
Movants owner, manage, or operate the facility, that they had a duty to afford handicapped persons
equal opportunity to use the Facility, and that Movants breached that duty by failing to provide
interpreter services, causing Plaintiff to diver its resources to investigate the alleged
discrimination.64
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Second Amended Complaint meets the pleading
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and thus Movants’ Motion for a More
58 Id. at 10.
59 Id.
60 Id. (citing Harrison v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 856 Fed. App’x 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2021)).
61 Id. at 11.
62 Id.
63 Id. (quoting Matthews v. United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2016-0389, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/17); 213 So. 3d
502, 506).
64 Id. at 11–12.
Definite Statement should be denied.65 Plaintiff argues the Second Amended Complaint places
Movants on adequate notice of the claims against them sufficient to “reasonably prepare a
responsive pleading.”66
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”67 A motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”68 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.’”69 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”70 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”71
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.72 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.73 “While legal conclusions
65 Id. at 12.
66 Id.
67 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
68 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
69 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2008)).
70 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
71 Id. at 570.
72 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
73 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”74
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” will not suffice.75 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.76 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”77 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
element of the asserted claims.78 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”
bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.79
IV. Analysis
Movants argue that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff
lacks standing, and because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
the FHA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ACA, the ADA, and Louisiana law.80 Plaintiff opposes,
74 Id. at 679.
75 Id. at 678.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
79 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dep’t, No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
80 Rec. Doc. 92.
arguing that it has organizational standing, and that it has adequately pled facts to state a claim
against Movants for housing discrimination.81 The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Whether Plaintiff Has Standing
Standing implicates the Court’s jurisdiction and must be addressed before determining
whether Plaintiff has adequately stated claims against Movants.82 A plaintiff, whether an
individual or an organization,83 must meet three requirements to have standing under Article III:
(1) the plaintiff has suffered an “injury in fact” which is both “concrete and particularized” and
“actual or imminent,” (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,” and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.”84 In other words, “[a] plaintiff must have suffered ‘a distinct
and palpable injury to himself . . . that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.”85
Finally, “a plaintiff may state a cause of action only when the interests in the litigation fall within
the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”86 When a plaintiff is in an organization, it can
establish the “injury in fact” requirement by alleging that its “ability to pursue its mission is
‘perceptibly impaired’ because it has ‘diverted significant resources to counteract the defendant’s
conduct.”87
81 Rec. Doc. 100.
82 See Steel Co. v. Citzens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102; Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158,
161 (5th Cir. 2001).
83 N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2010).
84 Tenth Street St. Residential Ass’n v. City of Dall., 968 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2020).
85 Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
86 Id. (quoting Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017) (internal punctuation
omitted)).
87 Id. at 500. (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to establish standing. First,
Plaintiff has alleged that it initiated testing of nursing homes and assisted living centers after
learning that “housing discrimination against deaf individuals in [such facilities] . . . may be
occurring in Louisiana.”88 Plaintiff further alleged that in order to “identify[] and counteract[] the
effects of [Movants’] discrimination,” it diverted significant resources from its other
organizational programs and activities.89 Plaintiff specifically identified several other planned
organizational activities from which it diverted resources in order to counteract Movants’ alleged
discriminatory practices, including “fair housing landlord trainings, [Plaintiff’s] annual fair
housing conference, Fair Housing Month events and event planning, fundraising campaigns,
promotional work regarding [Plaintiff’s] ‘Fair Housing Five’ children’s book, and other projects
and activities.”90 Plaintiff alleged that Movants’ actions have impeded its efforts to pursue its
mission of ensuring equal housing opportunity in Louisiana.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s allegations establish an injury in fact. That injury is fairly attributable to Movants’
alleged discriminatory practices because Plaintiff undertook the testing which required diversion
of critical resources only after Plaintiff learned that such discrimination may be occurring at
Louisiana nursing homes and assisted living facilities. To address this injury, Plaintiff requests
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Those remedies,
if granted, are likely to redress Plaintiff’s injury.91 Additionally, the FHA, ADA, ACA, and
88 Rec. Doc. 70 at 10.
89 Id. at 25.
90 Id. at 26.
91 See Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100.
Rehabiltation Act all afford protections to individuals facing disability discrimination. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s injury falls within the “zone of interests” of these statutes. 92 Thus, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has standing to bring this action.
B. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under the FHA
The FHA’s broad ban on disability discrimination in housing extends to any “refusal to
make reasonable accommodations . . . [which] may be necessary to afford [a] protected person
equal opportunity to enjoy a dwelling.”93 A “dwelling” is “any building . . . which is occupied as
. . . a residence.”94 Traditional theories of tort liability, including a principal’s liability for wrongful
acts of his agents, apply to violations of the FHA.95 Here, the Court finds that the Second Amended
Complaint adequately states a claim against Movants under the FHA. Plaintiff alleges that the
Facility is a dwelling as defined by the FHA.96 Plaintiff avers that St. Jude is an owner or operator
of the Facility,97 and that Stansberry is an owner with operational or managerial control of the
Facility.98 Plaintiff alleges that the Facility provides residential care99 and that employees at the
Facility refused to make reasonable accommodations for prospective deaf residents.100 Plaintiff
92 Id. (quoting Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303).
93 Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
94 Id. § 3602(b).
95 Meyer, 537 U.S. at 282, 286.
96 Rec. Doc. 70 at 6–7.
97 Id. at 6.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 21–24.
further alleges that those employees acted as Movants’ agents in so refusing.101 These allegations
sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the Court denies the Motion
as to Plaintiff’s FHA claim.
C. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act or the ACA
The Rehabilitation Act protects individuals from discrimination in the administration of
federal programs on the basis of disability: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in
the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, . . . be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”102 To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
they have a qualifying disability, (2) they are otherwise qualified for participation in the program,
(3) they are being denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of their disability, and (4)
the program receives federal financial assistance.103 The statute expressly lists deafness as a
disability.104
Additionally, the ACA provides that “an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited
under . . . [the Rehabilitation Act], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving
Federal financial assistance.”105 The Fifth Circuit has explained that “[f]or disability-
discrimination claims, the ACA incorporates the substantive analytical framework of the
101 Id. at 12.
102 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
103 See Spann ex rel. Hopkins v. Word of Faith Christian Ctr. Church, 589 F. Supp. 2d 759, 764 (S.D. Miss.
2008).
104 29 U.S.C. § 705(21).
105 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794).
[Rehabilitation Act].”106 Accordingly, because the standards are the same, the Court analyzes these
claims together.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ACA. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that its testers requested
accommodations for prospective deaf residents who are otherwise qualified to reside at the
Facility.107 Plaintiff also alleges that the Facility “received substantial Federal financial
assistance.”108 According to Plaintiff, the Facility employees failed to provide benefits to the
prospective residents on the basis of a qualifying disability.109 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Movants’ “ongoing policy or practice . . . to deny the use of qualified ASL interpreters via VRI”
deprives prospective deaf residents of “meaningful access to the services, programs, and benefits
the [Movants] offer to other individuals.”110 These allegations meet the requirements for disability
discrimination under both the Rehabilitation Act and ACA. Therefore, the Court denies the Motion
as to these claims.
D. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”111 Pursuant to that purpose, the
ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities by those who own, lease, or
106 Francois v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 8 F.4th 370, 378 (5th Cir. 2021).
107 Rec. Doc. 70 at 21–24.
108 Id. at 9.
109 Id. at 28–29.
110 Id. at 28.
111 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
operate places of public accommodation.112 Public accommodations include the “professional
office[s] of a healthcare provider, hospital[s], or other service establishment[s].”113 The ADA
defines “discrimination” to include denying individuals or entities “equal goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities . . . because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or
association.”114 Thus, “[t]he question of whether a person is a proper defendant under the ADA
turns . . . on whether . . . the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public
accommodation.”115 Although courts are more often asked to determine if a particular defendant
operated a place of public accommodation,116 defendants who own or lease public
accommodations may also be held liable for discrimination.117 Further, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that a defendant may be held vicariously liable for the
actions of its agents in ADA discrimination cases.118
Under these standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient to
state a claim for relief under the ADA. Plaintiff alleges that Movants own, operate, or manage the
Facility, which Plaintiff alleges is a place of public accommodation.119 Plaintiff also alleges that
employees at the Facility engaged in discriminatory behavior by refusing to offer adequate
112 Id. § 12182.
113 Id. § 12181(7)(F).
114 Id. § 12181(b)(1)(E).
115 Coddington, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
116 See id.
117 See Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1069 (5th Cir. 1995).
118 Rodriguez v. Baird’s Bakery, Inc., 111 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 1997).
119 Rec. Doc. 70 at 6–7, 30.
interpretive services to prospective residents on the basis of a known disability.120 Finally, Plaintiff
asserts that the employees acted as agents of the Facility’s owners when they refused those
services.121 Therefore, the Court denies the Motion as to Plaintiff’s ADA claims.
E. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under Louisiana Law
Under Louisiana law, “[n]egligent hiring and supervision is recognized as a cognizable
tort.”122 The tort is governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and “[t]he standard duty-risk
analysis used in all negligence cases.”123 This requires a court to “decide that there was a duty, a
breach of the duty, the substandard conduct was a substantial factor or the cause-in-fact of the
harm, and the substandard conduct is the legal cause.”124 Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Movants
are owners, managers, or operators of the Facility,125 and that Movants had a duty to “afford
handicapped persons equal opportunity” to enjoy and use their dwelling.126 Plaintiff asserts that
Movants breached that duty by failing to provide interpretive services, like VRI,127 and that breach
proximately caused injury to Plaintiff by requiring it to divert resources to investigate the alleged
discrimination.128 These factual allegations, accepted as true for purposes of this Motion to
120 Id. at 21–24, 30.
121 Id. at 12.
122 Matthews v. United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2016-0389, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/17); 213 So. 3d 502, 506.
123 Harrington v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 97-1670, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/98);
714 So. 2d 845, 850.
124 Id.
125 Rec. Doc. 70 at 6.
126 Id. at 10.
127 Id. at 21–24.
128 Id. at 24–26.
Dismiss, satisfy the requirements of the standard duty-risk analysis used to evaluate negligent
supervision claims in Louisiana, and therefore, dismissal is inappropriate at this juncture.
Accordingly, Movants’ Motion is denied as to the Louisiana law allegations.
F. Motion for More Definite Statement Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)
Finally, Movants request, in the alternative, for the Court to order a more definite
statement, arguing that the Second Amended Complaint is “so vague and ambiguous that
[Movants] have not been placed on adequate notice to . . . prepare an Answer.”129 Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”130 A district court has wide discretion as to whether to order a
more definite statement under Rule 12(e).131
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is sufficient to allow Movants
to reasonably prepare a response. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
Movants discriminated against prospective deaf residents by refusing to provide interpretative
services.132 Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Movants are owners or operators of the Facility.133
Plaintiff provides detailed information regarding the testing process, including verbatim quotations
from the interactions with staff at the Facility, setting forth the basis for its allegations of
discriminatory practices.134 Plaintiff also includes allegations that the employees at the Facility
129 Rec. Doc. 92-1 at 10.
130 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
131 Old Time Enters., Inc. v. Int'l Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1217 (5th Cir. 1989); see also In re
McWilliams, 22 F.3d 1095 (5th Cir. 1994).
132 See Rec. Doc. 70 at 7–24.
133 Id. at 6–7.
134 Id. at 21–24.
“were agents acting on behalf of the owners, operators, and managing entit[y].”!°° On that basis,
Plaintiff alleges that Movants violated the FHA, ADA, ACA, Rehabilitation Act, and Louisiana
law.!3° In other words, the Second Amended Complaint provides a short, plain statement of facts
sufficient to put Movants on notice of the claims against them. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's complaint is not so “vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response.” !>” Accordingly, the Court denies Movant’s request for a more definite statement.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants St. Jude Management #2, LLC and
Lawrence Stansberry’s “12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and, in the
Alternative, 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement”'?* is DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 16th day of May, 2022.
DV arrette Jobwvett (BA
NANNETTE JOLIV E BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
135 Td. at 12.
36 Tq. at 26-31.
137 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
88 Rec. Doc. 92.
20