Adams v. Landry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AMY ADAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-2153

ASHLEIGH LANDRY, ET AL. SECTION “B”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are defendants Ashleigh Landry, Tina Babin,

and the Lafourche Parish School Board’s motions to dismiss for

failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction (Rec. Docs.

23, 24), the defendants’ motion for a more definite statement (Rec.

Docs. 23, 24), plaintiff’s response in opposition (Rec. Doc. 35),

and defendants’ replies in support of their motions to dismiss

(Rec. Docs. 44, 45).

For the reasons discussed below,

IT IS ORDERED that defendants Ashleigh Landry, Tina Babin,

and the Lafourche Parish School Board’s motions to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Rec. Docs. 23, 24) are GRANTED,

dismissing plaintiff’s claims against Tina Babin individually and

in her official capacity as president of Lafourche Parish School

Board with prejudice and dismissing plaintiff’s federal law claims

against Ashleigh Landry and the Lafourche Parish School

Board without prejudice; and declining without prejudice

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff may seek leave to amend

the complaint as to federal law claims against Ashleigh Landry and

the Lafourche Parish School Board no later than Monday, May 30,

2022, to address below discussed deficiencies in the complaint.

If leave to amend is allowed, the state law claims would be

reinstated;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motions for a more definite

statement (Rec. Docs. 23, 24) are hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 2, 2013, Jerry T. was awarded custody of his son,

minor TMT. Rec. Doc. 24-3. More than six years later on October

28, 2019, Jerry T. agreed to grant defendant Ashleigh Marcel Landry

temporary custody of TMT, a minor under the age of seventeen. Rec.

Doc. 24-2; Rec. Doc. 35 at 2; see also Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Landry is

an adult resident of Lafourche Parish in Louisiana, who was an

employee of the Lafourche Parish School Board (the “Board”) system

and the principal of Lockport Middle School located in Lafourche

Parish. Id. at 1-2.

Over the course of the fall 2020 semester, Landry engaged in

a sexual relationship with TMT. Id. at 3. Landry “sexually

exploit[ed]” TMT during normal school and employment hours of

Lockport Middle School. Id. at 9. While Landry was principal of

Lockport Middle School, she would periodically transport TMT from

the school to her home, where TMT also lived, to engage in sexual

relations. Id. at 3; Rec. Doc. 35 at 2. In March 2021, she confessed

to this relationship, as well as to exchanging lascivious/sexual

text messages with TMT. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Landry was then arrested

for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile in March 2021. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the Board “was made aware of the sexual

relationship between Landry and TMT . . . prior to Landry’s

arrest.” Id. at 4. On March 9, 2021, the Seventeenth Judicial

District Court of Louisiana granted custody of TMT to plaintiff

Amy Adams, an adult resident of Lafourche Parish, Louisiana and

the biological mother of TMT. Rec. Doc. 35-1. Prior to March 2021,

the Board allegedly failed to take action to protect plaintiff’s

son from Landry’s sexual advances, intentionally allowed Landry to

continue her sexual exploitation of TMT, and failed to properly

monitor or supervise Lockport Middle School over the course of

Landry’s sexual exploitation. Rec. Doc. 1 at 4, 9. Plaintiff

alleges that even after her arrest, Landry maintains an ongoing

sexual relationship with TMT. Id. at 4.

On November 19, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint with this

Court alleging that defendants Landry, individually and in her

official capacity of principal of Lockport Middle School, Tina

Babin, individually and in her official capacity as president of

the Board, and the Board violated TMT’s substantive due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at

2, 9. Plaintiff also alleges defendants are liable for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligence, sexual misconduct,

and intentional spoilation of evidence under Louisiana State law.

Id. at 5, 9. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that Babin and the Board

are vicariously liable for Landry’s tortious conduct. Id. at 9.

Accordingly, plaintiff claims defendants are liable for general

and special damages, including emotional distress and mental

anguish, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Id. On January 31,

2022, defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and in the

alternative, a motion for more definite statement pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Rec. Docs. 23, 24.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In

other words, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 556 U.S. at 556).

When deciding whether a plaintiff has met its burden, a court

“accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and

interpret[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, but ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements’ cannot

establish facial plausibility.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v.

SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678) (some internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiffs must “nudge[] their claims across the line

from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

B. Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion

In addition to their 12(b)(6) motion, defendants also move

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Rec. Doc. 24-

1 at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that “federal question claims can be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (rather than

failure to state a claim) only when the claim is not even

‘colorable,’ i.e., it is wholly insubstantial and frivolous or is

immaterial and made solely for purposes of obtaining

jurisdiction.” Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 7 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 682-83 (1946)). Defendants urge us to dismiss plaintiff’s

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than for

failure to state a claim, because “there is a complete absence of

facts which lead to a conclusion that Babin, or Landry for that

matter, were acting under state law.” Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 13-14.

Nevertheless, this case does not meet the standard for

jurisdictional dismissal.

“The Supreme Court has enunciated a strict standard for

dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the basis

of jurisdiction is also an element in the plaintiff’s federal cause

of action.” Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.

1981). However, there is an exception for a suit where the alleged

claim under the Constitution or federal statutes “clearly appears

to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining

jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” WickFire,

L.L.C. v. Laura Woodruff, 989 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83). “A claim is wholly

insubstantial and frivolous if it is foreclosed by previous

decisions of the Supreme Court.” Id. Generally, “[i]f the challenge

to jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal

cause of action, a district court should assume jurisdiction exists

and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of

the plaintiff’s case.” Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 210 (5th Cir.

2016) (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “The exceptions to this rule are narrowly drawn,

and are intended to allow jurisdictional dismissals only in those

cases where the federal claim is clearly immaterial or

insubstantial.” Williamson, 645 F.2d at 416. “The nonexistence of

a cause of action is no proper basis for a jurisdictional

dismissal.” Stem, 813 F.3d at 210 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998)).

Here, defendants do not meet their burden of proving that

plaintiff’s claim against Landry is “clearly immaterial or

insubstantial.” See id. at 416. Defendants assert that from 2019-

2021, Landry was TMT’s legal guardian. See Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 12;

24-2. Because Landry was TMT’s legal guardian, allegedly “[e]ach

time Landry exercised control over TMT, and particularly when she

removed him from school to ‘transport TMT . . . to her home . . . ,’

she was exercising her authority as his legal guardian, not as his

principal.” Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 13. Thus, defendants claim “Landry’s

employment with the LPSB is an ancillary fact, being used to gain

federal jurisdiction over the LPSB,” and Landry was “not in her

official capacity as the principal of Lockport Middle School or as

a state actor.” Id. at 11, 13.

However, even assuming Landry was TMT’s legal guardian during

the time period in question, we cannot say that plaintiff’s claim

that Landry was acting under color of state law is frivolous or is

clearly “foreclosed by previous decisions of the Supreme Court.”

See Wickfire, 989 F.3d at 349. Despite Landry’s role as TMT’s

temporary legal guardian, Landry was also principal of Lockport

Middle School while she was abusing TMT, and thus, very well could

have been acting under color of state law when engaging in this

misconduct. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 2. Moreover, defendants never

provide a Supreme Court case that they allege forecloses

plaintiff’s claim. See Wickfire, 989 F.3d at 349-51. Accordingly,

as plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction pursuant to

§ 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s federal claims regardless of whether they have merit

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rec. Doc. 1 at

2; see also Williamson, 645 F.2d at 416 (noting “Bell v. Hood’s

general prohibition of jurisdictional dismissals which implicate

the merits of the plaintiffs’ case”).1

C. Plaintiff’s Standing to Sue on Behalf of Minor

In Louisiana, “[a]n unemancipated minor does not have the

procedural capacity to sue.” La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 683

(2021); see also Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343,

347 (5th Cir. 2011). “[T]he tutor is the proper plaintiff to sue

to enforce a right of the unemancipated minor.” La. Code Civ. Proc.

Ann. art. 683 (2021); see also Pleasant v. U.S. ex rel. Overton

Brooks Veterans Admin. Hosp., 764 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 2014).

“If both parents have acknowledged their child born outside of

1 To the extent defendants also argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s state law claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), the Court has the discretion to maintain any of plaintiff’s state law

claims after dismissing her federal claims. See infra Section II.F.

marriage, the judge shall appoint as tutor the one by whose care

the best interests of the child will be served.” La. Civ. Code

Ann. art. 256 (2021).

Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks capacity to sue on

behalf of TMT because TMT’s father “is actually the proper party

to bring this matter on behalf of the minor.” Rec. Doc. 23-3 at 9;

see also Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 14-15. However, defendants seem to be

mistaken. Defendants assert, and plaintiff does not dispute, that

TMT was born outside of marriage and that TMT’s mother and father

both acknowledge him. See Rec. Doc. 23-3 at 9; see generally Rec.

Doc. 35. Thus, the proper tutor in this case is whomever the judge

appoints as the one who will serve the best interests of the child.

See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 256 (2021). On March 9, 2021, the

Seventeenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana awarded custody

of TMT to plaintiff. Rec. Doc. 35-1.2 As TMT’s custodial parent,

she thus has standing to bring lawsuits on behalf of her

unemancipated minor child. See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 683;

Pleasant, 764 F.3d at 448. Accordingly, plaintiff has the

procedural capacity to bring the instant suit against defendants.

2 “It is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice

of matters of public record.” Norris v. Hearst Tr., 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th

Cir. 2007) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994)).

Accordingly, the judgment on plaintiff’s custody of TMT does not convert this

motion into one for summary judgment. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,

495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)) (“[I]f matters

outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion

shall be treated as one for summary judgment.”).

D. Tina Babin

Babin and the Board contend that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against Babin must fail because Babin did not become president of

the Board until March 2021, months after Landry and TMT’s sexual

relationship began. Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 7. Moreover, even after

becoming president, defendants claim Babin was still not a

supervisory school official and lacked any knowledge of the events

underlying plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. In response, plaintiff

states she does not oppose Babin and the Board’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s claims against Babin. Rec. Doc. 35 at 3. Accordingly,

the Court dismisses as unopposed plaintiff’s claims against Tina

Babin, individually and in her official capacity as president of

the Board.

E. Ashleigh Landry

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege

a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” James v.

Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore

v. Willis I.S.D., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted). For a cause of action under § 1983 for

violation of the Due Process Clause, plaintiffs “must show that

they have asserted a recognized ‘liberty or property’ interest

within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Doe v. Taylor

Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990)). In the

Fifth Circuit, school children have a liberty interest in their

bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and “physical sexual abuse by a school

employee violates this right.” See A.W. v. Humble Indep. Sch.

Dist., 25 F. Supp. 3d 973, 998 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Taylor, 15

F.3d at 451-52); Doe v. Rains Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d

1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995).

A school employee acts under color of state law in sexually

abusing a student when “a real nexus exist[s] between the activity

out of which the violation occurred and the teacher’s duties and

obligations as a teacher.” Rains, 66 F.3d at 1406-07 (quoting

Taylor, 15 F.3d at 452 n.4). Additionally, “a defendant acts under

color of state law if he ‘misuses or abuses his official power’

and if ‘there is a nexus between the victim, the improper conduct,

and the defendant’s performance of official duties.’” Townsend v.

Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.

Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Bennett v.

Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th Cir. 1996). Courts often find that

a school employee has acted under color of state law when the

sexual abuse and wrongful conduct “occurred on school property”

and the defendant used her position as a school employee to molest

the child. See Humble, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 998; Rains, 66 F.3d at

1407 (finding that the school employee acted under color of state

law when the teacher had considerable interaction with the child

at school, had physical contact with the minor at school, gave her

rides from school, delivered personal notes to her, and gave gifts

to her); Taylor, 15 F.3d at 447-48 (finding same when teacher began

exchanging notes with the student at school, giving her gifts,

took her to lunch during the school day, walked her to class, and

engaged in sex both on and off school grounds); cf. Becerra v.

Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding school employee

did not act under the color of state law because he first molested

the student five months after the student withdrew from the school

where the defendant taught, there was no evidence of physical

sexual abuse occurring at the school, the school employee was not

the student’s teacher “before, during, and after the sexual abuse,”

and the school employee’s contacts with the student “were in no

way part of his duties as a state employee, were not school-

sponsored, and were not reported to any school official”).

Here, plaintiff satisfies the first prong of the § 1983

inquiry, but misses the mark on the second. Plaintiff alleges that

Landry, former principal of Lockport Middle School and a school

employee of the Lafourche Parish School District, sexually abused

TMT. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 3 (“Landry confessed to exchanging

lascivious/sexual test messages and engaging in sexual relations

with TMT.”). As physical sexual abuse violates school children’s

“liberty interest in their bodily integrity protected by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” plaintiff does allege

a violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

See Humble, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 998; James, 535 F.3d at 373.

The more difficult question is whether Landry engaged in this

wrongful conduct “under color of state law.” Plaintiff alleges

that Landry and TMT’s sexual relationship began in the fall of

2020. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. She states that in Landry’s “official

capacity as principal at Lockport Middle School,” she “would

periodically transport TMT from Lockport Middle School to her home

to engage in sexual relations with TMT.” Id. Plaintiff continues

that:

[d]uring all material times herein: Landry was employed

by [the Board] as a teacher and acting in the course and

scope of her employment with [the Board]; all incidents

of Landry intentionally sexually exploiting TMT, during

normal school and employment hours of Lockport Middle

School to teach educational course material to TMT, and

other students.

Id. at 9.

With these allegations, and taking plaintiff’s complaint as

a whole, plaintiff has not yet stated a claim for relief regarding

whether Landry violated TMT’s due process rights “under color of

state law.” Plaintiff does allege that Landry “intentionally

sexually exploit[ed] TMT, during normal school and employment

hours of Lockport Middle School to teach educational course

material to TMT,” but it is unclear whether this allegation means

Landry was TMT’s teacher or “had considerable interaction with

[the minor] at school.” See Rec. Doc. 1 at 9; Rains, 66 F.3d at

1405. Plaintiff alleges that Landry admitted to “sexual relations

with TMT,” but the allegations do not include whether, and what

part of, Landry’s contacts with the student were “part of [her]

duties as a state employee” or were “school-sponsored.” For

example, without more information, it is unclear whether any

physical sexual abuse occurred on school property or a school-

sponsored event. See generally Rec. Doc. 1; see also Becerra, 105

F.3d at 1047.

Additionally, it is possible that Landry’s transportation of

TMT from school to her home was reflective of Landry “us[ing] her

position” as a school employee to molest a child. See, e.g., Rains,

66 F.3d at 1407. However, without any facts as to whether Landry’s

relationship with TMT was school-related, the allegation that

Landry was “acting in her official capacity” when transporting TMT

is conclusory and requires factual support. See Snow Ingredients,

833 F.3d at 520 (5th Cir. 2016).3 At the pleading stage, plaintiff

3 Defendants allege that Landry was not acting under color of state law when

she abused TMT because at that time, Landry was also TMT’s temporary legal

guardian. See Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 12-13; Rec. Doc. 24-2. To support their

contention, defendants attach a signed custody agreement sworn by a notary

public. See Rec. Doc. 24-2; see also Rec. Doc. 35 at 1 (plaintiff admitting

Landry “hous[ed] the minor T.M.T. at her home with Kip Landry”). When

considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must limit

itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” Collins

v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). However, a district court may consider documents “attached

to the motion to dismiss” when the documents “are referred to in the plaintiff’s

complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.” Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ.,

need only provide “a short and plain statement” showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However,

a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. Plaintiff has not yet alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate

that Landry was acting under color of state law when she sexually

abused TMT.

F. Lafourche Parish School Board

“After finding that (1) a rights violation occurred (2) under

color of state law, only then do we ask a third and final question:

Who are the state actors responsible for the constitutional

violation?” Rains, 66 F.3d at 1407 (citing Bush v. Viterna, 795

F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986)). “[W]ithout an underlying

constitutional violation, there can be no § 1983 liability imposed

on the school district.” Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048

(5th Cir. 1997). However, “given a real nexus, school supervisors

who are deliberately indifferent to a student’s constitutional

liberty interest in her bodily integrity are themselves the state

actors who perpetrated the constitutional tort, regardless of

whether the individual who actually made illicit physical contact

343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). The custody agreement is central to

plaintiff’s claim that Landry was acting under color of state law when she

abused TMT, but plaintiff does not seem to refer to this agreement in her

complaint. See generally Rec. Doc. 1. Accordingly, the Court does not rely on

the custody agreement in determining that plaintiff has not yet alleged facts

sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against Landry.

with the student was acting under color of state law.” Id., as

supplemented on denial of reh’g (Apr. 7, 1997).

A “local governmental entity such as an independent school

district may be held liable only for acts for which it is actually

responsible.” Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,

153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). A municipality “cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory;”

nevertheless, “a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. (quoting

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978))

(citations omitted). Liability of a school district under § 1983

requires the following: (1) “a policymaker”; (2) “an official

policy”; and (3) “a violation of constitutional rights whose

‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Doe ex rel. Magee v.

Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 866 (5th

Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff alleges that the Board deprived TMT of his

constitutional rights to substantive due process because it “was

made aware of the sexual relationship between Landry and TMT by

petitioner Amy Adams prior to Landry’s arrest in March 2021” and

“failed to take any action to protect TMT from Landry’s sexual

advances prior to March 2021.” Rec. Doc. 1 at 4. In doing so,

plaintiff claims that the Board “clearly practiced an official

policy and practice of deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

right to an educational environment free of sexual congress between

a mandated reporter and a minor student.” Rec. Doc. 35 at 2.

Despite these allegations, plaintiff fails to state a claim

that the Board was liable for Landry’s sexual abuse under § 1983.

Because the Court finds that plaintiff has not alleged facts

sufficient to state a claim that Landry violated TMT’s

constitutional rights under color of state law, then Landry’s

conduct cannot be the constitutional violation underlying the

Board’s liability pursuant to § 1983. See Covington, 675 F.3d at

867 (noting that because the person who sexually abused the minor

was not a state actor, then plaintiff must allege another state

action that could give rise to a constitutional violation); Floyd-

Evans v. Moorehead, No. 3:14cv214-DPJ-FKB, 2016 WL 5374148, at *8

(S.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2016) (finding that because plaintiff did

not present evidence to show the school employee abused the minor

while acting in his official capacity, the school employee’s

actions could not form the predicate constitutional violation);

Doe v. Dixon, No. W-14-CV-457, 2015 WL 589632, at *5 (W.D. Tex.

Feb. 11, 2015) (finding that because the sexual abuse of the child

did not occur under color of state law, there was no state action).

Without an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no

§ 1983 liability imposed on the Board, and plaintiff has failed to

state a claim against the Board under § 1983. See Becerra, 105

F.3d at 1048 (“Without an underlying constitutional violation, an

essential element of municipal liability is missing.”); Dixon,

2015 WL 589632, at *5 (dismissing claims against the school

district because the sexual abuse of the child did not occur under

color of state law).

However, it is possible that plaintiff offers “an alternative

argument” that the state actor here is the Board which was

deliberately indifferent to TMT’s right to be free from sexual

assault. See Rec. Doc. 35 at 1-2; see also Floyd-Evans, 2016 WL

5374148, at *8; see also Becerra, 105 F.3d at 1048, as supplemented

on denial of reh’g (Apr. 7, 1997). If a plaintiff alleges that

“school supervisors” are “deliberately indifferent to a student’s

constitutional liberty interest in her bodily integrity,” then the

school supervisors are the state actors who perpetrated the

constitutional tort, “regardless of whether the individual who

actually made illicit physical contact with the student was acting

under color of state law.” Becerra, 105 F.3d at 1048, as

supplemented on denial of reh’g (Apr. 7, 1997). Nevertheless, this

potential argument does not apply here because plaintiff sued the

board as “a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana,” not

as individuals. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2; see also Floyd-Evans, 2016 WL

5374148, at *8 (applying Becerra to “individual state actors,” not

a board or school district). There is a “crucial distinction

between a section 1983 claim against a school official in his or

her supervisory (i.e. individual) capacity, and a section 1983

claim against a school district or members of the Board of Trustees

in their official capacity.” Brittany B. v. Martinez, 494 F. Supp.

2d 534, 543 (W.D. Tex. 2007).

In plaintiff’s opposition, she provides the standard in which

a supervisory school official can be held personally liable for a

subordinate’s violation of a student’s constitutional right to

bodily integrity. See Rec. Doc. 35 at 2. However, plaintiff does

not state a claim against a school official who was tasked with

supervising Landry.4 Instead, she brings a cause of action against

the Board, which is “a political subdivision of the State of

Louisiana.” Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.5 Accordingly, plaintiff must state

a claim under municipal liability and allege three elements: (1)

“a policymaker”; (2) “an official policy”; and (3) “a violation of

4 Plaintiff originally sued Tina Babin, who perhaps was a supervisory school

official, but in plaintiff’s opposition, she stipulated to dismissing Tina Babin

in her individual and official capacity. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 2; Rec. Doc. 35 at

3; see also supra Section II.D.

5 In her opposition, plaintiff seems to suggest that because Landry was principal

of Lockport Middle School, the standard for supervisory school officials’

liability under § 1983 should apply to Landry. See Rec. Doc. 35 at 2 (stating

the standard and arguing that “Defendant Landry then utilized her role as

principal and employee to engage in deliberate indifference towards the

constitutional rights of minor T.M.T. to prevent or stop her abuse of T.M.T.”).

However, it is unclear why plaintiff applies the supervisory official liability

standard to Landry. “[A] supervisory school official can be held personally

liable for a subordinate’s violation” of a student’s constitutional right to

bodily integrity in physical sex abuse cases. Hagan v. Houston Indep. Sch.

Dist., 51 F.3d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). That, as principal,

Landry may play a supervisory role to other school employees, does not mean the

supervisory school official standard applies to herself as the perpetrator of

the sexual abuse.

constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or

custom.” Pitrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.

2001). Because the Court finds that plaintiff did not allege facts

sufficient to demonstrate that Landry was acting under color of

state law when she abused TMT, and plaintiff did not allege another

state action that could give rise to a constitutional violation,6

then plaintiff cannot satisfy the third element of municipal

liability. See Pitrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. Thus, plaintiff fails

to state a claim against the Board under § 1983.

Even if the Court did find that plaintiff sufficiently alleged

that Landry acted under color of state law, it is unclear what is

the “official policy” under which plaintiff claims municipal

liability. See generally Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff seems to suggest

that because the Board “failed to take any action to protect TMT

from Landry’s sexual advances prior to March 2021,” the Board

“clearly practiced an official policy and practice of deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s right to an educational environment

6 In plaintiff’s opposition, she mentions that “in her role as minor TMT’s

principal, Landry violated her obligation as a mandated reporter in committing

criminal acts with her sexual relationship with minor TMT.” Rec. Doc. 35 at 1.

It is possible that through this assertion plaintiff argues that regardless of

whether Landry sexually abused TMT under color of state law, the Board is still

liable under a special relationship or state-created danger theory. See

Covington, 675 F.3d at 855-866. However, whether that is indeed plaintiff’s

intention is unclear, and furthermore, plaintiff does not include these theories

of liability in her complaint. See Skinner v. Gautreaux, 549 F. Supp. 3d 493,

499 (M.D. La. 2021) (quoting Roebuck v. Dothan Sec., Inc., 515 F. App’x 275,

280 (5th Cir. 2013)) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by

briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”); Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank

USA, NA, 359 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004) (limiting consideration of a motion

to dismiss under 12(b)(6) to the allegations set forth in the complaint).

free of sexual congress between a mandated reporter and a minor

student.” Rec. Doc. 1 at 4; Rec. Doc. 35 at 2. However, the

complaint does not mention a policy or practice, only plaintiff’s

opposition does, albeit only an inkling of one. See Skinner, 549

F. Supp. 3d at 499.

Perhaps plaintiff suggests that “the Board established an

informal custom of ignoring or condoning sexual harassment or abuse

of students such that it constituted official Board policy, and

this informal custom increased the danger to Plaintiff.” Brittany

B., 494 F. Supp. 2d at 542. If so, and it is unclear whether

plaintiff suggests as much, then plaintiff has not alleged facts

sufficient to demonstrate the Board had actual or constructive

knowledge of Landry’s misconduct. See id. Plaintiff’s claim that

the Board “was made aware of the sexual relationship between Landry

and TMT by petitioner Amy Adams prior to Landry’s arrest in March

2021,” is conclusory. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 4. In plaintiff’s

opposition, she claims that the Board was “aware of the sexual

activities between Ashleigh Landry and minor TMT during the

relevant times” because in the presence of other teachers at the

school, “her daughter was subjected to jokes about sexual relations

between Ashleigh Landry and minor TMT when the daughter

matriculated to Lockport Middle School.” Rec. Doc. 35 at 3. Again,

these claims were not raised in the complaint. See Kennedy, 359

F.3d at 839. And even if they were, they do not state “whether the

alleged jokes occurred before or after Landry’s arrest, when

knowledge of the relationship would have been widespread.” See

Rec. Doc. 45 at 2. Nor do they demonstrate that the Board, rather

than merely teachers at the school, had actual or constructive

knowledge of Landry’s sexual misconduct.

G. State Law Claims

“[D]istrict courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) [of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367] if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);

see also Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir.

2004); Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 1999)

(affirming dismissal of pendent state law claims when “there

remained the need for a full-blown jury trial”). The decision of

“whether or not to exercise pendent jurisdiction after dismissing

a case’s federal causes of action is within the discretion of the

district court.” Williams v. DiVittoria, 777 F. Supp. 1332, 1341

(E.D. La. 1991) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404-05

(1970)); see also Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588, 595 (5th

Cir. 1999) (noting “the wide discretion vested in the trial court

to order a remand of state claims on the heels of a dismissal of

federal claims”). “Pendent state law claims should be remanded

when it would be in the best interest of ‘judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Tex. First Nat. Bank v. Wu,

347 F. Supp. 2d 389, 401 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

“The main reason courts keep jurisdiction over state claims

after the federal claims have been dismissed is judicial economy.”

Id. (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

(1966)). Judicial economy generally “weighs in favor of retaining

federal jurisdiction only when the federal claims are dismissed

after a substantial expenditure of federal resources, such as a

trial on the merits.” Id. When substantial pretrial activity has

followed removal, remand is still appropriate when the parties’

work product could be taken, with little loss, to the state

litigation. Guzzino, 191 F.3d at 595. Because “the general rule is

that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims over which it

had pendent jurisdiction,” then we should only maintain

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims if judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity disfavor remand. See

Tex. First, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 401.

As the Court dismisses the claims in which it has original

jurisdiction, we may decline to exercise jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A trial

has not yet occurred and is not imminent, proceedings are at a

relatively early stage, and the parties’ preparatory steps for

trial, if any, will not be wasted. See Parker & Parsley Petroleum

Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992); Sibley,

184 F.3d at 490; Williams, 777 F. Supp. at 1341; Guzzino, 191 F.3d

at 595. Thus, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity

favor declining supplemental jurisdiction over of

plaintiff’s state law claims.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of May, 2022

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE