Selection Healthcare Services, LLC v. Bliant Specialty Hospital, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SELECTION HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-1936

BLIANT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL, LLC, SECTION “B”(2)

ET AL

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is plaintiff’s unopposed motion for default

judgment (Rec. Doc. 19). For the following reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for default judgment

(Rec. Doc. 19) is GRANTED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action was filed on October 21, 2021 against defendants

Bliant Specialty Hospital, LLC (“Bliant”) and Juanita B. Bonds

(“Bonds”) (hereinafter “defendants”) for violations of Louisiana’s

Unfair Trade Practices Act, La R.S. §§ 51:631 et seq. (“LUTPA”)

and for breach of contract. Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff alleges that it

provided defendants with over $100,000.00 of contractually agreed

upon medical staffing services, and for nearly two years,

defendants have consistently failed to pay invoices for services.

Id.

The Clerk of Court record indicates defendant Bonds was served

via certified mail with the summons and complaint on December 21,

2021. Rec. Doc. 13. The record further indicates defendant Bliant

was served through the Louisiana Secretary of State on December

20, 2021. Rec. Doc. 9. Defendants’ responses were due within 21

days of service, on January 11, 2022, and January 10, 2022,

respectively.

To date, defendants have not filed an answer or responsive

pleadings in this record. On plaintiff’s motion, the Clerk of Court

entered a default against defendants on February 9, 2022. Rec.

Doc. 15. Consequently, plaintiffs filed the instant motion for

entry of a default judgment on March 21, 2022.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Default Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of

defaults and default judgments. That rule states that “[w]hen a

party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has

failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by

affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.”

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 55. The Fifth Circuit has also explained that

there are three steps for obtaining a default judgment: (1)

default; (2) entry of default; and (3) default judgment. See N.Y.

Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); Bradford

v. Telerecovery, No. CV 16-2933, 2017 WL 2573947 (E.D. La. June

14, 2017). A default occurs when “a defendant has failed to plead

or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time required by

the Federal Rules.” N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141. The clerk

will then enter an entry of default “when the default is

established by affidavit or otherwise.” Id. After the clerk's entry

of default, “a plaintiff may apply for a judgment based on such

default. This is a default judgment.” Id. Default judgements are

“a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted

to by courts only in extreme situations.” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d

766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican

Homestead and Savings Ass'n., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)).

B. Jurisdiction to Enter a Default Judgment

As a preliminary matter, the Court considers whether it has

subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal

jurisdiction over Bliant and Bonds. See Bradford v. Telerecovery,

No. CV 16-2933, 2017 WL 2573947 (E.D. La. June 14, 2017)

(establishing the court had personal and subject matter

jurisdiction over the defendant prior to determining whether entry

of default judgment was proper.)

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction on the basis

diversity jurisdiction. See Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff Selection is a

limited liability company, organized pursuant to Mississippi law.

Rec. Doc. 1 at pg. 2. All members/owners of Selection are citizens

of Mississippi. Id. Thus, plaintiff is a citizen of Mississippi.

See Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Capsco Indus., Inc., 934 F.3d 419, 422

(5th Cir. 2019) (citing Settlement Funding, L.L.C. v. Rapid

Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 2017)) (“[t]he

citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of each of

its members.”) Likewise, defendant Bliant is a limited liability

company, organized under Louisiana law. Id. at pgs. 2-3. Defendant

Bonds is the sole owner and member of Bliant, and plaintiff has

alleged Bonds is a Louisiana citizen, domiciled in Orleans Parish.1

Id. Thus, Bliant and Bonds are Louisiana citizens. See Greenwich,

934 F.3d at 422; MidCap Media Fin. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F3d

310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446,

448 (5th Cir. 1954)) (“For individuals, ‘citizenship has the same

meaning as domicile,’ and ‘the place of residence is prima facie

the domicile.’”). Because plaintiff Selection and defendants

Bliant and Bonds are diverse parties and plaintiff is seeking more

than the jurisdictional amount of $75,000.00, the Court has

diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff also brings a claim under LUTPA.

See Rec. Doc. 1. Because the plaintiff’s state law claim arises

out of the same case and controversy, the Court has supplemental

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).

2. Personal Jurisdiction

In two seminal decisions, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,

S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2847, 2853-54 (2011), and Daimler AG v.

1 Although plaintiff has alleged Bonds is domiciled in Louisiana, the record indicates that Bonds was served at her

“new” residence in Georgia. Rec. Doc. 13; Rec. Doc. 19. Assuming arguendo that Bonds is now domiciled in Georgia

and not Louisiana, the court nevertheless maintains diversity jurisdiction over this matter because the parties remain

diverse. If Bonds is domiciled in Georgia, she is a Georgia citizen, and Bliant would also be deemed a Georgia citizen

given the status of its sole member, Bonds.

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757 (2014), the United States Supreme Court

held that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a

corporation is justified when the corporation is either

incorporated in the forum state or has its principal place of

business there. The decisions in Daimler and Goodyear also apply

equally to limited liability corporations. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct.

at 761 (looking to MBUSA’s place of incorporation and principal

place of business to determine whether general jurisdiction

existed, even though MBUSA was an LLC.)

Here, defendant Bliant is a limited liability company with

its principal place of business in New Orleans, Louisiana. Rec.

Doc. 1. At pgs. 2-3. Therefore, Bliant is at home in Louisiana and

this Court has general personal jurisdiction over this defendant.

Plaintiff has also stated that defendant Bonds is domiciled in

Louisiana, and thus it would seem the Court also has general

personal jurisdiction over her. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924; see

Daimler, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“For an individual, the paradigm

forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's

domicile….”) Defendants are therefore subject to the general

personal jurisdiction of the state of Louisiana and this Court.

However, for the sake of being thorough, the Court must

acknowledge the declarations in the record wherein plaintiff’s

counsel stated that Bonds was served at her “new” residential

address in Georgia. Rec. Doc. 13; Rec. Doc. 19. Given the chance

that Bonds might be a citizen of Georgia, the Court must determine

whether it can nevertheless exercise personal jurisdiction over

her as a non-resident defendant.

A court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant when: (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers

personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the forum

state's exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gross v. RSJ Int'l, LLC, No.

CIV.A. 11-73, 2012 WL 729955 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing

Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999)). Because

Louisiana's long-arm statute, La. R.S. § 13:3201, et seq., extends

jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court's focus

is solely on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case

satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc. v.

Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (citing La. R.S.

§ 13:3201(B)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has

purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of

the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts” with that state,

and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does

not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash.,

326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). A Court has

specific jurisdiction sufficient to establish minimum contacts

when a nonresident defendant “has purposefully directed its

activities at the forum state and the litigation results from

alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.”

Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d

235, 243 (5th Cir.2008).

Here, Bonds’ activity clearly satisfies the requirement of

minimum contacts with Louisiana. Not only was Bonds domiciled in

Louisiana until about July 2021, when she allegedly acquired her

new Georgia address,2 but she also started a company in Louisiana,

Bliant, which catered to Louisiana citizens. Further, the present

litigation directly relates to Bonds’ activity within Louisiana,

i.e., her operation of an undercapitalized business. The exercise

of personal jurisdiction will also not offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice. Although the burden on Bonds

would be high, the interest of the plaintiff and the forum state

outweigh it. Selection has a greater interest in obtaining

convenient and effective relief. Likewise, the forum state has a

high level of interest in this case because the contract was

executed in this state, the alleged unlawful acts were committed

here, and Bliant is a Louisiana company organized through the

2 See Rec. Doc. 7-1 at pg. 2.

Louisiana Secretary of State. Thus, even if Bonds is a Georgia

citizen, the Court will retain personal jurisdiction over her.

3. Service of Process

The Court must also confirm that the defendants were properly

served. For a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over

a defendant, “the procedural requirement of service of summons

must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,

Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (citing Miss. Publ'g Corp. v.

Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946) (“[S]ervice of summons is the

procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the

subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of

the party served.”)). Consequently, absent proper service, the

court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and any

default judgment entered against the defendant is void. See Rogers

v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 940 (5th

Cir. 1999) (“When a district court lacks jurisdiction over a

defendant because of improper service of process, the default

judgment is void….”)

Bliant was properly served with a summons and complaint on

December 20, 2021. Rec. Doc. 9. Plaintiff perfected service by

serving Bliant through the Louisiana Secretary of State in

accordance with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1266-

67. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. (h)(1) (allowing service on

unincorporated association “in the manner prescribed by Rule

4(e)(1) for serving an individual”); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(e)(1)

(allowing service on individual by “following state law for serving

a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction

in the state where the district court is located or where service

is made.”).

Likewise, Bonds was properly served on December 21, 2021,

through certified mail in accordance with La. Rev. stat. §

13:3204(A). Rec. Doc. 13. Plaintiff perfected service by serving

Bonds at the address listed as her Georgia residence, which is

also the address of her new company, Bliant Specialty Hospital of

Georgia. Therefore, service of process on defendants was proper.

Having answered the questions of jurisdiction and service, the

court must next address the property of entering default judgment

against defendants.

C. Entry of Default

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Bliant and Bonds

Plaintiff asserts that defendants’ act of not paying their

invoices for the contractually agreed upon medical staffing

plaintiff provided not only breached the contract between the

parties, but also resulted in a violation of Louisiana’s Unfair

Trade Practices Act, La R.S. §§ 51:631 et seq. (“LUTPA”).

Accordingly, the Court addresses each of these claims in turn.

a. Breach of Contract

The contract at issue in this case has a Mississippi choice

of law provision; thus, this Court sitting in diversity must apply

Mississippi law to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. To prevail

on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove only, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that there was (1) an existing and

binding contract and (2) that the defendant breached the contract.

Garth v. Curlee, No. 1:17-CV-94-SA-DAS, 2018 WL 4571870, *9 (N.D.

Miss. Sept. 24, 2018) (citing Business Communications, Inc. v.

Banks, 90 So. 3d 1221, 1224-25 (Miss. 2012)).

Selection has properly established both elements in this

case. Through the declarations attached and facts alleged,

plaintiff entered a contract with Bliant to provide temporary

contractor nurses and defendant failed to compensate plaintiff

under the terms of the contract. Specifically, plaintiff

established that it provided nurse staffing to Bliant from March

30, 2020, to May 26, 2020, and sent defendants nine invoices for

payment. See Rec. Doc. 19-2 (Declaration of Avery Hughes); Rec.

Doc. 19-3 (contract). Under the terms of the contract, Bliant was

required to remit payment of each invoice within 30 days of the

invoice; however, plaintiff alleges defendant has failed to make

any payments. Because defendants have not filed any responsive

pleadings, the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint are deemed

admitted. See Johnson v. Coastal Priv. Prot. Sec., Inc., No. CV

19-12660, 2020 WL 3888286, *4 (E.D. La. July 10, 2020).

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a claim against Bliant for breach of contract.

b. LUTPA Violation

A successful LUTPA claim requires a showing that the defendant

engaged in conduct that “offends established public policy

and...is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or

substantially injurious.” First Am. Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Bus.

Tech., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 390, 405-06 (E.D. La. 2016). “Fraud,

misrepresentation, deception, and similar conduct is prohibited,

mere negligence is not.” Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d

1419, 1422 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Marshall v. Citicorp, 601 So.2d

669, 670 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992)). The range of prohibited practices

under LUTPA is extremely narrow. Id. LUTPA actions require a case-

by-case analysis to determine whether the subject conduct is a

violation of the statute. Id. Additionally, LUTPA is not an

alternative remedy for simple breach of contract claims. Id. “There

is a great deal of daylight between a breach of contract claim and

the egregious behavior the statute proscribes.” Id. However, there

is case law that actions that are in breach of a contract can have

deceptive and unethical "undertones" that would allow a LUTPA claim

to stand in addition to the breach of contract claims. See Tubos

de Acero de Mex. SA v. Am. Int'l Inv. Corp, 292 F.3d 471 (5th

Cir.2002); First Am. Bankcard, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d at 406.

Selection has properly established, through the declarations

attached and facts alleged, that Bliant’s intentional

misrepresentation of its intent to pay for the services plaintiff

provided, after approving the invoices several times via email,

constituted an unethical act. Additionally, plaintiff has also

attached a notice from the Louisiana Attorney General to Bliant,

advising the defendant to evaluate its trade practices and “cease

such activity.” Rec. Doc. 19-6 (Notice from Attorney General”).

Plaintiff has also alleged that it sustained an ascertainable loss

from Bliant’s unfair trade practices, i.e., the unpaid invoices.

Rec. Doc. 19 at pgs. 14-15; See La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1409(A) (“Any

person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable

property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or

employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method,

act, or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, may bring an

action individually but not in a representative capacity to recover

actual damages.”). As stated supra, defendants have not filed any

responsive pleadings, thus the facts alleged in plaintiff’s

complaint are deemed admitted. See Johnson, 2020 WL 3888286 at *4.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a claim against Bliant for a violation of LUTPA.

c. Bonds’ Personal Liability for Bliant’s Actions

Plaintiff seeks to hold Bonds personally liable for Bliant’s

actions by piercing the corporate veil. Plaintiff contends that

Bonds should be held personally liable for breach of contract under

Mississippi law and for violations of LUTPA under Louisiana law.

In order to hold Bonds personally liable for breach of

contract, plaintiff had to establish that veil piercing was

appropriate under Mississippi law. “Mississippi case law generally

favors maintaining corporate entities and avoiding attempts to

pierce the corporate veil.” Powertrain, Inc. v. Ma, 88 F. Supp. 3d

679, 695 (N.D. Miss. 2015), aff'd, 640 F. App'x 263 (5th Cir.

2016). To pierce the corporate veil, the complaining party must

prove: (1) some frustration of contractual expectations; (2) the

flagrant disregard of corporate formalities by the defendant

corporation and its principals; and (3) a demonstration of fraud

or other equivalent misfeasance on the part of the corporate

shareholder. Gecko Outdoor Prod. Corp. v. Casablanca Constr. Inc.,

250 So. 3d 508, 513 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

First, there was an evident frustration with contractual

expectations in this case, given the defendant’s failure to pay

for the contractually agreed upon nursing services. Additionally,

defendant flagrantly disregarded corporate formalities when they

failed to file a required LLC document with the Louisiana secretary

of State, causing Bliant to be labeled as a business “not in good

standing for failure to file annual report.” Rec. Doc. 19. Lastly,

Bonds committed fraud or a similar misfeasance when she repeatedly

refused to pay for services plaintiff provided. Operating a

business while also refusing to pay the business’s debts lends

support to the notion that Bliant was undercapitalized.

Accordingly, the Court finds Bonds should be held personally liable

for breach of contract.

Turning next to whether Bonds could be held personally liable

for a violation of LUTPA, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

instructed that factors to consider when determining whether to

pierce the corporate veil “include, but are not limited to: 1)

comingling of corporate and shareholder funds; 2) failure to follow

statutory formalities for incorporating and transacting corporate

affairs; 3) undercapitalization; 4) failure to provide separate

bank accounts and bookkeeping records; and 5) failure to hold

regular shareholder and director meetings.” Veterans Bros. No. 126,

L.L.C. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 16-2034, 2017 WL 345858 (E.D. La.

Jan. 24, 2017) (quoting Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590

So.2d 1164, 1168 (La. 1991)).

While plaintiff provided no evidentiary support for factors

one, four, and five, there is clearly enough support in the record

to establish factors two and three. As stated supra, Bonds’

operation of Bliant, i.e., entering contracts for medical staffing

and failing to pay for the services provided, establishes Bliant

was undercapitalized. Further, defendants failed to follow

statutory corporate formalities when they: (1) failed to file a

required LLC document with the Louisiana Secretary of State; and

(2) ignored the notice sent by the Louisiana Attorney General.

Factors two and three weigh heavily in favor of breaching the

corporate veil to hold Bonds personally liable for a violation of

LUTPA.

2. Whether Default Judgment is appropriate

When deciding whether entry of default judgment is proper,

courts weigh a series of factors:

whether material issues of fact are at issue whether

there has been substantial prejudice, whether the

grounds for default are clearly established, whether the

default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable

neglect, the harshness of a default judgment, and

whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside

the default on the defendant’s motion.

Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998); Am.

Contractors Indem. Co. v. Galafaro Constr., LLC, No. CV 20-2860,

2021 WL 5230988 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2021) (citing Lindsey, 161 F.3d

at 893).

Default judgment is appropriate under the Lindsey factors

listed above. First, there are no material issues of fact in

dispute because defendants’ failure to respond bars them from

contesting the facts that are established by plaintiff’s

complaint. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515

F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The defendant, by his default,

admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is

concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from

contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”). Second,

defendants’ failure to file responsive pleadings since service was

made four months ago prejudices plaintiff’s interests by halting

the adversary process. See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia

Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 809, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2015)

(“failure to respond threatens to bring the adversary process to

a halt, effectively prejudicing [Plaintiffs’] interests.”);

Taylor, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 814. Third, the grounds for default are

clearly established given that there is proof the defendants were

served the complaint and failed to file an answer, and the clerk

of court subsequently entered default. See Rec. Doc. 15. Fourth,

nothing in the record suggests that defendants’ default is due to

a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” Fifth, defendants’

failure to file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend the

instant lawsuit for more than four months mitigates the harshness

of the default judgment.” Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F.

Supp. 3d 807, 814 (M.D. La. 2014); see also J&J Sports, 126 F.

Supp. 3d at 814. Sixth, there is presently no basis to believe

that the Court would later need to set aside the default judgment.

See Taylor, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 814; J&J Sports, 126 F. Supp. 3d at

814-15. Accordingly, the entry of default judgment against

defendants is warranted in this case.

D. Damages

Having concluded that entry of default judgment is

appropriate, the only remaining issue to address is the question

of damages. A court may, but is not required to, hold an

evidentiary hearing to determine damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2)(B). Such a hearing is not necessary in this case because

the declarations and invoices provided are sufficient to determine

the issue of damages. Plaintiff’s complaint, corresponding

declarations, exhibits, and motion for default judgment establish

that it is entitled to $112,259.41 for unpaid invoices.

Additionally, plaintiff is entitled to finance charges and

prejudgment interest as provided for in the contract, totaling

$37,937.60.3

Plaintiff should also be awarded attorneys’ fees as provided

for in the contract. Kirkland Properties, LLC v. Pillar Income

Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-162-SA-DAS, 2021 WL 1206404 (N.D.

Miss. Mar. 30, 2021) (“[U]nder Mississippi law, attorney's fees

may be awarded when authorized by statute, by court order, or by

contract.”) Bliant agreed to pay plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’

fees “for the cost of collection after 120 days” from nonpayment

of the invoices. Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of

3 Rec. Doc. 19-3 at pg. 7 (“Invoices not paid within (30) days are considered

past-due and will be charged a finance charge of one and half (1.5%) percent

per month on the unpaid balance (annual percentage of 18%) or the maximum

interest rate allowed by law, whichever is greater.”); see also Rec. Doc. 19-1

at pg. 12 and Rec. Doc. 22 (computation table illustrating the total amount due

for each past-due).

$5,000.00. In support, plaintiff submits the declaration of Avery

Hughes, attesting that plaintiff had to pay a $5,000.00 retainer

fee to secure representation in this matter. Plaintiff also seeks

attorneys’ fees, costs, and treble damages because defendants’

actions constituted unfair trade practices. See La. Rev. Stat. §

51:1409(A) (“If the court finds the unfair or deceptive method,

act, or practice was knowingly used, after being put on notice by

the attorney general, the court shall award three times the actual

damages sustained.”) Plaintiff has established that the Attorney

General did issue a notice to Bliant and Blaint continued its

practice of not paying previously approved invoices. The Court

finds the attorney’s fees, related costs, and treble damages sought

to be reasonable.

Therefore, defendant Bliant is liable to plaintiff for

damages in the amount of $336,778.23 (three times the actual

damages of $113,259.41), finance charges and pre-judgment interest

in the amount of $37,937.60, costs and attorneys’ fees in the

amount of 5,000.00,4 and post-judgment interest on all sums allowed

under law accruing from the date of default judgment until paid.

4 To the extent plaintiff is seeking attorneys’ fees in excess of the $5,000.00

retainer, plaintiff has not provided enough information for the Court to

determine that amount. Plaintiff has not provided any declaration attesting to

the total amount of attorneys’ fees incurred in excess of the $5,000.00 or

presented the Court with any invoices showing the excess amount paid.

Accordingly, if plaintiff is seeking an amount greater than retainer, it should

file a motion requesting such relief and attach as exhibits any pertinent

invoices and/or declarations. Once received, the Court will evaluate the

reasonableness of the amounts sought.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 28th day of April, 2022

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE