The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MANUEL ADAMS, JR. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 20-2794
ROBERT WALKER ET AL. SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant City of Harahan’s Motion to Certify for
Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Stay Discovery (Doc. 50).
For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Manuel Adams, a former Captain with the Harahan Police
Department, brings claims against the City of Harahan, Chief of Police Robert
Walker, and Assistant Chief of Police Keith Moody.1 Plaintiff began his career
1 Plaintiff’s most recently filed complaint is the First Amended Complaint. See Doc. 52.
However, the Motion before the Court is a request to certify for appeal an interlocutory order
on a motion to dismiss filed in response to Plaintiff’s original Complaint. See Docs. 50, 45, 32.
Thus, the allegations relevant to this Order appear in the earlier complaint. See Doc. 1.
with the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”) in January 2001. Plaintiff was
eventually promoted to Captain of the HPD—the department’s highest-
ranking civil service employee position. Plaintiff’s disciplinary record was
unblemished until October 15, 2019. On that day, Chief Walker determined
that Plaintiff violated departmental policies including, but not limited to,
“Conduct Unbecoming an Officer,” “Unsatisfactory Performance,” and “False
Statement.”2 Plaintiff contends that this finding, and the others addressed in
his Complaint, are the result of fabricated and unfounded investigations
concocted to destroy his career in law enforcement.
Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 33:2561, Plaintiff, as a
classified civil service employee, had the right to appeal to the Harahan Fire
and Police Civil Service Board any disciplinary action taken against him that
he felt was taken without just cause within 15 days of the action. On October
19, 2019, before Plaintiff’s 15-day appeal period had expired, Chief Walker
emailed the office of the Jefferson Parish District Attorney (“JPDA”), notifying
the JPDA of the results of Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. As a result, the
JPDA placed Plaintiff on its Witness Notification/Giglio list.3 On October 22,
2019, Plaintiff timely appealed the HPD’s disciplinary action taken against
him. Regardless of the outcome of Plaintiff’s appeal, Plaintiff will remain on
the Witness Notification/Giglio list, as there is no legal basis for removal once
2 Doc. 1-11 at 3.
3 The Witness Notification/Giglio list is maintained by the JPDA in compliance with Brady
v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that due process
requires the prosecution to turn over evidence favorable to the accused and material to their
guilt or punishment, which includes evidence that may be used to impeach the prosecution’s
witnesses, including police officers. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
an officer is placed on the list. Consequently, Plaintiff alleges that his career
in law enforcement is permanently impaired.
Plaintiff brings claims against the City of Harahan for violation of
Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stigma-
plus-infringement pursuant to § 1983, and for defamation, invasion of privacy,
and negligence under Louisiana state law. The City of Harahan previously
moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c).4 In response, this Court held in relevant part that
Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to support a violation of procedural due process
based on a deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty interest in his occupation as a law
enforcement officer.5 The Court explained that when a disciplinary process is
conducted by a biased decision-maker and there is no adequate appellate
process, there is a denial of procedural due process.6 Plaintiff sufficiently
alleged that Chief Walker was a biased decision-maker at the disciplinary
hearing because of his plan to destroy Plaintiff’s career. Plaintiff also
adequately pled that the appeals process with the Harahan Fire and Police
Civil Service Board was inadequate because it did not have the power to
remove Plaintiff’s name from the Giglio list. Further, the Court found that
Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to hold the City of Harahan liable for the acts
4 See Doc. 32.
5 See Doc. 45 at 6–10.
6 See id. at 7 (citing Cordova v. La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd. of Supervisors, No.
6:19-CV-01027, 2020 WL 1695053, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr. 7, 2020)).
of Moody and Walker. The City’s motion to dismiss was therefore denied in
part.
Now before the Court is the City of Harahan’s Motion to Certify for
Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the Court’s Order denying
dismissal as to Plaintiff’s liberty-interest claim outlined above (“the Order”).7
Plaintiff filed an opposition that provides no legal arguments against
certification, and the City replied in support of its Motion.8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, a court can allow for interlocutory appeal
of orders without directing entry of a final judgment on the order. For an
interlocutory order to be appealable pursuant § 1292(b), three conditions must
be satisfied. The trial judge must certify in writing that: (1) the order involves
a controlling question of law, (2) there exists a substantial ground for difference
of opinion on that question of law, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order
may “materially advance the ultimate termination of [the] litigation.”9 The
moving party carries the burden of showing the necessity of interlocutory
appeal.10 Interlocutory appeals are “exceptional” and should not be granted
“simply to determine the correctness of a judgment.”11
7 See Docs. 50 (Motion to Certify), 45 (Order).
8 See Docs. 54, 58.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1292; see also Rico v. Flores, 491 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 2007).
10 Chauvin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Nos. 06-7145, 2007 WL 4365387, at *2 (E.D.
La. Dec. 11, 2007).
11 Id. (quoting Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng’rs, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 702 F.2d 67, 68–69 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
The Court finds that the City of Harahan has carried its burden with
respect to each of the three considerations above. First, the Order involved a
controlling question of law insofar as it denied a motion to dismiss as to one of
Plaintiff’s due process claims.12 “A controlling question of law is one ‘that would
require reversal on appeal from a final judgment or would materially affect the
outcome of the case.’”13 Resolution of a controlling question of law need not
terminate the litigation entirely so long as it “would have some significant
impact on the advancement of the litigation.”14 “Additionally, controlling
questions of law generally must be purely legal in nature.”15
Here, there is a controlling question of a purely legal nature: whether
Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for deprivation of liberty
without due process of law against the City of Harahan. If Plaintiff were to
proceed to a final judgment on this claim, and the City were to successfully
appeal, the Fifth Circuit would have to reverse the judgment at least as to this
claim. While the resolution of this question may not end the entire litigation,
it will have a substantial impact.
Second, there also exists a substantial ground for a difference of opinion
as to Plaintiff’s due process claim. Courts often find as much “if novel and
12 See La. State Conf. of Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Louisiana, 495
F. Supp. 3d 400, 413–414 (M.D. La. 2020) (holding that denial of a motion to dismiss involved
a controlling question of law).
13 D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co. v. 1031 Canal Dev., LLC, No. 20-1051, 2020 WL 7626817, at *3
(E.D. La. July 14, 2020) (quoting Jesclard v. Babcock & Wilcox, Civ. A. No. 82-1570, 1990 WL
182315, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1990)).
14 Id. (citing Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 444 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723 (N.D. Tex. 2006); S.E.C. v.
Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 103 F. Supp. 2d 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
15 Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, No. CIV.A. 15-321, 2015 WL 4755162, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug.
11, 2015)).
difficult questions of first impression are presented.”16 In the Order, this Court
stated that it was “[u]naware of any Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence on point.”17 Thus, the question is at least novel. The question is
also difficult in light of the Giglio dynamic of this case. The City of Harahan
argues that any responsibility for placing Plaintiff on the Giglio list falls on
the actor who makes that decision, namely, the JPDA, not Chief Walker or
Assistant Chief Moody. Additionally, the City argues that law enforcement
officers have a duty to report certain information under Brady and Giglio.
While this Court acknowledged law enforcement’s reporting obligations under
Brady and Giglio—and in fact explained in the Order that the result reached
depended crucially on Plaintiff’s allegation that “the officers intentionally,
falsely accused the plaintiff of misconduct for the purpose of permanently
Giglio-impairing the plaintiff”—there is a difference of opinion on the issue.18
Finally, an immediate appeal from the Order may materially advance
the termination of this litigation. This inquiry is inherently related to the first,
namely, the controlling question of law.19 An immediate appeal of the Order
that results in a reversal and dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim against
the City of Harahan would simplify the issues before the Court.
16 Mitchell v. Hood, No. 13-5875, 2014 WL 1764779, at *5 (E.D. La. May 2, 2014) (quoting
Couch v. Telescope, Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also D.H. Griffin Wrecking
Co., 2020 WL 7626817, at *4.
17 Doc. 45 at 8.
18 Id. at 10; see generally Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police
Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743 (2015).
19 D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co., 2020 WL 7626817, at *3 (“To this extent, the ‘controlling
question’ inquiry is inherently related to the requirement that resolution of the issue
materially advance the outcome of the litigation.”).
Accordingly, this Court, pursuant to § 1292(b), certifies for immediate
appeal the question of the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations as to his
liberty-interest claim because this is a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and immediate appeal may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the City of Harahan’s
Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Stay
Discovery (Doc. 50) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should application for appeal be
made timely after this Order, this case will be STAYED pending the outcome
of the appeal. If such application is not timely made, the case will proceed
without a stay.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 14th day of February, 2022.
g TRICHE Lh 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE