The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KATHERINE MUSLOW, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 19-11793
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SECTION M (2)
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
AND AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of plaintiffs Katherine Muslow and Meredith Cunningham
(together, “Plaintiffs”) for review1 of the magistrate judge’s order2 denying Plaintiffs’ motion to
compel discovery.3 Defendant Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU”) responds in opposition.4 Having considered the
magistrate judge’s order, the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
denies the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an employment dispute. In the summer of 2019, just weeks after
their employment at LSU (New Orleans) ended, Plaintiffs filed this suit asserting, inter alia, claims
of gender discrimination and retaliation under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
The discovery deadline in this case lapsed on July 9, 2021.5 On September 21, 2021,
Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery deadline, arguing that a recent internal LSU audit
1 R. Doc. 379.
2 R. Doc. 369.
3 R. Doc. 337.
4 R. Doc. 411.
5 R. Doc. 335 at 2 (citing R. Doc. 111 at 2).
warranted “reopen[ing] discovery as to the matters contained in the report” so that Plaintiffs could
“fully investigate the audit report and depose the defendants and witnesses regarding same.”6 This
Court denied the motion on September 22, 2021, “except as to scheduling and conducting on or
before October 14, 2021, the depositions of Elizabeth Martina, Shael Wolfson, Leslie Schiff, Caren
Goldberg, and John Harman, as well as the Rule 30(b)(6) of the LSU Board (once the categories
of testimony are clarified).”7 Shortly after, on September 28, 2021, LSU moved for a protective
order, objecting to Plaintiffs’ “overly broad and burdensome proposed Rule 30(b)(6) topics,” and
seeking to establish the final dates of Plaintiffs’ employment – June/July 2019 – as the terminus
of the relevant timeframe for the discovery.8 On October 8, 2021, the magistrate judge granted
the motion for protective order in part and denied it in part (hereinafter, the “October 8, 2021
order”), allowing the timeframe for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics to extend past the requested
2019 dates through 2021.9
On November 22, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel LSU’s responses to certain of
Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and requests for production10 – the motion that is the subject of the order
Plaintiffs now ask this Court to review and reverse.11 When Plaintiffs originally served their
interrogatories and requests for production on December 16, 2020, responses were limited to the
parties’ stipulated timeframe of 2014 to 2019.12 However, in seeking to compel the production of
additional information and documents, Plaintiffs argued that in light of the magistrate judge’s
October 8, 2021 order, LSU was required to supplement its discovery responses for a timeframe
6 R. Doc. 320-1 at 3, 5.
7 R. Doc. 323 at 1-2.
8 R. Doc. 324-1 at 1-2.
9 R. Docs. 335 at 10 (concluding that “allowing discovery through 2021, approximately two years after
Plaintiffs’ employment, is reasonable and not unduly burdensome or disproportionate”); 369 at 3.
10 R. Doc. 337.
11 R. Doc. 379.
12 R. Doc. 369 at 3.
that extended through 2021.13 On January 14, 2022, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion
(hereinafter, the “January 14, 2022 order”), the magistrate judge denied the motion.14 Plaintiffs
now seek review of that denial.
II. PENDING MOTION
In their motion for review, Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate judge erred in finding that
LSU did not have an obligation to provide written responses or documentary evidence beyond the
scope of the parties’ previous stipulation, which limited the discovery timeframe to the period
between 2014 and 2019.15 The stipulated 2014-2019 discovery timeframe no longer applies, say
Plaintiffs, because it was “superseded” by the Court’s October 8, 2021 order, which allegedly
extended the discovery timeframe through 2021.16 Plaintiffs argue that because the 2014-2021
discovery timeframe now controls, LSU is required to supplement its responses to Plaintiffs’
interrogatories and requests for production to include relevant information through 2021.17
Consequently, Plaintiffs ask this Court to reverse the magistrate judge’s January 14, 2022 order
and enter an order compelling LSU to cure its allegedly defective or incomplete responses to
Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and requests for production.18
In opposition, LSU argues that the January 14, 2022 order “was based on several legal and
factual grounds, none of which [is] clearly erroneous or contrary to law,” and that the magistrate
judge’s October 8, 2021 order did not supersede the parties’ stipulated 2014-2019 discovery
timeframe.19 “Plaintiffs’ continued request[s] to re-open, extend, or re-do discovery are not in
accordance with this Court’s Scheduling Order, prior Court Orders denying re-opening of
13 R. Doc. 337.
14 R. Doc. 369.
15 R. Doc. 379 at 1.
16 R. Doc. 379-1 at 3-4.
17 Id. at 1-2, 4.
18 Id.
19 R. Doc. 411 at 22-23.
discovery, or the parties’ Rule 29 stipulations regarding Plaintiffs[’] Written Discovery Requests,”
says LSU.20 It argues that reopening discovery at this juncture, less than two months before trial,
would be prejudicial. Therefore, asserts LSU, the Court must deny Plaintiffs’ motion for review
and uphold the magistrate judge’s January 14, 2022 order.
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order
Magistrate judges are empowered to “hear and determine” certain nondispositive pretrial
motions, including discovery issues. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also PYCA Indus., Inc. v.
Harrison Co. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996). If a party is
dissatisfied with a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive motion, it may appeal to the
district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). When timely objections are raised, the district court will
“modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Id.; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The court reviews the magistrate judge’s “factual findings under
a clearly erroneous standard, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.” Moore v. Ford Motor
Co., 755 F.3d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). A factual “finding is ‘clearly
erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
B. Analysis
In her January 14, 2022 order, the magistrate judge gave multiple grounds for denying
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel.21 First, Plaintiffs failed to comply with both Rule 37(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the magistrate judge’s specific requirements as to the
20 Id. at 23.
21 R. Doc. 369.
handling and subject matter for the mandatory Rule 37 conference.22 The magistrate judge
specifically concluded that “Plaintiffs’ failure to engage in a fulsome meet and confer prior to
filing [the motion to compel] constitutes sufficient reason in itself to deny this motion.”23 Second,
Plaintiffs’ motion, which raised objections to LSU’s discovery responses, was untimely, as all
motions to compel discovery were required to be filed and resolved prior to the discovery deadline
of July 9, 2021.24 And third, Plaintiffs’ Rule 26(e) supplementation request was improper, as (1)
Plaintiffs sought information for a different timeframe (namely, 2020-2021) than the parties had
agreed would govern their written discovery, rather than a supplementation of responses for the
agreed-upon timeframe of 2014-2019; and (2) such a request would require reopening discovery,
relief that the district court previously denied.25 The magistrate judge also explained that,
“[c]ontrary to Plaintiffs’ contention [that her order examining the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6)
depositions superseded the 2014-2019 discovery timeframe the parties stipulated would apply to
their written discovery], this Court’s October 8, 2021 Order addressing topics during the Rule
30(b)(6) deposition does not justify a late modification of the parties’ stipulation regarding written
discovery to re-open discovery for a new time period.”26 The magistrate judge also expressed
concern that the Plaintiffs’ motion to compel amounted to an end-run around this Court’s
September 22, 2021 refusal to reopen discovery to allow Plaintiffs to explore matters contained in
the 2021 audit report.27
After reviewing the January 14, 2022 order and the authorities cited therein, the Court
agrees with the magistrate judge’s comprehensive and well-supported analysis. Each ground
22 Id. at 5-6.
23 Id. at 6.
24 Id. at 6-8.
25 Id. at 8-10.
26 Id. at 9.
27 Id. 9-10.
identified by the magistrate judge is sufficient alone to warrant the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to
compel; together, they are irrefutable. In particular, this Court finds that the magistrate judge’s
January 14, 2022 order does not “sanction[] the coexistence of two incompatible discovery
timeframes,” as Plaintiffs contend.28 There is no incompatibility between enforcing the timeframe
the parties stipulated would apply to written discovery, on the one hand, and allowing Plaintiffs a
broader reach in their Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, on the other.29 In short, in their instant motion
for review, Plaintiffs fail to raise any objection that was not already thoroughly addressed in the
magistrate judge’s order, nor do they present any authorities undermining her sound legal analysis.
Therefore, the Court finds that the January 14, 2022 order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for review (R. Doc. 379) of the magistrate judge’s
order (R. Doc. 369) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of February, 2022.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
28 R. Doc. 379-1 at 4.
29 In any event, if the Court were to find an incompatibility, it would be inclined to enforce the more limited
timeframe with respect to all aspects of discovery, rather than the broader timeframe, since the more limited timeframe
represented the parties’ agreement and was in place when discovery closed.