The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LOUISIANA FAIR HOUSING CIVIL ACTION
ACTION CENTER INC.
VERSUS CASE NO. 20-2339
PLANTATION MANAGEMENT SECTION: “G”(3)
COMPANY LLC et al.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two identical Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by
Moving Defendants Jeremy Goux and Timothy Goux’s (collectively, “Moving Defendants”).1 In
this litigation, Plaintiff Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (“Plaintiff”) alleges that several
assisted living facilities and nursing homes in Southeast Louisiana, including one facility allegedly
partially owned by Moving Defendants, have engaged in discriminatory practices against
individuals who are deaf in violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and Louisiana law.2 Having considered the motions, the memoranda in support and in opposition,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motions to dismiss.
1 Rec. Docs. 48, 76.
2 Rec. Doc. 43 at 1–2. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against Defendants under the Rehabilitation
Act and under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Id. at 27–28.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On August 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against Moving Defendants,
Commcare Corporation, Commcare Management Corporation, Lucy Garner, William Garner,
Ronald A Goux, Highpoint Healthcare LLC, Metairie Operations, LLC, Notre Dame Health
System, Plantation Management Co., L.L.C., St. Jude Management #2, L.L.C., Lawrence
Stansberry, and Medico, LLC.3 On March 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.4 In the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendants are owners of the Metairie
Healthcare Center (the “Facility”).5 Plaintiff avers that during the course of a years-long
investigation into nursing homes and assisted living facilities in Southeastern Louisiana, Plaintiff
discovered that employees of the Facility engaged in acts of discrimination against individuals
who are deaf.6 Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that staff at the Facility “refused interpretive assistance
notwithstanding receipt of generous federal funds that not only presume and require non-
discrimination in services, but affirmatively mandate that necessary methods to enable effective
communication be provided to deaf individuals.”7 According to Plaintiff, four entities have direct
3 Rec. Doc. 1. Moving Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 9, 2021. Rec. Doc. 29. On March
11, 2021, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint, which this Court granted. Rec.
Docs. 39, 42. Given that the Amended Complaint asserted new claims, eliminated others, and alleged additional facts,
this Court denied Moving Defendants’ first motion to dismiss as moot. Rec. Doc. 54.
4 Rec. Doc. 43.
5 Id. at 1–2.
6 Id.
7 Id.
ownership interests in the Facility: Ronald Goux, Jeremy Goux, Timothy Goux, and Metairie
Operations, L.L.C. (the “LLC”).8
Plaintiff is a nonprofit fair housing advocacy organization that investigates alleged or
suspected discriminatory housing practices and litigates enforcement actions.9 Plaintiff sends
testers to simulate housing transactions and evaluate a provider’s treatment of prospective tenants
to determine if the provider is engaging in discriminatory housing practices.10 Plaintiff states that
upon learning of possible discrimination in area nursing homes and assisted living facilities, it
launched an investigation and testing process which initially included sixty such homes and
facilities.11 As part of this investigation, Plaintiff explains that its testers contacted housing
providers and made inquiries on behalf of a fictitious prospective deaf resident.12
During “Phase 2” of that investigation, Plaintiff avers that one of its testers contacted
Metairie Healthcare Center.13 According to Plaintiff, the tester asked to speak to someone in
admissions and then spoke to a person identified as “Tiffany.”14 Plaintiff continues that Tiffany
informed the tester that no one at the Facility was able to communicate using American Sign
Language, but the Facility had a “chalk or message board” available to assist deaf residents in
communicating with staff.15 Plaintiff asserts that when the tester asked “whether the facility would
8 Id. at 5–6.
9 Id. at 3.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 10.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 11, 20.
14 Id. at 20.
15 Id. at 21.
be open to exploring having VRI [video remote interpreting] available” for the prospective
resident, “Tiffany said she would check with her administrator and call [the tester] back.”16
Plaintiff avers that Tiffany did not contact the tester for eleven days, so the tester again contacted
the Facility on August 28, 2018.17 At that time, Plaintiff asserts Tiffany stated that the
administrator would not consider incorporating VRI at the Facility.18
Plaintiff conducted further investigation in July 2020, referred to as “Phase 3.”19 Plaintiff
asserts that during Phase 3, one of its testers again contacted the Facility on June 15, 2020, this
time speaking to Daphne LeBlanc in Admissions.20 Plaintiff explains that its tester again inquired
about interpretive services at the Facility, and that Ms. Leblanc responded that the Facility “did
not have an interpreter and typically used communication boards.”21 When the tester asked about
the availability of VRI, Plaintiff asserts Ms. Leblanc explained “that ‘usually the family provides
that’ and the facility would be able [to] provide it if the family pays for it.”22
Plaintiff brings three claims against Moving Defendants: (1) a violation of the Fair Housing
Act (“FHA”), (2) a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and (3) a negligent
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 11.
20 Id. at 21.
21 Id.
22 Id.
supervision and training claim under Louisiana law.23 Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.24
B. Procedural Background
On March 26, 2021, Moving Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss.25 Plaintiff filed
its opposition on April 13, 2021, and, with leave of Court, Moving Defendants filed their reply in
further support of the motion on April 28, 2021.26
On June 1, 2021, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which
this Court granted.27 In moving for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
explained that the proposed amendments did not affect the allegations against Moving
Defendants.28 Additionally, Plaintiff stipulated, “to the extent permissible under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and governing precedent, that the proposed amended pleading does not affect
or moot the pending motion[] to dismiss” and that the arguments in that motion and in opposition
“apply equally to the . . . Second Amended Complaint.”29
In response to the Second Amended Complaint, on June 17, 2021, Moving Defendants
filed another motion to dismiss.30 In the motion, Moving Defendants reassert all of the arguments
23 Id. at 26–31.
24 Id. at 32–33.
25 Rec. Doc. 48.
26 Rec. Docs. 57, 59, 61, 62.
27 Rec. Docs. 68, 69.
28 Rec. Doc. 68 at 1.
29 Id. at 2.
30 Rec. Doc. 76.
in the earlier motion to dismiss.31 Likewise, Plaintiff filed its opposition on July 6, 2021,
reasserting the arguments in its earlier opposition.32 Given that the arguments made by each party
in the motions and oppositions are identical, the Court addresses them collectively.
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Moving Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion
Moving Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them, arguing that
the Amended Complaint fails to properly allege Moving Defendants’ ownership interest, and,
therefore, does not state a basis for liability.33 In support, Moving Defendants note that the
Amended Complaint alleges only that Moving Defendants are each “owners” of the Facility.34
Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not allege that Moving Defendants were personally
involved in the alleged acts of discrimination.35 Rather, Moving Defendants assert that the
Amended Complaint “merely [makes] a collective allegation against all Moving Defendants that
‘[t]he employees of [facilities contacted by Plaintiff’s testers] . . . , were agents acting on behalf of
the owners, operators, and managing entities of [each facility].’”36 Moving Defendants argue the
Amended Complaint “does not . . . alleg[e] sufficient facts to show that [Moving Defendants] can
be liable under [the FHA or the ADA].”37 Specifically, Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
allegations do not plead with specificity the nature of Moving Defendants’ ownership interest.
31 Id.
32 Rec. Doc. 79.
33 Rec. Doc. 48-1 at 1, 4.
34 Id. at 2–3.
35 Id. at 2.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 3.
Moving Defendants assert that Plaintiff alleges at different points that Moving Defendants “own”
the Facility and that the Facility is “owned and operated” by the LLC.38
Moving Defendants contend that these facts do not state a claim against them under the
FHA or the ADA, because the nature of their ownership interest determines the extent to which
they may be held personally liable.39 Moving Defendants assert that Plaintiff is alleging one of
four possibilities: that Moving Defendants own (1) the LLC, (2) the land on which the Facility sits,
(3) the physical building used by the Facility, or (4) the entity operating the Facility.40 Moving
Defendants argue that none of these possibilities make them personally liable.41
First, Moving Defendants argue that if Plaintiff is alleging that Moving Defendants own
the LLC, then “absent extraordinary circumstances necessary to ‘pierce the corporate veil,’” well-
settled law shields Moving Defendants from personal liability.42 Second, Moving Defendants
argue that if Plaintiff is alleging that Moving Defendants own the land on which the Facility sits,
then Moving Defendants assert that they cannot be liable for discrimination under the FHA or the
ADA because they do not own a “housing or place of public accommodation.”43
Third, if Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendants own the building used by the Facility,
then Moving Defendants concede that “liability could possibly attach only if certain other
requisites are met.”44 However, Moving Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not make sufficient
38 Id. at 4.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 4–8.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 5.
44 Id.
factual allegations to state a claim for relief.45 Finally, Moving Defendants argue that if Plaintiff
alleges that Moving Defendants own the operating entity then it is “well-settled” that corporate
officers are generally not vicariously liable for the acts of their employees.46 Moving Defendants
also specifically attack Plaintiff’s ADA claim, arguing that “it is well-settled that the statute does
not provide for personal liability.”47
Moving Defendants similarly contend that Plaintiff’s allegation that Facility employees
were “agents acting on behalf of the owners” is inadequate.48 Specifically, Moving Defendants
assert that Plaintiff “has plead no facts to describe the ‘agent’ relationship, the basis or limits
thereof, or any other facts regarding this ‘agency.’”49 Accordingly, Moving Defendants assert that
they cannot be liable solely based on Plaintiff’s allegations that they are “owners” of the non-
juridical Facility at which “the employees of an LLC acted pursuant to some undefined and
unexplained agency relationship.”50
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to Moving Defendants’ Motion
In opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that the Amended Complaint alleges that Moving
Defendants have a “direct ownership interest” in the Facility.51 Plaintiff avers that its “allegation
that [Moving] Defendants are direct owners of a facility at which employees acting on behalf of
45 Id.
46 Id. at 5–6 (discussing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)).
47 Id. at 7–8 (citing Cannon v. Dewberry, No. 17-144, 2019 WL 1275340, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2019);
Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1999); Garcia v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107
(2d Cir. 2001), Shaw v. TDCJ-CID, 540 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2008)).
48 Id. at 8.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 3.
the owners violated the FHA is sufficient.”52 Plaintiff reasons that under Supreme Court precedent,
the “owners and co-owners of a property whose agents or employees engage in discriminatory acts
in violation of the FHA are vicariously liable for those acts.”53 Plaintiff further explains that its
allegation of ownership suffices to give Moving Defendants “fair notice that they are alleged to be
owners of a facility at which the employees, acting on behalf of the owners, violated various anti-
discrimination laws.”54
Plaintiff insists that the “detailed factual allegations” deemed imperative by Moving
Defendants are not required to adequately state a claim.55 Indeed, Plaintiff argues that uncovering
such facts “is the purpose of discovery,” not a requirement of pleading.56 Plaintiff contends that
the same is true regarding facts which define and explain the agency relationship between Moving
Defendants and employees at the Facility.57 Thus, Plaintiff asserts that its allegations sufficiently
state a claim for Moving Defendants’ liability under the FHA.58
Plaintiff disputes Moving Defendants’ argument that the ADA cannot impose personal
liability.59 Plaintiff notes that Moving Defendants have previously conceded that several courts,
52 Id. at 4.
53 Id. (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003); Richards v. Bono, No. 04-484, 2005 WL 1065141, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2005); Terry v. Inocencio, 2014 WL 4686570, *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014); Miller v. Towne Oaks
E. Apartments, 797 F. Supp. 557, 562 (E.D. Tex. 1992); Short v. Bridwell, No. 91-2280, 1992 WL 142592, at *3 (E.D.
La. June 8, 1992); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F. 556, 563 (5th Cir. 1979)).
54 Id. at 5.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 6.
58 Id.
59 Id.
including one in the Eastern District of Louisiana, “have held that personal liability may attach
under the ADA.”60 Plaintiff explains that in arriving at the “sweeping proposition” that the ADA
cannot impose personal liability, Moving Defendants incorrectly cited case law interpreting the
wrong ADA provision.61 Specifically, Moving Defendants’ authority interprets 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
which is applicable to public entities, but Plaintiff’s claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 12181
et. seq., which applies to places of public accommodation.62 Plaintiff contends that under the
correct ADA provision, “an individual who owns the public accommodation where the
discrimination occurs is subject to personal liability.”63
Additionally, Plaintiff notes that Moving Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff could only
establish personal liability under the ADA by pleading that Moving Defendants “were the persons
responsible for the discriminatory policies” allegedly carried out at the Facility.64 Plaintiff asserts
that the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that “respondeat superior is a theory used in ADA cases
to impute actions of an employee-agent to the employer,” and that other federal district courts have
directly held that Title III imposes vicarious liability on owners for the acts of their agents.65
C. Moving Defendants’ Arguments in Further Support of the Motion
In reply, Moving Defendants re-urge their argument that Plaintiff must set forth more facts
that establish they are personally liable.66 Moving Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s factual
60 Id.
61 Id. at 7.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 7–8 (quoting Rodriguez v. Baird’s Bakery, Inc., 111 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted)).
66 Rec. Doc. 62 at 1.
allegations fail to specify the nature of their ownership interest or how that interest establishes an
agency relationship between Moving Defendants and employees of the Facility.67 Moving
Defendants stress the importance of Plaintiff’s failure to establish exactly what the Moving
Defendants are alleged to own.68 Without those facts, Moving Defendants argue Plaintiff has not
stated a claim for relief.69
Moving Defendants dispute the relevance of the cases cited by Plaintiff in support of its
contention that property owners are liable for ensuring compliance with the FHA.70 Moving
Defendants explain that Plaintiff cited only cases that were “decided before Meyer v. Holley, or
[which] rel[y] upon case law that pre-dates Meyer.”71
Moving Defendants reiterate their argument that the nature of their ownership interest is
determinative.72 Moving Defendants aver that Plaintiff conceded that Moving Defendants are not
personally liable if they own only the LLC.73 Moving Defendants reargue that if the Plaintiff’s
allegations are construed to mean that Moving Defendants own the physical building used by the
Facility, then more facts would be required to establish liability.74 For example, Moving
Defendants acknowledge that in Richard v. Bono, a “non-discriminating co-owner could
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1–2.
70 Id. at 2.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 3.
74 Id.
theoretically be liable” for the acts of a discriminating co-owner.75 However, Moving Defendants
attempt to distinguish that case from the present controversy. Moving Defendants assert that, in
Richard, the court found that the complaint “sufficiently alleged that the discriminating co-owner
was acting as an agent of the other owner.”76 But here, Moving Defendants maintain that Plaintiff
did not plead facts establishing any legal or agency relationship.77
Similarly, Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s other cited cases are inapplicable
because they all rely either on principles of agency or of respondeat superior to impose liability
upon an owner for FHA violations.78 Here, though, Moving Defendants argue that no facts in the
Amended Complaint establish that Moving Defendants directly employed or had an
agency/principal relationship with the individuals who allegedly engaged in discriminatory
behavior.79
Additionally, Moving Defendants claim that the paragraph Plaintiff added in the Amended
Complaint is a “shotgun” pleading which does not distinguish between the actions taken by
individual defendants.80 Moving Defendants assert that “shotgun pleadings” are always
insufficient to state a claim against any individual defendant because they fail to provide
defendants with sufficient notice to file an answer.81 Moving Defendants contend that this
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 3–4.
80 Id. at 4.
81 Id.
allegation should fail because it “simply lodges legal conclusions with no factual support.”82
Therefore, Moving Defendants conclude that, at most, Plaintiff has pled facts “merely consistent
with liability,” and such pleadings lack the factual specificity required to survive a motion to
dismiss.83
Next, Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails for the same reasons
discussed above.84 Moving Defendants note that in support of the ADA claim, Plaintiff only cited
cases which support individual liability for “the person responsible for making the discriminatory
decision on behalf of the employer corporation.”85 Moving Defendants argue, however, that not
all owners are necessarily involved in making such discriminatory decisions.86 Thus, Moving
Defendants assert that an ownership interest alone is insufficient to establish individual liability
under the ADA.87 Moreover, Moving Defendants aver that Plaintiff did not plead facts indicating
that Moving Defendants were responsible for making the allegedly discriminatory decisions at
issue.88 Accordingly, Moving Defendants move the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.89
82 Id.
83 Id. at 5.
84 Id. at 6.
85 Id. at 7. (citing United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092, 1094 (E.D. La. 1994) (Carr, J.)).
86 Id. at 6. (citing Coddington v. Adelphi Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
87 Id. at 7.
88 Id.
89 Id.
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”90 A motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”91 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.’”92 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”93 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”94
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.95 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.96 “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”97
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” will not suffice.98 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
90 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
91 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
92 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2008)).
93 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
94 Id. at 570.
95 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
96 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
97 Id. at 679.
98 Id. at 678.
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.99 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”100 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
element of the asserted claims.101 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an
“insuperable” bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.102
IV. Analysis
Moving Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint includes no specific facts
establishing a legal relationship between Moving Defendants and the Facility employees who
allegedly violated the FHA, ADA, and Louisiana law by engaging in discriminatory behavior.103
Plaintiff opposes, insisting that Moving Defendants’ alleged co-ownership of the Facility is
sufficient, standing alone, to state a claim against Moving Defendants for housing
discrimination.104 The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under the FHA
The FHA broadly bans housing discrimination based on disability, including any “refusal
to make reasonable accommodations . . . [which] may be necessary to afford [a] protected person
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
102 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dep’t, No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
103 Rec. Doc. 48.
104 Rec. Doc. 57.
equal opportunity to enjoy a dwelling.”105 Under the FHA, a “dwelling” is defined as “any building
. . . which is occupied as . . . a residence.”106 In Meyer v. Holley, the United States Supreme Court
clarified that violations of the FHA result in tort liability, and thus the traditional theories of tort
liability, including a principal’s liability for wrongful acts of his agents, apply to violations of the
FHA.107 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendants partially own the Facility,108 that the
Facility provides residential care,109 that employees of the Facility refused to make reasonable
accommodations for prospective deaf residents,110 and that the employees were acting as the
Moving Defendants’ agents in so refusing.111
In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept these factual allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Under this standard, the Court is persuaded
that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to place Moving Defendants on notice of, and allow
Moving Defendants to understand, the nature of the claims against them.112 These factual
allegations may be sparse, but at the pleading stage, detailed factual allegations are not required.
Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the complaint need
only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”113
105 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
106 Id. § 3602(b).
107 Meyer, 537 U.S. at 282, 286.
108 Rec. Doc 43 at 6.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 20–21.
111 Id. at 12.
112 Rec. Doc. 62.
113 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Although this standard requires “more than labels and conclusions,”114 it does not require
“heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”115 Instead, this standard “simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [liability].”116 Here, the allegations in the
Amended Complaint place Moving Defendants on notice of the nature of the claims against them
so that additional facts of ownership can be developed during discovery.
B. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”117 Pursuant to that purpose, the
ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities by those who own, lease, or
operate places of public accommodation.118 Public accommodations include the “professional
office of a healthcare provider, hospital[s], or other service establishment[s].”119 The ADA defines
“discrimination” to include denying individuals or entities “equal goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities . . . because of the known disability
of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or
association.”120 Thus, “[t]he question of whether a person is a proper defendant under the ADA
turns . . . on whether . . . the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public
114 Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
115 Id. at 570.
116 Id. at 556.
117 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
118 Id. § 12182.
119 Id. § 12181(7)(F).
120 Id. § 12181(b)(1)(E).
accommodation.”121 Although courts are more often asked to determine if a particular defendant
operated a place of public accommodation,122 defendants who own or lease public
accommodations may also be held liable for discrimination.123 Further, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that defendants may be held vicariously liable for
actions of their agents in ADA discrimination cases.124
Under these standards, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendants own the Facility, which Plaintiff alleges is a place of
public accommodation.125 Plaintiff also alleges that Facility employees engaged in discriminatory
behavior by refusing to offer adequate interpretive services to prospective residents on the basis of
a known disability.126 Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the employees acted as agents of the Facility
owners when they refused those services.127
As explained above, detailed factual allegations are not required to state a claim for relief.
Instead, a complaint must state “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of [liability].”128 Here, the allegations in the Amended Complaint place
Moving Defendants on notice of the claims against them so that additional facts of ownership can
be developed during discovery.
121 Coddington, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
122 See id.
123 See Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1069 (5th Cir. 1995).
124 Rodriguez v. Baird’s Bakery, Inc., 111 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 1997).
125 Rec. Doc. 43 at 6, 30.
126 Id. at 20–21, 30.
127 Id. at 12.
128 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
C. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Under Louisiana Law
Under Louisiana law, “[n]egligent hiring and supervision is recognized as a cognizable
tort.”129 The tort is governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and “[t]he standard duty-risk
analysis used in all negligence cases.”130 This requires a court to “decide that there was a duty, a
breach of the duty, the substandard conduct was a substantial factor or the cause-in-fact of the
harm, and the substandard conduct is the legal cause.”131 Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Moving
Defendants are owners of the Facility,132 that the Facility is a covered dwelling under the FHA,133
that Moving Defendants have an agency relationship with the Facility’s employees,134 that those
employees failed to afford reasonable accommodations to the Facility’s residents,135 and that
failure denied the residents “equal opportunity to enjoy a dwelling.”136 For the reasons explained
above, the Court finds that these factual allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief because
they put Moving Defendants on notice of the claims against them.
Finally, Moving Defendants’ argument that the Amended Complaint is a classic example
of a “shotgun pleading” is not persuasive. “A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates either
129 Matthews v. United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2016-0389, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/17); 213 So. 3d 502, 506.
130 Harrington v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 97-1670, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/98);
714 So. 2d 845, 850.
131 Id.
132 Rec. Doc. 43 at 5–6.
133 Id. at 6.
134 Id. at 12.
135 Id. at 26–28; 30–31.
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both.”137 Such pleadings are prohibited
because they represent an attempt by the plaintiff to confuse the adverse party and the court in
order to mask inappropriate theories of relief.138 In support of this argument, Moving Defendants
cite to Magluta v. Samples,139 but the complaint in that case is distinguishable from the Amended
Complaint here. In Magluta, the complaint was fifty-eight pages long, named fourteen defendants,
and charged all defendants in each count.140 Further, each count incorporated all factual allegations
contained within 146 numbered paragraphs, and each count also incorporated all prior counts,
resulting in a confusing jumble of irrelevant factual allegations in each count.141 Finding that “the
toleration of complaints such as [the one described] ‘does great disservice to the administration of
civil justice,’” the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case with
an order to require repleading of all claims.142
There are similarities here, as the Amended Complaint names “all defendants” in the
disputed counts and incorporating dozens of numbered paragraphs into each count. The Amended
Complaint is distinguishable, though, because the numbered paragraphs which are incorporated
are clearly grouped into sections setting forth the allegations relevant to each defendant. Plaintiff
lays out its claims in a manner that introduces no ambiguity, masks no theories for recovery, and
avoids lengthy and unnecessary duplication of allegations for each individual defendant accused
137 Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021).
138 Id.
139 Rec. Doc. 62 at 4 (citing Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001)).
140 Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284.
141 Id.
142 Id.
of similar behavior. Thus, the Court does not find the Amended Complaint to be an impermissible
shotgun pleading.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Moving
Defendants Jeremy Goux and Timothy Goux’s Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)!*
are DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 24th day of January, 2022.
NANNETTE J S ETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
43 Rec. Does. 48, 76.
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