Robinson v. Ancalade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WARDELL ROBINSON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 19-9915

LISA ANCALADE, ET. AL. ET AL. SECTION “KWR”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

by Lisa Ancalade (Rec. Doc. 44). Robinson has not filed an opposition.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Complaint

The Plaintiff, Wardell Robinson (“Robinson”), is a convicted inmate housed in the

Plaquemines Parish Detention Center (“PPDC”) in Point-A-La-Hache, Louisiana.1 Robinson filed

this pro se and in forma pauperis complaint against the Defendants, PPDC, Medical Director Lisa

Ancalade, Annette Logsdon RN, and Patrick Egan. Robinson alleges that, on April 7, 2019, he

fell out of his wheelchair while attempting to use a toilet at PPDC. He claims that he requested

new wheelchair brakes, and the Defendants failed to provide them. He also claims that he injured

his back and has acute pain and suffering. He informed the Defendants of his pain and requested

treatment.

B. The Spears Hearing

Robinson testified that he is twenty-seven (27) years old and is serving a ten (10) year

sentence for conspiracy to sell narcotics. A car accident left him paralyzed from the waist down,

and he is confined to a wheelchair. He stated that earlier this year, he fell from his wheelchair

while trying to transfer onto a toilet at the PPDC. He stated that the wheelchair moved causing

1Rec. Doc. No. 6.

him to fall and hit his back on the toilet. Two inmates, Kendrick Johnson and Craig Richardson,

assisted him, and an incident report was prepared by the jail officials. Robinson also notified the

nurse, Ms. Rachel, and the nurse’s aide, Ms. Michelle, about the fall. He also claimed that he was

not examined or sent to the hospital after the fall.

Robinson further stated that, after the fall and after he filed this suit, he eventually was

provided new brakes by Patrick Egan, the owner of Egan Caregivers,2 the nursing company that

provides care for the paraplegics at the jail. He explained that the prison nurses do not care for the

paraplegics; he instead receives his care from the Egan company employees.

Robinson stated that his brakes were broken for a year and all of the deputies and medical

personnel knew about it from his verbal complaints. He claimed that he also advised Lisa

Ancalade, a nurse with the Egan company, and Ms. Rachel, and they told the other prison nurses.

Robinson testified that he sued PPDC because he did not know who he was supposed to

sue. He stated that he included all of the people that knew about the broken brakes. He sued

Annette Logsdon because she is the head nurse and everything that went on was under her control.

He also stated that he and Ancalade both told Logsdon about his broken brakes, and she did not

do anything about it.

He sued Patrick Egan because he was the owner of Egan Caregivers and knew about the

broken brakes as well. Robinson testified that he did not speak directly to Eagan about the brakes

because when Egan and his father were at the prison, Robinson was not allowed to see him.

Robinson also claimed that he was repeatedly told by the nurses that they were waiting for the

Sheriff’s office to approve new brakes and that Patrick Egan had to get them. At one point, he

2The plaintiff and the prison records provide several versions of this company name. Egan’s Motion to

Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No. 18) reflects the name to be Egan Caregivers.

was told the brakes were ordered but that Egan received the wrong part and had to wait for the

correct one.

Robinson also testified that he attempted to use the prison’s grievance system to complain

about the broken brakes and his fall, but the kiosk would “freeze” and tell him his complaint was

pending. He also claims that he requested two or three times through the kiosk to be taken to the

hospital, but he got no response and did not go to the hospital.

In connection with the Spears Hearing and Robinson’s testimony, the Court directed

defense counsel to provide documents indicating when the wheelchair brake was replaced, copies

of Robinson’s grievances related to the broken brake, and any medical care requests after the

incident.3 The inmate grievance records contain only one submission dated April 20, 2019, weeks

after the fall, where Robinson complained that the wheelchair brake had been broken since August

7, 2018, and nothing was done about it despite his complaints to prison staff. He also indicated in

that grievance complaint that, because it was not repaired, he fell on the floor and was having

severe back pain. The response entered by Lisa Ancalade on May 30, 2019, one month later, reads

as follows:

Brake has been replaced. No previous request regarding broken brake found.

Informed of broken brake by S. Lott, who attempted to repair the brake but was

unable to. Notified Lt. Jourdan who said to obtain the brake through Egan Care.

Brake info. obtained from S. Lott and forwarded to Mr. Egan. 1st received wrong

brake, notified Mr. Egan who had correct part sent. Brake replaced by Maintenance

Officer when received.

Ancalade’s response to the grievance did not address Robinson’s complaint of injury or

pain. However, the records provided also contain a Chronic Care Progress Note dated April 9,

2019, two days after the fall, indicating that Robinson received a routine physical assessment by

3Rec. Doc. No. 21. The documents received September 5, 2019, have been separately filed in the record

under seal.

Dr. Charles Mary. The doctor’s notes reflect that Robinson complained of “having chronic pain

in his entire back” and that Robinson was already receiving Ultram (or tramadol)4 twice a day for

pain. The note does not indicate where Robinson was seen for this visit.

A second Chronic Care Progress Note reflects that Robinson was seen by Dr. Walter Smith

on June 24, 2019, for a routine physical assessment. Again, the note does not indicate where the

visit took place. Nevertheless, the doctor wrote: “Patient is being seen today secondary to chronic

pain. Patient is presently getting pain medication requesting An [sic] increase.” The doctor also

indicated that he “[w]ill increase pain medication,” although the form does not reflect what change

was made.

II. Standards of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(a) provides that summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). A

fact is “material” if resolving that fact in favor of one party could affect the outcome of the suit.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691

F.3d 624, 626-27 (5th Cir. 2012).

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial as the plaintiff, or as a defendant

asserting an affirmative defense, that party must support its motion with “credible evidence . . .

that would entitle it to directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 331 (1986). In such a case, the moving party must “establish beyond peradventure all of

the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn

4Ultram is the brand name for tramadol, a medication similar to opioid (narcotic) analgesics used to relieve

moderate to moderately severe pain. https://www.webmd.com/.

Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original); see also Access Mediquip L.L.C.

v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2011). Credible evidence may include

depositions, documents, affidavits, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment by the

party with the underlying burden of proof, the Court considers the substantive evidentiary burden

of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The moving party’s

burden is therefore “understandably heavier” where that party is the plaintiff. S. Snow Mfg. Co. v.

Snow Wizard Holdings, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 437, 447 (E.D. La. 2011).

Once the moving party has made its showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

produce evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Engstrom v. First Nat.

Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24). All

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

However, “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are

not sufficient to defeat a motion for Summary Judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337

F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted); see also Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322,

1325 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that “mere conclusory allegations” are insufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment). Although the Court may not evaluate evidence on a motion for summary

judgment, the Court may make a determination as to the “caliber or quantity” of evidence as part

of its determination of whether sufficient evidence exists for the fact-finder to find for the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.

III. Analysis

A. Deliberate Indifference

Ancalade now contends that she was not responsible for Robinson’s care and is not a

medical director, which is not in dispute, as Robinson confirmed that she was not responsible for

his care. Ancalade contends further that she is a liaison between the administration and medical

providers.

To state a claim under § 1983 against state actors, Robinson must establish that each

defendant violated his constitutional rights. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155

(1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, the Supreme Court set the standard of conduct for

providing care for an inmate’s serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. The Court

held that deliberate indifference to the health and safety of prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary

wanton infliction of pain,” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 104. This is true where

the indifference is manifested by prison officials or medical personnel in their response to the

prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id. It is also true where the indifference is manifested by prison

officials in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering

with the treatment being prescribed. Id. To state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts

or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference that can offend “evolving

standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.

“Deliberate indifference” means that a prison official is liable “only if he knows that the

inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The Farmer definition

applies to Eighth Amendment medical claims. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994).

Thus, for a plaintiff to demonstrate that a prison official has violated his Eighth Amendment right

to adequate medical care, he must establish two factors: “First, the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’; a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and second, the “prison official must have a

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ . . . one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or

safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation and citations omitted).

Robinson orally or in writing notified Ancalade that his wheelchair, his sole means of

movement and stability, was in disrepair and they failed to take action to ensure its repair, even if

she was a liaison between the administration and medical providers this would constitute deliberate

indifference. See Roberts v. McDonald, No. 20:11-cv-0474, 2013 WL 3283351, at *8 (E.D.

California June 27, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when plaintiff

alleged defendants did not repair the wheelchair when he made administrative requests, only

conceded the unsafe condition of the chair after plaintiff filed for relief in state court, and then lied

about the status of repairs to avoid having it repaired).

Although Ancalade was not responsible for his medical care, if Robinson did make the oral

request of her, Ancalade failed to present any evidence, by testimony or affidavit, establishing

what she did after the oral communication occurred.

Ancalade further relies upon medical records as a rebuttal to Robinson’s contention that

she was not deliberately indifferent. This argument however fails.

Accepting as true Ancalade’s contention that she was a liaison between medical and the

prison administration, the medical records failed to highlight any involvement by her, neither does

the Court expect there to be a reference to a liaison in the inmate’s medical records. It is true that

the records from January 2019 through October 2019 show that Robinson experience pain which

was chronic, however the medical records show no connection or relationship with Ancalade. Rec.

Doc. 37, at p. 11. Ancalade’s reliance on the medical records as evidence does not support her

claims about her role in Robinson’s care. The Court therefore is constrained to deny the summary

judgment on this basis.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.

44) filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by Lisa Ancalade is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nc day of November,2021.

2g WELLS roTy

UNITED STATES MAGISTRA GE