The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WAYLAND COLLINS, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 18-7465
JOHN C. BENTON, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
This action arises from an alleged motor vehicle collision in the Parish of Orleans, State
of Louisiana.1 Before the Court is Defendants Mark Ingle, John C. Benton d/b/a Q&M Motor
Transports, Innovative Transport Solution, Inc., Automotive Transport Services, Inc., and
Northland Insurance Co.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) “Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence
of Prior Conviction.”2 Plaintiffs Wayland Collins and Alvin Polk (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
oppose the motion.3 Considering the motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the
record, and the applicable law, the Court grants the motion.
I. Background
On August 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Mark Ingle (“Ingle”),
John C. Benton d/b/a Q&M Motor Transports (“Q&M Motor”), and Northland Insurance Co.
(“Northland”) in this Court, seeking recovery for injuries and property damage that Plaintiffs
1 Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.
2 Rec. Doc. 380.
3 Rec. Doc. 404.
allegedly sustained in an automobile accident.4 According to the Complaint, on August 9, 2017,
Plaintiff Wayland Collins was operating a vehicle on Interstate 10 when, while exiting onto
Interstate 510, he collided with an 18-wheeler driven by Ingle.5 Plaintiffs allege that Ingle was
turning onto Interstate 510 and negligently misjudged his clearance, resulting in the motor vehicle
incident at issue.6 Plaintiffs additionally allege that Ingle was cited for an “improper lane
change.”7 Plaintiffs bring negligence claims against Ingle and Q&M Motor, who is allegedly
Ingle’s principal, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.8 Plaintiffs also bring claims against
Northland, who purportedly insured the 18-wheeler operated by Ingle.9
On November 2, 2021, Defendants filed the instant “Motion in Limine Regarding
Evidence of Prior Conviction.”10 Plaintiffs filed an opposition on November 7, 2021.11
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion in Limine
Defendants move the Court to issue an Order “excluding from evidence at trial and
prohibiting any mention of, interrogation about, and exhibits pertaining to a Citation and
conviction on same, dating back to 2013, for possession of a controlled substance, issued to Mark
4 Rec. Doc. 1. Candy Kelly was also originally named as a Plaintiff in this litigation. Id. On September 24,
2021, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss Candy Kelly’s claims. Rec. Doc. 357.
5 Rec. Doc. 1.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Id.
10 Rec. Doc. 380.
11 Rec. Doc. 404.
Ingle.”12 According to Defendants, “the fact that Ingle received a citation in 2013 for possession
of a controlled substance has no conceivable relevance to any issues related to the alleged traffic
incident in 2017 that forms the basis of this litigation, whether as to liability or damages.”13
Additionally, Defendants argue that any potential relevance is outweighed by the likelihood of
unfair prejudice and misleading the jury.14 Finally, Defendants assert that the prior conviction is
not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 because Ingle was not convicted of a crime
that was punishable by more than one year imprisonment or a crime involving a dishonest act or
false statement.15
B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition to the Motion in Limine
In response, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are downplaying Ingle’s conviction.16
Plaintiffs assert that Ingle was convicted of “DUI (1st offense), Possession of Marijuana in a
[Motor Vehicle] and Possession of Paraphernalia” and that his driver’s license was suspended for
six months.17 According to Plaintiffs, Ingle testified falsely at his deposition when he said that
his only prior conviction was for possession of marijuana.18
Plaintiffs contend that they should be able to rely on Ingle’s prior convictions when cross-
examining Defendants’ expert on insurance adjusting, Louis Fey.19 Plaintiffs assert that Fey
12 Rec. Doc. 380-1 at 1.
13 Id. at 3.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 4.
16 Rec. Doc. 404 at 1.
17 Id. at 1–2.
18 Id. at 3.
19 Id.
should have considered Ingle’s prior conviction when determining whether there were “red flags”
in the insurance investigation of this incident.20
Next, Plaintiffs argue that Ingle’s prior conviction is relevant because “Ingle admitted in
deposition that he committed perjury in that 2013 offense.”21 Specifically, Ingle testified that the
marijuana belonged to his son, but Ingle “took the rap” because his son had custody of Ingle’s
grandson.22 According to Plaintiffs, Ingle admitted that he lied to the court and the investigating
officer about possessing the marijuana. Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that the evidence should be
admitted under Rule 609.23
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Ingle “has a habit of lying since at least 2013 and this habit
evidence is admissible to show that Ingle acted in conformity” with this habit.24 Plaintiffs argue
that his conviction is admissible “to show Ingle’s habit of untruthfulness and that he acted in
conformity with this habit under Rule 406 of being untruthful.”25
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, relevant evidence
is admissible unless the United States Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of
20 Id. at 2–3.
21 Id. at 4.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 5–6.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 9.
Evidence or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, “the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” The Fifth Circuit instructs that “[t]he exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 should
occur only sparingly[.]”26 “Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair
prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter
under Rule 403.”27
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, evidence of a criminal conviction may be
introduced as impeachment evidence to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. Evidence of
a criminal conviction for a crime that was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than
one year “must be admitted, subject to Rule 403,” in a civil or criminal case when the witness is
not a defendant.28 Evidence of any criminal conviction, regardless of the punishment, that
required proving a dishonest act or false statement must also be admitted.29
IV. Analysis
Defendants move the Court to issue an Order “excluding from evidence at trial and
prohibiting any mention of, interrogation about, and exhibits pertaining to a Citation and
conviction on same, dating back to 2013, for possession of a controlled substance, issued to Mark
26 United States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1115 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1149 (1994).
27 Id. at 1115–16 (quoting United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979)).
28 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A).
29 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).
Ingle.”30
Rule 609(a) provides for admission of prior convictions as impeachment evidence where
the crime is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or where the crime involves a
dishonest act or false statement. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show that Ingle was
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. Moreover, possession
of a controlled substance does not involve a dishonest act or false statement.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court should consider the offense to involve a false statement
because “Ingle admitted in deposition that he committed perjury in that 2013 offense”31 is a
complete mischaracterization of the deposition testimony. Ingle testified that he had a prior
conviction for possession of marijuana.32 Ingle stated that he “got busted for about a joint of
marijuana that belonged to [his] son.”33 Ingle stated that his son had custody of his grandson so
Ingle “took the rap instead of [his son] having it on him.”34 According to Plaintiffs, Ingle admitted
that he lied to the court and the investigating officer about possessing the marijuana. The
deposition testimony does not support this quantum leap of logic. Ingle’s explanation that the
marijuana belonged to his son does not suggest that Ingle lied under oath regarding his possession
of the marijuana. Instead, the deposition testimony suggests that the marijuana belonged to Ingle’s
son but Ingle admitted to possessing the marijuana. Therefore, evidence of Ingle’s prior
conviction is not admissible under Rule 609.
30 Rec. Doc. 380-1 at 1.
31 Rec. Doc. 404 at 4.
32 Rec. Doc. 380-6 at 7.
33 Id.
34 Id.
Plaintiffs suggest that evidence of the prior conviction should be admitted because it shows
that Ingle has a “habit” of lying. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs have not shown that Ingle did in
fact lie about his prior conviction. During the deposition, Plaintiffs counsel asked Ingle if he “ever
received a citation for having a controlled substance,” and Ingle responded affirmatively.35 Ingle
then stated that he “got busted for about a joint of marijuana that belonged to [his] son.”36
Plaintiffs’ counsel then turned to a different line of questioning.37 Plaintiffs now rely on a Notice
of Appeal in the criminal case which references a conviction for “DUI First Offense, possession
of marijuana in a motor vehicle, and possession of paraphernalia.”38 Plaintiffs have not shown
how the Notice of Appeal renders Ingle’s deposition testimony untruthful. Ingle was asked about
the conviction for possession of marijuana, and he admitted to the conviction.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not shown that Ingle has a “habit” of lying. Federal Rule of
Evidence 406 provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s habit . . . may be admitted to prove that on
a particular occasion the person . . . acted in accordance with the habit.”39 “To offer evidence of
a habit, a party must at least demonstrate a regular practice of meeting a particular kind of
situation with a specific type of conduct.”40 “Habit suggests a regular response to a repeated
specific situation that has become semi-automatic.”41 Plaintiffs have not shown that lying is a
35 Rec. Doc. 380-6 at 6–7.
36 Id. at 7.
37 Id.
38 Rec. Doc. 404-1.
39 Fed. R. Evid. 406.
40 United States v. Anderson, 755 F.3d 782, 794 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Heard, 709 F.3d
413, 434 (5th Cir. 2013)).
41 Id.
regular practice of Ingle such that it is semi-automatic. Therefore, the prior conviction is not
admissible under Rule 406.
Finally, Ingle’s prior conviction must be excluded under Rule 403. Ingle’s 2013 criminal
conviction is of limited probative value to the alleged traffic accident that occurred in 2017. Any
limited probative value that the conviction may have is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the Court excludes any evidence or testimony regarding Ingel’s
2013 criminal conviction.
Y. Conclusion
Ingle’s 2013 conviction is not admissible as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a).
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not shown that the prior conviction is admissible under Rule 406 to
show Ingle’s alleged “habit” of lying. Finally, Ingle’s prior conviction must be excluded under
Rule 403. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Mark Ingle, John C. Benton d/b/a Q&M
Motor Transports, Innovative Transport Solution, Inc., Automotive Transport Services, Inc., and
Northland Insurance Company’s “Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence of Prior Conviction”””
is GRANTED. Any evidence pertaining to Mark Ingle’s criminal conviction from 2013 is hereby
excluded.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 12th day of November, 2021.
NANNETTE JOLPWETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
” Rec. Doc. 380.