The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DERRICK KEVIN HEAD CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 20-1612
ST. TAMMANY PARISH SHERIFF
SECTION: "A" (4)
RANDY SMITH
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec.
Doc. 18) filed by the defendant, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Randy Smith. The pro se
plaintiff, Derrick Kevin Head, has not responded to the motion.1 The motion, noticed for
submission on September 1, 2021, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.
This case arises out of Derrick Head’s incarceration as a pretrial detainee at the St.
Tammany Parish Jail. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pleading form, which is dated April 23, 2020,
complains of events that occurred over a 15 day period, obviously at some point in time
prior to the complaint being filed. Head’s complaints are as follows: Head was housed on
hard concrete and his blanket was taken every weekend (by whom is not stated). Further,
the holding cell was so overcrowded that Head could not move and some people had to
sleep under the toilet. Head advises that he is willing to accept $1.5 million dollars to
redress the conditions that he endured.2 (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint at 5).
1 The certificate of service that accompanies the motion, which is signed by counsel, states that
unrepresented parties have been sent a copy of the motion through U.S. mail. (Rec. Doc. 18 at 2).
Unrepresented parties do not receive electronic filing notices from the CM/ECF system.
2 The record indicates that on August 25, 2021, the parties participated in a settlement conference
with the magistrate judge but the negotiations were not successful and a settlement was not
reached. (Rec. Doc. 19, Minute Entry).
1
The sole defendant in this case is Sheriff Smith, who while not alleged to have any
personal involvement in the complained of events, presumably runs the jail and sets policy
for that facility.
A telephone status conference is set for September 30, 2021, and a jury trial is
scheduled for October 18, 2021. (Rec. Doc. 16, Scheduling Order).
Sheriff Smith now moves for summary judgment on essentially two issues: 1) that
Head’s complaint must be dismissed because he did not administratively exhaust his claims
prior to filing suit, and 2) that the “horrible” conditions that Head complains about do not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation.3
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” when viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-movant, “show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute about a material
fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The court must draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Once the
moving party has initially shown “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-
moving party’s cause,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant
must come forward with “specific facts” showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing
3 Because Sheriff Smith was not personally involved in the events at issue, the claims asserted
against him are necessarily official capacity claims, not personal capacity claims. Therefore, the
defense of qualified immunity, which was argued in the motion for summary judgment, is not
applicable. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Hofheinz, 646 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1981).
2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)). Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,
unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097
(5th Cir. 1993)).
When faced with a well-supported motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 places the
burden on the non-movant to designate the specific facts in the record that create genuine
issues precluding summary judgment. Jones .v Sheehan, Young, & Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d
1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court has no duty to survey the entire record in
search of evidence to support a non-movant’s position. Id. (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d
1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1992); Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir.
1988)).
Regarding Sheriff Smith’s first issue, that of administrative exhaustion, ordinarily,
plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit in court. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523
(2002) (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)). But 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a), Suits by Prisoners, provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.” This mandate, which is part of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances
or particular episodes. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. Importantly, the court has no discretion to
excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take “special circumstances” into account. Ross v.
Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-57 (2016) (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000)).
3
But § 1997e(a) does contain a textual exception to exhaustion insofar as the
exhaustion requirement hinges on the “availab[ility]” of administrative remedies; an inmate’s
ability to file suit cannot be thwarted based on unavailable remedies. Id. at 1858. An
administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance
materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or
consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates. Id. at 1859 (citing Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001)). When the facts on the ground demonstrate that the
potential for “some relief” does not exist, the inmate has no obligation to exhaust the
remedy. Id. at 1859 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738).
It is undisputed that Head did not file an administrative complaint with the jail to
exhaust his grievances before he filed suit in this Court. On the form complaint Head
acknowledged that the jail does have a grievance procedure but he checked “no” when
asked if had presented the facts relating to the § 1983 complaint in the prisoner grievance
procedure. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint at 2 § II(B)). When answering the question why he had
not done so, Head answered, “They wouldn’t allowed [sic] me to. I was denied a grievance
after asking for one.” Id. at 3 § II(D)). Nothing in the record expounds upon these
statements and whether perhaps the grievance procedure was “unavailable” to Head
thereby relieving Head of the obligation to exhaust prior to filing suit.
Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, rather than rejecting Head’s case based
on the failure to exhaust, the Court turns to Sheriff Smith’s second issue which is that the
“horrible” conditions that Head complains about do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the “imposition of conditions of confinement
on pretrial detainees that constitute ‘punishment.’” Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 540
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir.1996)); Bell v. Wolfish,
4
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Overcrowding of persons in custody is not per se
unconstitutional. Collins, 382 F.3d at 540 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-50
(1981)). There is a de minimis level of imposition that does not give rise to a constitutional
claim. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)).
The Court agrees with Sheriff Smith’s contention that the conditions that Head
complains about, while not favorable, are de minimis and do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. There is no suggestion that Head was deprived of basic human
needs or that the conditions he complains about posed a substantial risk to his safety.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 18) filed by
the defendant, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Randy Smith is GRANTED. The complaint filed
by Derrick Kevin Head in proper person is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A final
judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
September 13, 2021 C | C t
(ured JUDGE