The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WAYLAND COLLINS, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 18-7465
JOHN C. BENTON, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is “Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue
of Liability.”1 In the instant motion, Plaintiffs Wayland Collins (“Collins”), Candy Kelly
(“Kelly”), and Alvin Polk (“Polk”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) urge this Court to grant partial
summary judgment in their favor, finding that Defendant Mark Ingle (“Ingle”) was at fault in the
vehicular accident at issue in this litigation.2 Ingle, Innovative Transport Solution, Inc.
(“Innovative Transport”), Automotive Transport Services, Inc. (“Automotive Transport”), and
Northland Insurance Company (“Northland”) (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion.3
Considering the motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court denies the motion.
I. Background
On August 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Ingle, Q&M Motor, and Northland
in this Court, seeking recovery for injuries and property damage that Plaintiffs allegedly sustained
1 Rec. Doc. 275.
2 Id.
3 Rec. Doc. 279.
in an automobile accident.4 According to the Complaint, on August 9, 2017, Collins was
operating a vehicle on Interstate 10 with Polk and Kelly as passengers when, while exiting onto
Interstate 510, he collided with an 18-wheeler driven by Ingle.5 Plaintiffs allege that Ingle was
turning onto Interstate 510 and negligently misjudged his clearance, resulting in the motor vehicle
incident at issue.6 Plaintiffs additionally allege that Ingle was cited for an “improper lane
change.”7 Plaintiffs bring negligence claims against Ingle and Q&M Motor, who Plaintiffs allege
is Ingle’s principal, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.8 Plaintiffs also bring negligence
claims against Northland, who purportedly insured the 18-wheeler operated by Ingle.9
On January 15, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a first supplemental and amending complaint.10 In the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs name Innovative Transport and Automotive Transport as
additional defendants to the instant action.11
On February 9, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment on
the issue of liability.12 Defendants filed an opposition to the instant motion on February 16,
2021.13 On February 25, 2021, with leave of Court, Plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in further
4 Rec. Doc. 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Id.
10 Rec. Doc. 180.
11 Id. at 1–4.
12 Rec. Doc. 274.
13 Rec. Doc. 279.
support of the instant motion.14 Plaintiffs also filed objections to several exhibits offered by
Defendants in opposition to the instant motion.15 Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s
objections on March 2, 2021.16 On March 5, 2021, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a reply to
Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ objections.17
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits
demonstrate “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”18 To decide whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court
considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations
or weighing the evidence.”19 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
Yet “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and
conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”20
If the entire record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then
no genuine issue of fact exists and, consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.21 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings.22 Instead, the nonmoving
14 Rec. Doc. 297. Plaintiffs’ reply memorandum is incorrectly labeled as a sur-reply memorandum.
15 Rec. Doc. 288.
16 Rec. Doc. 305.
17 Rec. Doc. 309. Plaintiffs’ response memorandum is incorrectly labeled as a sur-reply memorandum.
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
19 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
20 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
21 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
22 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
party must identify specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that
evidence establishes a genuine issue for trial.23
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of showing
the basis for its motion and identifying record evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.24 Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, “the movant may
either (1) submit evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some material element of the
opponent’s claim or defense, or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the
ultimate burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently
supports an essential element of the opponent’s claim or defense.”25 If the moving party satisfies
its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “identify specific evidence in the
record, and to articulate” precisely how that evidence supports the nonmoving party’s claims.26
However, “where the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant ‘must establish
beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in
his favor. Once the movant does so, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish an issue of
fact that warrants trial.’”27 “The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either countering
with sufficient evidence of its own, or “showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that
it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”28
23 See id.; Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
24 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
25 Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Little, 939 F.2d at 1299).
26 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Morris
v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
27 Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020).
28 Ridgeway v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIVA 09-2794, 2010 WL 1729187, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2010) (Vance,
J.).
III. Analysis
In this litigation, Plaintiffs brings negligence claims against Defendants arising out of an
alleged motor vehicle collision involving an 18-wheeler allegedly driven by Ingle.29 In the instant
motion, Plaintiffs seeks to establish that Ingle is liable as a matter of law for the alleged motor
vehicle accident.30 Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving all elements of their negligence claims,
including causation of the alleged motor vehicle accident.31 Therefore, in order to succeed on the
instant motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs “must establish beyond peradventure” that Ingle
caused the alleged accident at issue.32 If Plaintiffs meet this burden, the “burden then shifts to
[Defendants] to establish an issue of fact that warrants trial.”33 Additionally, under Louisiana law,
“[o]rdinarily, the determination of whether negligence exists in a particular case is a question of
fact; therefore, cases involving a question of negligence ordinarily are not appropriate for
summary judgment. This principle extends to questions of comparative fault as well.”34
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of
causation of the alleged accident is appropriate here because “[a]ll competent and admissible
sworn testimony clearly shows that [Ingle] was completely at fault in making an improper left
29 Rec. Doc. 1.
30 See Rec. Doc. 275.
31 Saden v. Kirby, 94-0854 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So. 2d 423, 427 (“Under the duty-risk approach to determining
tort liability, the court first determines whether the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
damages.”).
32 Lyons, 964 F.3d at 302.
33 Id.
34 Freeman v. Teague, 37,932, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 371, 373 (internal citation
omitted).
turn and directly [sic] into [Plaintiffs’] lane of travel.”35 In support, Plaintiffs point to the
testimony of Collins, investigating officer Jack Kounlavong (“Officer Kounlavong”), Polk, Kelly,
Ingle, and Ingle’s employer John Benton.36 Plaintiff also points to the “guilty plea of [Ingle]” in
support of the instant motion for partial summary judgment.37 In response, Defendants argue that
disputed issues of material fact exist regarding causation and fault that preclude summary
judgment.38 Specifically, Defendants argue that physical evidence, footage from Officer
Kounlavong’s bodycam, Ingle’s testimony, and testimony from Defendants’ “accident
reconstruction/biomechanical engineer” expert Dr. Richard Baratta (“Dr. Baratta”) will “confirm
that [P]laintiffs caused the accident in question” by intentionally speeding up as Ingle was
changing lanes in order to cause the alleged accident.39
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Collins was operating a Nissan vehicle that was
struck by a Peterbilt 18-wheeler driven by Ingle when “Ingle negligently failed to keep a proper
lookout and attempted to change from the middle lane to the right lane and misjudged the turn,
causing his vehicle to enter Plaintiffs’ lane of travel and collide with Plaintiffs’ vehicle.”40
Louisiana Revised Statute 32:79 provides: “A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”41
35 Rec. Doc. 275-1 at 4.
36 Id. at 4–12.
37 Id. at 11–12.
38 See Rec. Doc. 279 at 20.
39 Id. at 20–21.
40 Rec. Doc. 1 at 3.
41 La. Rev. Stat. § 32:79.
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs point to facts indicating that Plaintiffs’ Nissan was driving
in the right lane on Interstate 10 when the Peterbilt driven by Ingle—which was allegedly
travelling in the lane to the left of Plaintiffs’ vehicle—sped up and moved into Plaintiffs’ lane,
thereby causing the accident at issue. In opposition, Defendants point to several pieces of
evidence in support of their theory of liability that Plaintiffs’ vehicle intentionally sped up as
Ingle was changing lanes. For example, the expert report of Dr. Baratta indicates that the accident
occurred when Plaintiffs’ Nissan was driving at a higher speed than the Peterbilt driven by Ingle.
Dr. Baratta’s expert report pertinently states:
The damage to the Nissan is consistent with a sideswipe accident with the
inclusion of panel snagging between the two vehicles. The folding back of the
fender, as well as the rear-directed distortion of the leading edge of the left-front
door panel, indicate that, at the time of contact, the Nissan was traveling faster
than the Peterbilt.42
Considering the conflicting evidence in the record, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material
fact exists regarding the relative speeds of the vehicles involved in the alleged accident and
consequently whether Plaintiffs or Ingle caused the alleged accident at issue in this litigation.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Defendants, the Court concludes that judgment as
a matter of law for Plaintiffs on the issue of liability is inappropriate in light of the record in this
case.
V. Conclusion
Considering the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Reply to
42 Rec. Doc. 279-28 at 6. Although Defendants initially submit an unsigned version of Dr. Baratta’s
affidavit, Defendants, with leave of Court, subsequently substituted a signed version of Dr. Baratta’s
affidavit into the record. Rec. Doc. 302. In addition, the testimony of Dr. Baratta offered here does not
contravene this Court’s July 2, 2020 Order which excluded Dr. Baratta’s testimony regarding medical
causation only. Rec. Doc. 222.
Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ objection to Defendants’ opposition exhibits** is GRANTED.
The arguments set forth in the reply brief were considered by the Court in deciding the instant
motion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that “Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Liability” filed by Plaintiffs Wayland Collins, Candy Kelly, and Alvin
Polk is DENIED.
_ 17th
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this day of May, 2021.
NANNETTE JO f ETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
* Rec. Doc. 309.
“ Rec. Doc. 275.