Baqer v. St. Tammany Parish Government

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AHMED BAQER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 20-980-WBV-JCW

ST. TAMMANY PARISH GOVERNMENT, ET AL. SECTION: D (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion For Summary Judgment, filed by defendants,

Randy Smith, Lacey Kelly, Rodney J. Strain and Greg Longino.1 The Motion is

opposed,2 and Defendants have filed a Reply.3 After careful consideration of the

parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED and Klabert

Guillot, Jr.’s claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

This is an action for declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief regarding

the conditions of pre-trial detention in the four holding cells at St. Tammany Parish

Jail. On March 22, 2020, Ahmed Baqer, Klabert Joseph Guillot, Jr. and Klabert

Joseph Guillot, Sr. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint seeking damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that they were forced to endure prolonged pre-trial

detainment in dirty, cramped holding cells in St. Tammany Parish Jail (sometimes

referred to as “the jail”) in violation of their constitutional rights under the

1 R. Doc. 111.

2 R. Doc. 117.

3 R. Doc. 122.

4 The Court has set forth the factual and procedural background of this matter in great detail in several

prior Orders and, for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here. See, R. Docs. 40, 149, 150.

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 Although Plaintiffs

named several entities and individuals as defendants in the Complaint,6 the only

remaining defendants are: (1) Randy Smith, in his individual and official capacity as

the Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish from July 1, 2016 to the present (“Sheriff Smith”);

and (2) Lacey Kelly, in her individual and official capacity as Warden of the St.

Tammany Parish Jail “[a]t all relevant times” (“Warden Kelly”).7

On October 7, 2020, Sheriff Smith, Warden Kelly, Strain and Longino

(collectively, “Defendants”), filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgement,

asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff, Klabert Joseph

Guillot, Jr. (“Guillot, Jr.”), failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing

this suit.8 Defendants claim that during the April 10, 2020 hearing on Plaintiffs’

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Guillot, Jr. testified that he had not exhausted his

administrative remedies at St. Tammany Parish Jail prior to filing this suit.9

Defendants point out that Warden Kelly has confirmed that Guillot, Jr. never

initiated any administrative remedies regarding any conditions of confinement prior

to filing this litigation.10 Defendants assert that, “No action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

5 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 118-129.

6 Id. at Introductory Paragraph and ¶¶ 12-23.

7 Id. at ¶¶ 15-23. On March 22, 2021, the Court dismissed the claims asserted against defendants,

Rodney J. Strain and Greg Longino, in their individual and official capacities. See, R. Doc. 149.

8 R. Doc. 111.

9 R. Doc. 111-2 (citing R. Doc. 38; R. Doc. 40 at p. 25; R. Doc. 44 at pp. 83-84).

10 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 37-1 at p. 4).

are available are exhausted.”11 Defendants claim that the requirement that a

prisoner exhaust all administrative remedies prior to suit is both mandatory and non-

discretionary.12 Defendants contend that this limitation is an attempt to eliminate

federal court interference in the running of the administration of prisons and to allow

the prisons an opportunity to deal with complaints before they proceed to court.13

Relying upon Guillot, Jr.’s testimony and the Affidavit previously submitted by

Warden Kelly, Defendants argue that no trier of fact could find a genuine dispute as

to any material facts regarding Guillot, Jr.’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies.14 As such, Defendants assert that Guillot, Jr.’s claims must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, asserting that it should be denied because

Defendants have failed to show that the administrative procedure was available to

Guillot, Jr.15 According to Plaintiffs, Defendants claim that the Administrative

Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) for the jail is included in an Inmate Handbook and made

available to inmates through each dormitory’s computer.16 Relying exclusively upon

a sworn declaration from Guillot, Jr., Plaintiffs assert that Guillot, Jr. was housed in

the holding cells at St. Tammany Parish Jail from December 18, 2019 through

January 3, 2020, during which time he was never advised that a computer existed or

that he had access to a computer.17 Plaintiffs point out that the grievance procedure

11 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

12 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4 (citing Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 2012)).

13 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368

(2006)).

14 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4.

15 R. Doc. 117.

16 Id. at p. 1 (citing 117-2 at ¶ 9); See, R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14.

17 R. Doc. 117 at pp. 1-2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 10).

is only available to an inmate for up to 90 days after an incident occurs and that

Guillot, Jr. testified during an April 2020 preliminary injunction hearing that he did

not know what a grievance was or that the jail had a grievance procedure.18

Plaintiffs assert that, “A short time after the preliminary injunction hearing,

Guillot, Jr. discovered a new orientation video that had been placed on the dormitory

computer (in his new housing unit) for inmates to review.”19 Plaintiffs claim that the

video discussed highlights from the Inmate Handbook, which first put Guillot, Jr. on

notice that the ARP existed.20 Plaintiffs further assert that Guillot, Jr. does not recall

anyone ever providing him with a copy of, or informing him of the existence of, an

Inmate Handbook and/or the existence of an ARP.21 Plaintiffs claim that while

Guillot, Jr. was housed in the holding cells, inmates were told to raise any complaints

about their living conditions to a supervisor, but that supervisors simply ignored their

complaints.22 Plaintiffs claim that no deputy or supervisor ever told Guillot, Jr. that

he needed to follow an administrative procedure to raise a complaint about the

condition of the holding cells.

Plaintiffs contend that by the time Guillot, Jr. learned of the existence of the

grievance procedure, over 90 days had passed since he had last been housed in the

holding cells.23 Plaintiffs assert that, as explained in the orientation video, a

grievance must be filed within 90 days, otherwise it will be rejected as untimely.24

18 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 12-14).

19 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 15).

20 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 16).

21 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 17).

22 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 18-19).

23 R. Doc. 117 at p. 3 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 21).

24 R. Doc. 117 at p. 3 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 22).

Plaintiffs claim that Guillot, Jr. never filed a grievance regarding the conditions of

the holding cells because it would have been untimely. Plaintiffs assert that if

Defendants had informed Guillot, Jr. of the grievance procedure before the 90 days

had passed, Guillot, Jr. would have filed a timely grievance.

Plaintiffs argue that although Defendants bear the burden of proof on their

summary judgment motion, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence that

Guillot, Jr.: (1) was informed that the ARP existed; (2) was provided with a copy of

the ARP; (3) was informed that the dormitory where he was housed had a kiosk/tablet

computer; (4) knew that the ARP could be located on the dormitory kiosk/tablet

computer; (5) knew that he had access to the dormitory kiosk/tablet computer; (6)

actually had access to the dormitory’s kiosk/tablet computer; or (7) notified of the ARP

and what it required through any other means.25 Plaintiffs contend that no such

evidence exists. Plaintiffs argue the Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied

because Defendants have failed to produce any evidence that the administrative

procedure was available to Guillot, Jr., and Plaintiffs have produced evidence that

the procedure was not available to him. Plaintiffs contend that by failing to inform

Guillot, Jr. of the administrative procedure until after the 90-day deadline had

expired, there was no way for Guillot, Jr. to properly exhaust his administrative

remedies.26

25 R. Doc. 117 at pp. 5-6.

26 R. Doc. 117 at p. 6.

In response, Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted because

the administrative procedure was available to Guillot, Jr.27 Relying upon several

Fifth Circuit opinions, Defendants argue that a grievance procedure is not

unavailable merely because the prisoner did not know about it if the prisoner has a

“fair, reasonable” opportunity to learn about its existence, and that ignorance of the

law does not excuse a prisoner of his obligation to exhaust his administrative

remedies.28 Defendants argue that the grievance procedures of the St. Tammany

Parish Jail were available to Guillot, Jr. because they are contained in the Inmate

Handbook, which is available to all inmates through kiosks or tablet computers.29

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that the

kiosks and/or tablet computers either did not contain the Inmate Handbook or that

the kiosks and/or tablet computers were not functioning property. Defendants point

out that Guillot, Jr. readily admits that he had access to a working computer during

his incarceration and that he knew how to use it.30 Defendants claim that Guillot,

Jr. had full access to all of the information he needed to learn about the grievance

process and, therefore, the grievance process was available to him. Defendants assert

that the statements in Guillot, Jr.’s declaration regarding his lack of knowledge about

27 R. Doc. 122.

28 Id. at pp. 1-2 (quoting Davis v. Hernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). See, Thomas v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civ. A. No. CV05-1222, 2006 WL 3861962

(W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2006); Castro v. Crawfoot, 102 Fed.Appx. 852 (5th Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Crawford,

419 Fed.Appx. 522 (5th Cir. 2011); Huff v. Neal, 555 Fed.Appx. 289 (5th Cir. 2014).

29 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R.Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14).

30 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12).

the grievance procedure amount to an unsupported denial and should not be relied

upon to defeat summary judgment.31

Defendants further point out that Guillot, Jr. was booked into the St.

Tammany Parish Jail on December 18, 2019, and filed the Complaint in this case on

March 22, 2020, just 95 days later.32 Defendants contend that the holding cell

conditions complained about in the Complaint – overcrowding, denial of recreational

activity, denial of proper hygiene, being held in intake in excess of 48 hours – would

not have been apparent until at least a few days into Plaintiff’s time at the jail. Thus,

Defendants argue that unless Guillot, Jr. retained counsel only two or three days

prior to filing the Complaint, he would have had the further benefit of counsel within

the 90-day time period within which to file his grievance to advise him of any such

administrative procedures.33 Defendants note that plaintiff, Klabert Joseph Guillot,

Sr. (Guillot, Jr.’s father), initiated and completed the grievance process during his

pretrial detainment at the jail.34 Finally, Defendants point out that the Fifth Circuit

has consistently held that district courts have no discretion to excuse a prisoner’s

failure to properly exhaust the prison grievance process before filing their complaint,

and that a case must be dismissed if available administrative remedies were not

exhausted.35 Defendants argue that because Guillot, Jr. never attempted to initiate

the grievance process, his suit is barred and summary judgment is warranted.

31 R. Doc. 122 at p. 4.

32 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 100).

33 R. Doc. 122 at p. 3.

34 Id.

35 Id. at p. 4 (quoting Ates v. St. Tammany Parish, Civ. A. No. 13-5732, 2014 WL 1457777 (E.D. La.

April 15, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed issue as

to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.36 A party moving for summary judgment must inform the Court of the basis for

the motion and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, that show that

there is no such genuine issue of material fact.37

If the moving party carries its burden of proof under Rule 56, the opposing

party must direct the Court’s attention to specific evidence in the record which

demonstrates that the non-moving party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is

entitled to a verdict in its favor.38 This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical

doubt as to alleged material facts, by unsworn and unsubstantiated assertions, by

conclusory allegations, or by a mere scintilla of evidence.39 Rather, Rule 56 mandates

that summary judgment be entered against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.40 In resolving a motion for

summary judgment, the Court must review the facts and inferences in the light most

36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265

(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986).

37 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

38 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

39 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

40 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court may not evaluate the credibility of

witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.41

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Guillot, Jr.’s

claims because he failed to exhaust available administrative

remedies.

The parties in this case do not dispute the existence of an administrative

grievance process at St. Tammany Parish Jail, or that Guillot, Jr. never initiated a

grievance regarding the conditions of his confinement in the holding cells of the jail

prior to filing this suit. In fact, Plaintiffs readily acknowledge that Guillot, Jr. did

not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the conditions of his pretrial

confinement in the holding cells at St. Tammany Parish Jail. Plaintiffs, however,

argue that Guillot, Jr.’s suit should proceed because the jail’s administrative

remedies were not available to him.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”), provides that, “No

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”42 The Fifth Circuit has clarified that, “Inmates need not exhaust all

administrative remedies, however, but only those that are ‘available’ to them.”43

41 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).

42 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

43 Davis v. Fernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th

Cir. 2010); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111

(3d Cir. 2002); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Further, “Whenever defendants claim a failure to exhaust, they have the burden to

prove that the plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies that were actually

available to him.”44 According to the Fifth Circuit, whether administrative remedies

are “available” is a question of law, but the resolution of that question sometimes

turns on questions of fact.45

The Fifth Circuit has developed “an extensive body of law addressing the

various circumstances that render grievance procedures unavailable within the

meaning of the [PLRA].”46 For instance, the Fifth Circuit has held that grievance

procedures were not “available” to a prisoner when prison authorities refused to

provide the prisoner with the grievance forms needed to exhaust administrative

remedies,47 and where an inmate did not discover his injuries until after he left the

jail.48 The Fifth Circuit has also held that an administrative remedy may be

unavailable if: (1) despite what regulations or materials may promise, prison officials

are unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates; (2) an

administrative scheme is so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable

of use by an ordinary prisoner; or (3) prison administrators thwart inmates from

taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or

intimidation.49

44 Davis, 798 F.3d at 294-95 (citing Cantwell v. Sterling, 788 F.3d 507, 507 (5th Cir. 2015); Dillon,

596 F.3d at 266).

45 Leggett v. Lafayette, 608 Fed.Appx. 187, 190 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillon, 596 F.3d at 266).

46 Davis, 798 F.3d at 295.

47 Aceves v. Swanson, 75 Fed.Appx. 295, 295 (5th Cir. 2003)

48 Allard v. Anderson, 260 Fed.Appx. 711, 714 (5th Cir. 2007).

49 Brantner v. Freestone County Sheriffs Office, 776 Fed.Appx. 829, 833 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ross

v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1859-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that an inmate’s ignorance of a prison’s

grievance procedures does not excuse his noncompliance.”50 In Leggett v. Lafayette,

the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, finding, “The

summary-judgment evidence establishes that Leggett had ‘avenues for discovering

the procedural rules governing [his] grievances.’ Thus, even if Leggett was

subjectively unaware of the procedures, the record sets out the substance of those

procedures and indicates that the information was available to Leggett.” 51

Subsequently, in Davis v. Fernandez, the Fifth Circuit held that there are “two oft-

applied and well-established rules of unavailability” that were applicable to the facts

of that case.52 “First, courts may not deem grievance procedures unavailable merely

because an inmate was ignorant of them, so long as the inmate had a fair, reasonable

opportunity to apprise himself of the procedures.”53 The Davis court held that the

undisputed evidence showed that the jail’s grievance procedures were published in

an inmate handbook, which was in the record, and explained on jail television, and

that the inmate did not contend that any circumstances precluded him from accessing

either source. 54 The court concluded that, “[H]is ignorance of the grievance

50 Pratt v. Deville, Civ. A. No. 2016 WL 1602948, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 23, 2016) (citing Aguirre v. Dyer,

233 Fed.Appx. 365 (5th Cir. 2007); Simkins v. Bridges, 350 Fed.Appx. 952, 953-54 (5th Cir. 2009);

Plaisance v. Cain, 374 Fed.Appx. 560, 561 (5th Cir. 2010)). See¸ Davis, 798 F.3d 290; Fisher v. Johnson,

174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (“First, ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

petitioner, generally does not exclude prompt filing.”) (citation omitted).

51608 Fed.Appx. 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010))

(internal citation omitted).

52 798 F.3d at 295.

53 Id. (citing Leggett v. Lafayette, 608 Fed.Appx. 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2015).Plaisance, 374 Fed.Appx. at

561 (“Plaisance’s ignorance of the law does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with procedural

requirements.”)) (emphasis in original).

54 Davis, 798 F.3d at 295.

procedures, without more, is no basis to deem them unavailable.”55 The Davis court

further found the second relevant rule applicable, which is that, “Grievance

procedures are unavailable to an inmate if the correctional facility’s staff misled the

inmate as to the existence or rules of the grievance process so as to cause the inmate

to fail to exhaust such process.”56 Based on the record before it, which included

testimony from the inmate that the jail staff told him the grievance process includes

only a single step and that he did not file an appeal based on that misrepresentation,

the Fifth Circuit held that, “we see no reason that Davis should not be entitled to rely

on the representations of his jailers.”57 As such, the Fifth Circuit held that the second

step of the jail’s grievance process was unavailable to the inmate, that he was not

required to exhaust the unavailable second step, and that the defendants were not

entitled to summary judgment on their exhaustion defense.58

Applying the foregoing authority to the facts of this case, the Court finds that

Defendants have put forth evidence showing that the St. Tammany Parish Jail’s

grievance procedure was available to Guillot, Jr. through kiosks/tablet computers. In

an Affidavit previously filed into the record, Warden Kelly states that the jail’s

grievance process was available to Guillot, Jr. because it was included in the Inmate

Handbook, which “is made available to all inmates through each dormitory’s

kiosk/tablet computer.”59 Warden Kelly further stated in her Affidavit that Guillot,

55 Id.

56 Id. at 295-95 (citing authority) (emphasis in original).

57 Id. at 296.

58 Id.

59 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14).

Jr. was removed from the jail’s holding cells on January 3, 2020, and has been

assigned to the C800 housing unit since January 10, 2020.60 Thus, Warden Kelly’s

Affidavit indicates that Guillot, Jr. has had access to a dormitory kiosk/tablet

computer since at least January 20, 2020. Plaintiffs do not dispute this evidence,

other than to assert that when Guillot, Jr. was housed in the holding cells, he was

never advised that a computer existed or that he had access to a computer.61

Plaintiffs, however, fail to direct the Court to any evidence or Fifth Circuit authority

indicating that Guillot, Jr.’s ignorance of the grievance procedure establishes that the

procedure was unavailable to him.

As in Davis, the undisputed evidence before the Court shows that the St.

Tammany Parish Jail’s grievance procedure is included in an Inmate Handbook, a

copy of which is in the record, and is made available to all inmates through each

dormitory’s kiosk/tablet computer. 62 Plaintiffs have not argued that the

kiosks/computers were not available to Guillot, Jr. or that they were not functioning

properly. In fact, the Court finds that the evidence relied upon by Plaintiffs – Guillot,

Jr.’s sworn declaration – shows just the opposite, as Guillot, Jr. confirms that he not

only had access to a dormitory computer during his incarceration, he also knew how

to use it and was able to review an orientation video that discussed highlights from

the Inmate Handbook.63 Further, there is no suggestion that anyone ever misled

Guillot, Jr. about the grievance process or attempted to dissuade him from making

60 R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 11.

61 R. Doc. 117 at pp. 1-2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 10) (emphasis added).

62 R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14 & at pp. 17-22.

63 R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12.

use of it. Plaintiffs allege, generally, that “if inmates had a complaint about the

inhumane living conditions in the holding cells, they were told to take it to ‘rank;’

meaning a supervisor,” and that, “when the complaints were communicated to the

supervisors, the complaints were simply ignored.”64 These allegations, however, do

not suggest that Guillot, Jr. was ever misled by jail officials regarding the existence

or rules of the grievance process or that jail officials “thwarted” his efforts to take

advantage of the grievance process. The Court therefore finds that Guillot, Jr. had a

“fair, reasonable opportunity to apprise himself” of the jail’s grievance process.65

The Court further finds that several unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions

indicate that even if Guillot, Jr. did not receive a hard copy of the Inmate Handbook,

that fact, alone, does not render the St. Tammany Parish Jail’s administrative

grievance procedures unavailable to him.66 In Manemann v. Garrett, the Fifth

Circuit concluded that the plaintiff-prisoner was unaware of the jail’s grievance

policy, but affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies because the record indicated that the jail had a grievance policy and there

was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff “ever asked for information about

filing a grievance and was refused such information or was given incorrect

64 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 18-19).

65 Davis, 798 F.3d at 295.

66 Leggett v. Lafayette, 608 Fed.Appx. 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Manemann v. Garrett, 484

Fed.Appx. 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2012); Huff v. Neal, 555 Fed.Appx. 289, 296 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding

that grievance procedures were available where inmate “could have discovered” deadline for filing a

formal complaint); Gonzalez v. Crawford, 419 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiff

prisoner’s] alleged ignorance of the exhaustion requirement, or the fact that he might have

misconstrued the language in the handbook, does not excuse his failure to exhaust.”); Palermo v.

Miller, 196 Fed.Appx. 234, 235 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claim for

failure to exhaust where prisoner mistakenly believed it was unnecessary to file a Step 2 grievance).

information.”67 As such, the Manemann court held that the defendants had met their

burden of showing that a grievance policy existed and that it was accessible to the

plaintiff-prisoner.68 The Fifth Circuit concluded that, “By failing to even inquire

about filing a grievance regarding the denial of his special footwear, Manemann failed

to exhaust his remedies with respect to any claims related to that denial, and those

claims were subject to dismissal.”69 District courts in this Circuit have likewise held

that a prisoner plaintiff must, at the very least, inquire about filing a grievance and

be denied to properly assert that administrative remedies are unavailable.70 Here,

there is no evidence before the Court indicating that Guillot, Jr. ever inquired about

a grievance policy at St. Tammany Parish Jail, or that he was ever refused such

information or given incorrect information by jail staff.

Finally, the Court would be remiss if it did not address Guillot, Jr.’s assertion

that he did not learn about the existence of St. Tammany Parish Jail’s grievance

procedure until after the April 10, 2020 preliminary injunction hearing. In their

Opposition brief, Plaintiffs assert that, “A short time after the preliminary injunction

hearing, Guillot, Jr. discovered a new orientation video that had been placed on the

dormitory computer (in his new housing unit) for inmates to review. The orientation

67 Id. (citing Manemann, 484 Fed.Appx. 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2012)).

68 484 Fed.Appx. at 858.

69 Id. (citing 72 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). See also, Garcia v. Spotts, Civ. A. No. 1:17cv26-LG-RHW, 2019 WL

4454508, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 30, 2019) (citing Manemann and finding that lack of a copy of the

inmate handbook does not render the ARP process unavailable to an inmate).

70 Davis v. Butler, Civ. A. No. 2:12cv210-MTP, 2014 WL 5502421, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 30, 2014) (citing

Manemann, 484 Fed. Appx. at 858); See also, Bailey v. Anderson, Civ. A. No. 4:13-CV-663-O, 2014 WL

4327917 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014) (concluding that administrative remedies were available where

plaintiff offered no explanation as to why he could not pursue the remedies while in the prison

hospital).

video discusses highlights from the Inmate Handbook, and for the first time, put

Guillot, Jr. on notice that the Administrative Remedy Procedure existed.”71 Plaintiffs

further assert that, “Prior to discovering the aforementioned orientation video on the

computer, Guillot, Jr. does not recall anyone ever providing him with a copy of, or

informing him of the existence of an Inmate Handbook and/or the existence of an

Administrative Remedy Procedure.”72

The Court finds these assertions suspect in light of the fact that Guillot, Jr.

retained counsel prior to filing the Complaint in this case on March 22, 2021, a mere

95 days after he entered the holding cells at St. Tammany Parish Jail on December

18, 2019.73 However, several of the holding cell conditions complained of in the

Complaint would not have been apparent to Guillot, Jr. for several days. In fact,

Plaintiffs have specifically alleged in the Complaint that, “The Defendants to this

action forced pre-trial detainees to endure days to weeks of prolonged pretrial

detainment in dirty, cramped holding cells, with as many as twenty-four (24)

detainees confined within a ten-foot by twenty-foot space.”74 Thus, unless Guillot, Jr.

did not retain counsel until just a few days before the Complaint was filed, he likely

had the benefit of counsel within the 90-day period for filing a grievance and his

counsel could have advised him of the jail’s grievance procedure. Plaintiffs’ counsel

was no doubt aware of the PLRA’s requirement that a prisoner must exhaust

71 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 15-16) (emphasis added). See, R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12-

13.

72 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 17); See, R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 14.

73 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 100, 104, 107.

74 Id. at ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court when counsel filed the

Complaint in this case. Presumably, counsel would have consulted with Guillot, Jr.

before filing this lawsuit. Further, Guillot, Jr. was expressly asked about St.

Tammany Parish Jail’s grievance procedure during the April 10, 2020 preliminary

injunction hearing. Although Guillot, Jr. testified that he did not know what a

grievance was or that the jail had a grievance process, when Plaintiffs’ counsel

objected to defense counsel’s line of questioning regarding the grievance procedure,

defense counsel explained, “Mr. Guillot, there is testimony in the record already from

the warden that there is an administrative review process for dealing with grievances

filed by inmates.”75 Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to why this line of questioning

did not suffice to make Guillot, Jr. aware of the existence of St. Tammany Parish

Jail’s grievance procedure. As such, the Court questions the veracity of Guillot, Jr.’s

assertion in his Declaration that he first learned about the jail’s grievance procedure

“A short time after the preliminary injunction hearing,” when he accessed a new

orientation video on a dormitory computer.76

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment as to Guillot, Jr.’s claims, which must be dismissed for his

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion For Summary

Judgment filed by defendants, Randy Smith, Lacey Kelly, Rodney J. Strain and Greg

75 R. Doc. 44 at pp. 83-84.

76 R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12.

Longino,’?7is GRANTED and Klabert Joseph Guillot, Jr.’s claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, April 23, 2021.

Ojos iB Vetter

WENDY B./VITTER

United States District Judge

Doe. 111.