Blanchard v. Tillman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SADIE MICHELE BLANCHARD ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 20-2400

JEFFREY SCOTT TILLMAN ET AL SECTION “B”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendant Jeffrey Tillman’s motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 10), plaintiff

Sadie Michele Blanchard’s response in opposition (Rec. Doc. 13),

and defendant’s reply (Rec. Doc. 20). For the reasons discussed

below,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction IS DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This suit arises out of an October 2019 state election. Rec.

Doc. 13 at 2. In October 2019, plaintiff Sadie Michele Blanchard

was a candidate for the Louisiana House of Representatives District

76 race. Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 2. During her candidacy, defendant

Jeffrey Tillman was an employee of U.S. Term Limits as its Deputy

Field Director. Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 2. During the election, Tillman

allegedly solicited information through a private email account

from plaintiff, seeking information regarding her thoughts on

congressional term limits. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint shows that

Tillman emailed Blanchard three times. Rec. Doc. 1 at 4-6.

Plaintiff states that Blanchard responded to his email on August

20, 2019. Id. Her response was that she had “no objection to term

limits for Congress or any other elected office.” Id. Tillman

emailed her two more times. Id. at 4.

According to plaintiff, U.S. Term Limits used her response to

launch a negative social media campaign two weeks prior to the

election. Rec. Doc. 13 at 2. U.S. Term Limits “caused four attack

mailers to be mailed that contained many false statements.” Id. As

a result, plaintiff filed a Petition for Damages and Fines pursuant

to La. R.S. 18:1463 and La. Civ. Code art. 2998 in the 22nd Judicial

State Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana.

Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 2. The petition contains three claims which are

(1) election law violations with a request for penalties; (2)

defamation with request for damages; and (3) enrichment without

cause under La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 2298. Rec. Doc. 13 at 2. On

September 1, 2020, defendants removed the state action to federal

court on the grounds of complete diversity and damages in excess

of $75,000. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

Then, on October 6, 2020, Tillman filed a motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Rec.

Doc. 10-1 at 1. Defendant is a resident of Michigan. Id. at 2.

Additionally, he does not own property in Louisiana. Id. He has

never resided in Louisiana and only visited the state once for a

convention. Rec. Doc. 10-2 at 2. Tillman claims to have not caused

plaintiff direct harm besides exchanging emails with her. Id.

Although Tillman admits to communicating by emails and phone calls

to elected officials and candidates for office in Louisiana, he

disputes any involvement in “produc[ing], generat[ing], or

transmit[ting] the mailers.” Id.; Rec. Doc. 20 at 1.

A. Whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the state

Before a defendant must answer to a court “with which he has

established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations,” the Due

Process Clause requires a “fair warning that a particular activity

may subject [him] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). The

Due Process Clause’s “fair warning” requirement “gives a degree of

predictability to the legal system that allows potential

defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum

assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them

liable to suit.” Id. at 472 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

“The minimum contacts prong of the due process analysis may

be satisfied if the contacts give rise to specific personal

jurisdiction or give rise to general personal jurisdiction.”

Planet Beach Franchising Corp. v. C3Ubit, Inc., 2002 WL 1870007 at

*2 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2002)(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, (1984)). A defendant’s

minimum contacts must demonstrate that his “conduct and connection

with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate

being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at

297. However, reasonable anticipation is tempered by the

“purposeful availment” requirement, which “ensures that a

defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result

of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Burger King, 471

U.S. at 475.

i. Specific Jurisdiction1

“Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an

out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this

‘fair warning’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has

‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum.

. .and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise

out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at

472. Accordingly, when the suit is related to or arises out of the

defendant’s alleged contacts with the forum state, “the minimum-

1 Plaintiff’s

opposition appears to be mainly based on this Court

exercising specific jurisdiction, alleging that defendant’s contacts

with the forum gave rise to the instant cause of action. Nevertheless,

plaintiff believes that defendants have systematic and continuous

contacts in Louisiana through solicitation of candidates and elected

officials’ support, signatures for their pledge, and voter donations.

Thus, plaintiff maintains that jurisdictional discovery is needed to

verify this belief. Rec. Doc. 13 at 19.

Defendant objects to jurisdictional discovery by alleging that it may

only serve “to open up a fishing expedition for Plaintiffs.” Rec. Doc.

20 at 5. Because we believe that the case subjects Tillman to specific

jurisdiction, a general jurisdiction analysis and limited discovery is

not necessary.

contacts inquiry focuses on the relationship among the defendant,

the forum and the litigation.” See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466

U.S. at 415. “A single act by the defendant directed at the forum

state can be enough to confer in personam jurisdiction over him,

if the cause of action arises out of that act.” Jackson v. Lotte

Chemical Louisiana LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00676, 2020 WL 6220160, at *1

(W.D.La. Oct. 22, 2020)(citing Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v.

Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Flowers

Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 332-34 (5th Cir. 1982)(holding that a

telephone call to the forum state was sufficient for satisfying

personal jurisdiction).

a. Whether Tillman conducted business in Louisiana

Tillman argues that he is not subject to personal jurisdiction

in the forum because he “did not purposefully avail himself to the

privileges of conducting business in Louisiana.” Rec. Doc. 10-1 at

9. In objecting to any purposeful availment in the state, Tillman

cites to Stuart v. Spademan, wherein the Fifth Circuit affirmed a

district court’s dismissal of a defendant for lack of personal

jurisdiction. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985).

In Spademan, the plaintiff asserted that the court could

exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant in the state of

Texas because of his various activities within the forum, such as

the execution of the contract in dispute and various written and

oral correspondence and transactions between the parties. Id. at

1189. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction because the parties “did not

contemplate a long-term relationship” involving “long-term

obligations and wide-reaching contacts.” Id. at 1194. Tillman

relies on Spademan to suggest that not even a defendant with

arguably greater contacts with a forum can be subject to personal

jurisdiction if those contacts do not contemplate a long-term

relationship with the forum. Rec. Doc. 10-1 at 10.

Specific jurisdiction does not depend on whether there be any

contact at all with a resident in the forum but rather the nature

of that contact. The Spademan Court emphasized that “an exchange

of communications between a resident and a nonresident in

developing a contract is insufficient of itself to be characterized

as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protections of

the forum state’s laws.” Spademan, 772 F.2d at 1193. However,

Spademan and the instant dispute share little, if any, factual

similarities. The plaintiff therein unilaterally initiated contact

with the defendant and judging by the nature of the parties’

infrequent correspondence regarding their contract, the defendants

did not contemplate a long-term business relationship with the

forum. Id. at 1194. Here, it was Tillman who attempted to contact

Blanchard about her position through email and phone calls until

Blanchard eventually responded to one of Tillman’s emails. Thus,

as the Fifth Circuit directed in Spademan, we must look to the

nature of Tillman’s contacts – namely his emails with Blanchard –

to determine whether he contemplated an ongoing business

relationship in the state.

Tillman principally relies on the Louisiana Second Circuit’s

decision in Devillier, involving a Louisiana plaintiff who sued a

Tennessee-based insurance agent for failing to inform him of a

policy limit. Devillier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 49,562 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 161 So.3d 993, 994-95. The plaintiff therein

argued that the insurance agent’s emails to the plaintiff while

the latter was temporarily relocated in Louisiana was sufficient

to confer personal jurisdiction over the agent. Id. at 996. The

appellate court disagreed and held that the emails were

insufficient to subject the agent to personal jurisdiction because

the suit arose “out of alleged acts and omissions committed by

[the agent] in Tennessee.” Id. at 997. Tillman suggests that this

holding stands for the proposition that a non-resident defendant’s

minimum contacts in the state cannot be established solely through

an exchange of emails with a party within that state. Rec. Doc.

10-1 at 6.

In Internet Doorway, the district court found that personal

jurisdiction was satisfied under the Mississippi long-arm

statute’s “doing business” prong based on emails sent by the Texas

defendant. Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F.Supp.2d 773, 775

(S.D.Miss. 2001). The district court reasoned:

. . .[W]hen [the defendant] allegedly transmitted the

email to a recipient or recipients in Mississippi, it

was an attempt to solicit business for a particular web-

site. Thus, [the defendant] committed a purposeful act

that occurred in Mississippi, just as if she had sent

via United State Mail a letter to a Mississippi resident

advertising a particular product of service.

Id. at 776. Notably, the court found that “the active as opposed

to passive nature of e-mail weighs in favor of finding personal

jurisdiction.” Id.

Devillier’s rationale indicates that the emails’ subject

matter is relevant for the purpose of specific jurisdiction. The

Louisiana Second Circuit determined that the nature of the email

communications was “too attenuated to serve as the basis for

specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 997. Thus, the Tennessee

agent could not have reasonably foreseen being haled into court in

Louisiana, given that the emails only pertained to matters within

Tennessee. Id. Because Devillier is not analogous to the present

case, we are not persuaded to apply its reasoning.

The instant dispute bears a greater factual similarity to

Internet Doorway because Tillman sought to contact Blanchard in

hopes of gaining her public support for U.S. Term Limits and their

mission. Their emails pertained to her candidacy for state office

in Louisiana and how Louisiana voters may respond to her position

on congressional term limits. Because their exchange related to

Louisiana politics, the nature of their emails are not so

attenuated that Tillman could not have reasonably foreseen being

haled into Louisiana. Moreover, because La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201(A)

advises us to construe “doing business” broadly, Tillman’s

deliberate solicitation of Blanchard’s support for his

organization reasonably falls under this prong of the long-arm

statute.

b. Whether Tillman committed a tortious act in Louisiana

Relative to jurisdiction over non-residents in intentional

tort suits, Calder requires courts to analyze the effects of the

alleged tort in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,

789 (1984). In Calder, the plaintiff, who was an actress residing

in the forum, filed suit in California against a Florida reporter

for writing a libelous story on her that was widely circulated in

the forum state. Id. at 785. The Court found jurisdiction proper

over the reporter because “his actions were expressly aimed at

California” by writing an article he knew would cause a

“potentially devastating impact” on the plaintiff in the forum

state where she lived and worked. Id. at 789-90.

The Fifth Circuit later modified the Calder effects test in

Revell v. Lidov to add a requirement that the defendant must have

knowledge of the forum at which his alleged conduct is directed.

317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002)(“Knowledge of the particular

forum in which a potential plaintiff will bear the brunt of the

harm forms an essential part of the Calder test.”). In Revell, the

plaintiff sued the Massachusetts defendant in a Texas court for

writing a defamatory article accusing the former of conspiring

with the Reagan Administration. Id. at 469. However, the defendant

was unaware that the plaintiff resided in Texas at the time he

wrote the article on an online forum maintained by Columbia

University. Id. The court found that a Texas court could not

exercise personal jurisdiction, in part, because the article made

no reference to Texas or the plaintiff’s Texas activities nor was

it directed at Texas readers. Id. at 473. The court stated,

“defendant must be chargeable with knowledge of the forum at which

his conduct is directed in order to reasonably anticipate being

haled into court in that forum, as Calder itself and numerous cases

from other circuits applying Calder confirm.” Id. at 475.2

Plaintiff argues that Tillman’s deliberate actions to contact

her in furtherance of his business ultimately caused injury to her

reputation and cost her an election, which may be grounds for

personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Rec. Doc. 13 at

6; Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 5. Tillman informed Blanchard in his email:

Our effort is for the folks in Washington DC[.] The

bureaucrats as well as [l]obbyist [sic] have an extreme

level of control already and the longer an official is

there the more cozy they become. . .We surely need open

seats to give more citizens a chance to step up and fix

2 The Fifth Circuit also noted, “Demanding knowledge of a particular

forum to which conduct is directed, in defamation cases, is not

altogether distinct from the requirement that the forum be the focal

point of the tortious activity because satisfaction of the latter will

ofttimes provide sufficient evidence of the former.” Id. at 475-76.

this. . .We would love to let our supporters in Louisiana

know you are with them. . .”

Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 5 (emphasis added). Once the defendant initiated

contact with plaintiff, he clearly indicated what his and U.S.

Term limits’ efforts were in doing so - to discuss Blanchard’s

position on congressional term limits and its potential impact on

their local supporters.

Although Tillman attests that he did not create nor

disseminate the mailers, executive director Nick Tomboulides

stated that U.S. Term Limits knew they had supporters in St.

Tammany Parish and it was Tillman’s responsibility as deputy field

director to contact Blanchard. Rec. Doc. 11-2 at 1-2. In that

email, Tillman informed Blanchard that they had supporters within

the state, who would want to know that she is “with them.” Rec.

Doc. 1-1 at 5. After Blanchard refused to sign the term limits

pledge to “voice her support”, Tomboulides further revealed in his

affidavit, “In connection with Mr. Tillman’s emails with Ms.

Blanchard, U.S. Term Limits’ committee directed that the mailers

in question be designed and sent to Louisiana.” Rec. Doc. 11-2 at

2.

Upon applying the Calder effects test, Tillman’s activities

reflected an intentional and orchestrated effort by the defendants

to contact Blanchard, gain her support for their cause, and impact

the local election in some manner depending on her response.

Defendants here knew they had support in St. Tammany Parish, and

as deputy field director, Tillman reached out to Blanchard, a

candidate for state office, and asked her to pledge her support

for term limits or risk forfeiting votes from their local

supporters. Moreover, Tomboulides’ affidavit confirms that Tillman

and Blanchard’s emails prompted U.S. Term Limits to create the

attack mailers. Not only does this display a collective plan by

the defendants that was noticeably missing in Belin but also

illustrates Tillman’s knowledge of the forum at the time he

contacted Blanchard, which ultimately provoked the dissemination

of the mailers, as required by Revell. As such, Blanchard alleges

the mailers costed her an opportunity to serve as a state

representative and damaged her reputation in the state. Rec. Doc.

1-1 at 19. Thus, Tillman’s activities, which ultimately gave rise

to the instant suit, satisfy all requirements of the Calder test

to the extent that he could have reasonably anticipated being haled

into a Louisiana court. Therefore, plaintiff has shown that Tillman

purposefully availed himself to the forum by establishing minimum

contacts and is subject to specific personal jurisdiction.

B. Whether personal jurisdiction over Tillman would offend

due process

The Fifth Circuit described the importance of analyzing

fairness in the jurisdiction inquiry because it “captures the

reasonableness of hauling a defendant from his home state before

the court of a sister state.” Revell, 317 F.3d at 476. “It is not

fairness calibrated by the likelihood of success on the merits or

relative fault. Rather, we look to the geographic focus of the

article, not the bite of the defamation, the blackness of the

calumny, or who provoked the fight.” Id.

Based on above, Tillman should have reasonably anticipated

being haled into court because his decision to contact Blanchard

directly related to Louisiana voters, a state election, and her

public support for U.S. Term Limits. Tillman was aware that if

Blanchard did not publicly support congressional term limits, it

could affect her electability among their local supporters. Thus,

in that respect, personal jurisdiction over Tillman does not offend

due process.

Tillman also argues that jurisdiction would impose a burden

upon him, given that he “lives a thousand miles away” and has no

other ties to the forum. Rec. Doc. 10-1 at 12. This argument alone

does not move the Court to render jurisdiction unfair because

traveling to this district to defend this suit will not be

“especially onerous.” See Annie Sloan Interiors, Ltd. v. Davis

Paint Co., No. 18-8431, 2019 WL 329580, at *4 (E.D.La. Jan. 25,

2019)(Lemmon, J.)(finding that personal jurisdiction would not

offend due process because the defendant, as president of the

defendant corporation, would likely be traveling to the forum in

connection with the litigation anyway). Even if this Court elected

not to exercise personal jurisdiction over Tillman, it is likely

that he would have been expected to travel to the forum anyway to

serve as a witness. Therefore, Tillman’s argument is without merit,

and the Court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over

Tillman comports with the traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 25th day of February 2021

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE