The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WAYLAND COLLINS, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 18-7465
JOHN C. BENTON, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
This action arises from an alleged motor vehicle collision in the Parish of Orleans, State
of Louisiana.1 Before the Court is Defendant General Star Indemnity Company’s (“General Star”)
“Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for More Definite Statement.”2 Plaintiffs Wayland
Collins, Candy Kelly, and Alvin Polk (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion.3 Also before
the Court is General Star’s “Unopposed Motion to Extend Certain Pre-trial Deadlines.”4
Considering the motions, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court grants the motion to dismiss in part and denies the motion to dismiss in
part. Additionally, the Court denies the motion to extend certain pre-trial deadlines as moot.
I. Background
On August 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Mark Ingle (“Ingle”),
John C. Benton d/b/a/ Q&M Motor Transports (“Q&M Motor”), and Northland Insurance
1 Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.
2 Rec. Doc. 195.
3 Rec. Doc. 198.
4 Rec. Doc. 256.
Company (“Northland”) in this Court, seeking recovery for injuries and property damage that
Plaintiffs allegedly sustained in an automobile accident.5 According to the Complaint, on August
9, 2017, Plaintiff Wayland Collins was operating a vehicle on Interstate 10 when, while exiting
onto Interstate 510, he collided with an 18-wheeler driven by Ingle.6 Plaintiffs allege that Ingle
was turning onto Interstate 510 and negligently misjudged his clearance, resulting in the motor
vehicle incident at issue.7 Plaintiffs additionally allege that Ingle was cited for an “improper lane
change.”8 Plaintiffs bring negligence claims against Ingle and Q&M Motor, who Plaintiffs allege
is Ingle’s principal, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.9 Plaintiffs also bring claims
against Northland, who purportedly insured the 18-wheeler operated by Ingle.10
On December 30, 2019, Plaintiffs moved to extend the time to amend pleadings in order
to add several defendants to this litigation.11 On January 9, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs’
motion to extend the time to amend pleadings.12 On January 15, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a first
supplemental and amending complaint (the “Amended Complaint”).13 In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs name General Star, Innovative Transport Solution, Inc., ABC Insurance
Company, Automotive Transport Services, Inc., Def Insurance Company, US AutoLogistics,
5 Rec. Doc. 1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id. at 5.
10 Id.
11 Rec. Doc. 164.
12 Rec. Doc. 178.
13 Rec. Doc. 180.
LLC (“US AutoLogistics”), GHI Insurance Company, The Hertz Corporation d/b/a Hertz Rent-
A-Car (“Hertz”), and XYZ Insurance Company as additional defendants.14
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following with respect to General Star:
General Star Indemnity Company, at all times relevant herein, had in full force
and effect a policy of liability insurance coverage of excess and/or umbrella
coverage in favor of defendants, John Benton, d/b/a Q & M Transport, Defendant
Ingle and/or U.S. AutoLogistics, LLC, as the permissive operator of the insured
vehicle, for his negligence in connection with the August 9, 2017, motor vehicle
collision at issue herein. As a result of the foregoing and as per applicable
Louisiana law, General Star Indemnity Company has been named herein as party-
defendant and is answerable and/or responsible for the negligence and/or
liability.15
Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed the claims against US AutoLogistics and Hertz.16
On April 13, 2020, General Star filed the instant “Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively,
Motion for More Definite Statement.”17 Plaintiffs filed an opposition on April 27, 2020.18 On
May 7, 2020, with leave of Court, General Star filed a reply memorandum in further support of
the instant motion.19 On September 1, 2020, with leave of Court, General Star filed a
supplemental memorandum in support of the instant motion.20 On September 14, 2020, with leave
of Court, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental opposition.21
On January 8, 2020, General Star filed an “Unopposed Motion to Extend Certain Pre-Trial
14 Id. at 1–4.
15 Id. at 7.
16 Rec. Doc. 219; Rec. Doc. 221.
17 Rec. Doc. 195.
18 Rec. Doc. 198.
19 Rec. Doc. 203.
20 Rec. Doc. 235.
21 Rec. Doc. 250.
Deadlines.”22 In that motion, General Star requests a two-week continuance of the deadline for
General Star to submit written expert reports and a two-week continuance of the deadline for all
parties to file witness and exhibit lists.23 General Star requests a continuance of these deadlines
pending ruling on the instant motion to dismiss.24
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. General Star’s Arguments in Support of the Motion to Dismiss
General Star urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against General Star pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for three reasons.25 First, General Star argues that the
allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint are “insufficient to state a claim against General
Star.”26 Specifically, General Star contends that Plaintiffs do not “specify the insurance policy
that General Star allegedly issued that purportedly provides coverage, nor do Plaintiffs identify
an actual alleged insured.”27 In addition, General Star asserts that the Amended Complaint “does
not contain any allegations as to why General Star may be liable to Plaintiffs under the unspecified
insurance policy.”28
Second, General Star argues that there are “insufficient facts to support a procedural right
to sue General Star.”29 Specifically, General Star avers that “Plaintiffs do not claim to be insureds
22 Rec. Doc. 256.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Rec. Doc. 195-1 at 4–13.
26 Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 6.
28 Id.
29 Id.
under any policy issued by General Star” and “therefore cannot assert a contractual claim against
General Star.”30 General Star also contends that “Plaintiffs cannot assert a plausible tort claim
against General Star.”31 In addition, General Star asserts that “[t]he only possible procedural
vehicle arguably available to Plaintiffs to sue General Star is [the] Louisiana Direct Action
Statute” but General Star claims that “the factual allegations are insufficient to support a direct-
action claim against General Star.”32
Third, General Star argues that the “Excess Automobile Liability Insurance Policy” issued
by General Star to Q&M Motor for the period of May 20, 2017 to May 20, 2018 (the “Excess
Policy”) “does not apply to the facts of this case.”33 General Star contends that the Excess Policy
“is implicated only if the claimed damages exceed the $1,000,000 attachment point.”34 General
Star then asserts that Plaintiffs “fail to state a plausible claim against General Star under the
[Excess Policy]” because the Excess Policy “applies only to ‘occurrences’ arising from the
Contract between [Q&M Motor] and [US AutoLogistics]” and Plaintiffs do not allege that the
collision occurred in connection with that contract.35
In the alternative, General Star argues that the Court should order Plaintiffs to provide a
more definite statement of their claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).36
General Star asserts that “Plaintiffs must clarify the nature of the contracts and the parties thereto
30 Id.
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id. at 6–7.
33 Id. at 7–8.
34 Id. at 8.
35 Id. at 9–10.
36 Id. at 13–14.
before General Star can answer the Amended Complaint and plead affirmative defenses.”37
B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the instant motion to dismiss should be denied
because the Amended Complaint “clearly describe[s] [Plaintiffs’] theory of liability against the
Defendant, General Star Indemnity Company.”38 First, Plaintiffs argue that the Excess Policy
issued by General Star identifies Q&M Motor as a named insured.39 Plaintiffs further argue that
the Louisiana Direct Action Statute enables Plaintiffs to bring tort claims against General Star as
insurer for Q&M Motor.40
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the factual allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint
“are far beyond a speculative level.”41 Plaintiffs further contend that the allegations “allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”42
Third, Plaintiffs oppose General Star’s argument that Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead
that the Excess Policy applies to the facts of this case.43 Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged
facts to show that the collision occurred in connection with a contractual relationship between US
AutoLogistics and Q&M Motor.44 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Ingle was “performing duties
on behalf of [Q&M Motor] and/or [US AutoLogistics] and/or [Hertz]” when the collision
37 Id. at 14.
38 Rec. Doc. 198 at 3.
39 Id. at 5–7.
40 Id. at 8.
41 Id. at 9–10.
42 Id. at 10.
43 Id. at 10–13.
44 Id.
occurred.45 Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that General Star “knew that Plaintiffs’ claims will
exceed $1,000,000.00,” the point at which the Excess Policy is implicated, from emails and letters
transmitted in connection with the instant lawsuit.46
C. General Star’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion to Dismiss
In the reply brief, General Star offers two principal arguments in further support of the
motion to dismiss. First, General Star argues that “Plaintiffs impermissibly ask this Court to look
beyond the four corners” of the Amended Complaint to consider “unpled allegations,” “multiple
references to e-mail communications,” “record documents,” and “statements in Opposition that
damages exceed the $1,000,000 policy limits of the Northland policy.”47 General Star contends
that the “vague allegations” in the Amended Complaint fail to identify, among other things, who
was insured under the Excess Policy.48
Second, General Star reiterates that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the purported collision
at issue in this litigation occurred in connection with the Excess Policy issued by General Star.49
In support of this argument, General Star points to the “Bill of Lading” between Hertz and Q&M
Motor, which General Star claims shows that the Excess Policy did not provide coverage for the
alleged collision.50
45 Id. at 11.
46 Id. at 13–14.
47 Rec. Doc. 203 at 2.
48 Id. at 3.
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. at 5.
D. General Star’s Supplemental Arguments in Further Support of the Motion to Dismiss
In the supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, General Star argues
that “there is no legal basis for General Star to remain in this lawsuit” because Hertz and US
AutoLogistics have been dismissed from the instant action.51 General Star contends that the
dismissal of US AutoLogistics “further evidence[s]” that US AutoLogistics was not involved in
the alleged accident and there was no coverage under the Excess Policy issued by General Star.52
General Star also contends that it has “repeatedly attempted to obtain a voluntary dismissal” from
the instant action to no avail, and General Star requests that this Court “award it any and all
remedies” in light of “Plaintiffs’ unreasonable and meritless refusal to voluntarily dismiss General
Star.”53
E. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Further Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
In the supplemental opposition brief, Plaintiffs argue that in the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that Q&M Motor is a named insured under the Excess Policy issued by General
Star.54 Plaintiffs contend that “the dismissal of Hertz and US AutoLogistics has nothing to do
with the instant claims” against General Star.55
III. Legal Standard
A. Legal Standard for 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for
51 Rec. Doc. 235 at 1.
52 Id. at 2.
53 Id. at 3–4.
54 Rec. Doc. 250 at 1.
55 Id. at 2. Plaintiffs assert that Hertz and US AutoLogistics were dismissed because the evidence indicated
that Hertz “never had any agreement” with US AutoLogistics for this specific job. Id.
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”56 A motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”57 “To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.’”58 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”59 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”60
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.61 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.62 “While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.”63 Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements” will not suffice.64 The complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, but it must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
57 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
58 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2008)).
59 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
60 Id. at 570.
61 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see
also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
62 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
63 Id. at 679.
64 Id. at 678.
the elements of a cause of action.65 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned,
the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”66 From the face of the complaint, there must
be enough factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as
to each element of the asserted claims.67 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is
an “insuperable” bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.68
B. Legal Standard for Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement
Rule 12(e) entitles a party to a more definite statement when a portion of a pleading “is
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive
pleading.”69 The motion must state the defects in the pleading and the details desired.70 A party
may not use a Rule 12(e) motion as a substitute for discovery.71 However, the Supreme Court has
held that “[i]f a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient
notice,” then a Rule 12(e) motion may be appropriate.72 In deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(e)
motion for a more definite statement, the trial judge is given considerable discretion.73
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
68 Moore v. Metro. Human Serv. Dep’t, No. 09-6470, 2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010)
(Vance, C.J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n. 9
(5th Cir. 2007).
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). See Cole v. JEBF Holdings, LLC, No. 14-0298, 2014 WL 6327088, at *2 (E.D. La.
Nov. 13, 2014) (Brown, J.).
70 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
71 Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959).
72 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
73 See Mitchell, 269 F.2d at 129. See also Cole, 2014 WL 6327088, at *2 (internal citation omitted) (“A
C. The Louisiana Direct Action Statute
Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1269(B)(1), known as the Louisiana Direct Action Statute,
“affords a victim the right to sue the insurer directly when the liability policy covers a certain
risk.”74 The statute pertinently provides: “The injured person . . . shall have a right of direct action
against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and, such action may be brought
against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido . . . .”75
Additionally, the statute provides that such action may be brought against the insurer alone under
certain enumerated conditions.76
IV. Analysis
General Star urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against General Star pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).77 In the alternative, General Star moves the Court to
order Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of the claims against General Star pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).78 General Star contends that “the factual allegations are
insufficient to support a direct-action claim against General Star.”79 General Star also contends
that dismissal of General Star is appropriate in light of Plaintiffs’ dismissal of US AutoLogistics
district court’s order pursuant to Rule 12(e) will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.”).
74 Soileau v. Smith True Value & Rental, 2012-1711 (La. 8/30/2013); 144 So. 3d 771, 780; see also La. Rev.
Stat. § 22:1269.
75 La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1269(B)(1).
76 Id.
77 Rec. Doc. 195.
78 Id.
79 Rec. Doc. 195-1 at 6–7.
and Hertz as parties to the instant action.80 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the instant motion
should be denied because the Amended Complaint “clearly describe[s] [Plaintiffs’] theory of
liability” against General Star under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute.81 Plaintiffs also argue
that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against US AutoLogistics and Hertz has no bearing on
Plaintiffs’ allegations against General Star.82
As an initial matter, both parties urge the Court to consider evidence in the record obtained
through discovery.83 In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.84
In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to
a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's
complaint and are central to her claim.”85 Accordingly, the Court limits its review of this matter
to the contents of the pleadings and the “Excess Automobile Liability Policy” attached by General
Star to the instant motion86 because the Excess Policy is referenced in the Amended Complaint
and is central to Plaintiffs’ allegation that General Star provided insurance coverage to Q&M
Motor for the alleged collision.87
80 Rec. Doc. 235.
81 Rec. Doc. 198 at 3, 8.
82 Rec. Doc. 250 at 2.
83 See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 198 at 13 (discussing excerpts of emails); Rec. Doc. 203 at 5 (referencing “Bill of
Lading”).
84 Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6).
85 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Venture Assocs.
Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir.1993)).
86 Rec. Doc. 195-2.
87 Rec. Doc. 180 at 7.
This tort action arises out of a motor vehicle collision that Plaintiffs allege was caused by
the negligent operation of an 18-wheeler driven by Ingle.88 Plaintiffs name Q&M Motor as a
defendant in the instant action under the doctrine of respondeat superior.89 In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs set forth the following allegations against General Star:
Paragraph 2(A): GENERAL STAR INDEMNITY COMPANY, a foreign
corporation upon information and belief, incorporated in a State other than the
State of Louisiana, who upon information and belief at all times relevant
herein provided excess and/or umbrella coverage to [Q&M Motor] and/or
[US AutoLogistics] for the August 9, 2017 motor vehicle collision at issue.90
. . .
Paragraph 14(A): General Star Indemnity Company, at all times relevant
herein, had in full force and effect a policy of liability insurance coverage of
excess and/or umbrella coverage in favor of defendants, [Q&M Motor],
Defendant Ingle and/or [US AutoLogistics], as the permissive operator of the
insured vehicle, for his negligence in connection with the August 9, 2017, motor
vehicle collision at issue herein. As a result of the foregoing and as per applicable
Louisiana law, General Star Indemnity Company has been named herein as party-
defendant and is answerable and/or responsible for the negligence and/or
liability.91
In opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiffs clarify that the cause of action against
General Star arises under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute.92 Pursuant to the statute, Plaintiffs
may sue General Star as insurer “within the terms and limits of the policy.”93
The Excess Policy issued by General Star names Q&M Motor as the “first named insured”
under the policy.94 However, the terms of the Excess Policy state that the policy applies only in
88 Rec. Doc. 1.
89 Id. at 5.
90 Rec. Doc. 180 at 1–2 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
92 Rec. Doc. 198 at 8.
93 La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1).
94 Rec. Doc. 195-2 at 3.
the following circumstances:
The insurance provided by this policy applies only to ultimate net loss in excess
of underlying insurance for damages for which the insured is legally liable, or
costs or expenses, arising out of, resulting from, caused or contributed to by:
a. An occurrence which is covered by the controlling underlying policy; and
b. The designated contract in the Schedule above.95
The “underlying insurance” referenced in this clause of the Excess Policy is the insurance
policy issued by Northland to Q&M Motor which provides up to $1,000,000 in liability
coverage.96 In addition, the “designated contract” referenced in this clause of the Excess Policy
is a “Master Transporter Agreement” between Q&M Motor and US AutoLogistics.97 Therefore,
the clear terms of the Excess Policy indicate that the policy applies only to incidents “arising out
of, resulting from, caused or contributed to by” the specified contract between Q&M Motor and
US AutoLogistics where liability exceeds $1,000,000.
It is unclear from Plaintiffs’ allegations whether the alleged collision occurred in
connection with a contract between Q&M Motor and US AutoLogistics. In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[Hertz] had contracted with [US AutoLogistics] and/or [Q&M
Motor] to perform duties on its behalf of returning return vehicles to one of its affiliate offices.”98
Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that the motor vehicle collision at issue occurred in connection with
95 Rec. Doc. 195-2 at 21 .
96 Id. at 4.
97 Id. at 21.
98 Rec. Doc. 180 at 4; see also Rec. Doc. 180 at 6 (“Upon further information and belief, a contract,
agreement or understanding between Hertz Rent-A-Car, US AutoLogistics, LLC, John Benton d/b/a Q&M
Motor Transport exists whereupon each of the parties were operating in furtherance of each of their
individual interests in the transportation of vehicles to the benefit of Hertz Rent-A-Car rendering each of
the named Defendants liable as this accident occurred in the course and scope of transporting The Hertz
Corporation d/b/a Hertz Rent-A-Car vehicles.”).
that alleged contract.99 Moreover, in opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiffs rely on this
alleged contract to argue that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the Excess Policy applies in the
instant action.100 Yet Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed their claims against Hertz and US
AutoLogistics and now contend that the dismissal of these parties from the instant action does
not bear on the applicability of the Excess Policy.101 Given that the Excess Policy, by its terms,
applies only to occurrences in connection with a contract between Q&M Motor and US
AutoLogistics, it is unclear how the Excess Policy is implicated in the instant action following
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against US AutoLogistics and Hertz.102
Plaintiffs’ allegations are too vague and ambiguous for the Court to decipher how
Plaintiffs assert that the Excess Policy applies to the accident at issue in this litigation––especially
considering that Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against US AutoLogistics and Hertz.
Accordingly, the Court grants General Star’s request for a more definite statement pursuant to
Rule 12(e). Plaintiffs must provide a more definite statement setting forth allegations regarding
how the Excess Policy––which by its terms only applies to occurrences “arising out of, resulting
from, caused or contributed to by” a contract between Q&M Motor and US AutoLogistics––
applies to the instant action.
V. Conclusion
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ ambiguous allegations
99 Id.
100 Rec. Doc. 198 at 11.
101 Rec. Doc. 250 at 2.
102 In addition, it is unclear from Plaintiffs’ allegations whether liability exceeds the $1,000,000 threshold
below which the Excess Policy does not apply. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not allege damages
in excess of $1,000,000. See Rec. Doc. 180.
leave uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the Excess Policy issued by General Star to
Q&M Motor in this action. Therefore, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to provide a more definite
statement to allege how the Excess Policy is implicated in this action following the dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ claims against US AutoLogistics and Hertz.
Additionally, the Court finds that General Star’s “Unopposed Motion to Extend Pre-trial
Deadlines” is moot.103 General Star sought a two-week continuance of the deadline for General
Star to submit written expert reports and a two-week continuance of the deadline for all parties to
file witness and exhibit lists pending ruling on the instant motion to dismiss.104 The parties have
already filed witness and exhibit list in accordance with the deadlines set by the Court.105
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that “Defendant General Star Indemnity Company’s
Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for More Definite Statement”106 is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that General Star
requests a more definite statement of Plaintiffs’ claims against General Star pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.
103 Rec. Doc. 256.
104 Id.
105 Rec. Docs. 260, 261, 262.
106 Rec. Doc. 195.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file a more definite statement alleging
how the Excess Policy issued by General Star to Q&M Motor is implicated in this action within
fourteen days of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that General Star’s “Unopposed Motion to Extend Certain
Pre-trial Deadlines” !°’ is DENIED AS MOOT.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 26th day of January, 2021.
NANNETYE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
107 Rec. Doc. 256.
17