Belcher v. Lopinto

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAYNE BELCHER ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 18-7368

JOSEPH LOPINTO, III ET AL. SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are Defendants CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC and

Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the

Opinions of Dr. Colley and Dr. Venters Relating to the Applicable Standard of

Care (Doc. 130). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Joshua Belcher’s suicide at the Jefferson Parish

Correctional Center (“JPCC”) in Gretna, Louisiana, where he was being held

as a pretrial detainee. Following his death, Belcher’s parents, Jayne and

Jimmy Belcher (“Plaintiffs”), filed this suit, alleging violations of § 1983 and

state law against Joseph P. Lopinto, III and Newell Normand, as the current

and former Sheriffs of Jefferson Parish, respectively; Jefferson Parish;

CorrectHealth Jefferson, L.L.C. (“CH”), the entity with whom Jefferson Parish

contracted to provide healthcare services at JPCC; and Ironshore Specialty

Insurance Co., the insurance provider for CH. Plaintiffs’ claims against the

Sheriffs and Jefferson Parish have been dismissed, leaving only Plaintiffs’

claims against CH and Ironshore.

Plaintiffs claim that CH’s treatment of Belcher at JPCC demonstrates a

policy of deliberate indifference. In the first few days after Belcher was

arrested, he exhibited multiple symptoms of alcohol and drug withdrawal. Six

days after he entered JPCC, on August 13, 2017, Belcher attempted suicide

and was subsequently placed on suicide watch. David Jennings, a social worker

for CH, was in charge of monitoring Belcher’s mental health while Belcher was

on suicide watch. Jennings conducted two, ten to twenty-minute, evaluations

of Belcher while he was in the infirmary. In the second evaluation, on August

15, 2017, Jennings found that Belcher’s mental health had improved and

believed Belcher’s withdrawal symptoms had abated. Shortly thereafter,

without conducting any psychological or diagnostic assessment, Jennings

discharged Belcher from suicide watch, authorized his release to general

population, and ordered that a follow-up evaluation be scheduled for one week

later. Belcher committed suicide in his cell two days later. Plaintiffs plan to

present the expert testimony of Dr. Jeremy Huston Colley and Dr. Homer

Venters to demonstrate that CH’s treatment of Belcher constitutes a gross

deviation from the appropriate standard of care in the correctional setting.

CH and Ironshore now bring their Motion in Limine to Exclude the

opinions of Dr. Colley and Dr. Venters Relating to the Applicable Standard of

Care.

LEGAL STANDARD

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of

Evidence 702, which provides as follows:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is

the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert

has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the

case.

The current version of Rule 702 reflects the Supreme Court’s decisions in

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 and Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael.2 The threshold inquiry is whether the expert possesses the

requisite qualifications to render an opinion on a particular subject matter.3

Having defined the permissible scope of the expert’s testimony, a court next

inquires whether the opinions are reliable and relevant.4 In undertaking this

tripartite analysis, courts must give proper deference to the traditional

adversary system and the role of the finder of fact within that system.5

“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful

instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means

of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”6 As the “gatekeeper” of expert

testimony, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining admissibility.7

1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

2 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

3 Wagoner v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 813 F. Supp. 2d 771, 799 (E.D. La. 2011); see also Wilson v.

Woods, 163 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A district court should refuse to allow an expert

witness to testify if it finds that the witness is not qualified to testify in a particular field

or on a given subject.”).

4 See United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010).

5 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

6 Id.

7 Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d 867, 881 (5th Cir. 2013).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs intend to introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Venters and

Dr. Colley on the adequacy of care that CH provided to the decedent, Belcher.

Defendants argue that, under the “locality rule” of Louisiana Revised Statutes

§ 9:2794, the standard of care against which CH’s actions should be measured

is that of a “similar community or locale and under similar circumstances.”8 As

neither Dr. Venters nor Dr. Colley has practiced medicine within the state of

Louisiana or is “familiar with the standard of care applicable to Louisiana

correctional healthcare,” Defendants argue that neither expert is qualified to

testify on the standard of care applicable to this case. Defendants therefore

move to exclude each doctor’s testimony accordingly.

Defendant’s entire argument is premised on the applicability of

Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2794. Louisiana’s “locality rule,” however, is

inapplicable to the current matter. “Although state law governs the substance

of Plaintiff[s’] [state law claims] against [Defendants], ‘the Federal Rules of

Evidence control the admission of expert testimony.’”9 It is thus whether

Plaintiffs’ experts are qualified to testify under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,

not Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:2794, that will control the admissibility of

Dr. Colley and Dr. Venters’ testimonies.10

“Whether an individual is qualified to testify as an expert is a question

of law.”11 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, “[e]xperts qualified by

‘knowledge, skill, experience, training or education’ may present opinion

8 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(A)(1).

9 Rodgers v. Gusman, No. CV 16-16303, 2019 WL 3220107, at *7 (E.D. La. July 17, 2019)

(quoting Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)).

10 See id. In Rodgers, this Court refuted the applicability of the same Louisiana case,

Berthelot v. Stadler, 2013 WL 3947106 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2013), that Defendants cite in

support of their present motion. Id.

11 Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).

testimony to the jury.”12 An expert need not be “highly qualified in order to

testify about a given issue.”13 Variances in expertise or specialization may

affect the “weight to be assigned to the testimony by the trier of fact, not its

admissibility.”14

Applying the above, Dr. Colley and Dr. Venters are patently qualified to

testify on the quality of care that CH provides at JPCC. Dr. Colley graduated

from medical school at Columbia University, completed his fellowship in

Forensic Psychiatry at New York University, received certifications from the

American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in Adult Psychiatry and Forensic

Psychiatry, and most recently served as the Program Director of the

Fellowship in Forensic Psychiatry at New York University.15 Of particular

relevance, Dr. Colley’s research focus includes the “[e]valuation, treatment,

and ethics related to [f]actitious [d]isorders in [c]orrectional [s]ettings” and the

“[h]arms of solitary confinement.”16 Dr. Colley is therefore qualified to offer

testimony as to the standard of care afforded to suicidal inmates at JPCC.

Dr. Venters is similarly suited to testify in this matter. Dr. Venters is “a

physician, internist and epidemiologist with over a decade of experience in

providing, improving and leading health services for the incarcerated.”17 Dr.

Venter’s resumé includes a long list of accolades, publications, and oral

presentations that demonstrate his expertise in both mental and physical

health services at correctional facilities. Notably, he served as Assistant

Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer of the New York City Jail

12 Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).

13 Huss, 571 F.3d at 452.

14 Id.; see also United States v. Wen Chyu Liu, 716 F.3d 159, 168–69 (5th Cir. 2013); Rodgers,

2019 WL 3220107, at *7.

15 Doc. 130-5. at 16–18.

16 Doc. 130-5 at 19.

17 Doc. 130-4 at 1.

Correctional Health Service, where he “was responsible for all aspects of health

services including physical and mental health, addiction, quality

improvement, re-entry and morbidity and mortality reviews.”18 Dr. Venters’

extensive experience in prison healthcare systems qualifies him to testify as to

the standard of care that should have been exercised at JPCC.

As stated above, the extent of Dr. Venters and Dr. Colley’s experience

with Louisiana standards will go to the weight of their testimonies, not their

admissibility. Even so, the Court notes that Louisiana standards play, at most,

a minor role in either expert’s report. In Dr. Colley’s report, he compares CH’s

practices to the standard of care articulated by the American Psychiatric

Association, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care

(“NCCHC”), federal court orders and consent decrees, and the widely cited case

of Ruiz v. Estelle.19 In Dr. Venters’ report, he compares CH’s practices to the

“most elemental standards of NCCHC, as well as basic correctional practice.”20

Both experts focus on national standards because it is a national standard,

that of the NCCHC, that CH contractually obligated itself to meet. As neither

expert opines on the standard of care in Louisiana, Defendants’ contention that

the experts are unfamiliar with Louisiana standards is largely

inconsequential.

This Court thus finds that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, both Dr.

Colley and Dr. Venters are qualified to testify in this matter despite lacking

locality-specific expertise.

18 Id.

19 See Doc. 130-5 at 6; Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part,

rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266

(5th Cir. 1982). Colley contends that the standards articulated in Ruiz have been adopted

nationally.

20 Doc. 130-4 at 6.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants CorrectHealth and Ironshore’s

Motion in Limine (Doc. 130) is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 2nd day of October, 2020.

g TRICHE MILAZZO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE