Opinion

Warren v. Mallory

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Jul 24, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ANTOINE WARREN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 18-11613

PETER MALLORY, ET AL. SECTION: “B”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS

NATURE OF MOTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Before the Court are: (1) defendants’ motion to strike

plaintiffs’ experts (Rec. Doc. 34); (2) plaintiffs’ response in

opposition (Rec. Doc. 35); and (3) defendants’ reply in support of

their motion to strike (Rec. Doc. 40). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion is DENIED subject to

plaintiffs submitting proper summary disclosures pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C), no later than September 20, 2020;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that expert deadlines are extended only

to allow for the latter submissions by plaintiffs and to provide

corresponding extension to defendants for related discovery and

responses to plaintiffs’ submissions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case stems from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on

November 29, 2017 in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 1 at para.

1. On that date, plaintiff Antoine Warren was operating a 2005

Cadillac SRX, owned by plaintiff Anthony Nettles, traveling

eastbound in the middle lane of Interstate 10. Id. at para. 4.

Plaintiffs Micheuala Brown, Anthony Nettles, and a minor child were

passengers in the vehicle. Id. at para. 5. At the same time,

defendant Peter Mallory (“Mallory”) was operating a 2016

Freightliner Model TT 18-wheeler, with an attached box trailer,

eastbound, in the right lane of interstate 10. Id. at para. 6.

Plaintiffs contend defendant Mallory attempted to change lanes and

collided with the vehicle. Id. at para. 7. Defendant Mallory was

cited by the New Orleans Police Department for an improper lane

change violation. Id. at para. 9. The Freightliner 18-wheeler driven

by defendant Mallory was owned by Wooden Products. Plaintiffs allege

defendant Mallory was in the course and scope of his employment with

Wooden at the time of the accident. Id. at para 10.

All plaintiffs are domiciled in Orleans Parish. Id. at pp. 1-2

(A-C). Further, plaintiff Anthony Nettles brings suit individually

on behalf of himself, as well as on the behalf of his unnamed minor

child, pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 4061.1 A. Id.

Defendant Mallory is a resident and domiciled in the County of

Montgomery, Alabama. Id. at p. 2 (A).

Defendant Wooden Products Transportation, Inc. (“Wooden”) is a

foreign corporation, incorporated and with a principal place of

business in Alabama. Id. at p. 2 (B). Defendant Wooden was the owner

of the Freightliner 18-wheeler, and the employer of defendant

Mallory, at the time of the collision. Id. Amtrust Financial

Services, Inc. (“Amtrust”) is a foreign insurance company authorized

to do and doing business in the state of Louisiana, incorporated and

with a principal place of business in “a State other than Louisiana”.

Id. at p. 2 (C). Amtrust is the insurer of the Freightliner 18-

wheeler, and/or trailer, which allegedly caused the collision. Id.

Defendant Wesco insurance Company (“Wesco”) is a foreign insurance

company authorized to do and doing business in Louisiana,

incorporated and with a principal place of business in states other

than Louisiana. Id. at p. 3 (D). Wesco is also alleged to be the

insurer of the Freightliner 18-wheeler, and/or trailer, involved in

the incident. Id.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on November 27, 2018. Rec.

Doc. 1. This Court entered the agreed upon scheduling order on August

29, 2019. Rec. Doc. 22. In that scheduling order, the parties agreed

to a final pre-trial conference to take place on April 9, 2020 and

a jury trial to begin on May 4, 2020. Rec. Doc. 22. The scheduling

order further noted:

Written reports of experts, as defined by Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), who may be witnesses for

plaintiff fully setting forth all matters about which they

will testify and the basis therefor shall be obtained and

delivered to counsel for defendant as soon as possible,

but in no event later than January 10, 2020.

Rec. Doc. 22 at 2(emphasis added). As of yet, plaintiffs have failed

to submit any expert reports in compliance with this Court’s

scheduling order or the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

Further still, plaintiffs did not submit any summary disclosures for

witnesses who do not provide expert reports, such as treating

physicians, before the prior deadline of February 4, 2020, ninety

(90) days before the originally scheduled trial. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(C).

On March 19, 2020, defendants filed a motion to continue the

trial, based on complications created by the COVID-19 global

pandemic, and in compliance with the Eastern District of Louisiana’s

then current General Order No. 20-2. Rec. Doc. 41. This Court granted

defendants’ motion to continue, cancelling the April 9, 2020 final

pre-trial conference and the May 4, 2020 jury trial. Rec. Doc. 42.

This Court then held a scheduling conference on April 9, 2020, to

establish a new trial date, and deadlines for the completion of

depositions. Rec. Doc. 45.

At the April 9 scheduling conference, the parties agreed to:

(1) a final pre-trial conference date of December 22, 2020; (2) a

jury trial to take place on January 11, 2021; and (3) and a completion

date for all trial-use depositions of November 20, 2020. Rec. Doc.

45 at 1. The scheduling order did not re-set or re-establish any

prior deadlines for expert reports. Rec. Doc. 45.

Because plaintiffs failed to submit expert reports before the

prior scheduling order’s January 10, 2020 deadline, defendants filed

the instant motion to strike the testimonies of plaintiffs’ four

treating physicians. Rec. Doc. 34. Defendants contend that because

plaintiffs failed to file written expert reports within the deadline

established by the first scheduling order, plaintiffs’ experts

should be excluded. Id. at 4; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs’ experts should be excluded

because plaintiffs also failed to submit summary disclosures 90 days

before the May 4, 2020 trial date, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(C). Plaintiff’s claim that by providing the medical records

of plaintiffs’ treating physicians, which include causation

opinions, that they have complied with both Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(B) and 26 (a)(2)(C). Rec. Doc. 35.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 requires parties to

“disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may

use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,

703, or 705.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). Rule 26 categorizes these

witnesses for purposes of disclosure requirements into those expert

witnesses who are retained or specially employed to give expert

testimony and those who are not retained or specially employed but

may provide expert testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A), (C);

Advisory Comm. Note 2010.

Experts who are retained by the party must provide an expert

report pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Non-retained expert witnesses

(e.g., treating physicians) were exempt from disclosure requirements

under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), prior to 2010; however, under the “treating

physician exception” those witnesses were allowed to testify as to

those facts related to the medical records and treatment. See Perdomo

v. United States, 2012 WL 2138106 at *1 (E.D. La. 2012); Morgan v.

Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 2008 WL 7602163 at *1 (E.D. La.

2008). Several courts have determined that treating physicians may

offer testimony as non-retained experts if the testimony is confined

to those facts or data the physician learned during actual treatment

of the plaintiff. Morgan, 2008 WL 7602163 at * 2; Perdomo, 2012 WL

2138106 at *4; LaShip, LLC, v. Hayward Baker, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 475,

480 (E.D. La. 2013); Kim v. Time Ins. Co., 267 F.R.D. 499, 502 (S.D.

Tex. 2008). However, where testimony “consists of opinions based on

‘scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge’ regardless

of whether those opinions were formed during the scope of interaction

with a party prior to litigation,” the testimony is rather that of

an expert. Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 757, n. 2

(7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For example, testimony as to

causation or as to future medical treatment has been considered the

province of expert testimony subject to the requirements of section

(a)(2)(B). Rea v. Wis. Coach Lines, Inc., No. 12-1252, 2014 WL

4981803, at * 2 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2014) (citations omitted). In

addition, where a physicians' testimony is prepared in anticipation

of litigation by the attorney or relies on sources other than those

utilized in treatment, courts have found that the treating physician

acts more like an expert and must submit a report under Rule

26(a)(2)(B). See e.g., Robert Parker, et al. v. NGM Insur. Co., et

al., No. 15-2123, 2016 WL 3198613, at *2 (E.D. La. June 9, 2016).

Since Congress amended Rule 26 in 2010, however, Rule

26(a)(2)(C) creates a separate requirement that expert witnesses who

do not provide a written report, such as treating physicians, must

submit a disclosure stating: (1) the subject matter on which the

witness is expected to testify under Federal Rules of Evidence 702,

703, and 704; and (2) the facts and opinions to which the witness is

expected to testify. The 2010 Advisory Committee Notes specifically

address treating physicians and have lead courts to the conclusion

that any testimony not contained in medical records is more aptly

considered expert testimony and subject to disclosure under Rule

26(a)(2)(C). See Perdomo, 2012 WL 2138106 at *1; Boudreaux, 2013 WL

3440027, at *3.

Failure to comply with the deadline for disclosure requirements

results in “mandatory and automatic” exclusion under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), and the party is not allowed to use “that

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing,

or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is

harmless.” Red Dot Bldgs. v. Jacob Tech., Inc., 2012 WL 2061904, at

*3 (E.D. La. 2012); see also Lampe Berger USA, Inc. v. Scentier,

Inc., 2008 WL 3386716, at *2 (M.D. La. 2008). Courts evaluate four

factors to assess the nature of the omission in deciding whether to

strike the testimony: (1) the explanation for the failure to identify

the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) potential

prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of a

continuance to cure such prejudice. Betzel v. State Farm Lloyds, 480

F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2007).

In this matter, defendants correctly contended plaintiffs

failed to adhere to the deadlines for submitting expert reports

imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26( a)(2)(B) and summary disclosures

imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). However, while that

contention was accurate at the time this motion was filed, it has

since been rendered inaccurate by complications resulting from

COVID-19, the Eastern District of Louisiana’s General Order 20-2,

and this Court’s order continuing the trial of this matter. Rec.

Doc. 42. The trial of this matter has been continued until January

11, 2021. Rec. Docs. 42, 45. Therefore, the applicable time period

for summary disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C) has

not yet passed, and plaintiffs may still comply with the requirements

set forth in FRCP 26(a)(2)(C). Accordingly, defendants’ motion to

strike plaintiffs’ experts is denied, subject to plaintiffs filing

requisite summary disclosures for treating physicians pursuant

to FRCP 26(a)(2)(C), no later than September 20, 2020.

Further, plaintiffs are warned the filing of medical records

containing doctors’ observations from a visit will not suffice.

FRCP 26(a)(2)(C) requires the party propounding the testimony of a

non-retained expert to provide a disclosure stating:

(1) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to

present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705;

and (2) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness

is expected to testify. Further, the Eastern District has held

that “disclosures consisting of medical records alone are

insufficient to satisfy the disclosure standard of Rule 26(a)(2)

(C).” Hooks v. Nationwide Hous. Sys., LLC, No. CV 15-729, 2016 WL

3667134, at *5 (E.D. La. July 11, 2016) (citing Williams v.

State, No. 14-00154, 2015 WL 5438596, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 14,

2015)).

New Orleans, Louisiana this 21st day of July, 2020.

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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