affirming dismissal of plaintiff Veritext’s constitutional claims against defendant CSR Board, and reversing the dismissal of Veritext’s Sherman Act claim with against CSR Board
How later courts described this case
- affirming dismissal of plaintiff Veritext’s constitutional claims against defendant CSR Board, and reversing the dismissal of Veritext’s Sherman Act claim with against CSR Board
- stating that an Order disposing of all claims against a defendant “clearly had the requisite finality to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, had the district court made a proper certification under Rule 54(b).”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
VERITEXT CORP. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 16-13903 C/W
17-9877
REFERS TO: 17-9877
PAUL A. BONIN, ET AL. SECTION: “B”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS ORDERED that defendant LCRA’s opposed motion for Rule
54(b) certification (Rec. Doc. 153) is DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court is familiar with the facts of this case. Therefore,
the factual basis for this Motion incorporates the prior factual
findings from this Court’s Order dismissing plaintiff’s Sherman
Antitrust Act and Constitutional Vagueness claims against defendant
LCRA and dismissing plaintiff’s Constitutional Vagueness claim
against defendant Louisiana Board of Examiners of Certified
Shorthand Reporters (“CSR Board”). Rec. Doc. 137 at 2-4.
In this Court’s order (Rec. Doc. 137), plaintiff Esquire’s
Sherman Act and Constitutional Vagueness claim against defendant
LCRA were dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Rec. Doc. 137.
This Court subsequently entered a judgment dismissing all claims
against LCRA in accordance with its Order and Reasons. Rec. Doc.
138. Defendant LCRA has filed the current Motion to certify this
Court’s Judgment (the “Judgment”) as final, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b) (“FRCP 54(b)”). Rec. Doc. 153.1
LAW AND ANALYSIS
FRCP 54(b) provides in pertinent part:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief –-
whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-
party claim -– or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the
court expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Eastern District of Louisiana has noted
that requests for certification pursuant to FRCP 54(b) “should not
be granted routinely.” Patterson v. Blue Offshore BV, et al., No.
13-337, 2016 WL 2348057, at *3 (E.D. La. May 4, 2016).
When determining whether to certify a judgment pursuant to FRCP
54(b), courts must make two determinations: (1) the court must
determine whether “‘it is dealing with a final judgment’”; and (2)
whether there is a just reason for delay. Briargrove Shopping Ctr.
Joint Venture v. Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc., 170 F.3d 536, 539 (5th
Cir. 1999). To determine whether there is a just reason for delay,
the district court must weigh “‘the inconvenience and costs of
1 Plaintiff contends that certification is not warranted because it would be
premature considering its pending motion for reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 145) and
defendant LCRA’s pending motion to dismiss in the Veritext litigation (Rec. Doc.
119). However, at the time plaintiff filed their opposition to defendant’s Motion
for certification, this Court had not ruled on plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration or defendant LCRA’s motion to dismiss. This Court has subsequently
ruled on and denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 193) and
granted defendant LCRA’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Rec. Doc.
210) in the Veritext litigation. Accordingly, the issues cited by plaintiff
pertaining to prematurity are moot.
piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice
by delay on the other.’” Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union v. Cont’l
Sprinkler Co., 967 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1992)(citing Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). Further, the
Fifth Circuit has noted that “the policy underlying both the finality
rule and the requirement of Rule 54(b) certification is to prohibit
‘piecemeal’ appeals . . .” Id. (citations omitted).
Defendant’s assert that the Judgment is an ultimate disposition
of fewer than all claims in this multi-claim action. Rec. Doc. 153-
1 at 3. In this Court’s Judgment, all of plaintiff’s claims pursuant
to the Sherman Antitrust Act and for Constitutional Vagueness of
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1434, against defendant
LCRA, were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Rec. Doc. 137.
Thus, defendant LCRA has been dismissed from the suit, and this
Court’s Judgment has met the initial requirement of being an ultimate
disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a
multiple-claim action. See DeMelo v. Woolsey Marine Indus., Inc.,
677 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982)(stating that an Order disposing
of all claims against a defendant “clearly had the requisite finality
to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, had the district court made
a proper certification under Rule 54(b).”).
Defendant further contends that there is no just reason for
delay. Rec. Doc. 153-1 at 4. Defendant suggests that without Rule
54(b) certification of this issue for immediate appeal, defendant
will be prejudiced by being forced to remain a party to the
litigation until final adjudication at trial. Id. Defendant further
avers that it has incurred “considerable expense defending
allegations that have been found legally insufficient on their face.”
Id. at 5.
Plaintiff counters that the LCRA has not advanced any viable
reason why this Court should depart from the Fifth Circuit’s stance
on piecemeal litigation. Rec. Doc. 157 at 5. Specifically, plaintiff
urges that premature certification of the Judgment could potentially
result in multiple appellate reviews involving two different cases
with “substantially identical legal and factual issues.” Id. This
Court agrees with plaintiff’s contention that there is no hardship
or burden that defendant has shown adequately entitles them to FRCP
54(b) certification.
In Decraene v. United States, the Eastern District of Louisiana
held that a motion for certification pursuant to FRCP 54(b) was
inappropriate where the claims involved “multiple overlapping
facts.” Decraene v. United States, No. 97-3190, 1999 WL 246708, at
*4 (E.D. La. Apr. 26, 1999). In Decraene, the court adopted the
findings of the Magistrate Judge, which dismissed with prejudice
eleven out of sixteen causes of action set forth by plaintiff, the
claims asserted against four defendants, and retained the remaining
claims for further proceedings. Id. at *2. The court held, “[e]ven
if some of the claims constitute final disposition of the claims and
parties . . . the interests of judicial economy outweigh plaintiff’s
desire to take the issues on appeal.” Id. at *4. In support, the
court further noted that, “[t]he claims involve[d] multiple
overlapping facts” and that “the Curtiss-Wright court cautions
against entry of a final judgment that would require an appeals court
to familiarize itself with the same issue or facts more than once.”
Id. (citations omitted).
The facts and claims pertaining to the Judgment in question
overlap with those of other similarly situated defendants in this
matter and the Veritext litigation, namely the allegations of Sherman
Antitrust Act violations against defendants CSR Board and its
members. Specifically, those facts pertain to the alleged conspiracy
to prohibit national court reporting firms, like the Veritext
Corporation and Esquire, from competing and/or doing business within
Louisiana.
Further, in the Veritext litigation, the Fifth Circuit recently
heard an appeal regarding plaintiff Veritext’s Sherman Antitrust Act
claims against defendant the CSR Board, concerning similar, if not
identical, facts as set forth in the instant dispute. See Veritext
Corp. v. Bonin, 901 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2018)(affirming dismissal of
plaintiff Veritext’s constitutional claims against defendant CSR
Board, and reversing the dismissal of Veritext’s Sherman Act claim
with against CSR Board). Subsequently, this court has recently issued
an opinion denying the CSR defendants motion for partial summary
judgment. In addition, the financial hardships cited by defendant
LCRA in monitoring the matter until resolution of all claims at trial
do not outweigh the cost and inconvenience of a piecemeal review of
this matter in the Fifth Circuit. Thus, defendant’s motion for
certification pursuant to FRCP 54(b) is inappropriate at this
juncture.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 10th Day of July 2020.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE