The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CRYSTAL STOKES, CIVIL ACTION
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF HER MINOR SON L.B.
VERSUS NO: 19-1642
GUY FARBER, ET AL. SECTION: "A" (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
(Rec. Doc. 35) filed by defendant, Guy C. Farber (incorrectly referred to in the
complaint as “Guy Faber”). The plaintiff, Crystal Stokes, individually and on behalf of
her minor child L.B., opposes the motion. The motion, submitted on January 8, 2020, is
before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.1
I. BACKGROUND
This complaint arises out of an incident that occurred at a public high school in
Jefferson Parish. L.B. is the minor child of the plaintiff, Crystal Stokes. In the fall of
2018, L.B. was a fifteen-year old 10th grader at Grace King High School in Metairie,
Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 14). In February 2018 L.B. was formally arrested by
the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office for terrorizing in violation of La. R.S. § 14:40.1.2
1 Plaintiffs filed a request for oral argument but the Court is not persuaded that oral
argument would be helpful at this time.
2 La. R.S. § 14:40.1, entitled Terrorizing, states:
A. Terrorizing is the intentional communication of information that the
commission of a crime of violence is imminent or in progress or that a
circumstance dangerous to human life exists or is about to exist, with the intent
of causing members of the general public to be in sustained fear for their safety;
or causing evacuation of a building, a public structure, or a facility of
transportation; or causing other serious disruption to the general public.
L.B. was suspended from Grace King and expelled. All charges were eventually
dismissed. Stokes filed this action to recover for the wrongful arrest and school
discipline that L.B. was subjected to in light of the terrorizing charge.
The events giving rise to this action are alleged as follows and the Court accepts
them as true for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss:3
On or about the morning of February 21, 2018, L.B. was in his second period
health class when his teacher, defendant Guy Farber, began a discussion with the
students about the recent high school shootings elsewhere in the country. Mr. Farber
stated to his students that the stereotypical high school shooter was a white male. L.B, a
male, was the only white person in the classroom of approximately 25 students and the
only person who fit Mr. Farber’s description of the stereotypical high school shooter.
The other students began to make jokes about L.B. fitting Mr. Farber’s description. For
instance, several students jokingly asked L.B. to spare them from being shot. L.B. went
along with the jokes and told them they would be okay. The entire class, including Mr.
B. It shall be an affirmative defense that the person communicating the
information provided for in Subsection A of this Section was not involved in
the commission of a crime of violence or creation of a circumstance dangerous
to human life and reasonably believed his actions were necessary to protect the
welfare of the public.
C. Whoever commits the offense of terrorizing shall be fined not more than
fifteen thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more
than fifteen years, or both.
3 The comprehensive recitation of events contained in this ruling is taken nearly verbatim
from the original complaint. No party should construe any statement contained in the
ruling’s Background section as a factual finding by this Court. The recitation includes
Plaintiffs’ characterization of the events described, including allegations of malicious intent.
The Court neither agrees nor disagrees with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the events alleged
in the complaint. The Court has opted to include in this ruling the nearly verbatim
allegations with only minimal changes because the complaint is well-written and very
effectively organizes the factual allegations underlying Plaintiffs’ claims.
Farber, laughed at those jokes. (Comp. ¶ 15).
One student, continuing the joke about L.B. fitting Mr. Farber’s description of the
stereotypical high school shooter, got out of his desk, walked to the front of the classroom,
drew a large caricature of L.B. on the white board affixed to the front of the classroom,
and wrote the words “Future School Shooter” in large letters above the caricature.
Another student asked the drawing student to change the hair on the caricature to match
L.B.’s hair more closely. Several students asked L.B. to pose next to the drawing so that
they could take photographs. Mr. Farber observed the student draw the caricature and
words above it and heard the students ask L.B. to pose next to the drawings so that they
could take photographs. Mr. Farber took no steps to discourage his students’ actions and
instead laughed along with the students at the drawings on the whiteboard. (Comp. ¶ 16).
To go along with the students and Mr. Farber’s joke about him fitting Mr.
Farber’s description of the stereotypical high school shooter, L.B. complied with the
students’ request, got out of his desk, walked to the front of the classroom, and posed
next to the caricature, while several of the other students took photographs with their
cellphones. Mr. Farber observed all this conduct yet took no action to stop or even
dissuade the students. Again, Mr. Farber laughed along with his students when L.B.
posed next to the caricature while the students photographed L.B. L.B. walked around
the class giving hand gestures, such as “fist bumps” to the students in response to their
jests asking L.B. to spare them. Mr. Farber observed all of this and laughed along with
his class. (Comp. ¶ 17).
The following morning, L.B. went to his first period class. The school’s dean of
students came to L.B.’s classroom and asked him to come to the principal’s office. At the
office, he met with Sgt. Billy Matranga of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (another
defendant herein), who was wearing a police uniform and badge, as well as carrying a
firearm. Sgt. Matranga restrained L.B. with handcuffs and placed him in the rear of a
marked police vehicle parked outside of the school. Sgt. Matranga then brought L.B. to
the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office Detective Bureau in Harvey, Louisiana. Sgt.
Matranga then locked L.B. in a holding cell for over an hour. (Comp. ¶ 18).
Sgt. Matranga contacted L.B.’s mother, Crystal Stokes, and asked her to come to
the detective bureau. When she arrived, Sgt. Matranga brought her to the cell where he
had imprisoned L.B. Sgt. Matranga questioned L.B. about the photographs and possibly
a video of L.B. posing next to the caricature in health class. Sgt. Matranga advised that
the photographs of L.B. that the other students had posted circulated through social
media sites and this caused parents and members of the media to contact the school and
the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office. During the questioning, Sgt. Matranga learned that
during L.B.’s health class Mr. Farber told the students that the stereotypical school
shooter was a white male, which led the other students to joke with L.B. because he was
the only one to fit this description; that another student drew the picture and caption;
that the other students asked L.B. to pose with the drawings; and that other students,
but not L.B., posted the photographs on social media. Sgt. Matranga learned that the
teacher, Mr. Farber, had full view of L.B. complying with the other students’ request and
that Mr. Farber gave his tacit consent to the students’ actions. Sgt. Matranga was aware
that Mr. Farber was present during this entire episode, initiated the joke that led to L.B.
appearing in the photographs standing next to the caricature and caption on the
whiteboard and laughed along with the students. (Comp. ¶ 19).
On information and belief, Sgt. Matranga’s supervisor, Capt. David Malveaux
(another defendant herein) learned of the above circumstances that led to L.B.
appearing in the photographs, including that Mr. Farber started and participated in this
joke with the students in his class. (Comp. ¶ 20).
On or about February 22, 2018, at 8:15 a.m., Mr. Farber signed a document
stating that in his health class the day before, “someone” wrote the caption next to the
caricature of L.B., but that he had not noticed it until “after the students left the room.”
Mr. Farber claimed that he saw L.B. draw a picture of himself earlier and that he “did
not have an opportunity to ask the students because they were all gone.” These
statements were false as Mr. Farber was fully aware of who wrote the caption and the
caricature during class. Mr. Farber intentionally made these false statements to avoid
trouble for himself because of public concern about what occurred in his classroom.
(Comp. ¶ 21).
Anyone seeing the photographs of L.B. standing next to the caricature and
caption that the students posted on social media and being aware of the layout of the
classroom would instantly realize that it was nearly impossible for Mr. Farber to have
signed a truthful document. It was nearly impossible for someone to have been in that
classroom and missed seeing the drawings, posing, and photographs being taken at the
very front of the classroom. (Comp. ¶ 22).
Sgt. Matranga and Capt. Malveaux were aware of the photographs and layout of
the classroom and thus aware of the implausibility of the statements in the document
Mr. Farber signed. (Comp. ¶ 23).
On information and belief, Sgt. Matranga and Capt. Malveaux read the document
Mr. Farber signed and realized it lacked credibility. (Comp. ¶ 24).
Additionally, all students who were present in the classroom were aware of Mr.
Farber’s involvement and that the photographs were produced at the request of the
other students to further the joke initiated by the teacher’s comments about the
stereotypical shooter being a white male and L.B. fitting that description. Sgt. Matranga,
and on information and belief Capt. Malveaux, either interviewed the other students
present in the classroom and disregarded their statements, or improperly failed to
conduct such interviews before taking any action against L.B. (Comp. ¶ 25).
Despite knowing that the photographs were the result of a joke that the students’
teacher initiated, Sgt. Matranga and Capt. Malveaux decided to formally arrest L.B.,
accusing him of violating Louisiana’s criminal terrorizing statute. (Comp. ¶ 26). Stokes
contends that these officers lacked probable cause to arrest L.B. and were completely
aware of his innocence yet they chose to arrest him in order to quell the public concern
resulting from the other children posting the photographs of L.B. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28).
Sgt. Matranga placed L.B. in handcuffs and then transported L.B. to the Rivarde
Detention Center in Gretna, Louisiana, where L.B. was formally booked, which included
fingerprinting and having his “mug shot” taken. Sgt. Matranga prepared or gave
information that went into a “Juvenile Arrest Register” that falsely stated that L.B. had
given a voluntary statement admitting that he knowingly created “terror in the school,
students, faculty, staff, and parents.” Sgt. Matranga deliberately lied in this document to
justify his arrest of L.B. while knowing that it would be used by the courts and others to
wrongfully restrain L.B.’s freedom. Sgt. Matranga omitted any mention of Mr. Farber’s
involvement in the incident from the “Juvenile Arrest Register” for the same malicious
reasons. (Comp. ¶¶ 29, 30).
Sgt. Matranga wrote, and Capt. Malveaux approved, a police report describing
the reasons for arresting L.B. The report failed to mention a single word about Mr.
Farber being present and involved in the joke that led to L.B. appearing in the pictures.
These officers intentionally repressed these exculpatory facts from being made known to
those reviewing the report, such as the Jefferson Parish District Attorney or the courts.
Sgt. Matranga and Capt. Malveaux excluded this information from the report so that
their arrest of L.B. would appear justified. (Comp. ¶ 31).
L.B. spent the night in jail. The following morning, he went to the Jefferson
Parish Juvenile Court. The judge in that court allowed L.B. to be released but only on
the conditions of house arrest and that L.B. wear an electronic ankle bracelet monitoring
device. On information and belief, the judge was unaware of Mr. Farber’s involvement in
the events leading to L.B.’s arrest because Sgt. Matranga and Capt. Malveaux omitted
this information from the documents submitted to the Juvenile Court for the judge to
consider when determining the conditions of a juvenile’s release. Had Sgt. Matranga and
Capt. Malveaux made that court aware of Mr. Farber’s involvement, the judge would
have released L.B. on lesser or no conditions at all. (Comp. ¶ 32).
After receiving Sgt. Matranga’s and Capt. Malveaux’s report that omitted Mr.
Farber’s involvement and the “Juvenile Arrest Register” that falsely described L.B.’s
statement, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a Petition in the Jefferson Parish
Juvenile Court on or about February 27, 2018, accusing L.B. of committing the crime of
terrorizing. (Comp. ¶ 33).
According to Stokes, by February 23, 2018, Grace King’s principal, Sharon
Meggs-Hamilton (another defendant herein), and on information and belief the school’s
disciplinarian, Valerie Johnson (another defendant herein), were fully aware of the
events that occurred in health class, including that Mr. Farber initiated the joke that L.B.
looked like a stereotypical school shooter; that a different student drew the caricature
and words above it; that the other students asked L.B. to pose in front of the caricature
so they could take pictures; that it was the other students who posted the pictures; and
that Mr. Farber was present and laughed along with the students at what was perceived
by all as a joke. They were aware of the incredibility of Ms. Farber’s written statement
denying his knowledge of how the picture came into being. Nonetheless, Ms. Meggs-
Hamilton, and on information and belief Ms. Johnson, decided to suspend L.B. from
school. (Comp. ¶ 34).
During the suspension, L.B. did not receive any teaching, educational resources,
materials, or any aids to keep up with his classwork. The suspension lasted for about
two weeks when Ms. Meggs-Hamilton, and on information and belief Ms. Johnson,
decided to recommend that the School Board expel L.B. from Grace King High School,
despite these defendants’ awareness that L.B. did nothing without the approval of his
teacher and nothing in violation of any school rules. (Comp. ¶ 35).
On or about March 8, 2018, Brandon Williams acted as the School Board’s
hearing officer to determine whether to follow the recommendation to expel L.B. During
the hearing, Ms. Meggs-Hamilton provided an oral statement to the hearing officer
merely saying that L.B. was implicated in the photographs. She failed to provide Mr.
Williams the exculpatory information that Mr. Farber initiated the joke and was present
for the entire incident. L.B. also gave a statement that more fully described the incident
and Mr. Farber’s involvement. Nothing in this hearing suggested in any way that L.B.
violated any school or School Board rule. Nonetheless, Mr. Williams approved the
recommendation to expel L.B. On information and belief, the School Board ratified Mr.
Williams’s decision. (Comp. ¶ 36).
Ms. Meggs-Hamilton, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Williams, and the School Board were
fully aware that L.B. did not violate any school or School Board rule and that he acted
with the full consent of his teacher, yet decided to have him expelled nonetheless. Their
actions were malicious and in bad faith as their motive was to quell the public concerns
and not because of any good faith belief that L.B. did anything wrong. (Comp. ¶ 37).
L.B. was then forced to go to school at John H. Martyn Alternative School in
Jefferson, Louisiana, a place the School Board sends “at-risk students.” When he first
arrived, a fellow student approached L.B. while he was eating lunch on a bench and
pushed him off the bench, accusing him of being a school shooter. Ms. Meggs-Hamilton,
Ms. Johnson, and Mr. Williams knew, or were substantially certain, that their wrongful
expulsion of L.B. would force him to attend a school with the “at-risk students,” which
would subject him to the increased risk of violence. (Comp. ¶¶ 38, 39).
Ms. Stokes was forced to retain an attorney to defend her son against the petition
filed in Juvenile Court. On or about March 16, 2018, L.B.’s attorney requested that the
Jefferson Parish Juvenile Clerk of Court issue a subpoena to Mr. Farber to appear in
that court. On information and belief, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney learned
about Mr. Farber’s involvement because of L.B.’s counsel’s subpoena request, realized
L.B.’s clear innocence, and on March 28, 2018, dismissed the Petition. The Juvenile
Court judge then removed the restrictions on L.B.’s release. (Comp. ¶ 40).
L.B. finished the remaining school year at John H. Martyn Alternative School.
The School Board advised that he was to return to Grace King High School for the
following school year. L.B. and his mother feared for L.B.’s safety at Grace King High
School because the officers’ arrest and the school administrators’ expulsion of him gave
credence to the erroneous belief that he had planned on being a school shooter. A
counsellor at John H. Martyn Alternative School wrote a letter to the School Board
urging that L.B. not have to attend Grace King because of his fears. L.B. has attended
Riverdale High School since then. Riverdale is much further away from Ms. Stokes’s
home than is Grace King, creating a hardship and expenses associated with the longer
travel for L.B. to attend school. (Comp. ¶ 41).
Stokes and L.B. contend that the actions of the defendants have caused and
continue to cause them to suffer the loss of L.B.’s freedom while he was arrested, jailed,
and restricted by the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, the incurrence of attorneys’ fees in
connection with L.B.’s wrongful arrest and prosecution, the loss of Ms. Stokes’ income
while she had to miss work to attend court and other matters related to this incident,
damage to L.B.’s reputation, as well as mental anguish and emotional distress. (Comp. ¶
42). Stokes and L.B. have sued Farber (teacher), Meggs-Hamilton (principal), Johnson
(disciplinarian), Williams (hearing officer), the Jefferson Parish School Board (as
employer of Farber, Meggs-Hamilton, Johnson, and Williams), Sgt. Matranga, Captain
Malveaux, and Joseph P. Loptino, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Jefferson
Parish (employer of Matranga and Malveaux).
Plaintiffs have asserted a host of state law claims (due process, false
arrest/battery, malicious prosecution, defamation, and generic delictual liability)
against all defendants. Original subject matter jurisdiction is grounded on Plaintiffs’
reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.4 (Comp. ¶ 44).
Defendant Guy C. Farber now moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety
4 This circuit has long applied the “general rule” that “a court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when all federal claims are eliminated before
trial.” IntegraNet Phys. Res., Inc. v. Tex. Indep. Prov., LLC, 945 F.3d 232, 241 (5th Cir. 219)
(citing Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir.
2009)). The parties should remain mindful of this rule.
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As noted above, Farber was L.B.’s teacher at the time of the
incident. Farber contends that the allegations in the complaint fail to suggest that
Farber played any part in criminally charging L.B. or disciplining him. Therefore, Farber
contends that no tort, constitutional or otherwise, can be established against him.
Should the Court agree with that argument then Plaintiffs request leave to amend their
complaint to cure any pleading deficiencies.
A jury trial is scheduled to commence on March 9, 2020. (Rec. Doc. 23).
II. DISCUSSION
In the context of a motion to dismiss the Court must accept all factual allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff=s favor.
Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974); Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the
foregoing tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009). Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550, U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v.
Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,
418 (5th Cir. 2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to Astate a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.@ Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). AA
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.@ Id. The Court does not accept as true Aconclusory allegations, unwarranted
factual inferences, or legal conclusions.@ Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d
690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). Moreover, a claim that is not based on a
cognizable legal theory is not plausible on its face. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
326-27 (1989); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); Frith v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737-37 (S. D. Tex. 1998) (citing Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F. 2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Vines v. City of Dallas, 851 F.
Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. Tex. 1994)).
The actionable conduct alleged with respect to Farber is as follows: 1) Farber
laughed along with his students as they joked about L.B. being a potential school
shooter, 2) he failed to intervene or dissuade his students when they drew the caricature
on the whiteboard and began to take photos of L.B. posing with the drawing, and 3) on
the morning after the incident Farber signed a document that contained false
statements about the incident in order to avoid trouble for himself. Farber argues, and
this Court agrees, that even if the first two allegations constitute conduct inappropriate
for a teacher, they raise no federal concerns of a constitutional nature.
The factual allegations of Farber’s involvement in any of the events described in
the complaint end with the allegedly false document that he signed on the morning after
the classroom incident. There is no suggestion that Farber ever actively worked with or
involved himself with law enforcement to have L.B. arrested and charged, or with school
administrators to have L.B. suspended and expelled. Presumably Farber was questioned
by law enforcement and school administrators about the terrorizing incident and there
is no allegation that he was untruthful with them. Thus, Farber’s culpability for any of
the injuries that Plaintiffs sustained begins and ends with the allegedly false document
that he signed.5
But as Farber points out in his motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the
complaint actually exonerate him of any fault for the initial arrest, the restrictions on
L.B.’s freedom, the school imposed discipline, and the criminal charges. The allegations
that Plaintiffs make against Matranga and Malveaux—the police officers actually
responsible for the decision to arrest L.B.—belie the assertion that Farber’s statement
played any role in the officers’ probable cause determination or the decision to arrest
L.B. much less for the District Attorney to file criminal charges. Specifically, Plaintiffs
have alleged that Matranga and Malveaux knew that Farber’s statement was implausible
and lacked credibility (Comp. ¶¶ 23, 24), that Matranga and Malveaux either
interviewed the students that were in classroom that day yet disregarded their
statements or improperly failed to conduct such interviews prior to the arrest (Comp. ¶
25), that prior to the arrest Matranga and Malveaux knew that the photographs were the
result of a joke that Farber had initiated yet they decided nonetheless to formally arrest
L.B. for terrorizing (Comp. ¶ 26), that prior to the arrest Matranga and Malveaux were
completely aware of L.B.’s innocence and had no good faith belief that he had
5 The Court has not seen a copy of Farber’s statement but there has been no suggestion that
the statement affirmatively accused L.B. or anyone else of criminal conduct. So this case is
not one where the defendant is accused of making a false accusation against a specific
person in order to incriminate him. In fact, Plaintiffs contend that Farber made the
untruthful statement in order to “save his own skin” and to absolve himself of responsibility
for the public scandal that resulted from the events that took place in his classroom. (Comp.
¶ 21; Rec. Doc. 38, Opposition at 16). So this case is not one where the defendant is accused
of lying to law enforcement out of malice in order to subject the plaintiff to criminal charges.
And according to Plaintiffs, it was concerned parents and members of the media who
contacted law enforcement after the photographs had appeared on social media, not Farber.
(Comp. ¶ 19).
committed a crime yet chose to arrest him anyway in order to quell public concerns
(Comp. ¶ 28), that Matranga deliberately lied when providing information to the
Juvenile Arrest Register knowing that a court would rely on that information in order to
restrain L.B.’s freedom (Comp. ¶ 30), and that Matranga and Malveaux approved a
police report that intentionally omitted Farber’s involvement in the classroom “joke” so
that the arrest would appear justified to the District Attorney (Comp. ¶ 31). Similarly,
Plaintiffs allege that the school administrator defendants were fully apprised of the
“joke” and of Farber’s true role in the incident when they decided to take disciplinary
action against L.B. (Comp. ¶¶ 34, 35).
Thus, Plaintiffs’ theory of the case against all of the other defendants contradicts
the key assertion underlying their theory of the case against Farber for false arrest and
for the subsequent disciplinary action, i.e., that it was Farber’s allegedly false statement
that caused all of the damage or even contributed to it. The chain of causation between
anything that Farber did and the injuries that Plaintiffs’ suffered is broken. There are no
factual allegations to support conspiracy or joint action between Farber and any other
defendant as to any constitutional violation. In fact, Plaintiffs’ allegations against
Matranga and Malveaux do not even allude to the possibility of these officers having
been influenced in their allegedly unconstitutional actions by what was in Farber’s
statement.
The “first step in any [§ 1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed.” John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citing Albright, 510 U.S. at 271). The complaint in this case alludes generally to
violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution in addition to a federal due process violation. Before filing his
motion to dismiss, Farber served Plaintiffs with discovery in order to have them
articulate which specific federal rights they believe that he violated.6 (Rec. Doc. 35-3).
Plaintiffs’ response to that interrogatory essentially recited the litany of rights named in
the complaint, even though there appears to be no set of facts to support a plausible
claim that Farber violated L.B.’s First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 3).
Farber filed his motion to dismiss nonetheless, and in their opposition Plaintiffs do not
mention the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments vis à vis Farber. These claims are
therefore waived as to Farber. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that by providing a false
statement about what occurred in his classroom Farber violated L.B.’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause.7 But again, the factual
6 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a defendant is only liable for his own personal conduct, not the
conduct of other state actors. See Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 668 (5th Cir. 2015).
The complaint contains no allegations to suggest a conspiracy between any of the
defendants or any type of joint action amongst them.
7 The Court assumes that it has understood Plaintiffs’ opposition correctly with respect to
their federal claim. Plaintiffs’ opposition demonstrates an inclination to be non-committal
when confronted with the issue of identifying the specific constitutional right that Farber
allegedly violated when he submitted the false statement. In his motion Farber characterizes
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against him as being based on a nebulous due process violation.
(Rec. Doc. 35-1, Memorandum at 8). In their opposition Plaintiffs argue in favor of a Fourth
Amendment violation while calling it a federal due process claim. This is not incorrect
because one form of substantive due process is the substantive protections in the Bill of
Rights—like those afforded by the Fourth Amendment—that have been “incorporated” into
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. John Corp., 214 F.3d at 577 n.3 (citing
Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988)). But Plaintiffs have not argued in
favor of nor alleged facts in support of a substantive due process claim against Farber.
Substantive due process serves to prevent governmental power from being “used for
purposes of oppression,” John Corp., 214 F.3d at 577 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)), and the complaint fails to allege on the part of Farber the type of egregious
and shocking conduct necessary to support a substantive due process claim, see County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). And where a particular Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior “that Amendment and not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing [the] claim.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273
(1994) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Thus, Plaintiffs’ federal false
arrest claim against Farber must be analyzed under Fourth Amendment standards, not
allegations that Plaintiffs rely upon to implicate the other defendants eviscerate any
inference that L.B. was arrested and subjected to the subsequent proceedings (both
criminal and administrative) because of Farber’s statement. The Court is persuaded that
at best, Plaintiffs have pleaded a state law tort claim against Farber.
The instant motion is the first dispositive motion that the Court has received in
this case and it merely tests the pleadings against one defendant even though all
defendants have now answered the lawsuit and trial is imminent. All deadlines from the
scheduling order have elapsed. The Court would think that the depositions of key
witnesses would be particularly enlightening as to the issues raised in Farber’s motion
yet the Court has not seen any evidence whatsoever in this case including the allegedly
false statement that Farber gave after the incident. The issues raised in Farber’s motion
would be more conducive to a motion for summary judgment rather than a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.
Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend their complaint to cure any pleading
deficiencies. With discovery presumably completed, Plaintiffs cannot at this time simply
amend their complaint to include conclusory alternative theories of liability. Plaintiffs
should know by now, having surely deposed Matranga and Malveaux, whether Farber’s
statement played any role in the arrest. The same is true with respect to the school
disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, it may be implausible that anyone would have
those of substantive due process.
The Court notes that when Farber filed his motion to dismiss he did not believe that
the false arrest claim was being asserted against him. (Rec. Doc. 35-1, Memorandum at 6
n.3). This belief was not unreasonable given Plaintiffs’ reference to a nebulous federal due
process claim and the manner in which they responded to Farber’s interrogatory on this
very issue. Farber therefore addressed the Fourth Amendment claim in his reply
memorandum.
relied on Farber’s statement to take action against L.B.—in fact, Plaintiffs have alleged
expressly the facial incredibility of the statement—but the Court has yet to see the
statement. And if the officers had probable cause to arrest L.B. even without Farber’s
statement then there is no Fourth Amendment violation for false arrest. But these are
issues that the Court cannot resolve on the pleadings.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.
35) filed by defendant Guy C. Farber is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART. The motion is GRANTED as to all constitutional law claims (both state and
federal) against Farber and as to any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which Plaintiffs did
not address in their opposition. The motion is DENIED as to the remaining state law
tort claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall move to amend their
complaint as to the Fourth Amendment claim (the only federal claim addressed in the
opposition) within ten (10) working days from entry of this Order.
January 27, 2020 C |
4 S As
AY C. ZAIN Y
D STARES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 An issue not raised although one that concerns the Court for purposes of the § 1983 claim
is whether Farber engaged in state action when he signed the allegedly false document.
Everyone seems to assume that he did so simply because he is a public school teacher. The
Court is not so certain that in signing the document Farber acted under color of state law.
See Ortolaza v. Capitol Region Educ. Council, 388 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D. Conn. 2019).
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