Sternberg v. Langston

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CYNTHIA LANGSTON

CIVIL ACTION

STERNBERG

VERSUS NO: 18-7349

KENNETH LANGSTON, ET AL. SECTION: “J”(3)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction filed

by Defendants Christopher Randall Purdum and Buffington Law Firm, LLC (the

“Firm”) (Rec. Doc. 51), Regnal Blackledge (Rec. Doc. 55), Jennifer Langston (Rec.

Doc. 58), Kenneth Langston (Rec. Doc. 73), and Katherine Langston (Rec. Doc.

82). Having considered the motions and memoranda, the record, and the applicable

law, the Court finds that the motions should be GRANTED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises from damages allegedly sustained by Plaintiff Cynthia

Langston Sternberg in connection with the succession of Lydia Marrero Langston

(“the Estate”), her mother. Named as Defendants are: Kenneth Langston, current

administrator of the Estate and Plaintiff’s brother; Jennifer Langston, Plaintiff’s

sister-in-law; James Wright Langston Jr.,1 Plaintiff’s brother; Katherine Langston,

Plaintiff’s sister; Regnal Blackledge, counsel for the Langstons in proceedings related

to the Estate; Christopher Randall Purdum, prior administrator of the Estate; and

1 James W. Langston Jr. was dismissed as a party to these proceedings on September 24, 2019, for

Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve him. (Rec. Doc. 78).

the Firm, Purdum’s employer. Plaintiff brings claims for breach of contract, fraud,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence against

all Defendants, as well as claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Purdum and

Kenneth as administrators of the Estate, and intentional interference with a contract

against Purdum. Essentially, Plaintiff claims that Defendants acted in concert to

deprive her of her rights to the Estate.

Plaintiff was initially appointed administrator of the Estate. After the

Langston heirs discovered that the documents of the deceased were forged by

Plaintiff, they hired Blackledge to represent them in proceedings to have the will set

aside. The Mississippi court set aside the will and named Purdum as administrator.

Litigation continued for approximately one year to account for the assets of the Estate

in light of Plaintiff’s fraud.

During this same period, Plaintiff also initiated litigation in Texas against her

siblings and sister-in-law. The Texas state court declared the trust fraudulently

created by Plaintiff to be invalid and ordered Plaintiff to reimburse the Estate for the

amounts she had taken.2

Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement agreement in the Mississippi

litigation as to the distribution of the Estate. However, Plaintiff tried to set aside the

terms of the settlement, which was rejected by the Mississippi court.

Plaintiff filed suit against Purdum and the Firm in the Southern District of

Mississippi on January 4, 2017; however, once Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

2 (Order on Final Summary Judgment, Sternberg v. Lydia Marrero Langston Trust, No. 2013-677-67 (Tex. Dist. Jan.

9, 2015), Rec. Doc. 73-5, at 3-4).

pauperis was denied, she did not continue to prosecute that suit.3 Plaintiff then filed

the instant suit in this Court.

Plaintiff resides in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Kenneth and Jennifer

Langston are residents of Illinois. Katherine Langston resides in Florida. Purdum

and Blackledge are both residents of Mississippi. The Firm was a limited liability

company formed on April 4, 2016, and dissolved on December 6, 2017, with its place

of incorporation and principal place of business in Mississippi.

PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them for lack of personal

jurisdiction. They assert the Court lacks general jurisdiction over them because no

Defendant is incorporated, has a principle place of business, nor is domiciled in

Louisiana. Further, they contend that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction because

Defendants do not have sufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana. In addition to

claiming that no contacts exist in Louisiana, Defendants maintain that the alleged

harm to Plaintiff arose out of events that occurred in Mississippi, not Louisiana.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief

can be granted and, in the alternative, request the Court to transfer this case to the

Southern District of Mississippi, where they assert venue would be proper.

II. PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION

3 Order, Sternberg v. Purdum, No. 17-6 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 20, 2017) (dismissing case without prejudice).

Plaintiff argues that the Court has jurisdiction and is the proper venue over

her claims relating to the Estate. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that personal

jurisdiction and venue are proper because the effects of Defendants’ actions were felt

and continue to be felt in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Plaintiff contends that the

injury arises out of the Defendants contacts, as Jennifer and Blackledge sent emails

and made telephone calls to Louisiana, Kenneth and Katherine own a share of stock

in a Louisiana company, Purdum did business with a corporation in Louisiana, sent

emails to Plaintiff in Louisiana, and made telephone calls to residents of Louisiana,

and the Firm by association with Purdum has such contacts to Louisiana.

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have waived their defense of

lack of personal jurisdiction because they did not assert it in their prior motions to

dismiss for untimely service pursuant to Rule 4(m).

III. DEFENDANTS’ REPLY

Defendants Jennifer Langston, Purdum, and the Firm argue that they did not

waive their right to offer Rule 12(b) motions by filing Rule 4(m) motions, as Plaintiff

did not serve them in accordance with Rule 4(m). They allege that their response

addressing such technical failures to serve in accordance with Rule 4(m) did not waive

their right to assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal of a suit

for lack of personal jurisdiction. “Where a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction,

the party seeking to invoke the power of the court bears the burden of proving that

jurisdiction exists.” Luv N’Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 483 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir.

2006). However, the plaintiff is only required to establish jurisdiction through a

prima facie showing. Id. The court must accept the plaintiff’s uncontroverted

allegations and resolve all conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’

affidavits and other documentation in favor of jurisdiction. Id.

To satisfy personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, a federal court

sitting in diversity must satisfy two requirements. Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware

GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2012). “First, the forum state’s long-arm

statute must confer personal jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must

not exceed the boundaries of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Id. The limits of the Louisiana long-arm statute are coextensive with constitutional

due process limits. Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, SRL, 615 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir.

2010). Accordingly, the inquiry here is whether jurisdiction comports with federal

constitutional guarantees. See id.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no

federal court may assume personal jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant unless

the defendant has certain “minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation

omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction:

specific and general. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1173,

1779-80 (2017).

Specific jurisdiction is limited to “adjudication of issues deriving from, or

connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). To establish specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show three

elements. Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 221. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate

that there are sufficient minimum contacts to connect the non-resident defendant to

the forum that is hearing the litigation. Id. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the

defendant purposefully established the contacts. Id. Third, the plaintiff must allege

a cause of action that either arises out of or is related to the defendant’s forum

contacts. Id. The defendant can then defeat the exercise of specific jurisdiction by

showing that it would be unreasonable. Id. at 221-22.

DISCUSSION

I. RULE 4(M) AND RULE 12(B) MOTIONS

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have waived their defense of lack of

personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) by moving to dismiss under Rule 4(m). The

Court disagrees.

Rule 4(m) provides:

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed,

the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must

dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order

that service be made within a specified time.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 4(m) authorizes a motion by its

own terms.

Rule 12(g) provides that “a party that makes a motion under this rule must not

make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available

to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) (emphasis

added). Further, Rule 12(h) provides that a party may also waive “any defense listed

in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by . . . failing to either: (i) make it by motion under this rule; or

(ii) include it in a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(B). Thus, the plain

language of Rule 12 provides that the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived

where a party files a Rule 12 motion or responsive pleading but fails to assert it, or

where a party fails to file a Rule 12 motion at all. Mississippi ex rel Hood v. Entergy

Miss., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-780, 2017 WL 2973998, at *1 (S.D. Miss. July 11, 2017); cf.

Alliantgroup, L.P. v. Feingold, No. H-09-0479, 2009 WL 1109093, at *6 (S.D. Tex.

Apr. 24, 2009) (“[Defendant’s] motion for extension of time to answer is not a

responsive pleading and his failure to object to jurisdiction in that motion did not

waive his objection to a lack of personal jurisdiction.”).

Courts cannot “ignor[e] what the Rule provides in plain language. We accept

the Rule as meaning what it says.” Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have not waived their defense of lack of

personal jurisdiction.

II. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants have

sufficient minimum contacts to support specific jurisdiction. Simply because a

plaintiff suffers injury in a forum is not enough to vest the court with specific

jurisdiction. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014) (“[M]ere injury to a forum

resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum”).

Katherine Langston’s sole contact with Louisiana is her ownership of shares

in the Marrero Land & Improvement Association, Ltd., a Louisiana corporation.

However, as Plaintiff’s claims against Katherine do not arise from her ownership of

this stock, but rather from her involvement in the Estate, the Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over Katherine Langston.

Plaintiff asserts that the Court has jurisdiction over Jennifer Langston,

Blackledge, and Purdum because of phone calls and emails they made to people

within Louisiana concerning her law license. “A single act by a defendant can be

enough to confer personal jurisdiction if that act gives rise to the claim being

asserted.” Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiff’s

claims arise from “her rights to and in the Succession of Lydia Marrero Langston.”4

There is not a single mention of Plaintiff’s law license in her complaint and, given

Plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting this case thus far, the Court declines to exercise its

discretion to grant her leave to amend her complaint to add an unrelated claim. As

Plaintiff has asserted no other basis for personal jurisdiction over Jennifer Langston

or Blackledge, her claims against them will be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against Kenneth Langston and Purdum in their capacity as

administrators of the Estate, the administration of which occurred in Mississippi,

lack any connection whatsoever to Louisiana and will therefore be dismissed. Plaintiff

4 (Rec. Doc. 1, at 3).

likewise fails to assert any connection between her intentional interference with a

contract claim against Purdum and Louisiana, so this claim will also be dismissed.

Finally, as there is no additional basis for jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims

against the Firm other than those asserted against Purdum, Plaintiffs claims against

the Firm will be dismissed.

In sum, Plaintiff's alleged injuries arise out of the administration of the Estate,

which occurred in Mississippi, and not from the Defendants’ minimal contacts with

Louisiana. Although the harm occurred to a resident within the Court’s jurisdiction,

this is insufficient to a finding of specific jurisdiction. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 290.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction (Rec. Docs. 51, 55, 58, 73, 82) are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs

complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of October, 2019.

□

CARL J. BAR

UNITED ST DISTRICT JUDGE