The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONALD GERARD CROCHET, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff
VERSUS NO. 18-13793
KRISTINE RUSSELL, ET AL., SECTION: “E”
Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge
Michael North recommending Plaintiff Donald Crochet’s complaint, insofar as it can be
construed as a request for habeas corpus relief, be dismissed without prejudice, and
further recommending Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 be dismissed with
prejudice.1 Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation.2
For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation as its
own and hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint.3
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Donald Gerard Crochet, pro se, was confined at the Lafourche Parish
Detention Center4 following his conviction in August 2018 for possession of child
pornography and possession with intent to distribute marijuana in the Seventeenth
Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafourche. On January 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed the
instant complaint, filled out on a form to be used by a prisoner in filing a complaint under
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 against Defendants, Lafourche Parish District
1 R. Doc. 8.
2 R. Doc. 10.
3 R. Doc. 5.
4 Id. at 2.
5 R. Doc. 5. Plaintiff initially filed a complaint on December 14, 2018 that was deemed deficient. R. Doc. 1.
Attorney Kristine Russell, Assistant District Attorney Rene Gautreaux, Detective Jeff
Chamberlain of the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office, Deputy Clay Blanchard of the
Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office, Frank Garcia of the Louisiana State Police, and former
District Attorney Camille Morvant, II.6 In his complaint, Plaintiff complains of the legality
of the searches that uncovered the physical evidence that led to his conviction7 and the
thoroughness and withholding of the State’s forensic computer analysis.8 He further
complains of the effectiveness of his attorney, the presentation of false testimony, and the
sufficiency of the evidence that was presented at his trial.9 Defendants have not filed an
answer.
The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation was filed on February 5,
2019.10 Plaintiff filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation on March 14, 2019.
In his objection, Plaintiff reviews many of his chief complaints, and, with respect to his
complaint regarding the legality of the searches that uncovered the physical evidence that
led to Plaintiff’s conviction, adds: “confidential informant . . . rented my room from me
and set me up knowing I never sold drugs [and] never had a history of selling drugs.”11
LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations, the Court
must review de novo any of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions to which a party has
specifically objected.12 The Court needs only to review the portions of the report to which
6 R. Doc. 5 at 1, 4.
7 Id. at 5. The Court notes purported Fourth Amendment violations were unsuccessfully litigated by Plaintiff
prior to trial. State v. Crochet, 200 So.3d 370 (La. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1583 (2017).
8 Id. at 5-6.
9 Id. at 6.
10 R. Doc. 8.
11 R. Doc. 10 at 1.
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which an objection is made.”).
there are no objections to determine whether they are clearly erroneous or contrary to
law.13
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Habeas Corpus Relief
The Court’s “first task is to determine if [Plaintiff’s] suit, although labeled a § 1983
action, is in reality a habeas corpus action subject to the exhaustion requirements of 28
U.S.C. s 2254(b).”14 “While a complainant in a § 1983 action who is not eligible for habeas
corpus relief is not generally required to exhaust state remedies, [the Fifth Circuit] has
made clear that when the suit in reality is challenging the validity of the conviction it
amounts to a habeas corpus action and the party must have exhausted state remedies.”15
“When a state prisoner attacks the fact or length of his confinement, the
appropriate cause of action is a petition for habeas corpus, even though the facts of the
complaint might otherwise be sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.”16 The Supreme
Court has explained: “by allowing a prisoner to challenge his confinement under a § 1983
suit in federal court, Congress’ intent that the states be given the first chance to decide
such suits would be frustrated.”17 Therefore, “[a]lthough a state prisoner may generally
bring a claim for damages under § 1983 without first exhausting state remedies, ‘where
the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction’, habeas
13 Id.
14 Caldwell v. Line, 679 F.2d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1982).
15 Id. (citing Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (1977);
Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 517, 54 L.Ed.2d 457 (1977); Grundstrom v. Darnell, 531 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1976);
Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Richardson, 556 F.2d 332, 334-35 (5th
Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1979); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127, 128 (5th
Cir. 1980); Delaney v. Giarrusso, 633 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326,
330 (5th Cir. 1981); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1981)).
16 Id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).
17 Id. (referring to Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-90)
corpus is the exclusive cause of action and the attendant requirement of exhaustion of
state remedies controls.”18 “[T]he exhaustion requirement is satisfied if a claim has ‘been
presented once to the state's highest court’”19 and “the habeas corpus applicant must
‘present his claims before the [state] courts in a procedurally proper manner according to
the rules of the state courts.’”20
As the Magistrate Judge stated, “Plaintiff’s allegations against the named
Defendants, which include accusations of improprieties by law enforcement officials, the
prosecutors, and his counsel, clearly challenge the fact and duration of his confinement,”21
and therefore must initially be pursued on habeas corpus grounds, but only after Plaintiff
has exhausted available state-court remedies with respect to such allegations.22 Because
Plaintiff indicates on the face of his complaint he has not initiated any other lawsuits in
state or federal court dealing with the same facts that are involved in this action or
otherwise relating to his imprisonment,23 insofar as the instant matter can be construed
as a request for habeas corpus relief, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without
prejudice for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies.24
II. Section 1983 Claims
The Court next determines whether any valid § 1983 claims are raised by Plaintiff’s
complaint. The Supreme Court has explained:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
18 Id. (quoting Fulford, 529 F.2d at 381).
19 Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 442 n. 10
(5th Cir. 1982), modified on other grounds, 691 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1056, 103
S.Ct. 1508 (1983)).
20 Id. (quoting Carter, 677 F.2d at 443).
21 R. Doc. 8 at 2.
22 Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986).
23 R. Doc. 5 at 1.
24 McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995).
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.25
In this case, Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing that his conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated by a state or federal tribunal authorized to make such a
determination. Accordingly, none of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against any of the defendants
are cognizable.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against the district attorneys, Defendants Russell,
Gautreaux, and Morvant, are also barred for the following additional reasons. “Criminal
prosecutors [] enjoy absolute immunity from claims for damages asserted under § 1983 for
actions taken in the presentation of the state’s case.”26 Accordingly, any claim against
Defendants Russell, Gautreaux, and Morvant in their individual capacity is barred by the
absolute prosecutorial immunity they enjoy. This immunity applies even where the
prosecutors’ acts were alleged to have been malicious, wanton, or negligent,27 and extends to
“actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the
courtroom.”28
Even construing Plaintiff’s allegations to be made against the prosecutors in their
official capacity, Plaintiff still fares no better. As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
For purposes of “official capacity” suits under § 1983, the district attorney's office
resembles other local government entities. Therefore, we advert to the Supreme
Court's development of principles for determining whether a municipality or other
25 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
26 Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1993)); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
27 Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1987).
28 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272 (1993) (quotation marks omitted).
local government entity should be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the
constitutional tort of its employee.”
“In order to hold a municipality or a local government unit liable under Section 1983 for the
misconduct of one of its employees, a plaintiff must initially allege that an official policy or
custom was a cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted.” °° “To satisfy the cause in fact
requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the custom or policy served as a moving force behind
the constitutional violation at issue or that [his] injuries resulted from the execution of an
official copy or custom.”*! “A plaintiff may not infer a policy merely because harm resulted
from some interaction with a governmental entity.”32 Instead, the plaintiff must identify the
policy or custom which allegedly caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights.%3 In this
case, Plaintiff does not even allege the purported violations here stemmed from an official
policy or custom, much less identify such a policy or custom. Accordingly, Plaintiffs § 1983
claims against the prosecutors must be dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint, insofar as
it can be construed as a request for habeas corpus relief, is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) (2) (B) (ii).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of September, 2019.
SUSIE Moye
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
29 Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 470 (5th Cir. 1999)
30 Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Department, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted).
31 Id.
32 Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993).
33 See, e.g., Murray v. Town of Mansura, 76 F. App'x 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2003); Treece v. Louisiana, 74 F.
App'x 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2003).