Galloway v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CASEY GALLOWAY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 18-14038

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD SECTION “B”(5)

COMPANY, INC.

ORDER AND REASONS

Defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company, Inc. filed a

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 8.

Plaintiff Casey Galloway filed a response in opposition. Rec. Doc.

12. Defendant then sought, and was granted, leave to file a reply.

Rec. Doc. 20.

For the reasons discussed below,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED

and plaintiff’s claims against defendant are DISMISSED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Casey Galloway filed a complaint against Illinois

Central Railroad Company, Inc. for violation of the Federal

Employers Liability Act. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff was employed

as a trackman by Defendant. Id. On March 9, 2017, plaintiff alleges

that his left foot was injured when a crane operator who was

holding up a rail suddenly moved the crane without warning, causing

the rail to come down onto plaintiff’s left foot. Id. Plaintiff

asserts that his injuries include a non-displaced fracture in his

left foot and a left foot sprain that became Complex Regional Pain

Syndrome in his left lower extremity. Id. Plaintiff also states

that he had a spinal cord stimulator permanently implanted in his

body, and that the injuries have caused him to become medically

disqualified from his railroad job. Id. Consequently, plaintiff

brought the instant case under the FELA claiming that defendant

and its agents negligently conducted themselves in failing to

provide a reasonably safe work place, train and supervise the swing

crane operator, and enact and enforce safety regulations, amongst

other things, all leading to plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 4.

Accordingly, plaintiff seeks damages for physical pain and

suffering, mental anguish, lost wages, medical expenses, and

additional categories of damages. Id. at 5.

Defendant subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 8.

THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Defendant argues that this Court cannot exercise personal

jurisdiction over defendant. Rec. Doc. 8. Defendant asserts that

specific personal jurisdiction does not exist in this action

because plaintiff does not allege sustaining any injury in

Louisiana and the underlying facts and circumstances giving rise

to the action did not occur within Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 1-

2. Regarding general personal jurisdiction, defendant argues that

its operations in Louisiana, as compared to the entirety of its

operations, are not of such a substantial nature as to render it

essentially at home here. Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 6. Defendant avers that

it only operated 10.52% of its total track mileage, employed 9.57%

of its total railroader workers, spent 14% of its total capital

investments, and paid 8.77% of its total cash taxes in Louisiana.

Id. at 6-7. In comparison, defendant operated 55% of its total

track mileage, employed 59.5% of its total employees, made 58.6%

of its total capital investments, and paid 61.43% of its total

cash taxes in Illinois. Id. at 7.

On the other hand, plaintiff argues that this Court has both

specific and general personal jurisdiction over defendant. Rec.

Doc. 12. Plaintiff asserts that this Court has general jurisdiction

over defendant in light of defendant’s decades-long systematic and

continuous contacts with the state of Louisiana, including

spending millions annually on infrastructure, training employees,

and paying taxes in Louisiana to reap financial benefits from the

state as well as the fact that Louisiana is one of only six (6)

states in which defendant operates. Id. at 2, 5-6. Plaintiff

further notes that he has continuously been a resident of Louisiana

since 1988 and that his employment with defendant was the result

of an online advertisement he viewed from his home in Louisiana.

Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that when he interviewed for the

position he was told he could continue to live in Louisiana to

receive his job assignments and eventually be headquartered in

Louisiana with a few months of seniority, and was offered the job

by a phone call to his home in Louisiana. Id. Plaintiff further

states that he received his paychecks in Louisiana, paid a portion

of his state income taxes to Louisiana, was based in Louisiana

during his employment with defendant despite travel occurring

outside of Louisiana, and had annual safety trainings in Louisiana.

Id. at 3. Plaintiff asserts that he performed work in various

railroad yards operated by defendant in Louisiana during his

employment and was required to maintain a commercial drivers

license and drivers license, both of which he had issued to him by

the State of Louisiana. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also states that

although he initially went to an emergency room in Mississippi

after his injury, all follow-up care has occurred in Louisiana.

Id. at 4. Additionally, plaintiff argues that this Court may

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over defendant. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff states that defendant purposefully availed itself of the

privileges of conducting activities in Louisiana because it

solicited plaintiff’s interest in the job while plaintiff was in

Louisiana, conducted plaintiff’s training in Louisiana, and made

all work-related payments in Louisiana. Id. at 8. Plaintiff avers

that he was provided all his safety training materials and training

in Louisiana, and this training led him to expect that the crane

operator would not to move until directed to, which ultimately

caused plaintiff’s injury. Id. Plaintiff also asserts that the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant is fair and

reasonable and any outsider would expect defendant to be a regular

participant in court proceedings in Louisiana. Id. at 9.

Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that although plaintiff’s injuries

occurred in Mississippi, his employment with defendant is in

Louisiana and the injury occurred on a job that originated and

ended in Louisiana. Id. at 10.

In its reply, defendant argues that plaintiff does not show

that defendant’s business in Louisiana is so continuous and

systematic as to render it essentially at home here. Rec. Doc. 20.

Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court has made clear that the

general jurisdiction inquiry focuses not just on the magnitude of

the defendant’s in state contacts, but rather calls for an

appraisal of a corporation’s activities in its entirety. Id. at 2.

Therefore, defendant states that even accepting plaintiff’s

allegations of its systematic and continuous contacts in

Louisiana, these activities do not render it essentially at home

in Louisiana when they are compared to its activities overall. Id.

Defendant asserts that because the “exceptional case” warranting

the exercise of general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

must meet a high standard, the Supreme Court has only found a

sufficient basis in one modern case and this case does not present

an opportunity to expand that number. Id. Defendant further notes

that plaintiff improperly details contacts between plaintiff and

defendant or plaintiff and Louisiana rather than between defendant

and Louisiana in support of his argument for specific jurisdiction.

Id. at 3. Defendant avers that the specific jurisdiction inquiry

must be focused on the relationship among the defendant, the forum,

and the litigation which arises out of contacts the defendant

himself creates with the forum state. Id. at 4. Therefore,

defendant argues that plaintiff’s unilateral activities and

contacts with Louisiana are irrelevant to establishing defendants’

purposeful contacts with Louisiana. Id. at 5. Additionally,

defendant states that claims of defendant’s contacts with

plaintiff personally are also not sufficient to establish specific

jurisdiction, because the Supreme Court has stated that the focus

should be on defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not

on contacts with an individual located in the forum state. Id. at

5-6. Defendant argues that plaintiff has not alleged any of

defendant’s suit-related contacts as is required for the exercise

of specific jurisdiction. Id. at 10. Rather, plaintiff has only

shown evidence of his own contacts with defendant, and his own

contacts with Louisiana. Id. The only evidence plaintiff provides

regarding defendant’s contacts with Louisiana, such as maintaining

yards and facilities in the state, address contacts that are not

related to the incident from which this case arises. Id. Therefore,

defendant argues that this Court cannot exercise personal

jurisdiction over it and this case should be dismissed. Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction

over a non-resident defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the

forum state creates personal jurisdiction over the defendant and

(2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the

due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. See

Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) The limits

of Louisiana’s long-arm statute are co-extensive with the limits

of constitutional due process, so the inquiry is whether this

Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process. See Luv

N' Care, Ltd., v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir.

2006). Due process is satisfied if the defendant purposefully

established “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that

maintenance of a lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice. See Clark v. Moran Towing &

Transp. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1023, 1026 (E.D. La. 1990). The plaintiff

has the burden to make a prima facie showing that personal

jurisdiction is proper. See Luv N' Care, Ltd., 438 F.3d at 469.

The Court “must accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in

the complaint and resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual

conflicts.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 869

(5th Cir. 2000). However, the Court is not required to accept

conclusory allegation, even if uncontroverted. See Panda

Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868

(5th Cir. 2001).

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-

resident defendant on the basis of specific or general

jurisdiction. See Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co.

Kg., 688 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2012). Specific jurisdiction may

be asserted over a non-resident corporation where that

corporation's in-state activity is continuous and systematic and

that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit. Id. Specific

jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “(1) there

are sufficient (i.e., not random, fortuitous, or attenuated) pre-

litigation connections between the non-resident defendant and the

forum; (2) the connection has been purposefully established by the

defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of

or is related to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. at 221. If

a plaintiff makes such a showing, the defendant can then defeat

the exercise of specific jurisdiction by showing that it would

nevertheless fail the basic fairness test. Id. at 221-222.

General jurisdiction requires a showing of substantial,

continuous, and systematic contacts between a nonresident

defendant and a forum, such “as to render [it] essentially at home

in the forum State.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d

429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.

117, 138 (2014) (quoting in part Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))). “The continuous and

systematic contacts test is a difficult one to meet, requiring

extensive contacts between a defendant and a forum.” Id. (citing

Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A., 249 F.3d 413,

419 (5th Cir. 2001)). The place of incorporation and principal

place of business are where a corporation is considered to be “at

home” and “are thus paradigm bases for jurisdiction.” Id. (citing

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). Considering the high threshold set in

Daimler, the Fifth Circuit noted that it is “incredibly difficult

to establish general jurisdiction” in a forum other than a

corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of

business. Id.

A. Specific jurisdiction

Specific jurisdiction does not exist over defendant in this

case because plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise out of

defendant’s forum-related contacts. As discussed above, specific

jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that: “(1) there

are sufficient (i.e., not random, fortuitous, or attenuated) pre-

litigation connections between the non-resident defendant and the

forum; (2) the connection has been purposefully established by the

defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of

or is related to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. at 22.

Plaintiff argues that this cause of action arises out of

defendant’s forum-related contacts because: (1) he received safety

training materials at his home in Louisiana; (2) the receipt of

paychecks and all other work-related payments in Louisiana led to

him being at work on the day of the injury-causing incident; (3)

and his training in Louisiana led him to expect that the crane

operator who dropped the piece of rail that caused his injuries

would not move until directed to move. Rec. Doc. 12 at 8-9. None

of these facts show that the incident forming the basis of this

action arises out of defendant’s contacts with Louisiana.

Plaintiff admits that the incident in which he was injured, and

which forms the basis of his claim, occurred in Mississippi rather

than Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 12 at 10. Plaintiff’s attempt to

tenuously connect the incident occurring in Mississippi to

Louisiana by pointing to the location of his payment and his safety

trainings is unpersuasive.

The complaint does not allege that a specific training in

Louisiana caused the incident leading to his injuries. Plaintiff

seeks to hold defendant liable under FELA for acting negligently

in failing to, among other things, provide plaintiff a safe work

place, enact and enforce proper safety regulations, and train and

supervise the crane operator. None of these allegations of

negligence relate to defendant’s contacts with the State of

Louisiana. None of these allegedly negligent actions that form

plaintiff’s cause of action arise out of defendant’s contacts with

Louisiana. Furthermore, it is the crane operator’s training rather

than plaintiff’s training that plaintiff identifies as negligently

conducted, and the complaint does not allege that the crane

operator was trained in Louisiana.

Finally, the fact that plaintiff was paid in Louisiana and

was sent training materials at his home in Louisiana is a result

of his own residence in Louisiana, and not evidence that this cause

of action arises out of defendant’s contacts with the state.

B. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction over defendant is absent because its

contacts with Louisiana are not so continuous and systematic as to

render it essentially at home here. As discussed above, the

paradigm locations where a corporation is considered at home are

the state of incorporation and the principal place of business.

There is no allegation that Louisiana is defendant’s state of

incorporation or principal place of business. Rather, plaintiff

seeks to have recognition that this is an “exceptional case” where

a non-resident corporate defendant’s contacts with a forum state

are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at

home in that state. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, n. 19

(2014).

Plaintiff argues that defendant has conducted operations in

Louisiana for decades and relied upon its presence and assets in

the state to collect business and income. Rec. Doc. 12 at 6.

Because this is not a “merely passing involvement,” plaintiff

asserts that defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction

in the State of Louisiana. However, the fact that defendant has

repeated contacts with Louisiana is not a sufficient basis for the

exercise of general jurisdiction over defendant, unless the

contacts are of such an extent and nature as to render defendant

essentially at home in Louisiana. We must consider defendant’s

operations in Louisiana relative to the entirety of its operations.

Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 2-3.

The Supreme Court has clarified that “[a] corporation that

operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of

them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing

business' tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the

United States.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014).

Rather, “[g]eneral jurisdiction [] calls for an appraisal of a

corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and

worldwide.” Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that nothing

in its caselaw on general jurisdiction “suggests that a particular

quantum of local activity should give a State authority over a far

larger quantum of ... activity having no connection to any in-

state activity”. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Therefore,

applying this framework to the case at hand, defendant’s operations

in Louisiana, when considered relative to its activities

nationwide, do not render it at home in Louisiana. Only

approximately 10% of defendant’s employees work in Louisiana

compared to approximately 60% in Illinois, its state of

incorporation and principal place of business. Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 2-

3. About 14% of its total capital investments were spent in

Louisiana compared to about 59% in Illinois; it paid roughly 9% of

its cash taxes in Louisiana compared to roughly 61% in Illinois;

and it operated about 11% of its track mileage in Louisiana

compared to 55% in Illinois. Id. Defendants’ operations in

Louisiana comprise only a small percentage of its operations

nationwide, especially when compared to its operations in its

paradigmatic home state of Illinois. Furthermore, the Fifth

Circuit has held that having employees located in a forum is not

a sufficient basis for the exercise of general personal

jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 235

(5th Cir. 2016)

The remaining contacts with Louisiana that plaintiff

identifies are a result of plaintiff’s residence in Louisiana

rather than defendant’s contacts with the state. Plaintiff states

that he was told he could continue to live in Louisiana to receive

his job assignments and with a few months’ seniority that he could

be headquartered out of Louisiana, and that this was part of the

reason he decided to work for defendant. Rec. Doc. 12 at 2.

Plaintiff’s choice to continue to reside in Louisiana while working

for defendant, or plaintiff’s ability to choose jobs based in

Louisiana after achieving seniority are reflective of his own

contacts with Louisiana, not defendant’s. Similarly, the fact that

plaintiff’s follow-up medical care was in Louisiana after his

injury and that he obtained Louisiana issued drivers licenses are

because he resides in Louisiana and not because of defendants’

continuous and systematic contacts in the state. Furthermore, the

fact that plaintiff viewed an online advertisement from his home

in Louisiana, which was likely also accessible to other individuals

located in other states who had internet access, does not render

defendant at home in Louisiana. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,

818 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1987)(“[T]hat [defendant] has engaged

in a nationwide advertising program does not support a finding of

general jurisdiction”).

There is only one modern case in which the Supreme Court found

a non-resident defendant’s contacts with a forum state to be so

continuous and systematic as to render it at home in the state.

See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2016)

(citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437

(1952)). In Perkins, the defendant maintained an office with

company files in the state, maintained bank accounts in the state,

used a state bank as a transfer agent for stock of the company,

corresponded from the state, paid salaries in the state, and held

director’s meetings in the state. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445

(1952). Defendants’ interactions with the state of Louisiana do

not rise to this level. Accordingly, there is not a sufficient

basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction over defendant in

this case and plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of June, 2019.

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE