Densmore v. City of Knox

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICHAEL DENSMORE,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-987 DRL-MGG

STARK COUNTY SHERIFF JACK ROSA,

and CHARLES LEONHARDT, Individually and

in his capacity as Deputy of the Starke County

Sheriff’s Department,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

On June 8, 2023, Michael Densmore sued Stark County Sheriff Jack Rosa and Deputy Charles

Leonhardt, claiming they violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights and falsely arrested him.

Sherriff Rosa and Deputy Leonhardt now move to dismiss count three in full and count four in part

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court grants the partial motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

These facts emerge from the second amended complaint, taking the well-pleaded allegations and

reasonable inferences in Mr. Densmore’s favor. On June 17, 2022, Deputy Leonhardt conducted a traffic

stop near Mr. Densmore’s residence at the corner of Cleveland Street and Lake Street in Knox, Indiana

[23 ¶¶ 6, 9-10]. Mr. Densmore openly videotaped, commented on, and questioned Deputy Leonhardt

regarding the traffic stop from his front yard [id. ¶ 10]. Deputy Leonhardt subsequently arrested Mr.

Densmore for this conduct and allegedly made a verbal threat [id. ¶ 11].

Mr. Densmore argues that Deputy Leonhardt did not have probable cause to arrest him for

resisting law enforcement or disorderly conduct, the charges of the arrest [id. ¶¶ 11, 13]. On November

16, 2022, the Starke County Prosecutor moved to dismiss these charges, which were then dismissed by

the Knox City Court [id. ¶¶ 14, 15]. Mr. Densmore alleges this arrest was pursuant to an unconstitutional

policy, custom, or act of a decisionmaker with final policymaking authority [id. ¶ 12].

The complaint against Deputy Leonhardt and Sheriff Rosa includes four counts, but this motion

concerns only two counts: a Monell claim in count three, see Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978), and a hodgepodge of state law claims in count four. In response, Mr. Densmore contests

count three’s dismissal, but not the pertinent portion of count four.

STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc.,

623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A “complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). It need not plead

“detailed factual allegations,” id., but “legal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the

elements of the claim are not entitled to [a] presumption of truth,” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611,

616 (7th Cir. 2011). A claim must be plausible, not probable. Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Steward Info. Servs. Corp.,

665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion

to dismiss is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (quotation and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Count Three.

Mr. Densmore claims that Deputy Leonhardt violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights by

arresting him while he was only recording the officer’s traffic stop, pursuant to a policy or custom of

Sherriff Rosa’s office. Mr. Densmore fails to state a plausible claim here.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person may sue anyone who, while acting under color of state law,

causes him or her to be deprived of any of his or her constitutional rights. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 60 (2011). A municipality can only be held liable under § 1983 if “execution of [its] policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The law recognizes three paths to municipal liability

for the deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights: (1) an express policy, (2) a widespread custom, or

(3) a deliberate act of a decisionmaker with final policymaking authority. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375,

379 (7th Cir. 2005).

To succeed on a § 1983 claim in this vein, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered a

deprivation of a federal right (2) as a result of an express policy, a widespread custom, or a deliberate act

of a decisionmaker with final policymaking authority for the county that (3) was the proximate cause of

his injury. See King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2014). “The ‘official policy’ requirement for

liability under § 1983 is to ‘distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,

and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually

responsible.’” Estate of Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)) (emphasis omitted). “To prove an official policy, custom, or practice

within the meaning of Monell, [a plaintiff] must show more than the deficiencies specific to his own

experience, of course.” Daniel v. Cook Cnty., 833 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2016).

Here, Mr. Densmore’s complaint only addresses the necessary path to municipal liability three

times:

Defendant Leonhardt’s conduct in arresting Plaintiff was pursuant to Starke County

Sheriff’s Department policy, custom and/or procedure that allowed for the arrest of

Plaintiff in violation of his First and Fourth Amendment rights which Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to a known risk of said policy, custom and/or procedure leading

to constitutional violations and the policy, custom and/or procedure was the “moving

force” behind Plaintiff’s constitutional injury [23 ¶ 12]. . . .

Defendant Rosa had final policy making authority and failed to train his officers and/or

had a policy, custom and/or procedure in place that condoned constitutional violations

as it relates to the protection guaranteed by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United State[s] Constitution [23 ¶ 66]. . . .

Plaintiff further asserts that his constitutional deprivation at the hands of the Defendants

was caused by (1) the enforcement of an express policy of the Stark County Sheriff’s

Department and/or (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to

constitute a custom or usage with the force of law in allowing Stark County Sheriff

Deputies to arrest persons in violation of their First, Fourth and Fourteen[th]

Amendments protections guaranteed to the citizens of the United States. [23 ¶ 68].

Mr. Densmore’s complaint merely restates the three paths to municipal liability as outlined in

Calhoun in conclusory fashion. He alleges no factual matter to permit a reasonable and plausible inference

of municipal liability. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Reynolds, 623 F.3d at 1146. He never specifies what

policy or custom of the department caused this injury. He offers no facts that would suggest that any

policy is widespread, either by scope or frequency. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir.

2008); Daniel, 833 F.3d at 734. The continued use of “and/or” within the second amended complaint

regarding the paths to municipal liability further suggests that its statements are mere conclusions without

factual matter to substantiate them. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.

In response, Mr. Densmore argues that inadequate training on constitutional rights led to the

violation of his rights. He contends that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for

§ 1983 liability when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons. See

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The only appearance of an inadequate training

allegation in this pleading is under the heading “Indiana State Law Claims,” asserting that “Defendant

Rosa negligently retained, hired, supervised and/or trained Defendant Leonhardt” [23 ¶ 72]. But this is

merely a restatement of a claim grounded in negligence and is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. This pleading offers no facts that would make this conclusion plausible in a

constitutional sense. “[A]dequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says

little about the training program.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. Without a sufficiently pleaded factual basis for

inadequate training, there is no need to determine whether training on the matter was necessary or if that

failure to train led the deputies to be “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” towards the rights of persons whom

they encountered. Id. at 388. The court dismisses count three.

B. Count Four.

Mr. Densmore claims that Deputy Leonhardt and Sherriff Rosa were negligent, intentionally

inflicted emotional distress, and falsely imprisoned him. Additionally, he claims that Sherriff Rosa was

negligent in his retention, hiring, supervision, and training. Mr. Densmore does not oppose dismissal of

his claims for negligence, negligent retention, hiring, supervision, and training, or intentional infliction of

emotional distress against either Sheriff Rosa or Deputy Leonhardt. These claims are dismissed but claims

for false arrest or imprisonment survive this motion.

The parties agree that, under today’s circumstances, the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) provides

immunity for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence, including negligent retention and

training. See Ind. Code §§ 34-13-3-3(6), (7), 34-13-3-5; see, e.g., Reiner v. Dandurand, 33 F. Supp.3d 1018,

1032 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (intentional infliction of emotional distress barred); Smith v. Ciesielski, 975 F.

Supp.2d 930, 942-43 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (negligent retention, hiring, supervision, and training barred by

discretionary function immunity). Only the claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are specifically

exempted from qualified immunity in Indiana. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the partial motion to dismiss [28] and DISMISSES count three

in its entirety and count four in pertinent part.

SO ORDERED.

October 6, 2023 s/ Damon R. Leichty

Judge, United States District Court