United Coalition for Social Equality Inc v. Lake Station City of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

SARAH COVINGTON, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:17-CV-13-JVB-JPK

)

CITY OF LAKE STATION, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on:

1. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike [DE 26], filed on March 20,

2017;

2. Lake Station-affiliated Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss & Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment & to Strike [DE 30], filed on March 20, 2017;

3. Defendants’, John Buncich and Lake County Jail, Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint [DE 47], filed on April 25, 2017;

4. Defendant Judge Gina Jones’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) [DE 52], filed on April 28, 2017;

5. Defendant, Donna Joiner’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 60], filed on June 23, 2017; and

6. Joint Motion for Summary Ruling by John Buncich and Lake County Jail [DE 86],

filed on December 5, 2019.

Plaintiff Sarah Covington,1 pro se, filed a response to the first two motions on April 17,

2017, and the Lake Station-affiliated defendants filed a reply on April 24, 2017. No other responses

or replies have been filed.

Plaintiff filed a seventy-some page complaint in which she sued more than forty local,

county, and state officials and entities, as well as several private individuals, for claims arising out

1 In a prior order, the Court clarified that the sole plaintiff in this case is Sarah Covington. (Order, ECF No. 68).

of her arrest in February 2016 and the loss of custody of her children.2 For the reasons stated

below, that complaint is dismissed.

LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is

to test the sufficiency of the pleading, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. Chi., 910

F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling on such a motion, the Court accepts as true all of the

well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); see also Tamayo v.

Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, the complaint must first comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),

such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Second, the “complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1082.

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

2 In a footnote to their memorandum in support of their motion, the State Defendants content that all defendants not

listed in the caption of the complaint are not parties to this action. They are wrong. Though Plaintiff violated the letter

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) by not listing all defendants in the caption, she satisfied the spirit of the Rule

by clearly listing each defendant beginning on the second page of the complaint. Most of these defendants have

appeared and those who haven’t have been dismissed by court order. The defendants who have appeared cannot show

they were prejudiced in any way by this peccadillo. All defendants named as such in pages 2-10 of the complaint who

have not already been dismissed are parties and remain so unless and until this Court dismisses them.

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) further requires the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing a court of

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Rule 56(e) specifies that once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made,

“the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth

specific facts to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In viewing

the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts

in favor of that party. Keri, 458 F.3d at 628. A court’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the

evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead

to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.

242, 249-50 (1986).

Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 56-1(f) requires a party seeking summary judgment

against a pro se party to serve that party with the notice found in Appendix C to the Local Rules.

The notice advises an unrepresented party of the rules for responding to a summary judgment

motion. The parties moving for summary judgment have complied with this rule. See (Notice, ECF

No. 32).

ANALYSIS

1. Rule 8

“Some complaints are windy but understandable. Surplusage can and should be ignored.”

United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). However,

“[l]ength may make a complaint unintelligible, by scattering and concealing in a morass of

irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” Id. Complaints are found “wanting when they

present a ‘vague, confusing, and conclusory articulation of the factual and legal basis for the claim

and [take] a general “kitchen sink” approach to pleading the case.’” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v.

Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th

Cir. 2011)). “[J]udges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”

Garst, 328 F.3d at 378. “[D]ismissal is the appropriate remedy for district courts presented with ‘a

bucket of mud.’” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co., 722 F.3d at 947 (quoting Garst, 328 F.3d at 378).

Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed because she has not complied with Rule 8’s

requirement to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim shoring that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A myriad of federal and state claims are leveled against all

defendants indiscriminately. (See Pl.’s Compl. 11-12, 16-18, ECF No. 1). She alleges many

wrongdoings by her former husband, but he is no longer a party to this case. The remaining

defendants are, at times, tangentially connected to Plaintiff’s allegations, but her “kitchen sink

approach to pleading” and her statements alleging that “defendants” have violated her rights and

harmed her leaves each defendant without fair notice of the claims must be defended against. See

Stanard, 658 F.3d at 798; see also (Pl’s Compl. 16-18, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff’s 70-plus page complaint is therefore dismissed. Because Plaintiff is litigating pro

se, the Court will give her another opportunity to present her claims to the Court. If she chooses to

file an amended complaint, she should make clear how she believes each defendant caused her

harm. Simply asserting that all of the defendants violated a list of rights and caused her a list of

harms without alleging what each defendant did to violate each right and cause each harm is not

enough.

In order to be of further assistance to the parties and because some matters brought in

Plaintiff’s complaint would be futile for her to bring in an amended complaint, the Court will

proceed to address a number of other arguments presented in the pending motions.

2. Younger Abstention

The State Defendants argue that Younger abstention applies to some of Plaintiff’s this case.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United

States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

effectuate its judgments.”). Younger concerned whether a federal court could enjoin an ongoing

state court prosecution on the grounds that the statute on which the prosecution was based was

unconstitutional. Id. at 41. This Court has already ruled that it cannot enjoin state court

proceedings. See (Order, ECF No. 69). Accordingly, any claims against the State Court Defendants

that seek to enjoin state court proceedings are dismissed with prejudice.

3. Domestic Relations Issues

The State Defendants also argue that Plaintiff, in her complaint, asks the Court to issue a

child custody order and that those claims should be dismissed under the domestic relations

exception to federal jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). The

Court agrees. Any such claims for a child custody decree are dismissed with prejudice.

4. Section 1983 Claims

Individual liability claims under § 1983 must allege personal involvement on the part of

the entity sued. Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017). To state a claim against

a municipality, on the other hand, “the complaint must allege that an official policy or custom not

only caused the constitutional violation, but was ‘the moving force’ behind it.” Id. (quoting Estate

of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007).

Any claims Plaintiff asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Pence, Zoeller,

and Carter in their official capacities as former Governor, former Attorney General, and Lake

County Prosecutor, respectively, must be dismissed. State officials sued in their official capacities

are not “persons” under the statute. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);

see also Bibbs v. Newman, 997 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that Indiana

prosecutors sued in their official capacities are state officials).

Plaintiff sues Mayor Anderson in both his individual and official capacities. With regard

to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an official-capacity suit is merely another way of pleading an

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1974). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against

Mayor Anderson will be dismissed as duplicative of her claims against the City of Lake Station.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the City of Lake Station must be dismissed for failure to

state a claim because her complaint does not allege that the city’s custom or policy caused the

alleged unlawful or unconstitutional conduct by the City police. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694;

Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Montano v. City of Chi., 535 F.3d

558, 570 (7th Cir. 2008).

5. Indiana Constitutional Claims

The Lake Station Defendants and Defendant Joiner argue that all claims founded on the

Indiana Constitution must be dismissed because Indiana courts have not recognized civil remedies

for such violations. See Ball v. Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014). In her response to

the Lake Station Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff apparently concedes that she has no claims under

the Indiana Constitution (Obj. 18, ECF No. 41). In any event, the Court will follow other district

courts in the state that have refused to recognize claims for damages under the Indiana

Constitution. See, e.g., Fidler v. City of Indianapolis, 428 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2006).

Thus Plaintiff’s claims for damages that purport to arise under the Indiana Constitution are

dismissed with prejudice.

6. Judicial Immunity

Judge Matejczyk and Judge Jones maintain that they are entitled to judicial immunity. A

judge has absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in his or her judicial

capacity. To determine whether a defendant is entitled to judicial immunity, a court must first

inquire whether the acts complained of are within the judge’s jurisdiction, and second, whether the

acts were performed in the judge’s judicial capacity. Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 759

(7th Cir. 1989); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Because of the absence of

factual allegations in the complaint against either judge, the Court is unable to perform the analysis

necessary to decide this issue at this time.

7. Indiana Tort Claim Act Notices

All of the Lake Station Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the

Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against them because she has submitted no evidence to challenge

the affidavits they filed indicating that she never filed the notice required by Indiana Code § 34-

13-3-8(a)(1). That statute bars tort claims against political subdivisions unless, within 180 days

after the loss occurs, notice is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision. Moreover,

under Indiana case law, notice to a political subdivision is required before its employees may be

sued for acts committed in the scope of their employment. Chang v. Purdue University, 985 N.E.2d

35, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against the Lake Station

Defendants for acts committed in the scope of their employment will be dismissed with prejudice.

8. Suable Entities

The Lake County Jail is not a suable entity, see Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037,

1040 (7th Cir. 2012)), so amending the complaint to attempt to assert claims against it would be

futile. Claims directed toward that jail should be brought as claims against Lake County. Therefore,

the Jail will be dismissed as a party to this case with prejudice.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims against the Lake Station Police Department must be dismissed

because it is not a suable entity. Indiana law does not grant municipal police departments the

capacity to sue or be sued separately from the municipality that they are a part of. Sow v. Fortville

Police Dept., 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011).

9. Motion for Summary Ruling

The motion for summary ruling asks the Court to rule on the pending motions. Because the

Court is ruling on the pending motions, the motion for summary ruling is granted.

10. State Defendants’ and Lake Station Defendants’ Requests to Strike

The request to strike filings made by United Coalition for Social Equality, Inc. and its

shareholders is denied as moot because that entity has been dismissed and the Court has determined

that Plaintiff Sarah Covington is the sole plaintiff in this litigation.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

1. GRANTS in part and DENIES as moot in part State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

and Motion to Strike [DE 26];

2. GRANTS in part and DENIES as moot in part Lake Station-affiliated Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss & Motion for Partial Summary Judgment & to Strike [DE 30];

3. GRANTS Defendants’, John Buncich and Lake County Jail, Joint Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint [DE 47];

4. GRANTS Defendant Judge Gina Jones’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) [DE 52];

5. GRANTS Defendant, Donna Joiner’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 60]; and

6. GRANTS Joint Motion for Summary Ruling by John Buncich and Lake County Jail

[DE 86].

Plaintiff’s Complaint [DE 1] is DISMISSED. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or

before January 31, 2020. Failure to file an amended complaint by the deadline will result in the

dismissal of this cause of action. Any such amended complaint must comply with Rule 8, and she

may not include the following claims, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE:

1. Claims to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings,

2. Claims for a child custody decree,

3. Official capacity claims against Pence, Zoeller, and Carter under § 1983,

4. Official capacity claims under § 1983 against Mayor Anderson,

5. Claims for damages arising under the Indiana Constitution,

6. The state law tort claims that she brought against the Lake Station-affiliated defendants

for acts committed within the scope of their employment,

7. Claims brought against the Lake County Jail, and

8. Claims against the Lake Station Police Department.

Defendants Lake County Jail and Lake Station Police Department are DISMISSED from this

cause of action.

SO ORDERED on December 13, 2019.

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: Plaintiff Sarah Covington, pro se