Croom v. Hughes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHRISTOPHER CROOM,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-2885-NJR

LATOYA HUGHES, ROB JEFFREYS,

and ANTHONY WILLS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Christopher Croom, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

who is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Menard

Correctional Center. His initial Complaint, alleging violations under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments while housed in Menard’s East Cellhouse, was dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim (Doc. 8). Croom was granted leave to file an

amended pleading.

In his First Amended Complaint, Croom alleges that he was denied due process

rights and subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the East Cellhouse.

He raises claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the First Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The First Amended Complaint

Croom now makes the following allegations: At all times relevant to the claims in

his Amended Complaint, Croom was housed in the East Cellhouse at Menard (Doc. 11,

p. 8). Although a general population cellhouse, Croom alleges that inmates are confined

to their cells in the unit for 24 hours per day, except for the days where inmates are

allowed access to the yard (Id.). Inmates have access to the yard, at most, two times per

week for 4-4 ½ hours at a time (Id.). They are not allowed to attend school, participate in

prison programs, or hold a prison job (Id. at p. 14). Croom alleges the East Cellhouse is

known as the disciplinary cellhouse, and the cellhouse, as a whole, is provided less

privileges than other general population cellhouses (Id. at p. 16).

Croom was placed in the East Cellhouse in March 2022. While confined to the

cellhouse, Croom experienced several cellhouse-wide disciplinary actions (Id. at p. 8).

During those time periods, inmates in the cellhouse were either on lockdown or limited

in their ability to access the yard or telephone privileges. For example, on September 1,

2022, the entire cellhouse’s yard access was limited to one day per week in response to a

fight between two inmates on the yard (Id.). The prison as a whole was not put on

lockdown. Only the East Cellhouse was subjected to the restrictions for 60 days (Id.). On

November 1, 2022, the East Cellhouse’s yard time was restored to two days per week (Id.).

On November 23, 2022, during the meal line for the Thanksgiving meal, a fight

broke out between inmates on 7-Gallery (Id. at p. 9). Again, the entire cellhouse was

punished with restricted yard access for one month (Id.). The cellhouse was on lockdown

for two to three days, but the limitation on yard access lasted for a full month (Id.). On

January 5, 2023, another fight broke out between two inmates on the yard. The East

Cellhouse was again limited to one yard day per week and a two or three-day lockdown

(Id.). Croom alleges this limitation on yard access lasted until his transfer from Menard

in June 2023 (Id.).

On May 16, 2023, another fight broke out on 5-Gallery resulting in the limitation

of phone privileges for the entire cellhouse. Thus, in addition to the limitation placed on

Croom’s access to the yard, he was also limited in the amount of access he had to the

telephones (Id. at p. 10). Specifically, telephone privileges were only offered on second

shift as opposed to both first and second shift. Croom alleges that these limitations on his

access to the yard and telephone constituted a punishment without due process. He never

received notice of the discipline or a chance to appear at a disciplinary hearing prior to

the punishment (Id. at pp. 10-11).

Croom alleges that as a result of the punishment, he was often confined to his cell

for six to seven days a week over the course of eight months (Id. at p. 12). The cell was

small, and the length of time confined to the cell caused Croom to suffer from severe

migraines, depression (including loss of interest in his normal recreational and

educational activities), body aches, and physical degradation (Id.). He is now easily

frustrated and prone to anger (Id.). Croom also was diagnosed with degenerative disc

disease in his lower back after being incarcerated at Menard and experiencing restrictions

on his mobility (Id.). He also suffers from PTSD, insomnia, and recurrent thoughts of

death, and he hears voices of his dead loved ones (Id.). He has been prescribed

psychotropic medications to combat his mental conditions (Id. at p. 13). He alleges that

he was forced to be involved in a riot which led to being stabbed by another inmate (Id.).

Croom blames the conditions he experienced in the East Cellhouse for his involvement

in the riot (Id.).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court designates

the following counts:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Anthony

Wills, Latoya Hughes, and Rob Jeffreys for restricting

Croom’s access to yard and other privileges during

cellhouse-wide restrictions placed on the East Cellhouse.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

against Anthony Wills, Latoya Hughes, and Rob Jeffreys for

restricting Croom’s access to yard and other privileges while

housed in the East Cellhouse.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and

orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that

is mentioned in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should

be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly

pleading standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face”).

Count 1

As to Croom’s due process claim, the Court undertakes a two-part analysis. Isby v.

Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court first evaluates whether a plaintiff was

deprived of a protected liberty interest, and then second, it evaluates whether the process

he was afforded was constitutionally deficient. Id. (citing Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ.,

839 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2016)). To establish the deprivation of a protected liberty

interest, a plaintiff must show that the discipline imposed an “atypical and signification

hardship” on the inmate. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-23 (2005).

Croom alleges that he experienced cellhouse-wide restrictions, including

restrictions on his access to the yard and limited use of the telephone. While housed in

Menard’s East Cellhouse, Croom also was not allowed to participate in any programs or

hold a prison job. But none of these restrictions amount to an atypical and significant

hardship. Courts have found that the loss of visitation privileges does not constitute an

“atypical and significant hardship.” Woody v. Zatecky, 594 F. App’x 311, 312 (7th Cir. 2015).

Further, the lack of access to a prison job, as well as the inability to participate in activities

and educational programs, does not constitute the deprivation of a protected liberty

interest. See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Thomas v. Ramos, 130

F.3d 754, 757-60 (7th Cir. 1997)); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding

no protected liberty interest in holding a prison job); Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485-86

(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1150 (1983) (no liberty interest in increased recreation

or prison programs); Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000) (no right to

educational or rehabilitative programs). As the Court previously stated in dismissing his

original Complaint, Croom’s allegations are akin to a cellhouse-wide lockdown, and

there is no liberty interest in avoiding a lockdown. See Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809

(7th Cir. 1996); Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, Croom’s due

process claim in Count 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Count 2

Croom’s allegations regarding the conditions he faced in the East Cellhouse could,

however, amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645,

652-53 (7th Cir. 2013). Croom alleges that due to the frequent restrictions placed on the

East Cellhouse, he was afforded limited opportunities outside of his cell. As a result, he

suffered both mentally and physically. As warden, Croom alleges that Anthony Wills

was the individual who instituted the cellhouse-wide restrictions after obtaining

permission from the directors, including Latoya Hughes and Rob Jeffreys. He alleges that,

per IDOC policy, only Wills could institute lockdowns and restrictions (Id. at p. 24). He

also alleges that the restrictions had to be reviewed and approved by the directors (Id.).

Thus, Croom states a claim in Count 2 against Anthony Wills, Latoya Hughes, and Rob

Jeffreys.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Count 2

shall proceed against Anthony Wills, Latoya Hughes, and Rob Jeffreys.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Anthony Wills, Latoya Hughes,

and Rob Jeffreys: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to

mail these forms, a copy of the First Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and

Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by Croom. If a defendant

fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within

30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect

formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the

full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Croom, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the First Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

Section 1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only

respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Croom, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Croom is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 23, 2024 7 g 2

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Amended Complaint. After service has

been achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Amended Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to

receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more.

When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless

specifically directed to do so.