The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EDWARD WILLIAMS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-164-DWD
)
DANIEL MONTI, Warden of Centralia )
Correctional Center, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Petitioner, an inmate at Centralia Correctional Center, filed a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The Petition is now before the Court for
a preliminary review. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District
Courts provides: “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts; accord Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 663 (2005).
On July 20, 2018, Petitioner pled guilty to 2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse of a minor under the age of 13 years old. (Doc. 1, pgs. 1, 25-26). On September 20,
2018, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 29 years and 30 years on counts I and
II, respectively, which are to be served consecutively. (Doc. 1, pgs. 1, 25-26).
1 Petitioner filed a seemingly identical Petition to initiate Case No. 24-cv-165-SPM, which was later
transferred to the undersigned. The Court consolidated the two cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(a)(2) on April 10, 2024. (Doc. 10). All filings shall now bear Case No. 24-cv-164-DWD. (Doc. 10).
Petitioner did not directly appeal the judgment of conviction. (Doc. 1, pg. 2).
However, he filed postconviction petitions in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County. (Doc.
1, pgs. 3-6, 41-45). Petitioner filed a pro se postconviction petition and a first amended
postconviction petition on November 20, 2019, and September 24, 2020, respectively,
claiming, among other things, Brady violations and errors rendering Petitioner’s sentence
void. (Doc. 1, pgs. 3-4, 26-27). Petitioner filed a second amended postconviction petition
on November 10, 2020, claiming ineffective assistance of plea counsel in relation to the
aforementioned sentencing errors. (Doc. 1, pgs. 4, 28). Petitioner filed a third amended
postconviction petition on May 17, 2021, again claiming the ineffective assistance of plea
counsel. (Doc. 1, pgs. 5, 29). The third amended postconviction petition also added a claim
of actual innocence based on medical examinations indicating the victim of Petitioner’s
underlying offenses had chlamydia, but Petitioner did not. (Doc. 1, pgs. 5, 29).
The third amended postconviction petition was dismissed on October 1, 2021.
(Doc. 1, pgs. 5, 31). However, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, reversed that
dismissal, on the basis that “the record rebut[ted] the presumption that postconviction
counsel complied with” Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c), and remanded the matter for
new second-stage proceedings with the appointment of new postconviction counsel.
(Doc. 1, pgs. 5, 39). The Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, advised that “[i]n
fulfilling Rule 651(c) duties, new postconviction counsel should make any amendments
necessary to adequately assert defendant’s contentions of constitutional error and
remove any claim that lacks legal merit.” (Doc. 1, pg. 39). And, importantly, this record
and the docket in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County indicate the state postconviction
proceedings remain ongoing. See People v. Williams, No. 17-CF-195; (Doc. 5).2
Now, the abstention principles articulated in Younger v. Harris counsel that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not interfere with ongoing state
judicial proceedings. See 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971); Hickey v. Duffy, 827 F.2d 234, 244 (7th Cir.
1987) (Flaum, J., concurring); see also Price v. Superintendent, Miami Corr. Facility, No. 9-cv-
409, 2009 WL 3762336, *1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2009) (noting Younger abstention applies if
there are ongoing state judicial proceedings that implicate important state interests and
there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in those state judicial
proceedings). The interests of comity and federalism require a state court to have the first
opportunity to decide a petitioner’s claims. Yeoman v. Pollard, 875 F.3d 832, 837-38 (7th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005)). Therefore, a petitioner must
exhaust his or her state court remedies before seeking relief under § 2254, meaning he or
she must “fairly present” the claims in the state court. Id. (citing Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.
27, 29 (2004); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275 (1971)). To “fairly present” claims, a petitioner must assert the claims “through
one complete round of state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or in
post-conviction proceedings.” Id. (citing Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845). The petitioner must
raise the claims “at each and every level in the state court system, including levels at
which review is discretionary rather than mandatory.” Id. In Illinois, this includes a
2The record indicates, at some unknown time, Petitioner also filed a pro se fourth amended
postconviction petition. (Doc. 1, pgs. 41-45).
petition for leave to appeal that is filed in the Supreme Court of Illinois. Soto v. Truitt, No.
96-cv-5680, 2023 WL 112585, *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2023) (quoting Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845)).
Relatedly, a petitioner who exhausts his or her state court remedies without fairly
presenting claims at each level of the state court has procedurally defaulted those claims.
Id. (citing Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848-49); Howard v. O’Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721, 725 (7th
Cir.1999); Momient-El v. DeTella, 118 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir.1997)). Procedural defaults bars
federal habeas relief unless the petitioner shows cause for and prejudice from the default
or a miscarriage of justice stemming from the denial of relief. Id. (citing Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)).
Here, the Court emphasizes that Petitioner does not allege his Petition is
“mixed”—i.e., that “it presents both exhausted and not exhausted claims”—as to support
staying the Petition and holding it in abeyance. Evans v. Scott, No. 15-cv-1122, 2018 WL
501337, *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2018) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276). Instead, the record fails
to indicate that any of Petitioner’s claims are exhausted, i.e., that they have been subject
to “one complete round of state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or
in post-conviction proceedings.” See Yeoman, 875 F.3d at 837-38. To the contrary,
Petitioner did not directly appeal the judgment of conviction. (Doc. 1, pg. 2). Petitioner
filed various amended postconviction petitions in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County.
(Doc. 1, pgs. 3-4). Of note, the third amended postconviction petition was dismissed by
the Circuit Court of St. Clair County before that court, in the only appeal reflected by the
instant record, was reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District. (Doc. 1, pgs. 5,
39). The record demonstrates the state proceedings, where Petitioner is represented by
counsel, remain ongoing following the remand. In short, Petitioner has not exhausted his
state remedies and, notably, it does not appear a dismissal of the operative postconviction
petition by the Circuit Court of St. Clair County will satisfy that requirement.
Therefore, the Court finds, without consideration of the merits, the Petition must
be DISMISSED without prejudice to allow for exhaustion in the state court. See Brown
v. Wisconsin, No. 14-cv-872, 2015 WL 631288, *3 (E.D. Wisc. Feb. 12, 2015) (finding, despite
filing of a § 2254 petition, a dismissal without prejudice was required since the court
could not ignore ongoing state-court proceedings or the fact that “a habeas petition ‘shall
not be granted’ if state-court remedies are unexhausted”) (Emphasis in original.). Also,
the Motion to Stay (Doc. 5), which only seeks a stay “until the end of April 2024…[when]
I will be done with the State court system,” is DENIED. As noted above, Petitioner will
not “be done with the State court system” even if the operative amended postconviction
petition is dismissed by the Circuit Court of St. Clair County. The Clerk of the Court is
DIRECTED to enter a judgment consistent with this Memorandum & Order.
Finally, under Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S.
District Courts, the Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters
a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate should be issued only where
Petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For a certificate of appealability to issue, Petitioner must show that
“reasonable jurists” would find the Court’s “assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S.
100, 115 (2017). However, where a petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, without
consideration of the underlying constitutional issue, Petitioner must show both that
reasonable jurists would “find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Here, no reasonable jurist would find it debatable that the Court's ruling on
exhaustion is correct. Therefore, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. If
Petitioner wishes to pursue an appeal, he may reapply for a certificate of appealability
with the Seventh Circuit. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 12, 2024
s/ David W. Dugan
__________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge