Cutler v. Wills

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHAD CUTLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-03127-GCS

)

ANTHONY WILLS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Chad Cutler, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff claims that he is suffering from untreated and undiagnosed episodes of paralysis

that put him in danger of attack and sexual assault by other inmates. Plaintiff seeks

monetary damages and injunctive relief. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for

preliminary injunction. (Doc. 8). Defendant Wills filed an opposition. (Doc. 23). On

November 30, 2023, the Court held a hearing on the motion and heard testimony from

Plaintiff, Angela Crain, Menard Health Care Administrator, and Lieutenant Mark Hanks,

an Internal Affairs supervisor. (Doc. 33). The Court took the matter under advisement

and allowed the parties additional time to supplement the record. Id. Both parties filed

supplemental documents. (Doc. 36, 37, 43, 46, 47, 49).1 For the reasons delineated below,

the Court denies the motion.

Plaintiff alleges that he has low functioning autism and another condition that has

not been diagnosed or evaluated. (Doc. 1, p. 3). This second condition causes Plaintiff to

enter a paralytic state when under extreme stress or at other random moments. During

these episodes, Plaintiff experiences loss of voluntary movement that lasts for minutes or

hours. As a result, Plaintiff claims that he is utterly defenseless to violent or sexual

advances by other inmates when he is in such a state. Id.

On July 10, 2023, Plaintiff began writing the medical department at Menard with

requests for urgent medical attention. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff states he has submitted over

fifty requests. According to Plaintiff, all these requests were ignored over a period of

seventy days. Id.

Plaintiff has also submitted three PREA reports due to the high likelihood of being

raped or maimed by a cellmate during a paralytic episode. (Doc. 1, p. 4). In July, Plaintiff

wrote to his counselor twice seeking assistance with acquiring medical attention and did

not receive a response. Id. at p. 5. On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff appeared before the

Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) and described his unsuccessful attempts to be

treated; he also claimed that his condition places him in danger. Id. Plaintiff further wrote

1 Documents 36, 37, and 47 are filed under seal as these documents pertain to Prison Rape

Elimination Act (“PREA”) claims made by Plaintiff. The Court thoroughly reviewed these

documents prior to issuing this Memorandum & Order. However, the Court is not citing to these

documents or utilizing the information contained in these documents in rendering its decision as

the Court finds that they are not necessary to determine the outcome of the pending motion.

emergency grievances on August 20, 2023, and September 1, 2023. On September 27, 2023,

Plaintiff again appeared before the ARB and presented his issues with obtaining medical

treatment and receiving recognition of his condition by staff, which he claims makes him

vulnerable to an attack by another inmate. (Doc. 9). Despite notifying prison officials that

he was being denied medical treatment, his condition continues to go untreated and

ignored by medical staff, thus placing him in a dangerous situation. Id.; (Doc. 9, p. 2-4).

On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed his motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 8).

On October 16, 2023, the Court performed its preliminary screening Order

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Wills for deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need. (Doc. 11).

DISCUSSION

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” for which there

must be a “clear showing” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520

U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R MILLER, & MARY KAY

KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an

injunction is “to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of

the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has the burden

of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate

remedy at law; and (3) irreparable harm absent the injunction. See Planned Parenthood of

Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012).

In the context of prisoner litigation, there are further restrictions on a court’s

remedial power. The scope of a court’s authority to enter an injunction in the corrections

context is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Westefer v.

Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief

“must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court

finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct

that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). See also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (noting that the PLRA

“enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison

conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over

the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a preliminary injunction would bind

only the parties, their officers or agents, or persons in active concert with the parties or

their agents.

The Seventh Circuit has described injunctions like the one sought here, where an

injunction would require an affirmative act by the defendant, as a mandatory preliminary

injunction. See Graham v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory

injunctions are “cautiously viewed and sparingly issued,” because they require the court

to command a defendant to take a particular action. Id. See also W.A. Mack, Inc., v. General

Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1958) (stating that “[a] preliminary injunction

does not issue which gives to a plaintiff the actual advantage which would be obtained

in the final decree.”).

Here, Plaintiff seeks “[a]n order requiring Menard and I.D.O.C. to place Chad

Cutler in strictly single cell status, protecting and isolating him from potential attackers.”

(Doc. 8, p. 3). In his reply brief, Plaintiff clarified his injunctive relief as follows: “[c]ourt

ordered application of single-cell status until such time as a medical evaluation can be

completed and further recommendations made.” (Doc. 30, p. 4). Plaintiff maintains that

he has demonstrated that he “suffers from a disabling condition which, in a prison

environment and without protection, places him in grave danger on a daily basis.” (Doc.

8, p. 4).

Regarding the first element, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any

likelihood of success – in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM

General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). If Plaintiff meets

his burden, the Court must then weigh “the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction

is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public interest.”

Id.

The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that

he is entitled to a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff seeks single cell placement and a

medical evaluation for his condition from medical staff at Menard. Despite Plaintiff’s

contentions in his reply brief that his “ability to articulate clearly his medical condition to

this Court has been severely hindered by Defendant denying him medical attention since

July 10th,” (Doc. 30, p. 1), Plaintiff participated fully in the hearing, testified on his own

behalf and cross-examined Defendants’ witnesses without experiencing an episode of

this purported paralysis.2 Indeed, in his court filings prior to the hearing, Plaintiff warned

the Court that he might not be able to get through the hearing because of this condition.

However, the Court observed Plaintiff during this lengthy hearing, and Plaintiff did not

appear to experience any of these issues.

Further, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has not provided the Court with

verifiable evidence that he has this medical condition or that this condition presents a

serious need requiring immediate medical attention. The record does not contain a

diagnosis regarding this medical condition from any doctor who may have seen Plaintiff

prior to his incarceration or from any medical doctor during his incarceration, even

though Plaintiff testified that he has had this issue his entire life.3 Plaintiff argues that he

will suffer irreparable harm from this condition and that this condition puts him in grave

danger of attacks. The undersigned notes that according to Plaintiff, his symptoms have

persisted many years prior to his incarceration, continued while he has been incarcerated

and have gotten worse in the last year during moments of extreme stress, shock or fear.

However, he has not provided evidence that his symptoms have escalated or that his

health has deteriorated. As to the frequency of these episodes, Plaintiff stated that in July

2023, the episodes began to increase to three to four times a week. When asked by the

Court to explain what caused these episodes to occur more frequently, Plaintiff testified

that in July 2023, he was moved from a good location to a bad one, which caused him a

2 The undersigned notes that the preliminary injunction hearing lasted over 3 ½ hours.

3 Plaintiff stated that, prior to incarceration, he never made a report of the episodes to

doctors, but symptoms were discussed.

great deal of stress and anxiety. Specifically, Plaintiff stated that up until July 2023, he

was in a cell house with small, single cells and then moved to a cell house with more

aggressive individuals. Additionally, Plaintiff testified that his medical condition is not

obvious to other inmates, as he tries to hide it. As a result, he has never been assaulted or

threatened because of this medical condition.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits

as to his claim regarding Defendant Wills’s alleged deliberate indifference towards his

serious medical needs. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he suffers

from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that the prison officials knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to his health. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Plaintiff believes that he suffers from these episodes of paralysis, which would be an

objectively serious and debilitating condition that would satisfy the first prong. However,

as stated supra the record does not establish that Plaintiff suffers from this medical

condition or that Defendant Wills knew of and disregarded such a risk to his health.4

First, the record does not reveal that Plaintiff has an objectively serious medical

condition. In fact, Plaintiff admitted that he did not report this purported medical

condition upon arriving to IDOC custody. Further, the record demonstrates that attempts

were made to address whatever mental health concerns Plaintiff had. For example, on

August 4, 2023, Lt. Hanks referred Plaintiff to Mental Health, but Plaintiff refused to go

4 There is conflicting testimony regarding the 75 written requests Plaintiff claims he made

regarding this issue by Plaintiff and Ms. Crain. Ms. Crain testified that after reviewing Plaintiff’s

medical records there were no medical requests from Plaintiff from June to the present and that

there were no grievances written by Plaintiff regarding medical treatment.

on August 10, 2023. (Doc. 46-1, p. 18, 19). On August 12, 2023, Plaintiff wrote a letter

asking for a full evaluation of his condition, and in this letter, he noted that this was at

least his 17th written request. This letter has a handwritten notation: “Refused/Addressed

8/14/23 KW.” Id. at p. 20. Thereafter, the medical record contains a refusal of services for

Mental Health dated August 21, 2023. Id. at p. 21. Also, Plaintiff saw a nurse practitioner

for this condition on November 22, 2023, wherein he was referred to Mental Health. Id.

at p. 5. On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff was seen by Mental Health and found to have no

current mental health diagnosis. Id. at p. 25. Just recently, Plaintiff saw a medical provider

at Menard on December 29, 2023, wherein a CT scan of Plaintiff’s brain was ordered, and

Plaintiff was told to obtain and provide the name of his prior provider/providers who

may have diagnosed him with any illness. (Doc. 46-1, p. 22-24). Thus, the Court finds that

there is no objective evidence of Plaintiff’s reported symptoms/medical condition or that

the relevant authorities ignored any appreciable risk to Plaintiff’s health. Therefore,

Plaintiff has not established this prong of the test.

Second, Plaintiff must show that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his legal remedies are inadequate.

Plaintiff can prosecute his case to achieve the legal remedies he seeks. An evaluation by

a medical provider for care is the type of relief Plaintiff could obtain if he is ultimately

successful at the conclusion of the case. Indeed, Plaintiff most recently had a medical

appointment on December 29, 2023.5 Such injunctive relief is not warranted when the

5 The fact that Plaintiff had the medical evaluation on December 29, 2023, and a CT scan of

his brain was ordered could render Plaintiff’s request for a medical evaluation moot. See, e.g.,

order would give “to plaintiff the actual advantage which would be obtained in the final

decree.” W.A. Mack, 260 F.2d at 890.

Lastly, to demonstrate entitlement to preliminary relief, Plaintiff would need to

establish that irreparable harm will result if injunctive relief does not issue. Here, Plaintiff

has failed to show any actual danger that he is experiencing. He testified that he has not

been attacked or threatened by anyone because of this medical condition. In fact, his

situation stems from his status as an inmate, rather than from circumstances unique to

him. He failed to identify any specific threat or assault he has received or why his

situation is any different from other inmates.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

injunction. (Doc. 8).

IT IS SO ORDERED. ee. .

Digitally signed

by Judge Sison

DATED: Feb 7, 2024. :

sonny Stlek © 3 1 2024.02.07

12:33:35 -06'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the PLRA bars claims for injunctive

relief that are moot). However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court addresses the merits of

the motion.

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