Crawford v. Piercefield

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DeANDRE CRAWFORD, )

M30080, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-02737-GCS

)

ZION PIERCEFIELD, )

MRS. FITZGERALD, )

MR. KOHN, )

MARGOT MADOLE, )

MR. GARRETT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff DeAndre Crawford, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”), brings this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated

his right to practice his religion, and they engaged in retaliation after he grieved the issue.

He seeks monetary compensation.

The Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner

1 The Court has jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff’s motions and to screen his Complaint due

to his consent to the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge (Doc. 5) and the limited consent to the

exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandums of Understanding

between the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford and this Court.

complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion

of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune

from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is a Muslim whose religious practice involves five daily prayers. (Doc. 1,

p. 2-3). The last prayer of the day is Isha. Plaintiff was completing his Isha prayer while

at his prison job on August 31, 2021. During the prayer, Defendant Piercefield asked other

workers about Plaintiff’s whereabouts and then called Plaintiff’s name despite other

inmates telling Piercefield he was praying. Piercefield asked Plaintiff to stop his prayer

at least twice and told him that his prayer was “holding the line up.” Id. at p. 3. Despite

Piercefield’s insistence, Plaintiff completed his prayer. Plaintiff later grieved Piercefield’s

interruption of his prayer, and the dietary response was that he was expected to work

while on assignment.

Plaintiff alleges that after he grieved Piercefield’s conduct, other staff began to

retaliate against him. (Doc. 1, p. 3). On September 10, 2021, Plaintiff believed he had the

day off from work, and he planned to use the day to rest because he had experienced

chest pains the previous night. Piercefield, however, issued Plaintiff a ticket for his failure

to report to work. Piercefield informed Plaintiff that even if he was sick, he would have

to report to work to check-in before taking the day off. He also informed Plaintiff that his

days off had changed. Plaintiff alleges he was found guilty of this ticket. Id. at p. 3-4. On

October 11, 2021, Piercefield wrote a second ticket for Plaintiff’s failure to report to work,

but it was later expunged. Id. at p. 4. Despite the ticket being expunged, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Kohn, the dietary supervisor, used the ticket as a basis to fire him from

his job. When the ticket was expunged, however, Plaintiff’s job was not restored.

Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Kohn to seek assistance from Piercefield’s alleged

harassment. Kohn, however, refused to assist. Plaintiff alleges that Kohn made the work

schedule, and he knew he did not inform Plaintiff of any schedule changes. (Doc. 1, p. 4).

Meanwhile, on September 20, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that Mrs. Fitzgerald issued

Plaintiff a ticket in retaliation for the grievance he had filed against Piercefield. Plaintiff

asked Mrs. Fitzgerald about the ticket, and she “said something about writing

grievances.” (Doc. 1, p. 4).

Plaintiff separately alleges that on July 31, 2021, he wrote a grievance that a non-

party counselor received on August 13, 2021. He sent the grievance to the grievance office,

and Defendant Garrett answered it on August 28, 2021. Plaintiff mailed it to the

Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) on October 9, 2021. Despite this timeline of events,

he alleges that the ARB did not receive the grievance until November 4, 2021, and on

November 15, 2021, Defendant Madole rejected the grievance as untimely. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Plaintiff alleges that the handling of this grievance violated his due process rights.

Plaintiff further alleges that he wrote a grievance about the retaliatory acts of

Piercefield and Mrs. Fitzgerald on August 9, 2021,2 but a counselor erroneously deemed

it a duplicate of his July 2021 grievance. He alleges that Defendants Garrett and Madole

compounded the errors with the August 9, 2021, grievance by failing to address it after it

was deemed a duplicate. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Plaintiff proceeds to identify enumerated counts against each Defendant. He

alleges Defendants Piercefield and Kohn violated his rights under the First Amendment

(religion and retaliation) and RLUIPA, Defendant Fitzgerald violated his First

Amendment rights through retaliation, and Defendants Garrett and Madole violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (Doc. 1, p. 6-9).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Claim 1: First Amendment (religious exercise) or RLUIPA claim

based on Piercefield’s and Kohn’s handling of Plaintiff’s

religious practice while on the job;

Claim 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Piercefield,

Kohn, or Fitzgerald for their alleged retaliation after

Plaintiff’s religious exercise at work or subsequent

complaints or grievances about the same;

Claim 3: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendants Madole and Garrett for their handling of

Plaintiff’s grievances.

2 This allegation does not make sense in the grand scheme of things, because Plaintiff

alleges that he had the initial encounter with Piercefield at work on August 31, 2021, and

Fitzgerald retaliated on September 20, 2021. If Piercefield and Fitzgerald did not act until late

August or mid-September, it would have been impossible for Plaintiff to file an August 9, 2021,

grievance about their actions.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (noting that an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

PRELIMINARY DISMISSAL

In addition to the three claims identified above, Plaintiff mentioned that he

received at least three disciplinary tickets (two from Piercefield and one from Fitzgerald),

only one of which was expunged. Despite the ticket being expunged, he alleges that

Defendant Kohn used it as a basis to fire him from his prison job. These allegations are

insufficient to allege a Due Process claim for two reasons. First, the Fourteenth

Amendment provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. Due process is only

required when punishment extends the duration of confinement or imposes an “atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Plaintiff does not describe the punishment he

received for the three disciplinary tickets, so he has not established he had a liberty

interest that was impacted by the discipline and that triggered due process protections.

Second, the loss of a prison job is not protected by the Due Process clause, so

Plaintiff cannot successfully allege a claim related to the loss of his work assignment

regardless of the disciplinary component to his termination. See, e.g., Cochran v. Buss, 381

F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that due process concerns were not triggered where

inmate alleged that “he lost his preferred prison living arrangement, his prison job and

his eligibility for rehabilitative programs . . . .”). Accordingly, the Court will not further

discuss Plaintiff’s allegations about the disciplinary tickets or his loss of prison

employment.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Piercefield and Kohn violated his rights under the

First Amendment and RLUIPA by their handling of his religion while on the job. An

inmate’s right to practice his religion is protected under the First Amendment, and the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-

1(a). “The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the state from imposing a substantial burden on

a central religious belief or practice.” Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A substantial burden puts [] pressure

on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thompson v. Holm, 809

F.3d 376, 379-380 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). RLUIPA

offers broader protections than the First Amendment by prohibiting substantial burdens

on an inmate's religious exercise unless that burden serves a “compelling governmental

interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). However,

RLUIPA does not permit the recovery of money damages against state officials; it only

allows for injunctive relief. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 287-288 (2011).

Here, Plaintiff indicates he would like to proceed under RLUIPA and the First

Amendment, but he has not sought injunctive relief, so he cannot proceed under

RLUIPA. As to the First Amendment, he may pursue a First Amendment claim against a

defendant if he alleges that the defendant has done something to put a substantial burden

on his ability to adhere to his religion. Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion Defendant

Piercefield approached him mid-prayer and directed him to stop praying. Despite

Piercefield’s actions, however, Plaintiff finished his prayer. While Piercefield’s actions

may have been disruptive, it does not appear that on the occasion alleged that he

prevented Plaintiff from praying. As such, this encounter cannot form the basis for a First

Amendment free exercise claim.

In the wake of this interaction, Plaintiff alleges that Piercefield twice gave him

tickets for not showing up to work. Reading the complaint broadly, it seems that Plaintiff

attributes these tickets to Piercefield due to the prior encounter over his prayer while at

work. But, by his own allegations Piercefield issued these tickets because Plaintiff was

scheduled to work, and Plaintiff did not show-up for work. Plaintiff also alleges that on

one of these days he had chest pain, which Piercefield already knew about, but Piercefield

refused to accommodate him. When Plaintiff raised concerns about his schedule changes

to Kohn, Kohn refused to help him. Plaintiff further alleges that Kohn would not help

him with Piercefield’s retaliation or harassment.

The problem with these allegations is that based on Plaintiff’s own allegations,

Piercefield was simply enforcing the procedure for an employee to report to work and/or

to request a sick day. It is not apparent that the actions taken by Piercefield and/or Kohn

further burdened the free exercise of Plaintiff’s religion. The only potential religious

disruption that Plaintiff experienced was the one incident on August 31st when

Piercefield tried to interrupt Plaintiff’s prayer. After that incident, Plaintiff does not allege

further hinderances to the exercise of his religion. As such, Plaintiff cannot proceed on

the First Amendment concerning the free exercise of his religion.

By contrast, to the extent that Plaintiff claims the defendants were trying to

retaliate against him for practicing his religion at work, he may proceed on this theory.

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must plead that “(1) he engaged in

activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely

deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was

‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.”

Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff alleges that after Piercefield confronted him at work about his religious

observance on the job and after Plaintiff grieved about the incident, he began to encounter

problems with Piercefield and others. Specifically, he alleges that Piercefield issued a

disciplinary ticket relating to his job attendance despite there being confusion or a lack of

communication regarding his schedule. Piercefield also issued a second disciplinary

ticket related to his job attendance that was later overturned as unfounded. The first ticket

came about two weeks after the prayer incident at work, and the second occurred a month

after the first. Although suspicious timing alone is insufficient to sustain a retaliation

claim, the Court will read the Complaint broadly at this preliminary juncture, giving

Plaintiff the inference that the timing suggests Piercefield issued the tickets with a

retaliatory motive.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kohn changed his work schedule without

notifying him. Plaintiff also alleges that Kohn refused to assist him when he reported

Piercefield’s retaliatory behavior. Again, suspicious timing alone will not be enough to

support this claim later in the litigation, but for now, the claim is sufficient and will be

allowed to proceed.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fitzgerald participated in the retaliation.

Plaintiff alleges that after he wrote a grievance about his interaction with Piercefield in

late August 2021, Defendant Fitzgerald issued him a disciplinary ticket in retaliation for

the grievance. Plaintiff alleges that when he asked Fitzgerald about the ticket, she said it

was linked to writing grievances. This series of events forms the basis for a valid

retaliation claim against Defendant Fitzgerald. Accordingly, Claim 2 concerning

retaliation may proceed against Defendants Piercefield, Kohn, and Fitzgerald.

In Claim 3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Garrett and Madole violated his right

to due process through their handling of two of his grievances. As to the first grievance,

filed on July 31, 2021, he alleges that Garrett answered the grievance and he appealed it,

but then Madole denied it as arriving at the ARB more than 30 days after the prison’s

final response. This series of events does not form the basis for a due process violation

because the alleged mishandling of a grievance by those who processed the grievance is

not sufficient to state a due process claim. See, e.g., Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 954 (7th

Cir. 2011) (noting that prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the constitution,

so the alleged mishandling of grievances by those who did not participate in the

underlying constitutional harm does not give rise to a due process claim).

The same reasoning applies to the second grievance, filed on August 9, 2021.

Plaintiff alleges that a grievance counselor erroneously labeled this grievance as a

duplicate, and Garrett and Madole subsequently violated his rights by merely adopting

that characterization of the grievance. Again, the mere mishandling of a grievance does

not give rise to a due process claim. Accordingly, Claim 3 against Defendants Madole

and Garrett is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 2 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives

initial screening as described above against Defendants Zion Piercefield, Mr. Kohn, and

Mrs. Fitzgerald. By contrast, Claims 1 and 3 are dismissed for failure to state a claim, and

there are no claims remaining against Defendants Margot Madole or Mr. Garrett. As such,

the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE these defendants.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Zion Piercefield, Mr.

Kohn, and Mrs. Fitzgerald: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service

of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED

to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order

to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign

and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from

the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service

on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,

to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED. Digitally signed by

Judge Sison

At Mek AS

DATED: December 11, 2023. Date: 2023.12.11

13:31:24 -06'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.

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