Rouser v. Larson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RASHAD ROUSER, )

Y47970, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-3469-DWD

)

DENNIS LARSON, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Rashad Rouser, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Big Muddy River Center (Big Muddy), brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional

rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that while he was on a hunger strike from April to May

of 2023, Defendant Dr. Dennis Larson refused to provide him with insulin treatments for

his diabetes, and he went into ketoacidosis that required hospitalization. Plaintiff seeks

monetary compensation, and revocation of Dr. Larson’s medical license.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that he was on hunger strike from late-April to early-May of 2023

for approximately four days. (Doc. 1 at 6). During his hunger strike, Dr. Larson knew he

was a diabetic, but refused to give him insulin shots. Dr. Larson also directed other staff

to refuse insulin shots. On May 2, 2023, Dr. Larson evaluated Plaintiff and then sent him

to an outside hospital where he remained for about a week. During his hospital stay,

Plaintiff was diagnosed with ketoacidosis, a condition he maintains could have killed

him. Plaintiff was told that he was in ketoacidosis because he had failed to take his

medication.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following

claim:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Dr. Dennis Larson for his alleged refusal of

insulin during Plaintiff’s hunger strike in April and May of

2023;

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Analysis

Plaintiff framed his claim as one of “medical malpractice,” but on the cover sheet

of the complaint he checked the box for a § 1983 action. The distinction matters because

mere malpractice is not sufficient to make out a constitutional claim under § 1983 about

the adequacy of prison medical care, but conduct by a medical care provider that rises to

the level of deliberate indifference is sufficient to state a claim. See e.g., Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim for mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation

merely because the victim is a prisoner). Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, so his complaint is

read broadly in his favor.

Inmates are “not entitled to demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019), nor are they entitled to “the best care

possible,” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). But, under the Eighth

Amendment, they are entitled to constitutionally adequate medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 104. To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective

component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed

as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.

2005). Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted in an intentional or

criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at

serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from

occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478

(7th Cir. 2005). For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to

an inmate's medical needs, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008).

Based on the facts alleged, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient

information to proceed on a theory of deliberate indifference against Dr. Larson for his

knowing refusal of insulin that led to Plaintiff’s week-long hospitalization.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives

against Defendant Dr. Dennis Larson.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendant Dr. Dennis Larson: (1)

Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form

6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy

of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the

Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 7 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this

order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 6, 2023 /s David W. Dugan

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.