Njie v. Jeffreys

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ADAMA NJIE,

#R11748,

Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-00795-SPM

v.

ROB JEFFREYS,

ANTHONY WILLS,

JUSTIN HECHT,

JOSHUA SCHOENBECK,

ANTHONY JONES,

SANDY WALKER,

JOHN DOE 1,

JOHN DOE 2, and

YVETTE BAKER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Adama Njie, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who

is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The Complaint is now before the Court

for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a

complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief

must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro

se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,

821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on August 17, 2021, all inmates in 10 Gallery of West Cellhouse were

handcuffed and taken to the chapel for a tactical shakedown. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Around 12:30 p.m.,

Plaintiff and his cellmate, Justin Baker, were called to the front and instructed to place their

foreheads to the wall. At around 1:00 p.m., Plaintiff was taken to segregation in North 2 Cellhouse.

He was assigned to cell 403, which was filthy and did not have a mattress. The cell was “plagued

with rodents and insects” and feces were smeared on the wall and toilet. Plaintiff was not given

hygiene items or personal property, including toilet paper, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, blankets,

towels, or cleaning supplies. Plaintiff asked correctional officers about the cell conditions and

being provided a mattress and cleanings supplies but “to no avail.” (Id.).

Plaintiff received a fabricated disciplinary report written by Defendant Hecht for the

offenses of “104 dangerous contraband and 203 drugs and drug paraphernalia.” (Doc. 1, p. 5). He

asserts that Internal Affairs Officers falsely stated that his family photos tested positive for

synthetic cannabinoids. (Id. at p. 6).

The next day, on August 18, 2021, Plaintiff was given a mattress but was not given bed

sheets or the personal hygiene items that he had previously purchased from the commissary,

cleaning supplies, or toilet paper. (Doc. 1, p. 6).

On August 19, 2021, Plaintiff was moved to cell 3-52. (Doc. 1, p. 6). The cell conditions

of this new cell were even worse. The lights were on 24 hours a day and seriously mentally ill

inmates (SMI) kicked and banged on the bars yelling and screaming all day and night. At some

point, the SMI inmates had attempted to burn their mattresses and so the correctional officers

opened windows for ventilation and to air out the smoke leaving the gallery “freezing.” The same

inmates were sprayed with pepper spray making the air more difficult to breath. When inmates

would walk by the cells, the SMI inmates would throw feces and urine. Plaintiff states he was

forced to smell feces, urine, smoke, and pepper spray the majority of his time in segregation when

he did not violate any institutional rule in the first place. (Id. at p. 6).

On August 24, 2021, Plaintiff had his disciplinary hearing before the Adjustment

Committee. (Doc. 1, p. 7). The Adjustment Committee was composed of members Schoenbeck,

Jones, and Walker. Plaintiff pled not guilty and informed the Adjustment Committee that the

substance on the photos was not synthetic cannabinoids but fish oil and urine. He asserts that over

a year prior to the current incident, in May of 2020, he left for yard and when he returned, he was

interviewed regarding an alleged fight with a cellmate and taken to segregation without his

property. (Id. at p. 26). When his property was returned to him, some of the property was missing

and damaged. (Id.). The damaged property included photos that were covered in urine and fish oil.

At the time, Plaintiff wrote a grievance about the issue dated May 7, 2020. (Id.). Plaintiff also went

before the Adjustment Committee on June 5, 2020, for the offenses of 104 dangerous contraband

and 308 contraband/unauthorized property and informed the Adjustment Committee that someone

had destroyed his property by urinating on it and pouring mackerel fish oil on it. (Id. at p. 7, 29).

Plaintiff told the Adjustment Committee members of all these facts in his statement, and they were

informed that the substance on the photos was not illicit. Despite this information, the Adjustment

Committee found him guilty. (Id.).

Plaintiff was sanctioned with six months in segregation, six months of contact visit

restrictions, and three months on C-grade states. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff was also placed on “pink

tag,” which means he could not go to showers for seven days and could not go to yard for thirty

days. (Id. at p. 7). Plaintiff claims that the Adjustment Committee’s final summary stated he was

found guilty partially on his admission that the photos were his and on the false statement that the

photos tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids. (Id. at p. 10). The disciplinary report issued to

Justin Baker, Plaintiff’s cellmate, was dismissed. Baker’s final summary falsely stated that

Plaintiff had taken reasonability for the synthetic cannabinoids. (Id.).

On August 26, 2021, some of Plaintiff’s personal property was returned to him, including

clothes, towels, face cloths, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, bedding, and most of his legal materials.

(Doc. 1, p. 8).

Plaintiff wrote a grievance asking to be compensated for his time in segregation and to

notify officials that he would pay for an independent company to test the photos for synthetic

cannabinoids. (Doc. 1, p. 8). On October 8, 2021, Yvette Baker recommended that Plaintiff’s

grievance be denied. (Id. at p. 9). She found that based on the charges, the sanctions imposed by

the Adjustment Committee were correct and in accordance with IDOC regulations. Plaintiff states

that Baker falsely wrote in the grievance response that he has an extensive history for possession

of dangerous contraband and drug paraphernalia. (Id.). Warden Wills then failed to properly

investigate the grievance and concurred in Baker’s recommendation. (Id. at p. 10). Plaintiff then

appealed the grievance and wrote Director Jeffreys a letter explaining that Menard staff had

falsified the disciplinary report and that it was fish oil and urine on the photos. (Doc. 1, p. 10).

In January 2022, Plaintiff received a memo from the Statue of Illinois Department of

Corrections stating the three months C-grade status demotion for the offense of 104 dangerous

contraband had been deleted from the disciplinary report. (Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff states that

Director Jeffreys knew that the entire disciplinary report was bogus and should have also deleted

the other offense of 203 drugs and drug paraphernalia, but Jeffreys did not. (Id.).

On March 23, 2022, officers from Internal Affairs returned to Plaintiff the nine photos that

had allegedly tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids. (Doc. 1, p. 13). Officer Hoffman told

Plaintiff that the photos had been sent to the Illinois State Police crime lab and the results had been

negative. Plaintiff asked how he could receive a copy of those results, and Hoffman told him he

would have to write to the legal department. Plaintiff wrote the legal department but did not receive

a response. Plaintiff also wrote to Schoenbeck, the chairperson of the Adjustment Committee, and

informed him that the photos had actually tested negative for synthetic cannabinoids. Plaintiff did

not receive a response. (Id.). Plaintiff also wrote an additional grievance based on this new

information, and the grievance was ultimately denied. (Id. at p. 14).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint and Plaintiff’s articulation of his claims, the

Court designates the following counts:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Jeffreys, Wills, Hecht,

Schoenbeck, Jones, Walker, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and

Baker for punishing Plaintiff without due process of law.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of

confinement while celled in cells 403 and 3-52.

Count 3: First Amendment claim against Jeffreys, Wills, Hecht,

Schoenbeck, Jones, Walker, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and

Baker for retaliating against Plaintiff.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly1 pleading standard.

Count 1

Prisoners are not entitled to Fourteenth Amendment due process protections unless they

1 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. This includes Plaintiff’s claims that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights

have been violated. (Doc. 1, p. 7, 17). He does not allege any supporting facts or associate these claims with any single

defendant. Therefore, they are dismissed without prejudice.

can establish the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property.

Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). A prisoner has no protected

liberty interest in housing in the general inmate population, except in the rare instances that his

“segregation conditions…constitute an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). See also Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F. 3d

568, 572 (7th Cir. 2000) (“the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters

for non-punitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a

prison sentence.”). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that when a term of

segregation is limited, typically to periods of less than six months, “an inmate’s liberty interest in

avoiding segregation is limited or even non-existent.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d

693, 697 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). See also Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th

Cir. 2005) (no due process violation for ninety days in disciplinary segregation); Hoskins v. Lenear

95 F.3d 372, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2005) (no due process violation for sixty days in disciplinary

segregation); Thomas, 130 F.3d at 760-62 (no due process violation for seventy days); Hardaway

v. Meyerhoff, 734 F. 3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (no liberty interest implicated where inmate spent

six months in segregation with a violent cellmate and “was permitted to use the shower and prison

yard once every week”). But see Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2015); Singh v.

Gegare, 651 F. App’x 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2016).

In this case, Plaintiff served six months in segregation because of the disciplinary ticket.

Other than stating that he was denied a shower for seven days and could not go to yard for 30 days,

he does not describe his conditions of his confinement in segregation once found guilty. (Doc. 1,

p. 7). Instead, Plaintiff focuses his complaints about the conditions he experienced in “quasi

punitive segregation” prior to the disciplinary hearing while celled in cell 403 and cell 3-52. (Id.

at p. 5-8). Not being able to shower for a week and being denied yard time for 30 days are not the

type of atypical conditions that create a cognizable liberty interest. A demotion in grade and

limitation on visitations also do not invoke due process protections. See Woody v. Zatecky, 594 F.

App’x 311, 312 (7th Cir. 2015). Absent any additional facts about his conditions while in

segregation, the Court is unable to find that a protected liberty interest was at stake or the right to

due process of law was triggered under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count 1 is dismissed without

prejudice.

Count 2

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to plead unconstitutional conditions of confinement

claim for the conditions he experienced while celled in cells 403 and 3-52, the claim also fails.

Plaintiff asserts that he was housed for nine days in filthy cells without hygiene items, bedding, or

cleaning supplies. Once he was placed in cell 3-52 on August 20, 2021, the gallery was loud,

smelled of smoke, feces, urine, and pepper spray, and the lights were on twenty-four hours. It is

not clear how long Plaintiff remained in cell 3-52.

The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)

(citation omitted). To succeed on a claim related to conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must

establish that (1) he was denied the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities creating an

excessive risk to his health or safety; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to him. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

“The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that temporary conditions such

as those the plaintiff complains of here do not amount to subjection to ‘cruel and unusual

punishment.’” Lee v. Washington, 1999 WL 759609, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1999) (citing

Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 138–39 (7th Cir.1989); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235–

36 (7th Cir.1988) (confinement in a “filthy, roach-infested” cell without articles of hygiene for

five to ten days did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 613 (7th

Cir.1980) (generally harsher conditions in segregation unit do not violate the Eighth Amendment)).

See also Isby v. Brown, 856 F. 3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not describe

any of the named Defendants as having any knowledge of his conditions. Thus, it cannot be said

that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and Count 2 is

dismissed without prejudice.

Count 3

Plaintiff’s allegation that prison officials retaliated against him is conclusory and not

associated with any specific defendant. (Doc. 1, p. 9, 10, 16). Therefore, Count 3 is dismissed

without prejudice.

MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 2), which is DENIED. As a

litigant in a civil case, Plaintiff has no right to counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir.

2007). However, a District Court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford

counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not submitted any documentation

to demonstrate to the Court that he is indigent. As he has paid the filing fee in full and is not

proceeding in forma pauperis in this case, the Court has no basis for concluding that he is unable

to afford counsel as is required by Section 1915(e). Thus, motion is denied without prejudice.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before

December 15, 2023. Should Plaintiff fail to file a First Amended Complaint within the allotted

time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim, failure to comply with a court order, and/or for failure

to prosecute his claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir.

1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

It is strongly recommended that Plaintiff use the civil rights complaint form designed

for use in this District. He should label the form, “First Amended Complaint,” and he should

use the case number for this action (No. 23-cv-00795-SPM). To enable him to comply with this

Order, the CLERK is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.

An amended complaint generally supersedes and replaces the original complaint,

rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d

632, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). The First Amended Complaint must stand on its own without

reference to any previous pleading. Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to

consider. The First Amended Complaint is also subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 17, 2023

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge