Opinion

Whitten v. Kijakozi

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Oct 25, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

pro se Plaintiff has no standing to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 242

How later courts described this case

  • pro se Plaintiff has no standing to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 242
  • “Congress has authorized the issuance of Federal Reserve Notes, 12 U.S.C. § 411, and declared them to be legal tender …”
  • to be liable under § 1983, each individual defendant “must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”
  • “District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RYNIAH WHITTEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-2403-DWD

)

KILOLO KIJAKOZI, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Ryniah Whitten filed this complaint against Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi,

the Acting Commissioner of the United States Social Security Administration (the

“Commissioner”) for alleged civil rights violations related to Plaintiff’s receipt of social

security or other benefits (Doc. 3). Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave

to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a federal court is authorized to permit an indigent

party to commence a civil action without prepaying the required fees if the party submits

an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets he or she possesses and that

demonstrates the party is unable to pay such fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Upon a showing

of indigency, the Court must screen the indigent plaintiff’s complaint under Section

1915(e)(2) and dismiss the complaint if it is clearly frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges

have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously,

and thus save everyone time and legal expense.”). Upon review of Plaintiff’s Motion

(Doc. 7), the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff is indigent at this time. However, and as

detailed below, Plaintiff cannot meet the second prong required to proceed in forma

pauperis because the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

To proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff’s complaint must include “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The statement must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”

which means that the pleaded facts must show there is “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When screening

a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, courts construe the plaintiff’s allegations liberally. Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Courts also “accept all well-pleaded facts as

true and draw reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s favor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817

F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, the Commissioner, improperly

stopped Plaintiff’s receipt of social security benefits without notice (Doc. 1). Plaintiff

complains that agents of the Social Security Administration located in Florida allegedly

forged a waiver of benefit payments form on Plaintiff’s behalf, which resulted in the

termination of benefits. Plaintiff indicates that this termination occurred in either

September 2021 or April 2023 (Docs. 3, 7). Plaintiff seeks $20 million in damages for

Defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties and the reinstatement of Plaintiff’s

benefits. The Court is unable to discern the exact type of claim Plaintiff is attempting to

pursue here. Plaintiff cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 18 U.S.C. § 242, and Section 16 of the Federal

Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 411 (Docs. 3, 7).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and Bivens actions are “conceptually identical and further

the same policies.” Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14

(1980); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983). However, Section 1983 governs claims for

federal rights violations against state actors, while Bivens provides a damages remedy for

certain federal rights violations committed by federal agents. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations

suggest federal or state actors were involved in the termination of Plaintiff’s social

security benefits. However, Plaintiff has only named Defendant Kijakozi, the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, as a defendant in this matter. To

plead a claim under either Section 1983 or Bivens, at minimum, Plaintiff must allege facts

demonstrating that the individual defendants were in some way involved in the

constitutional deprivation. Pepper v. Vill. of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (to

be liable under § 1983, each individual defendant “must have caused or participated in a

constitutional deprivation.”). Here, the Complaint does not provide enough details of

Defendant’s purported involvement in the events so to indicate that Defendant was

personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, to the extent

Plaintiff is purporting to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims or Bivens, the

complaint is insufficiently pled and will be dismissed.

The other statutes cited by Plaintiff also do not support a sufficient claim for relief.

18 U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute criminalizing the deprivation of civil rights under

color of law. This statute does not provide a private right of action and Plaintiff has no

standing to sue under it. See, e.g., Weiland v. Byrne, 392 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (pro

se Plaintiff has no standing to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 242). Similarly, the Federal Reserve

Act, 12 U.S.C. § 411, provides no private cause of action, but instead governs the issuance

of Federal Reserve notes by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and

makes clear that these notes are authorized currency of the United States. See United

States v. Snow, 670 F.2d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Congress has authorized the issuance of

Federal Reserve Notes, 12 U.S.C. § 411, and declared them to be legal tender …”).

The Court cannot otherwise discern a basis to assert jurisdiction over the

purported claim alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint

allude to a possible claim under the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”), which provides

jurisdiction for suits against the United States for torts committed by federal officers. See

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2008). In relevant part, the FTCA authorizes:

[C]ivil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . .

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government

while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable

to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or

omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, the United States is the only proper defendant in an

FTCA action. See Jackson, 541 F.3d at 693. Plaintiff did not name the United States as a

defendant, and thus the Complaint does not sufficiently state an FTCA claim.

Likewise, the complaint alludes to an action to reinstate terminated social security

benefits or for judicial review of the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s social security

benefits. However, Plaintiff has not provided enough information in the complaint to

infer that the Court has jurisdiction to review of a final decision of the Commissioner

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section 405(g) permits an individual to obtain judicial review

of “any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to

which [the individual] was a party” by commencing a civil action “within sixty days after

the mailing” of notice of the final decision. Id.; Washington v. Saul, 788 F. App'x 388, 389

(7th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“Federal courts may review only ‘final’ decisions of the

Social Security Administration made after a ‘hearing.’”). “For a decision to be ‘final’

under Title II of the Social Security Act, the claimant must complete a multi-step

administrative review process.” Washington, 788 F. App'x at 389 (internal citations

omitted). These steps generally include: an initial waiver request, an opportunity for

reconsideration, a hearing before an administrative law judge, and a review by the

Appeals Council. Id. These steps apply to decisions about the re-entitlement to benefits,

reduction in benefits, termination of benefits, and nonpayment of benefits. See, 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.902(a)-(x).

Plaintiff mentions to two possible terminating events involving either the Social

Security Administration or some other state agency. The first proceeding suggests a

suspicion or termination of benefits notice received in September 2021 from agents in

Florida (Doc. 3, p. 4). The second involves an alleged suspension of benefits from April

2023 (Doc. 7, p. 3). However, the Complaint does not provide further details of the

substance of these documents or proceedings for the Court to determine whether a final

decision from the Commissioner of Social Security was received, or whether these

documents related to a different state or federal agency. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to

coherently explain the timeframe, facts, and legal basis for the claims suggested in the

complaint.

For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7)

is DENIED, without prejudice, and Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 3) is DISMISSED,

without prejudice, for a failure to state a claim. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint

on or before November 15, 2023. Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint in this

matter, the complaint must clearly explain the timeframe, facts, and legal basis for their

claims, that is the who, what, when, where, how, and why behind their allegations.

Plaintiff shall further describe the dates and content of any relevant notices allegedly

received by Defendant or the Social Security Administration that explain the type of

benefits at issue, the timeframe for the termination or suspicion of those benefits, and the

individual actors allegedly responsible for the acts alleged in the complaint. If Plaintiff

fails to file an amended complaint by November 15, 2023, this action will be dismissed

for a failure to abide by a court order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2023 Lb J

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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