Haywood v. Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DONALD HAYWOOD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 22-cv-01219-SPM

v.

ANTHONY B. JONES,

JOSHUA SCHOENBECK,

MS. WALKER,

BUETTNER,

DR. POTEI,

MABREY,

DRAPPER,

STILLHORN,

ROWLAND,

HOOD,

ANTHONY WILLS,

CARRI MORRIS,

DR. MELVIN HINTON,

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE, and

JOSHUA MEADE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Donald Haywood filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while an

inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) for violations of his constitutional

rights that occurred while at Menard Correctional Center. The First Amended Complaint is now

before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any portion of a complaint

that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on September 9, 2021, he was involved in a staff assault at Pontiac

Correctional Center. (Doc. 20, p. 19). That same day, he was transferred to Menard Correctional

Center (“Menard”) and issued two disciplinary tickets for the incident. (Id. at p. 9, 20). Upon his

arrival at Menard, he was placed in a cell with only his jumpsuit and a mattress. Plaintiff repeatedly

asked staff that walked by his cell for help. He was told by the gallery officer he was “pinked

tagged.” (Id. at p. 21).

The next day, Plaintiff spoke to Counselor Hood. (Doc. 20, p. 21). Plaintiff told her that he

did not have any bedding and was not being fed. Hood told him that she would see about giving

him sheets but did not know about providing him food because “what was [he] expecting after

beating up a white man?” (Id.). Hood told Plaintiff, “We stick together in our community.” (Id.).

Plaintiff wrote Hood every night. (Doc. 20, p. 21). In one letter, he asked her about an

upcoming court date and seeking a disciplinary hearing on his tickets. (Id.). Hood told Plaintiff

that if a disciplinary hearing is not set, then he “will beat it” because Rule 504 provides that a

hearing must be held within fourteen days from when the ticket is issued. (Id. at p. 22). Plaintiff

also wrote mental health because he had been at Menard for over a week and still had not been

seen by a mental health professional. Plaintiff states that the case Rasho v. Jeffreys established that

when an inmate is transferred to a new prison, then he or she must be seen by mental health within

“so many hours.” (Id.).

On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff asked for a crisis team. (Doc. 20, p. 22). In response to

his request, he saw Buettner and told her “everything he was going through.” After she left his

cell, Plaintiff overheard Buettner speaking with security staff calling him racial slurs and stating

that she did not care that he did not “have shit in [his] cell. [He] was going to lern[sic] about how

the Blackman suffer when he put his hands on the white man.” (Id.). Later that night, Plaintiff was

escorted from his cell in preparation for his transfer the following day. Plaintiff left Menard on a

court writ on September 22, 2021, and did not return until February 2, 2022. (Id. at p. 22-23).

After returning to Menard, a disciplinary hearing was held on February 15, 2022. (Doc. 20,

p. 23). Upon his arrival at the hearing, Plaintiff saw that the Adjustment Committee was made up

of three security staff members, Schoenbeck, Walker, and Jones. (Id.). Plaintiff asked where was

mental health? Walker responded, “don’t worry about mental health how do you plea on these

tickets?” (Id. at p. 24). Plaintiff informed the committee of the rule that they only had fourteen

days to hear his disciplinary tickets and that time had lapsed. The members disregarded the

information he provided.

Plaintiff states that Walker is supposed to be the record keeper and serve the disciplinary

tickets and should not be on the Adjustment Committee. (Id. at p. 24-25). Schoenbeck is the

chairperson, and “Jones is suppose[d] to be there for the Black inmates to make sure they don’t be

on no racese[sic] things.” (Id. at p. 25). Jones has told other inmates that he does not have a say on

the Adjustment Committee because, “they have two white[s] running the board and he just sign[s]

his name.” If he says anything, Jones will be removed from the committee. (Id.).

Following the hearing, Plaintiff was returned to segregation and placed in a dirty cell. (Doc.

20, p. 10). The cell had feces and blood on the walls, the toilet did not work, and mace had

previously been sprayed and not cleaned. Plaintiff was denied cleaning supplies and bed linens.

The mattress was filthy, and he was routinely denied showers. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that he is designated “seriously mentally ill” and that while at Menard, he

has been denied mental health treatment. (Doc. 20, p. 13). In retaliation for filing grievances about

his lack of care, Buettner, Dr. Potei, Mabrey, Drapper, Morris, Dr. Hinton, and Stillhorn refused

to provide Plaintiff with treatment and instead issued him disciplinary reports with falsified

statements. (Id. at p. 14). As a result of their conduct, Plaintiff was placed in solitary or otherwise

punished.

Based on a review of the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff’s articulation of his

claims, the Court designates the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Hood for not arranging for

Plaintiff to speak with a mental health provider soon after his

transfer.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against

Defendants for allowing Plaintiff to be placed in a cell on September

9, 2021, with only a jumpsuit and denied food.

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment Due process claim against Jones,

Schoenbeck, Walker, Potei, Buettner, Drapper, Rowland, Morris,

and Wills for disciplining Plaintiff with six months in segregation

without due process.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim for placement

of Plaintiff in a filthy cell with no cleaning supplies for six months.

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Wexford

and mental health defendants for failing to provide Plaintiff

adequate mental health treatment at Menard.

Count 6: First Amendment claim against Buettner, Potei, Mabrey, Drapper,

Morris, Hinton, Stillhorn, Wills, Hood, Meade, and Rowland for

retaliating against Plaintiff for filing grievances.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned in the First

Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly1 pleading standard.

DISCUSSION

Count 1

Prison officials can be held liable if they are aware of an objectively serious risk of harm

1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

to an inmate and knowingly or recklessly disregard it.” Szopinski v. Koontz, 832 F. App’x 449,

451 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994)).

Plaintiff claims that he should have been seen by a mental health staff member soon after

his transfer to Menard pursuant to Rasho v. Jeffries. Plaintiff notified his counselor, Hood, but

Hood told him it was not “her job to make mental health come talk to [him] about [his] ticket or

give [him]any kinda help.” (Doc. 20, p. 9). He also reached out to mental health. When Plaintiff

requested a crisis team, he was seen later that day by Buettner. (Id. at p. 22). These facts, as pled,

do not include any details that Plaintiff was at a serious risk of harm and that any of the Defendants,

including Hood, ignored that risk. Thus, waiting a week to see a mental health professional does

not violate the Eighth Amendment.

To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to enforce the settlement agreement in the class action

lawsuit Rasho v. Walker, No. 07-1298 (C.D. Ill.) or seek damages because Defendants violated the

settlement agreement in Rasho, the claim is dismissed without prejudice. Claims pertaining to

enforcement of the settlement agreement should be brought in the Central District of Illinois, where

that case was litigated. See Rasho v. Walker, No. 07-1298, 2018 WL 2392847, at *6 (C.D. Ill. May

25, 2018) (stating that the “Settlement Agreement allows for the Plaintiffs to seek relief from this

Court if there is a dispute as to whether or not the Defendants are in substantial compliance.”). For

these reasons, Count 1 is dismissed.

Count 2

Count 2 will proceed against Defendant Hood. Plaintiff claims that he was denied all

property and food when he was transferred to Menard. He informed Hood of the situation, and she

did not act to ensure he received meals.

Count 2 is dismissed as to the other Defendants. Plaintiff states that he wrote every

Defendant listed to “get help but they all refused.” (Doc. 20, p. 9). This not enough information

for the Court to plausibly infer that each Defendant had the requisite knowledge that Plaintiff was

being held in unconstitutional conditions and then disregarded risks to his health and safety. See

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F. 3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (a prisoner cannot recover tort damages by

generally alleging that anyone with knowledge has harmed him by the conditions of the prison).

Count 3

For a prison disciplinary hearing to satisfy constitutional due process requirements, the

inmate must be provided: (1) written notice of the charge against the prisoner 24 hours prior to the

hearing; (2) the right to appear in person before an impartial body; (3) the right to call witnesses

and to present physical/documentary evidence, but only when doing so will not unduly jeopardize

the safety of the institution or correctional goals; and (4) a written statement of the reasons for the

action taken against the prisoner. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974). See also Black

v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994) (disciplinary decision must be supported by “some

evidence”); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988).

The Court will allow Count 3 to proceed in part. Plaintiff states that he was not provided

adequate notice of the charges prior to hearing. Based on responses by staff regarding his hearing

date, he believed there was no longer an outstanding disciplinary ticket against him when he

returned to Menard from his court writ. (Doc. 20, p. 16). He was then taken to his hearing on

February 15, 2022, with no notice. Plaintiff also asserts that the members of the Adjustment

Committee were impartial. Following the faulty hearing, he was held in segregation for six months

in filthy conditions. Thus, Count 3 will proceed against Jones, Schoenbeck, and Walker to the

extent Plaintiff claims he was not given adequate notice of the charges and was denied a hearing

before impartial decision makers.

Count 3 is dismissed to the extent Plaintiff claims that due process was violated solely

because the hearing was not conducted in accordance with IDOC rules. Plaintiff asserts that a

mental health provider was not present at the hearing, which is the responsibility of Dr. Potei,

Buettner, Drapper, Rowland, Morris, and Wills. (Doc. 20, p. 26). Additionally, the hearing was

not held within fourteen days of the disciplinary tickets being issued, and Walker performed duties

not within her job description. None of these acts, however, violate Due Process as required by the

Constitution. As previously discussed, (see Doc. 17, p. 3), the fact that state law or regulation was

violated does not automatically state a claim for a constitutional violation. See James v. Baldwin,

No. 17-cv-623-NJR, 2017 WL 3057609, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 9, 2017) (citing Archie v. City of

Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989);

Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty. Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly,

these violations of IDOC rules do not state a due process claim, and Count 3 is dismissed as to

Potei, Buettner, Drapper, Rowland, Morris, and Wills.

Count 4

Count 4 is dismissed without prejudice, as Plaintiff does not assert that he notified any of

the named Defendants regarding the conditions of his cell.

Counts 5 and 6

Plaintiff asserts that during his time at Menard, he was denied adequate mental health

treatment. (Doc. 20, p. 13-16). In retaliation for filing grievances about his need for mental health

care, Defendants have retaliated against him. Specifically, in September 2022, he was placed in

segregation for writing a grievance and issued a disciplinary ticket simply for asking for mental

health treatment. (Id. at p. 14).

The Court finds that these claims are not properly joined in this suit. The Seventh Circuit

instructs that unrelated claims against different defendants should be severed in to separate

lawsuits. George v. Smith, 507 F. 3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s claims of inadequate mental

health care during the entirety of his stay at Menard and ongoing retaliation by mental health

providers are not related to the conditions of confinement and due process claims against

Defendants Hood, Jones, Schoenbeck, and Walker, which occurred within months of his arrival at

Menard. Therefore, Defendants Wexford, Potei, Buettner, Mabrey, Drapper, Morris, Hinton,

Stillhorn, Wills, Hood, Meade, and Rowland are an improperly joined parties. See FED. R. CIV. P.

20(a)(2). Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants district courts broad discretion

when deciding whether to sever claims or to dismiss improperly joined defendants. Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court will exercise its discretion and dismiss

without prejudice Counts 5 and 6 as improperly joined.

REQUEST FOR COUNSEL

Plaintiff requests the Court to recruit counsel to represent him so that he can “get all the

staff names,” and to be given help due to his mental health issues. (Doc. 20, p. 18). The request is

DENIED. Currently, an attorney is not needed to further identify any of the Defendants. The Court

will conduct service on Plaintiff’s behalf and will allow Plaintiff to engage in limited discovery if

a Defendant is not properly named and further identification is needed. Furthermore, at this early

stage, Plaintiff has demonstrated he can represent himself. He can communicate with the Court,

file motions, and meet deadlines. Plaintiff may refile his motion, if he continues to have difficulties

once discovery on the merits has commenced.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons set forth above, the First Amended Complaint survives preliminary review

pursuant to Section 1915A. COUNT 2 will proceed against Hood and is DISMISSED without

prejudice as to the other defendants. COUNT 3 will proceed in part against Jones, Schoenbeck,

and Walker and is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Potei, Buettner, Drapper, Rowland,

Morris, and Wills. Plaintiff’s allegations that due process was violated solely for failure to follow

state law or regulation in relation to the disciplinary hearing held on February 15, 2022, are

DISMISSED with prejudice (See Count 3). COUNTS 1 and 4 are DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim. COUNTS 5 and 6 are DISMISSED without prejudice as

improperly joined in this action. Because there are no remaining claims against Buettner, Potei,

Mabrey, Drapper, Stillhorn, Rowland, Wills, Morris, Hinton, Wexford, and Meade, the Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to terminate them as defendants.

The Clerk of Court SHALL prepare for Hood, Jones, Schoenbeck, and Walker the

following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2)

Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy

of the First Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendants’ place of

employment. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6)

to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate

steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant pay the

full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his

last known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above

or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the

Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the First

Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant

to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants should respond to the issues stated in this Merit

Review Order.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 10, 2023

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will

enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.