The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TIMMIE D. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 23-cv-44-NJR
IDOC, MENARD STAFF, M.
OTTENSMEIER, BRUMLEVEL, A.
JONES, TREVOR ROWLAND, C/O
EVANS, C/O HERN, and JOHN DOES,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Timmie D. Martin, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Martin’s
Complaint (Doc. 1) was dismissed without prejudice, and he was granted leave to file an
Amended Complaint.
On June 29, 2023, Martin submitted an Amended Complaint (Doc. 23). He
subsequently submitted several supplements to the pleading (Docs. 24-27).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Amended Complaint
Martin’s original Complaint was dismissed because it was difficult to decipher,
and it was not entirely clear what claims he sought to raise in his pleading. He also
identified groups of defendants rather than identifying specific John Does, and he sought
to bring claims against the IDOC, an entity that is not subject to suit under Section 1983
(Doc. 21). He was, however, granted leave to file an Amended Complaint (Id. at p. 5).
On June 29, 2023, Martin filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 23). He
subsequently filed three “supplements” (Docs. 24, 26, 27) and a notice of urgent issue
(Doc. 25), which also appears to be an attempt to add additional claims to his Amended
Complaint. The Court previously told Martin that it does not accept piecemeal
amendments to the pleadings (Doc. 21, p. 2). He was instructed that if he wanted to
amend his pleadings, he would need to seek leave and file a proposed Amended
Complaint, complete with both original and new allegations (Id.). His various
supplements do not meet the requirements previously set forth by the Court. Thus, to the
extent he seeks to add to his Amended Complaint by way of supplements, those requests
are DENIED (Docs. 24, 25, 26, 27).
Martin’s Amended Complaint is, again, very difficult to decipher. He notes on the
first page that the pens in his possession are inadequate for writing and that he is doing
his best to communicate his claims to the Court (Doc. 21, p. 1). While the print is legible,
words are written close together and in the margins, making it difficult to read. Further,
there are no allegations under the statement of claim (Id. at p. 6), and there is no reference
to where the allegations are located in the 124-page pleading.
A thorough review of the lengthy pleading revealed no statement of facts. Instead,
Martin included a number of exhibits in which he incorporated what appear to be notes
to the Court. One such note, on a document presumably from the mail staff indicating
how Martin should properly address his mail, Martin wrote that the document
demonstrates that he is unable to mail letters to his family (Doc. 23, pp. 10-11).
Martin also includes handwritten forms entitled “petition of mandamus” and
“civil complaint,” but neither handwritten document is filled out (Id. at pp. 19-20). He
includes letters to state legislators seeking a change in laws (Id. at pp. 16-17). Another
page sets forth standards for Fourteenth Amendment due process claims but fails to set
forth any facts which indicate he is pursuing such a claim. The page also mentions the
Eighth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and excessive bail (Id. at p. 21). Martin also
includes handwritten treatises that he appears to have copied from unknown self-help
legal books. He includes a handwritten document entitled, “Chapter VIII State Due
Process Issues” and “Jailhouse Lawyer’s Handbook Chapter Six” (Id. at pp. 26-33).
Although some of these handwritten documents mention due process claims, Martin fails
to indicate that he is proceeding on such a claim.
In a grievance response found in the middle of his pleading, he notes that the
grievance was related to medical permits (Id. at p. 34). In the margins, he includes an
address to the Court indicating he received an examination by Dr. King regarding
Martin’s ability to be cuffed behind his back (Id.). He does mention that C/O Brumlevel
accused Martin of tampering with the permit (Id.). Dr. King is not listed as a defendant
in the case. Although Brumlevel is identified in the caption of the Amended Complaint,
the allegations do not suggest that he violated any of Martin’s constitutional rights related
to the medical permit. He also includes numerous grievances on a variety of other topics
including medical permits, damage to property, emergency phone calls, and other staff
conduct (Id. at pp. 35-76, 86-122).
Under the portion of his Amended Complaint entitled “Grievance Procedure,”
Martin indicates that he wrote a grievance about discovering a jailhouse homemade
weapon and turning it in to authorities (Id. at p. 4). He complained that he was then
“framed” and charged with possession of the weapon. He mentions Defendants
Ottensmeier and A. Jones (Id. at p. 4-5). He states that they lied about searching him (Id.
at p. 5). His request for relief states that he seeks a monetary award in relation to the
incident (Id. at p. 7).
Discussion
Once again, Martin’s Amended Complaint clearly violates Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to set forth “a short and plain statement of
[Plaintiff’s claim(s)] showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
Rule 8(d) requires “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). The
purpose of these rules is to “give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and
the grounds for supporting the claims.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Martin’s
Amended Complaint is neither simple nor direct. He fails to present any true allegations
in the pleadings. He includes notes in the margin to the Court, but nothing that clearly or
concisely indicates a specific claim he is pursuing.
To the extent that he seeks to bring a claim regarding the issuing of medical
permits, Martin simply includes numerous grievances about his need for a front-cuff
permit. On one grievance response he indicates that he was examined for a permit and
Brumlevel questioned the permit (Doc. 23, p. 34). But nothing in the note indicates that
any defendant acted with deliberate indifference in issuing the permit. Hayes v. Snyder,
546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
Further, to the extent that he attempts to allege a due process claim in relation to a
disciplinary hearing, Martin also fails to state a claim. It is not at all clear that Martin is
attempting to pursue a due process claim in relation to this disciplinary charge, although
statements throughout the Amended Complaint suggest that may be his intent. He does
include statements about grievances he submitted related to the charges, but no
statement of claim regarding due process violations. Martin includes a handwritten
“chapter” on due process issues, but merely includes citations to case law without any
indication whether he is claiming such violations in this case (Id. at pp. 26-28). He also
seeks compensation in his request for relief because all he “did was the fairly but
righteous type… [when] I turned in a jailhouse type made..found weapon.” (Id. at p. 7).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
deprivations of life, liberty, and property.” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017).
When an inmate raises a procedural due process claim, the Court undertakes a two-part
analysis. Id. The Court first evaluates whether the prisoner was deprived of a protected
liberty interest, and then second, evaluates whether the process he was afforded was
constitutionally deficient. Id. (citing Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673 (7th
Cir. 2016)).
Martin fails to allege that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. He
mentions that the charge carried a one-year segregation status, but he does not indicate
whether he received one year in segregation nor does he describe the conditions he
experienced in segregation. An inmate’s liberty interests are protected by the Due Process
Clause only insofar as a deprivation of the interest at issue would impose an “atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). On a scrap of paper on page 83 of his Amended
Complaint, there is a note with a direction to add a quote to his lawsuit to suggest that
“plaintiff” seeks compensation from being placed in segregation for 23-hours a day and
not being unable to participate in educational, vocational programs or work (Id. at p. 83).
There is no indication Martin actually experienced these conditions. Further, there are no
allegations to suggest the conditions he experienced amounted to an “atypical and
significant” hardship.
Martin also has not alleged that his due process rights were violated in the
disciplinary hearing. Due process safeguards that are associated with prison disciplinary
hearings include: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) the opportunity to appear
before an impartial hearing body to contest the charges; (3) the opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence as a defense (if prison safety allows and
subject to the discretion of correctional officers); and (4) a written statement summarizing
the reasons for the discipline imposed. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974).
In addition, the decision of the adjustment committee must be supported by “some
evidence.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007). Martin merely states that he
was “framed”, “setup”, and that the search of his body was a lie (Id. at pp. 5, 7). But there
are no allegations to suggest he was denied any of these due process protections.
For these reasons, Martin again fails to state a claim. This is Martin’s second
attempt at stating a viable claim and he has been unable to do so, despite clear and concise
instructions from the Court on how to set forth “a short and plain statement” of his
claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Because Martin is unable to set forth a viable claim, the
Court finds that further amendment would be futile at this time.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Martin’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is
DISMISSED with prejudice. The dismissal shall count as one of Martin’s three allotted
“strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If Martin wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Martin
does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of
the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v.
Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir.
1999). He must list each of the issues he intends to appeal in the notice of appeal and his
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). A proper and
timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day
appeal deadline. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than
twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be
extended.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 18, 2023 Tl
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge