The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LAWRENCE ADAMCZYK, M24512, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-00863-SMY
)
IDOC,1 )
Illinois State Agency, )
ROB JEFFREYS, )
IDOC Director, )
RICH MORGENTHLER, )
BMRCC Warden, )
SARAH BROWN-FOILES, )
IDOC/SOP Policies Coordinator, )
HEATHER DeLAHMUTT, )
SDP BMRCC Administrator )
JESSICA STOVER, )
Treatment Staff, )
ROBERT MOONEY, )
Treatment Staff, )
HEATHER YOUNG, )
VSOP/SDP Treatment Provider, )
and WEXFORD, )
SOP Evaluator Administrator, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Second Amended
Complaint filed by Plaintiff Lawrence Adamczyk. (Doc. 35). Plaintiff is civilly committed at Big
Muddy River Correctional Center under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS
205 et seq. He maintains that he has been treated like a prisoner, even though he was not convicted
of a crime and alleges violations of his rights stemming from his wrongful incarceration since
1 “IDOC” is an abbreviation for the Illinois Department of Corrections.
March 13, 2016. He seeks declaratory, monetary, and permanent injunctive relief. Id. Plaintiff
also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on July 18, 2023, which will be addressed herein.
(Doc. 40).
This case is now before the Court for review of the Second Amended Complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 Any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or
requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 35):
Plaintiff is a civilly committed person who has been housed at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center (BMRCC) pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (“the Act”) since
March 31, 2016. All charges against him were dismissed, and he faces no outstanding criminal
charges. The Act authorizes civil detention of sexually dangerous persons (SDPs) for non-punitive
purposes and calls for restoration of their liberty upon successful completion of treatment.
Persons in Illinois who are designated as SDPs are made Wards of the State under the Act.
They are initially committed to BMRCC. There are approximately 170 persons currently classified
as SDPs, and 146 of these individuals are now housed at BMRCC. The prison is designed to house
980 persons and currently holds almost 1,300.
Although SDPs are typically placed in separate housing from convicted prisoners, their
conditions of confinement mirror prisoners’ living conditions. Plaintiff is forced to live in the
same “punitive” cells, wear the same prison clothing, wear the same hat, and display the same
identification as prisoners. When he asked to order some of these items for a cheaper price from
an outside vendor, Plaintiff’s request was denied. He was instructed to use the prison commissary
2 Persons who are civilly committed under the Act are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915
et seq. Kalinowski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2004).
to purchase the same items at the same price as convicted prisoners.
Wards are denied work release and higher paying jobs that convicted prisoners are allowed.
Plaintiff has been subjected to limitations on his phone, mail, and internet privileges even though
he was never convicted of a crime, let alone one stemming from the use of these electronic devices.
Plaintiff’s personal funds are held in a non-interest bearing trust fund account.
The facility has failed to hire, train, and retain mental health professionals who can properly
treat the wards. And Wexford evaluators lack skills and knowledge necessary to properly evaluate
the wards. As a result, SDPs are often worse off after treatment and evaluation and consequently
unable to regain freedom.
Discussion
Plaintiff asserts the following claims in the pro se Second Amended Complaint:
Count 1: Peonage claim against all defendants, except the IDOC, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994 and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at ¶¶ 53-56.
Count 2: Claim against all defendants under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1595 and 22 U.S.C.
§ 7101-7200 (TVPA). Id. at ¶¶ 57-60.
Count 3: Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claim against all defendants for
failing to provide Plaintiff with necessary and adequate treatment for his
mental illness/disorder as an SDP and thereby subjecting him to an
unreasonable risk of prolonged or indefinite detention. Id. at ¶¶ 61-67.
Count 4: Claim against all defendants for interfering with Plaintiff’s right to
accumulate property by denying him fair educational opportunities,
employment opportunities, wages, commissary prices, or access to an
interest bearing account in violation of the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and
Sixteenth Amendments. Id. at ¶¶ 68-77.
Count 5: Claim against Warden, IDOC Director, and IDOC for violating the Fair
Minimum Wage Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq. Id. at ¶¶ 78-81A.
Count 6: Claim against Warden, IDOC Director, and IDOC for adopting housing and
employment practices that violate the ADA or Rehab Act. Id. at ¶¶ 82-88.
Count 7: First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Defendants, IDOC Director, Warden, Wexford’s
SOP Administrator, IDOC’s Sex Offender Program Administrator, and
BMRCC SOP Administrator for failing to train or supervise employees as
it pertains to the liberty or other rights of SDPs. Id. at ¶¶ 89-94.
Count 8: Racketeering claim against all defendants, except IDOC, for violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(A) and (B), 1964 based on their participation in
tortious conduct that violates 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1589, 1590, 1592, 1593,
and, especially, 1594, as well as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1513, 1951, 1961,
1964, 725 ILCS 205/8, 720 ILCS 5/1756, 720 ILCS 5/8-2.1, and 720 ILCS
5/12-6. Id. at ¶¶ 95-101.
Count 9: First Amendment claim that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
(SDPA), 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01, et seq., is facially unconstitutional
for the reasons set forth at Doc. 35, ¶¶ 1, 33-47, 109-27.
(Doc. 35).
Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8
Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Each of
these claims is based upon a long list of alleged federal constitutional or statutory violations that
Plaintiff attempts to pass off as a single claim that is unsupported by allegations of misconduct by
the defendants. Counts 1, 2, and 8 also hinge on violations of federal criminal statutes, which, as
a private citizen, Plaintiff cannot pursue against the defendants in this civil suit. As such, these
claims do not survive review under the most liberal pleading standards, and will be dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 3
Plaintiff was committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections under the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/0.01, et seq. Persons who are civilly
committed under the Act are considered pretrial detainees. See Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076,
1080 (7th Cir. 2003). Claims raised by detainees under § 1983 implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment (not the Eighth Amendment).
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, and property, without due process of law.” “Due process requires that the conditions and
duration of confinement . . . bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are
committed.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). See also Allison, 332 F.3d at 1079. The
duration of Plaintiff’s commitment depends on this successful completion of treatment. As the
Seventh Circuit has explained, “[p]ersons charged with sex offenses in Illinois may be diverted
before trial to civil confinement, if a mental illness of at least one year’s duration led to the criminal
conduct. Those who complete treatment successfully are released and the criminal charges
dismissed.” Allison, 332 F.3d at 1078. In other words, there is no prospect of release without
treatment.
As the Seventh Circuit recently explained in Howe v. Hughes, -- F.4th --, 2023 WL
4701985, at *2 (7th Cir. July 24, 2023), civil confinement undoubtedly “‘constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty’ and ‘can engender adverse social consequences,’ thereby ‘requir[ing] due
process protection.’ . . . The Fourteenth Amendment requires states to balance their interests—
caring for citizens suffering from mental illness and protecting the community—against the liberty
interests of those who it seeks to civilly detain. . . . This balance can only be struck where the
state’s interest in civil commitment is non-punitive.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges
that he has been denied adequate treatment as an SDP and treated like a prisoner, or worse, during
his detention. These allegations are sufficient to allow Count 3 to proceed against the individual
defendants.
Count 6
In Count 6, Plaintiff articulates a viable claim under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act). The ADA,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of
that disability . . . be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehab Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e, prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals based on a physical
or mental disability. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e. Discrimination under both statutes includes the
failure to accommodate a disability. The analysis is the same under both statutes, except that the
Rehab Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept
for their prisons. Jaros v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to discrimination because of his mental illness by being
deprived of access to treatment, programs, and/or housing at BMRCC. Accordingly, the
ADA/Rehab Act claims shall proceed.
The proper defendant for these claims is the relevant state department or agency.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670 n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not
available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)). Plaintiff
named IDOC as a defendant and shall be allowed to proceed with Count 6 against that agency.
This claim will be dismissed without prejudice against all other defendants.
Count 9
Plaintiff raises a constitutional challenge to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act in
Paragraphs 33-47 and 109-27 of the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 35). Although the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01, et seq., is described and
sustained against one constitutional challenge in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), this claim
is not subject to dismissal at this time under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. As such, the Court will allow
Count 9 to proceed against Rob Jeffreys (IDOC Director), Rich Morgenthler (BMRCC Warden),
and Heather DeLahmutt (SDP Program Administrator), in their official capacities. This claim will
be dismissed without prejudice against all other defendants.
Motions for Preliminary Injunction
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate the following: (1) he will
suffer irreparable harm if he does not obtain the requested relief; (2) traditional legal remedies are
inadequate; and (3) he has some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claim. See Mays v.
Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). If Plaintiff makes this showing, the
court must balance the harm to Plaintiff caused by denying the preliminary injunction with the
harm to Defendants caused by granting relief. Id.. The court takes a “sliding scale” approach
when balancing these harms; the more likely the plaintiff is to win on the merits, the less the
balance of harm needs to weigh in his favor. Id. (citation omitted). When a plaintiff seeks a
“mandatory preliminary injunction,” as here—requiring affirmative acts by the defendants—such
requests are “ordinarily cautiously viewed and sparingly issued.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed July 18, 2023 (Doc. 40) and related
motions filed July 25, 2023 (Doc. 42), August 8, 2023 (Doc. 43), and August 15, 2023 (Docs. 44
and 45) are now before the Court. The initial motion spans 42 pages and consists of Plaintiff’s
renewed challenge to the constitutionality of the Act, numerous requests for immediate and
affirmative changes to his living conditions, and a request for release from detention. (Doc. 40).
The subsequent motions inquire into the status of the first motion. (Docs. 42-45). These requests
not only pertain to certain claims that do not survive screening, but also far exceed the scope of
his surviving claims and interim relief he can obtain.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s sweeping requests for mandatory preliminary
injunctive relief in Documents 40, 42, 43, 44, and 45 are DENIED without prejudice at this time.
Plaintiff may renew his request for interim injunctive relief, if the request stems from claims that
survive screening. To do so, he must file a separate motion that focuses on the exact relief he
requires in order to avoid irreparable harm during the pending action.
Disposition
The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 35) survives screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, as follows:
• COUNT 3 will receive further review against ALL INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS.
• COUNT 6 will receive further review against the ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS.
• COUNT 9 will receive further review against ROB JEFFREYS, RICH
MORGENTHLER, and HEATHER DeLAHMUTT, in their official capacities.
ALL OTHER CLAIMS against the defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk shall prepare for ALL DEFENDANTS: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 35),
and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by
Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps
to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full
costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Second
Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated
in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes
the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the
costs, even though he was granted in forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 15, 2023 s/ Staci M. Yandle_____
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
Once identified, the Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Second Amended Complaint. After service has been
achieved, Defendants will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Second Amended
Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date they are served with this lawsuit to
receive the Defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When
Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has
appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an
appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.