Oaks v. Jackson County Jail

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BACAREE OAKS, 20160-156, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-02435-JPG

)

JACKSON COUNTY JAIL, )

GREG ROWALD, )

and DEA AGENTS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Bacaree Oaks brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 for deprivations of his due process rights at Jackson County Jail. (Doc. 1). In his

Complaint, Plaintiff claims he was taken into custody by federal and local officials pursuant to a

state warrant for his arrest on October 27, 2021. (Id. at 2-6). Officer Greg Rowald informed

Plaintiff that he would not be processed at the Jail, served with a federal complaint, allowed to

contact an attorney, or given permission to post bond until he spoke with a Drug Enforcement

Agent, which occurred two days later. (Id.). He seeks monetary relief for the alleged violations

of his due process rights resulting from this delay. (Id. at 6).

The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints and filter out non-meritorious claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed.

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the pro se Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate

a single claim in this action:

Count 1: Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law under the

Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment by arresting him pursuant to a state

warrant and then delaying his processing at the Jail, service with a

federal complaint, access to phone calls with an attorney, and

permission to post bond until he spoke with Drug Enforcement

Agents from October 27-29, 2021.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein is considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.1

Jackson County Jail and DEA Agents

Section 1983 and Bivens both create a cause of action based on personal liability and

predicated upon fault. Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (§ 1983);

Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1047 (7th Cir. 1994) (Bivens). The doctrine of respondeat

superior does not apply in either context. Id. In order to establish liability, an individual defendant

must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation. Id. In other words, Plaintiff must

identify particular defendants and describe the acts or omissions that caused a violation of his

federally protected rights. He must draw a connection between each defendant and his own

constitutional deprivation.

Merely listing potential defendants in the case caption is not enough to state a claim against

them. Plaintiff lists Jackson County Jail and DEA Agents as defendants but sets forth no

allegations or claims against them. Plaintiff does not describe what they did, or failed to do, in

violation of his rights. The Court is unable to guess. Plaintiff must provide some context for his

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).

claims against each one. He has not done so in the body of his Complaint, so Count 1 shall be

dismissed against Jackson County Jail and DEA Agents without prejudice.

Moreover, Jackson County Jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 or Bivens.

Plaintiff’s designation of the county jail may represent an attempt to hold the county liable for his

injuries. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978). However,

municipal liability arises from the execution of a government policy or custom that causes a

constitutional injury. Id. Plaintiff points to no policy or custom that caused his injuries to occur.

Accordingly, no Monell claim survives screening, either.

Greg Rowald

Greg Rowald is the only defendant who is both named as a defendant and allegedly

involved in the events giving rise to this action. Plaintiff claims that Rowald detained him for two

days without processing him at the Jail, serving him with a federal complaint, allowing him to

speak with counsel, or allowing him to post bond until he spoke with DEA agents. Because he is

a local official, the claim against him arises under § 1983 and not Bivens. To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the complained of conduct was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Panfil v. City of Chicago, 45

Fed. Appx. 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

The Complaint includes insufficient allegations to support a due process claim. The

Seventh Circuit has held that no due process violation occurs where a person is arrested pursuant

to a valid arrest warrant and held for a short time, such as the two-day period that Plaintiff

describes. See, e.g., Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1978) (no due process

violation arose from detention of wrong individual for 24 hours); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137 (1979) (no due process violation arose from two-day detention of wrong twin brother pursuant

to valid arrest warrant); Panfil, 45 Fed. Appx. at 532 (no due process violation arose from two-day

detention and four-day detention of wrong twin brother arrested pursuant to valid warrant, over

protests of the arrestee). After all, “the Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be

arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted—indeed,

for every suspect released.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 145.

The allegations also support no Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Rowald

for the denial of Plaintiff’s request to post bond. This claim is undeveloped. Plaintiff did not

indicate when he requested permission to post bond, whether and how often he directed the request

to Rowald, and the length of the delay in actually posting bond.

Similarly, the Complaint lacks facts necessary to analyze Plaintiff’s related claim for denial

of access to an attorney. When presented with a Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial

of the right to counsel, a court must determine: (1) whether the right to counsel attached at the time

of the statement or proceeding at issue; (2) if so, whether the accused executed a valid waiver of

his right to counsel; and (3) absent a valid waiver, whether the police conduct violated the

accused’s right to counsel. Walder v. City of Chicago, 391 F. Supp. 2d 660, 677 (N.D. Ill. 2005)

(citing United States v. Spruill, 296 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 2002)). Under the Sixth Amendment,

“an accused person is entitled to counsel at critical stages of a criminal prosecution” such as “any

interrogation after the initiation of formal criminal proceedings against the accused.” Id. at 677-

78 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)). Because Plaintiff describes no

statement, interrogation, or proceedings that were actually instituted against him, the allegations

state no claim for relief, and Count 1 shall also be dismissed without prejudice against Rowald.

Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff will have an

opportunity to re-plead his claim in a First Amended Complaint if he would like to proceed with

his claims in this case. When preparing a First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff should identify each

defendant in the case caption and set forth allegations describing what each defendant did, or failed

to do, to violate his constitutional rights. To avoid dismissal with prejudice, he must follow the

instructions and deadline in the below disposition.

Motion for Recruitment of Counsel

Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED without prejudice. An

indigent plaintiff seeking representation by court-recruited counsel must demonstrate:

(a) reasonable efforts to locate counsel on his own; and (b) an inability to litigate the matter without

representation. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has demonstrated

no efforts to find counsel on his own. Before filing a new motion for recruitment of counsel, he

should call, email, or write at least three attorneys or law firms and request representation in this

case. If he is unable to do so, he may ask a family member or friend to complete this task on his

behalf. Along with his new motion for recruitment of counsel, Plaintiff should also provide a list

of attorneys/firms contacted, dates of contact(s), and responses received, as well as copies of

written communications to/from attorneys/firms showing his efforts to find counsel. In the

meantime, the Court deems it unnecessary to recruit counsel on his behalf, as Plaintiff’s pleadings

are coherent, well-organized, and timely. His allegations simply require further factual

development before the Court can determine whether Plaintiff can articulate a claim.

Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the defendants. COUNT 1 against

ALL DEFENDANTS is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to

TERMINATE ALL DEFENDANTS as parties in CM/ECF.

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a First Amended Complaint on or before

July 20, 2023. Should Plaintiff fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted time

or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed with

prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims.

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga,

34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The dismissal shall also count as one of

Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

It is strongly recommended that Plaintiff use the civil rights complaint form designed for

use in this District. Plaintiff should label the form “First Amended Complaint” and list the case

number for this action (No. 22-cv-02435-JPG) on the first page. To enable Plaintiff to comply

with this Order, the CLERK is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.

An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the

original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1

(7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own without reference

to any previous pleading. Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along

with it. The First Amended Complaint is also subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that the obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was

incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable, regardless of

whether Plaintiff files a First Amended Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing within 7 days of a

transfer or other change in address. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 6/22/2023 s/J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

United States District Judge