“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILFRED McCLENDON, )
B59999, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
SHEILA D. LEWIS, )
MICHAEL R. CONAT, )
DUSTIN SLOVER, )
JAMES HANSON, ) Case No. 21-cv-313-DWD
JUSTIN ECKELBERRY, )
JOSH SLUNAKER, )
ETHAN MARSHALL, )
DEE DEE BROOKHART, )
ROBERT REID, )
AMBER ELLIOTT, )
CODEY PIPER, )
DEENA K. SEED, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Wilfred McClendon, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) currently detained at Vienna Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning events that occurred at Lawrence Correctional
Center (Lawrence). (Doc. 17). Upon initial review of the Amended Complaint, the Court
identified seven claims against the named defendants. (Doc. 27). Defendants Brookhart,
Eckelberry, Elliott, Hanson, Lewis, Marshall, Piper, Reid, Slover and Slunaker filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies
(Doc. 42)1, and Defendant Seed filed a separate Motion on the same issue (Doc. 56).
Plaintiff was notified of both motions (Docs. 44, 58), but he failed to respond. The Court
now finds it appropriate to grant both motions because the Defendants have met their
burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to
all claims presented in this lawsuit.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleged that on March 18, 2019, he had a cup of ice with him when he
attended medication line to get his medications. Defendant Lewis allegedly tried to
snatch the cup, at which point he reflexively moved his hand out of the way. He alleges
Lewis ordered him to cuff-up, and the Lewis and Conat conspired to ‘trump up’
disciplinary charges against him for an alleged assault related to the interaction. Later
the same day, Defendants Reid, Conat, Slover, Hanson, Eckelberry, Marshall, and
Slunaker escorted him to segregation. During the escort Reid, Conat and Slover tightened
the handcuffs, slammed him to the ground, and then pulled him off of the ground by the
cuffs. He alleges Hanson, Eckelberry, Marshall and Slunaker failed to protect him or to
intervene in this assault. Upon arrival at segregation, Conat told Slunaker to pepper
spray him, and Slunaker complied. His hands were also pulled thru the chuck hole and
1 Defense counsel technically did not name Defendant Conat as a party seeking summary judgment in the
caption of the motion or the signature block. It is not clear why this occurred. Defendant Conat was the
only defendant against whom claims proceeded after initial review of the original complaint. (Docs. 1, 12).
He was served and counsel appeared on his behalf. (Docs. 14, 18). After review of the amended complaint,
Conat filed an answer (Doc. 29). Subsequently, other defendants were served (Doc. 30), Conat’s counsel
entered an appearance on their behalf (Doc. 31), and an answer was filed (Doc. 34). Given that it appears
to be an error Conat was not listed in the caption and given that substantive arguments were made on his
behalf that demonstrate administrative remedies were not exhausted, the Court considered the motion as
if it was also filed on Conat’s behalf.
twisted around, which produced visible bleeding. All the while, Slover, Hanson,
Eckelberry and Marshall stood by and did nothing.
Plaintiff told officers Phillip and Thomas (non-parties) that he needed his asthma
pump because he could not breath. Twenty minutes after his request, Defendant Seed
brought his asthma pump and a liquid solution to clean his face and eyes, but she did not
treat injuries to his wrists or the rest of his body. He alleges he should not have allowed
him to stay in segregation with open wounds.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lewis and Conat gave him disciplinary tickets
about the incident, and he had a hearing, but he was not allowed to present witnesses or
to otherwise represent himself. He was found guilty.
Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville and to the Cook County Department of
Corrections in August of 2019, but he was returned to Lawrence in February of 2020.
Upon return, he alleges Defendant Piper wrote him a false disciplinary ticket to have him
moved to segregation, and Defendant Brookhart helped with this move as a form of
retaliation. He further alleges in August and September of 2020 that Defendant Elliott
fabricated new discipline to keep him in segregation, and in November of 2020 Brookhart
had him placed in administrative detention without following proper procedures. At the
time of filing the amended complaint, Plaintiff was still in administrative detention.
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, which are more fully
recounted in the Order of Initial Review (Doc. 27), the Court designated seven claims:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Conat, Reid, Slover, and
Slunaker for excessive force;
Claim 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Conat and Slunaker for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition in
ordering him sprayed with mace;
Claim 3: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against
Defendants Conat and Lewis for filing false disciplinary
charges that resulted in segregation, C-grade, visiting
restrictions and a disciplinary transfer;
Claim 4: Eighth Amendment failure to protect or intervene by Slover,
Hanson, Eckelberry, and Marshall;
Claim 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs
against Defendant Seed;
Claim 6: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against
Defendants Piper and Elliott for fabricated investigative
tickets; and,
Claim 7: First Amendment retaliation or Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim against Brookhart for keeping Plaintiff in
segregation without cause.
(Doc. 27 at 6-7).
The Defendants have identified just one grievance that is potentially relevant to
the claims presented in this lawsuit—a grievance drafted on May 23, 2019. (Doc. 43-1 at
11-12; Doc. 57-1 at 24-25).
FINDINGS OF FACT
In the May 23, 2019, grievance, Plaintiff wrote,
On above date 3-18-19 I was housed in seven house on B Wing Low 17 at
time of medline called. The C/O who work seven house B wing open my
cell to let me out to go get my med and then I asked him could I get some
ice. Sgt. Lewis was out there in foyer when I went to get ice and then my
med. She said to me that I wasn’t out there for ice I then told her I asked
my C/O can I get some ice, I started to put the water in my cup and Sgt.
Lewis started talking about the ice again and then she try to take my cup
out my hand. Then I pulled my cup back and told her she can not touch
my cup. In our ruled book it say you can not touch me or take anything out
of my hand or inmates hand. Then I told her she was wrong for trying to
take my cup out my hand. So then she ask me for my I.D. and I told her I
didn’t have it. She said cuff-up then I told her what for I didn’t do anything.
I said I would like to speak with Lt. then she said go back on the wing. I
went back on the wing. After that the Lt. Conat show up with a lot of C/O’s.
Then I try to explain to him about situation with Sgt. Lewis behave right
then and there he had his mind made up. I was cuff by the C/O and they
started take me off the wing then the Lt. Conat told the C/O I got him we
started walk out the door and the Lt. Conat started pulling on me and ruff
with me. Then started squeezed down hard on handcuff when we got
outside. Lt. Conat shove me to ground then he started drag me I told him
this not how you treat human being. So he stated stop resisting and I was
not resisting. We got back to seg he told C/O to get lead chain. Lt. Conat
put me in shower and then he put the lead chain throughout shower
chuckhole. So he told me to put my hand through shower chuckhole which
I couldn’t do that then he stated to C/O’s if I don’t to spray me. Right there,
I told him I have asthma that they couldn’t spray then Lt. Conat told C/O
to spray and then all the C/O’s started pulling the lead chain in real hard
and my arm went through the shower door scratch up my elbow and my
back but door real hard too. Then Lt. Conat started squeezed the handcuff
tighter and tighter he was pulling down on my arm trying to break it my
wrist too which was unnecessary excessive force. After they spray me I
couldn’t breathe then I told Lt. Phillipe I need my asthma pump. She called
the nurse after 20 minute went by the nurse came she put solution in my
eyes and gave me my asthma pump. The Lt. Phillipe put me in cell I asked
her could the nurse clean my cuts and bandage them up. After that the
nurse didn’t come back and shift has change 11:00 to 7:00pm and I then told
them what happen and nothing was done.
(Doc. 43-1 at 11-12). Plaintiff designated the grievance as an emergency, but none of the
boxes on the grievance form are completed by officials at his prison. Specifically, the
emergency review box for the Chief Administrative Officer was left blank, and the
Counselor’s response box was left blank. (Doc. 43-1 at 11).
The grievance is stamped as received by the ARB on June 3, 2019. (Doc. 43-1 at
11). On June 6, 2019, the ARB completed a return of grievance form that indicated “not
submitted in the timeframe outlined in Department Rule 504; therefore, this issue will not
be addressed further. (Doc. 43-1 at 10).
Plaintiff’s cumulative counseling summary does not reflect a grievance submitted
on an emergency basis at Lawrence on or around May 23, 2019. (Doc. 43-2 at 8). There
are also not any notes about grievances from March 18, 2019, thru May 23, 2019. There is
a notation that on May 21, 2019, Plaintiff was “seen at the cell during 30 day contacts and
stated “I’m good thanks,” no other concerns or issues advised to write a request slip if he
needs anything.” (Doc. 43-2 at 8).
In addition to the May 23, 2019, grievance, Defendant Seed submitted grievance
documentation from the ARB, along with an affidavit from a records custodian that the
ARB documentation was comprehensive. (Doc. 57-1 at 11-25; Doc. 57-1 at 10, Affidavit
of Margaret Madole). Per the ARB records, the only grievance appeal that the ARB
received from Plaintiff in 2019 was the May 23, 2019, grievance, which was returned on
June 6, 2019. (Doc. 57-1 at 11). Defendant Seed also submitted grievance logs and
documentation from Lawrence, that purport to contain all grievances officially filed and
processed at Lawrence by Plaintiff. (Doc. 57-2). The documentation does not include any
grievances lodged by Plaintiff in 2019 and officially cataloged by the institution.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In
determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is
not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to
exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). After hearing evidence, finding
facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the claim to
proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th
Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.
Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021); Miller v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., 2017 WL
951399 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2017).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring
a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion
requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”
Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the
administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process
outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
The regulations first require an inmate to file his grievance with his counselor within 60
days of the discovery of an incident, occurrence, or problem that gave rise to the
grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). Administrative regulations require the
grievance “contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject
of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c).
If the complaint is not resolved through the counselor, the grievance may be
submitted to a grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations
in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e).
The CAO then provides the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with
the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s
decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer
and CAO to his appeal. Id. The ARB submits a written report of its findings and
recommendations to the Director, who them makes a final determination. 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE § 504.850(d), (e).
For an emergency grievance, an inmate may direct his request to the Chief
Administrative officer, who will determine if the issue should be handled as an
emergency. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(a)-(c). If the grievance is not deemed an
emergency, the inmate must return to the normal grievance channels to resubmit the
grievance as non-emergent. Id.
B. Analysis
The Court finds that the Motions for Summary Judgment can be resolved on paper
without a Pavey hearing. The Defendants have submitted credible evidence in support
of their contention that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust any grievance relevant to the claims
presented in this case, and Plaintiff has not refuted that evidence.2 Specifically, the May
23, 2019, grievance that Defendants submitted is clearly relevant in substance because it
recounts many of the facts presented in the Amended Complaint. The grievance could
perhaps serve to exhaust claims against all individuals mentioned in the grievance text—
which included, Lewis, Conat, and Seed3. Reading the grievance liberally, Plaintiff also
mentioned that “a lot of C/Os” showed up at his cell with Conat. The complaint
identified the group of officers as Reid, Slover, Hanson, Eckelberry, Marshall, and
Slunaker. Even if the Court read the grievance broadly to include all of these defendants,
the grievance is still insufficient because it was not properly exhausted.
2 Plaintiff was notified upon the filing of both motions of his opportunity to respond, and of the potential
consequences of failing to respond. (Docs. 44, 58). Plaintiff never responded to either motion, though on
March 24, 2023, the Court received a notice from Plaintiff that he had been moved to a new facility. (Doc.
59).
3 Seed was the nurse that responded to Plaintiff’s cell with his inhaler. She was initially a Jane Doe
defendant, but Plaintiff followed the proper procedures in this case to identify Seed and to substitute her
for the Jane Doe.
As the Defendants indicate, the grievance procedures require an inmate to submit
a grievance within 60 days of the underlying incident. Here, the incident occurred on
March 18, 2019, but Plaintiff did not file this emergency grievance until May 23, 2019.
This is beyond 60 days, and thus is not in compliance with the grievance rules.
Additionally, there are no markings on the grievance that indicate anyone at Lawrence
ever received or processed the grievance. (Doc. 43-1 at 11-12). Plaintiff’s cumulative
counseling summary does not reflect the grievance (Doc. 43-2 at 8), and the Lawrence
internal grievance logs do not reflect the grievance (Doc. 57-2). To the contrary, the
cumulative counseling summary indicates that on May 21, 2019, Plaintiff was visited at
his cell and reported that he had no concerns or issues to raise. (Doc. 43-2 at 8).
At most, the ARB records indicate that the ARB received the May 23 emergency
grievance directly from Plaintiff on June 2, 2019. By June 6, 2019, the ARB rejected the
grievance as outside the timeframe provided by Department Rule 504. (Doc. 43-1 at 10).
Based on all of the available evidence, the May 23, 2019, grievance was not properly
submitted at the institution, so it was not sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies
as to the claims presented in this lawsuit. Plaintiff does not offer any arguments or
evidence to contradict the Defendants’ Motions. Having thoroughly reviewed the record
evidence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
in this case, and he would no longer be able to do so because the time for exhaustion has
long since expired.
DISPOSITION
The Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Docs. 42, 56) are
GRANTED. All of Plaintiff's claims as identified by the Court from the Amended
Complaint (Doc. 17) are DISMISSED without prejudice for his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547
F.3d 724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious,
Plaintiff may incur another “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely
motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal
deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days
after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 29, 2023 Bun i Le
DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge