Martin v. IDOC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TIMMIE D. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-44-NJR

IDOC, MENARD STAFF,

M. OTTENSMEIER, BRUMLEVEL,

TREVOR M. ROWLAND, and

A. JONES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Timmie D. Martin, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action

for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the

Complaint, Martin alleges various constitutional violations and seeks declaratory

judgment, monetary damages, and injunctive relief.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Simply put, Martin’s Complaint is difficult to decipher. Martin’s Complaint is

lengthy and difficult to read because he places very little spacing between his words. In

some parts it is completely illegible. He also has submitted several supplements and

“letters” to the Court which are equally difficult to decipher (See Docs. 5, 12, 14, 16, 17,

18, 19, 20). Some of the supplements are grievances, with additional commentary directed

to the undersigned (Docs. 12, 17, 18, 19). Another “supplement” appears to request

additional damages and addresses his living conditions in segregation (Doc. 5). The Court

does not accept piecemeal amendments to the pleadings. To the extent that Martin wishes

to amend his Complaint, he would have to seek leave to amend his Complaint and file a

complete Amended Complaint, with both his original and new allegations. To the extent

he seeks to add claims, allegations, and/or evidence to his original Complaint with his

various supplements, his request is DENIED.

Turning to his original Complaint (Doc. 1), his pleading clearly violates Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to set forth “a short and plain

statement of [Plaintiff’s claim(s)] showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(d) requires “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. FED. R. CIV. P.

8(d)(1). The purpose of these rules is to “give defendants fair notice of the claims against

them and the grounds for supporting the claims.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797

(7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Martin’s Complaint is neither simple nor direct. He presents difficult to decipher,

sometimes illegible, and rambling allegations.

It appears that Martin may be trying to allege a violation of his due process rights

during a disciplinary hearing. But Martin’s Complaint is missing necessary facts that are

pertinent to such a claim. Martin states that he was placed in segregation for “doing a

good deed” (Doc. 1, p. 13). He states that he was subjected to “false imprisonment” and

that officers lied in a disciplinary report (Id. at p. 4). Although not entirely clear, a weapon

may have been found during a search of his cell, or Martin may have turned the weapon

in to staff (Id. at pp. 4, 9)

But Martin’s allegations are missing a number of key facts. When an inmate raises

a procedural due process claim, the Court undertakes a two-part analysis. Isby v. Brown,

856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court first evaluates whether the prisoner was

deprived of a protected liberty interest, and then second, whether the process he was

afforded was constitutionally deficient. Id. (citing Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d

668, 673 (7th Cir. 2016)). An inmate’s liberty interests are protected by the Due Process

Clause only insofar as a deprivation of the interest at issue would impose an “atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Although Martin mentions a “significant (or)

atypical departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life,” he fails to include any

allegations regarding the length of time he spent in segregation or the conditions that he

faced while there (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). He indicates that the charge comes with a possible year

in segregation, but it is not clear whether he actually received that discipline (Id. at p. 4).

Martin’s Complaint also fails to include any allegations about what process, if any, he

received regarding the disciplinary charge. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69

(1974).1

It also appears that Martin is seeking to allege an excessive force claim. He alleges

that several named officers jumped him and threw him down on the floor, twisting his

arm and shoulder (Doc. 1, p. 9). The Complaint, however, fails to indicate when this event

occurred and who participated in the use of force. There does not appear to be any date

listed in the Complaint regarding the use of force. He mentions being placed in

segregation on December 12, 2022, but it is not clear if this is the date the alleged excessive

force occurred (Id. at p. 10). Martin mentions that he showed Brumlevel his front cuff

permit; he later states that Brumlevel accused Martin of lying about his medical permit

and grabbed him (Id. at pp. 9-10). Earlier in the Complaint he states that Ottensmeier,

A. Jones, and Brumlevel used excessive force by throwing him down with several other

officers (Id. at p. 3). The Complaint simply fails to include pertinent information to clearly

establish an excessive force claim.

Martin further identifies groups and entities in his case caption that do not appear

in the statement of claim. He identifies “Menard Staff” but fails to indicate what staff he

is seeking to sue and for what violations. Although Martin may certainly allege claims

against identified John Does (i.e., John Doe #1, John Doe #2), he includes groups that are

1 Due process safeguards that are associated with prison disciplinary hearings include:

(1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) the opportunity to appear before an impartial

hearing body to contest the charges; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence as a defense (if prison safety allows and subject to the discretion of

correctional officers); and (4) a written statement summarizing the reasons for the discipline

imposed.

too generic to survive threshold review as he does not describe them or even state the

number of them. He further lists IDOC as a defendant, but the Illinois Department of

Corrections is a state government agency and is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1989); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56

F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by

virtue of Eleventh Amendment).

Because Martin’s Complaint fails to adequately set forth claims, his Complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice. Martin will have an opportunity to file a First Amended

Complaint if he wishes to pursue any of his claims in this action. If he chooses to do so,

Martin must comply with the instructions and deadlines set forth in the below

disposition. To aid Martin in drafting his Amended Complaint, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to send Martin a Section 1983 Complaint form.

Discussion

For the reasons stated above, Martin’s Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice. He is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before July

12, 2023. Should he fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted time or

consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed

with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his

claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997);

Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The dismissal shall

count as one of Martin’s three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Anamended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering

the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638

n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). As mentioned above, the Court will not accept piecemeal amendments

to the original Complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own,

without reference to any previous pleading, and Martin must re-file any exhibits he

wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended Complaint. The First

Amended Complaint is subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Martin is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action

was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable,

regardless of whether he elects to file a First Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Martin is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this Order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 14, 2023 Tl

neff lions?

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge