Boclair v. Lashbrook

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STANLEY BOCLAIR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 18-cv-2084-NJR

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Stanley Boclair, an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”)

brought this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. On August 15, 2022, Defendant Brandy Tripp was granted summary judgment

(Doc. 218). The remaining defendants entered into a settlement agreement with Boclair

(Doc. 2019). On November 17, 2022, the Court entered judgment in the case (Doc. 220).

On April 3, 2023, the Court granted Brandy Tripp’s bill of costs and a taxed a total of

$1,172.60 to Boclair.

This matter is before the Court on Boclair’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 226). Boclair

asks the Court to reconsider its decision to tax costs because his assigned counsel failed

to submit an updated trust fund account which would have demonstrated that Boclair

currently lacks to funds to pay the costs. Defendant Tripp filed a response (Doc. 227) in

opposition to the motion.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Boclair filed his motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 60(b). “[W]hether a motion

filed within [28] days of the entry of judgment should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or

Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the motion, not on the timing or label affixed to

it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in the original) (citing

Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (clarifying that “the former

approach-that, no matter what their substance, all post-judgment motions filed within

[28] days of judgment would be considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”)).

Nevertheless, a motion to reconsider filed more than 28 days after entry of the challenged

order “automatically becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.” Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140,

1143 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992)); see

also Talano v. N.W. Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).

A motion to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) may only be

granted if a movant shows there was a mistake of law or fact or presents newly

discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Matter of Prince,

85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1040; Deutsch v. Burlington N. R. Co., 983 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1993). “‘[M]anifest

error’ is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale

disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A

movant may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to present evidence that could have been

submitted before entry of the judgment. Obriecht, 517 F.3d at 494 (citing Sigsworth v. City

of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy

and is granted only in exceptional circumstances. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d

319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)).

Rule 60(b) allows a court “to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and

not merely to erroneous applications of law.” Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors

Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). It is also not an appropriate vehicle for rehashing

old arguments or for presenting arguments that should have been raised before the court

made its decision. Russell, 51 F.3d at 749; Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th

Cir. 2000).

ANALYSIS

Although labeled a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), Boclair’s motion was

filed exactly 28 days after the Court’s Order granting costs for Tripp and could be

considered under Rule 59(e). But Boclair’s motion to reconsider fails under either

standard. Boclair fails to point to any mistake of fact or law, nor has he presented any

evidence that could not have been presented earlier. Further, he has not shown any

inadvertence or excusable neglect. Instead, Boclair argues that his assigned counsel

should have submitted an updated trust fund account which would have demonstrated

his inability to pay the bill of costs. His trust fund statement could have been offered in

response to the motion, but his assigned counsel failed to do so. The Court does not find

this failure to fall under either standard for reconsideration.

Further, even if the Court had considered Boclair’s most recent trust fund

statement, the statement demonstrates that his account fluctuates. This is the same

conclusion the Court reached in its previous order (Doc. 225, p. 3). The trust fund

statement indicates that in November 2022, Boclair’s account was as high a $882.84

(Doc. 226, p. 10). He routinely receives deposits into his account, totally $100 to $200 (Id.

at pp. 10-12). Further, Boclair acknowledges in his motion that he received a $750.00

settlement in November 2022 (Id. at p. 2). Although Boclair argues that he uses the funds

he receives to pay previous court costs, his trust fund statement clearly demonstrates that

he receives funds from which he is able to pay the costs in this case, either now or in the

future. Thus, the Court finds that Boclair is able to pay the taxed costs. Boclair’s motion

to reconsider (Doc. 226) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 17, 2023 Tl (ocaitig

mes

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge