The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARY JO CONNAWAY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-264-SMY
)
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Mary Jo Connaway filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant Jefferson County,
Illinois, asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Illinois Human Rights
Act (“IHRA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Defendant moves for summary
judgment (Doc. 48), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 58). For the following reasons, the motion is
GRANTED.
Factual Background
Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Connaway, the evidence and reasonable
inferences establish the following facts relevant to the pending summary judgment motions:
Defendant Jefferson County, Illinois (the “County”) is a local government entity that operates a
jail (Doc. 49-2, ¶ 3). Plaintiff Mary Jo Connaway began working for the County in 2007 and
became a full-time correctional officer in October 2008 (Doc. 59-2, p. 12).
Jefferson County correctional officers are responsible for all aspects of ensuring the
security, safety, and care of the incarcerated persons, including booking, intake, dispensing
medications, providing food, arranging for outdoor time, providing for secure movement to visit
with attorneys, attending court hearings, and transporting to outside medical facilities (Doc. 49-4,
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pp. 17-20; Doc. 49-2, at ¶ 4). Correctional officers work 12-hour shifts, and each officer rotates
in four-hour increments among four different job functions: booking, well-being, relief, and
control (Doc. 59-2, p. 17, pp. 26-27; Doc. 59-3, -p. 60; Doc. 59-4, pp. 18-20; Doc. 59-5, p. 52).
One of the duties of correctional officers is to work in the control room watching the jail
facility via camera monitors, controlling all doors and movement within the facility, and keeping
control of the keys and less-than-lethal weapons (Doc. 49-4, pp. 19-20; Doc. 49-5, p. 51). The
control room is the only regularly assigned duty for correctional officers that does not involve
direct physical contact with detainees and that is always monitored by video and audio (Doc. 49-
4, p. 27; Doc. 49-3, pp. 131-132). Connaway believes the control room was the most stressful job
in the jail because there was constant activity and noise (Doc. 59-1, at ¶ 3).
The County generates revenue by housing prisoners from other counties and from federal
agencies, such as the United States Marshals Service (Doc. 49-4, pp. 25-26, 138; Doc. 49-3, p. 50).
Federal detainees are integrated with the rest of the population at the jail, and there is no reasonable
operational way to keep federal detainees segregated from the rest of the jail population (Doc. 49-
3, pp. 51-52; Doc. 49-2, at ¶ 5).
Connaway’s Disciplinary History
Connaway had been involuntarily terminated for misconduct by the County on two
separate occasions prior to Jeff Bullard’s election as County Sheriff in 2018 (Doc. 49-4, p. 37;
Doc. 49-5, p. 55). She was later reinstated by labor arbitrators who converted the terminations
into long-term disciplinary suspensions. Id.
There was an open investigation regarding Connaway when Sheriff Bullard was elected
(Doc. 49-3, pp. 69-70; Doc. 49-7, p. 97). The investigation involved serious allegations of
misconduct by Connaway regarding three federal prisoners (Doc. 49-8; Doc. 49-4, p. 133). While
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that investigation remained pending, the U.S. Marshals Service removed all federal prisoners from
the Jefferson County Jail (Doc. 49-7, p. 63; Doc. 49-2, at ¶ 6). Connaway continued working on
the floor and had physical contact with inmates (Doc. 59-1, at ¶ 5; Doc. 59-26, pp. 85-86, 120).
Connaway believed that the investigation had been concluded and that the allegations made against
her were unfounded (Doc. 59-1, ¶ 4; Doc. 59-2, p. 83).
After assuming office in December 2018, Sheriff Bullard reviewed the open investigation
and concluded the evidence supported disciplining Connaway for an attempted battery conspiracy
between inmates and unauthorized dispensing of phone cards to inmates (Doc. 49-4, pp. 84-86;
Doc. 49-9; Doc. 49-3, pp. 76-79, 126). Connaway received a written reprimand and assignment
to the control room on an indefinite basis so that she could not directly interact with the inmate
population (Doc. 49-4, p. 206). The written reprimand and indefinite assignment to the control
room were sustained through a grievance process between Connaway’s union and the County
(Doc. 49-8; Doc. 49-4, pp. 206-207). The U.S. Marshals Service resumed sending federal inmates
to the Jefferson County Jail after Connaway was assigned to the control room but advised the
County that it would remove the inmates if Connaway had access to them (Doc. 49-10; Doc. 49-
3, p. 201; 49-7, pp. 66-68; Doc. 49-2, at ¶ 7).
Connaway received several disciplinary infractions in 2019 and 2020, including:
(1) January 2019 – a written reprimand for conduct unbecoming an officer for not following
the instructions of the officer-in-charge on December 24, 2018, and a 5-day suspension
(later reduced to 2 days) for giving false or misleading statements, and of a lack of candor
during the related investigation (Doc. 49-4, p. 80; Doc. 49-11).
(2) April 2019 – a 2-day suspension for missing a mandatory CPR training session on March
25, 2019 (Doc. 49-4, pp. 95-96; Doc. 49-12). Connaway contacted Lieutenant Burrell to
see if she could come in on her day off to make up the training, but was told no (Doc. 59-
7, pp. 106-107).
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(3) May 2019 – a 2-day suspension for violating the “keep separate” policy and procedure and
for failure to notify a supervisor of a potential emergency due to the keep separate violation
(Doc. 49-4, pp. 99-100; Doc. 49-13; Doc. 49-3, p. 160). Connaway stated that she did not
see the flag or warning indicating that a keep separate order existed (Doc. 59-2, pp. 104-
105).
(4) January 2020 – a 7-day suspension (later reduced to 5 days) for repeated safety violations,
in this instance violating the cell phone policy by bringing her personal cell phone into the
control room, using it, and attempting to hide it under the work counter so it could not be
viewed by the cameras in the control room (Doc. 49-4, pp. 117-124; Doc. 49-14; Doc. 49-
3, p. 179). It is against County policy to have a cell phone in inmate areas or in the control
room. Supervisors are allowed to have cell phones on the floor or in the control room (Doc.
49-4, p. 121; Doc. 49-3, p. 167; Doc. 49-5, p. 126).
(5) April 2020 – a 5-day suspension based on repeated safety violations, again for having a
cell phone in the control room (Doc. 49-4, pp. 127-131; Doc. 49-15).
The investigations into Connaway’s disciplinary infractions were usually conducted by
Lieutenant Mansker; Sheriff Bullard did not conduct the investigations (Doc. 49-4, p. 146; Doc.
49-3, p. 162). Lieutenant Mansker followed the same process as to all personnel investigations
that may lead to the discipline of employees, including interviewing the accused employee and
other witnesses, gathering documents and video and audio recordings, and making assessments of
credibility and candor (Doc. 49-2, at ¶ 9). Sheriff Bullard issued discipline based on the
investigation findings, the step in progressive discipline, and the comparative treatment of others
for misconduct. Id. at ¶ 10.
In the fall of 2019, the County received a report that Connaway had brought her cell phone
into the control room. Subsequently, Sheriff Bullard authorized Lieutenant Mansker’s request to
set up a camera underneath the control room desk (Doc. 59-6, pp. 146-147). Lieutenant Mansker
instructed Lieutenant Nancy Burrell to place a camera under the control room desk to monitor
whether Connaway was using her phone under the desk out of sight of the other cameras (Doc. 49-
5, pp. 123-124; Doc. 4923, pp. 167-170). Connaway discovered the camera disguised as a phone
charger under her desk pointed at her crotch the first day the County used it. She reported it to
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Lieutenant Burrell, and no evidence was gained from it (Doc. 49-3, p. 169, Doc. 49-7, p. 127).
The camera was in place for less than one day. Id. On December 9, 2019, Connaway filed a
complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights alleging, in part, a hostile and
intimidating environment, based on the camera she found in the control room (Doc. 49-3, p. 171).
In her deposition, Connaway testified that Sheriff Bullard and Lieutenant Mansker never
said anything to her that she identified as sexist. Id. at pp. 147-148. She could not identify any
time when they used derogatory terms regarding her or other female officers or used sexist slurs
or profane comments about women correctional officers. Id. She could not recall either of them
saying that women are not capable of being very good, capable, proficient correctional officers.
Id. The only example of a sexist comment Connaway could recall was Sheriff Bullard telling her
on one occasion, “I know how manipulative you are. You’re not going to get away with that here.”
The comment was made in the presence of Lieutenant. Nancy Burrell, and Connaway interpreted
it as insinuating she was manipulative because of her sex (Doc. 59-2, p. 150, pp. 238-239; Doc.
59-3, pp. 90-91; Doc. 59-7, pp. 65-66).
Connaway claimed that Scott Smith, a male detective with the County, failed to attend a
meeting between personnel and Sheriff Bullard shortly after he was elected. Sheriff Bullard issued
Smith a counseling for missing the meeting (Doc. 59-3, p. 154; Doc. 59-7, p. 109). On one
occasion during Sheriff Bullard’s administration, the County mandated Officer Garcia, a male, to
come into work. Sheriff Bullard testified that Garcia requested to be excused from the mandate
because he needed to work on his roof (Doc. 59-3, pp. 180-181; Doc. 59-8, pp. 48-53). On another
occasion, Connaway complained to Lieutenant Mansker that Sergeant Garcia had violated a keep
separate order (Doc. 59-18). Garcia testified that he was written up and received a verbal warning
for cell phone usage (Doc. 59-8, pp. 53-55). Correctional officer Stephen Yandell, a male, was
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caught with a cell phone in the control room twice in four months. The County issued him a
coaching for the first offense and issued him a three-day suspension for the second offense (Doc.
59-3, p. 184; Docs. 60-4-6).
No male correctional officers have a similar discipline history to Connaway, including
prior terminations and suspensions, who have not received similar progressive discipline for
similar offenses (Doc. 49-2, at ¶ 8). Connaway has no personal knowledge of other correctional
officers’ disciplinary histories (Doc. 59-2, p. 157).
Connaway’s Requests for Accommodations
Connaway has been diagnosed with migraine headaches (Doc. 49-4, p. 189). She first
notified the County of her migraines with a doctor’s note in 2016 or 2017. Id. at pp. 190-191. The
migraines are often triggered and/or exacerbated by bright lights and sensitivity to light, loud
sounds, and stress (Doc. 59-1, at ¶ 8; Doc. 59-2, pp. 196-197; Doc. 59-9, pp. 15-19).
On April 11, 2019, Connaway complained to former Jail Administrator Scott that the
County ’s instruction that lights in the control room must be turned down affected her migraines.
Id. She also notified the County that her indefinite assignment to the control room increased the
frequency of her migraines and that she could not have the light contrast based on her migraines
(Doc. 59-3, pp. 143-144; Doc. 60-11). The next day, the County instituted a new directive that
required officers to keep the lights in the control room at their lowest setting (Doc. 59-3, pp. 148-
149; Doc. 60-12).
The lights in the control room are kept dim so the inmate population cannot see what is
inside, including weapons, radios, other jail equipment, and information contained on the computer
screens or paperwork. The safety glass surrounding the control room is reflective in such a way
that if the lights are turned up, detainees can see in the control room (and the correctional officer
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cannot see out). If the lights are dim, the correctional officer can see out, but the detainees cannot
see in (Doc. 49-3, pp. 137-138; Doc. 49-6, pp. 122-129). There had been a practice of keeping the
lights dim before the directive was issued and Connaway’s complaint (Doc. 59-6, pp. 140-141).
Connaway requested to not be assigned to the control room because she believed that the
work triggered her migraines, but there are no other jobs that do not require direct physical
interaction with detainees (Doc. 49-4, pp. 212-214; Doc. 49-3, pp. 217-220). The County would
not allow Connaway to go back to performing duties that would involve direction interaction with
inmates including federal inmates (Doc. 49-4, pp. 199-204).
Connaway’s doctor, Dr. Mark Whealy, provided her with a letter that encouraged the
County to see if there was a position “more conducive to her migraines” than the control room.
Dr. Whealy testified that he is unaware of why Connaway was assigned to the control room. He
also testified that he did not know if there were any other available jobs or duties to which
Connaway could be assigned. He did not suggest any other accommodations (such as assistive
devices), and did not correspond directly with the County regarding other possible
accommodations (Doc. 49-17, pp. 29-30, pp. 41-47).
Connaway requested a desk lamp as an accommodation for her migraines, which the
County provided (Doc. 49-4, p. 199; Doc. 49-3, pp. 147-148; Doc. 49-5, pp. 87-88; Doc. 49-7, pp.
138-139). She also requested to take more breaks from the control room. As an accommodation,
the County allowed Connaway to conduct perimeter checks by walking around the outside of the
jail. Perimeter checks are usually performed by lieutenants or sergeants (Doc. 49-4, pp. 201-202;
Doc. 49-3, pp. 147-148; Doc. 49-5, pp. 98, 119; Doc. 49-6, pp. 135-136). The times Connaway
conducted the checks were inconsistent, did not occur daily, and required proper staffing for
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someone to relieve her in the control room when the checks were to be conducted (Doc. 59-2, pp.
201-202; Doc. 59-3, p. 148; Doc. 59-4, p.45).
Sheriff Bullard offered to sit down with Connaway to discuss additional ideas to
accommodate her needs, but Connaway did not respond (Doc. 49-4, pp. 235-237, 241; Doc. 49-
18; Doc. 49-3, p. 214). Sheriff Bullard explained to Connaway that if the U.S. Marshals Service
pulled their inmates from the Jefferson County Jail, it would have a serious negative effect on
county revenues (Doc. 49-18).
Connaway’s Termination
Connaway’s daughter Emily Potter, Potter’s boyfriend Jeremy Sneed, and friend Zackary
Spurlock were involved in a road rage incident on November 8, 2021. Sneed dropped Potter off
at a gas station after an argument. Potter called Spurlock and Spurlock and his mother picked
Potter up near the gas station (Doc. 49-19, pp. 19-26, p. 40). While driving, Spurlock noticed a
silver Mercedes SUV he believed was owned by Sneed. The SUV began tailgating his car and at
one point, pulled up next to Spurlock’s vehicle and attempted to push him off the road. While the
SUV was next to him, Spurlock saw that Sneed was driving the vehicle (Doc. 49-19., pp. 21, 27-
34; Doc. 49-3, p. 233). Spurlock called 911 and while on the phone, made a U-turn and the SUV
drove into a ditch. The recorded 911 call identifies the SUV and Sneed as the driver and includes
Potter’s screams reacting in real time to the danger being caused by Sneed (Doc. 49-19, pp. 30-34;
Doc. 49-21). Spurlock reported that as he was driving away, he saw Connaway driving in the
opposite direction toward the SUV in the ditch (Doc. 49-20, Doc. 49-21).
Connaway reported that she went to the gas station to pick up her daughter, but she had
already gotten a ride from Spurlock (Doc. 49-4, pp. 164-170; 49-21). Connaway then called Sneed
and told him she did not have enough gas to make it home and then back to work. Connaway and
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Sneed agreed to switch cars. Connaway stated that after exchanging cars, she turned around
because Sneed had left his checkbook in the SUV. Connaway then saw something, swerved to
avoid it, and ended up in a ditch while driving the SUV (Doc. 49-4, pp. 164-170; 49-21). When
the Wayne County Deputy who responded to the 911 call arrived at the scene, Connaway told him
she was driving the SUV when it landed in the ditch (Doc. 49-4, pp. 229-235, Doc. 49-21). After
learning of the incident, Sheriff Bullard appointed Lieutenant Mansker to open a personnel
investigation into the events. Id.
Lieutenant Mansker investigated the November 8, 2021 incident, including interviewing
Spurlock, his mother, and Connaway as well as reviewing the 911 recording and phone records.
Lieutenant Mansker also attempted to interview Potter and Sneed, but both declined (Doc. 49-3,
pp. 235-241, Doc. 49-21).
While the investigation was ongoing, Sheriff Bullard believed that Connaway had lied
about her involvement in the November 8, 2021 incident. Id. He sent a text message to Lieutenant
Burrell on November 23, 2021 stating, “Getting her interview scheduled. She is pretty much nailed
on this one no matter which way she goes” (Doc. 59-23, Doc. 59-41).
Based on his review of the evidence, Lieutenant Mansker did not believe Connaway’s
version of the events and found her interview to be deceitful (Doc. 49-21). This was based on the
credibility of the witnesses, the contemporaneous recording of the 911 call reporting Sneed driving
the Mercedes SUV in the ditch, contradictory phone records that did not show Sneed on the phone
with Connaway at the times she claimed, and the physical impossibility of the events occurring as
Connaway alleged. Id. He concluded that Connaway gave false information to the Wayne County
Deputy regarding the events (Doc. 49-4, p. 171, Doc. 49-3, p. 235, Doc. 49-21, Doc. 49-22).
Sheriff Bullard agreed with the findings. Id. Giving false information in a police report and giving
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false information to protect someone from criminal prosecution is a serious violation of the
County’s policies, and committing a criminal act is also a major violation of policy (Doc. 49-4,
pp. 174-180).
On December 6, 2021, following her interview with Lieutenant Mansker, Sheriff Bullard
sent a notice seeking Connaway’s termination of employment before the Merit Commission for
the following charges: giving false information in a police report; committing a criminal act;
conduct unbecoming an officer; and making false statements during an administrative
investigation. Connaway was placed on administrative leave until the hearing with the Merit
Commission (Doc. 49-4, pp. 161-162, Doc. 49-22). From December 6, 2021, through December
28, 2021, the County continued to investigate Connaway’s alleged misconduct (59-6, pp. 162-163,
p. 218; Doc. 59-35, Doc. 59-36). Lieutenant. Mansker completed his investigative report on
December 28, 2021.
Connaway opted to use an arbitrator to assess whether there was just cause for termination
instead of having a hearing with the Merit Commission (Doc. 49-4, p. 163). When Connaway
waived her right before the Merit Commission, her employment was formally terminated, and she
then entered the grievance process (Doc. 49-4, p. 163; Doc, 49-3, p. 227). No one mentioned
Connaway’s sex or migraines during the investigation that led to her termination or at any time
relative to her termination (Doc. 49-4, pp. 186-187).
Discussion
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the non-moving party
“has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which
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she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th
Cir. 2004).
Sexual Discrimination
The determinative question for a court at the summary judgment stage in a discrimination
case is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's
race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse
employment action.” Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2018)). A plaintiff can
use the McDonnell Douglas framework to present such evidence but need not do so. The court
“must consider all admissible evidence to decide whether a reasonable jury could find that the
plaintiff suffered an adverse action because of her [protected characteristic].” Skiba v. Ill. Cent.
R.R., 884 F.3d 708, 720 (7th Cir. 2018); see Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764–65
(7th Cir. 2016).
To succeed on her sexual discrimination claim, Connaway must establish that: (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting Defendant’s legitimate performance
expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) another similarly situated
individual not in the protected class was treated more favorably than she was. See Coleman v.
Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 835 (7th Cir. 2012). The County argues that Connaway cannot make out
a prima facie case because she was not meeting her employer’s legitimate work expectations, nor
can she point to other similarly situated male employees who were treated more favorably.
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With respect to its contention that Connaway was not meeting performance expectations,
the County points to numerous disciplinary infractions – misconduct involving inmates, missing
mandatory training, repeated violations of safety policies, and the events culminating her
termination. Connaway made no response to the County’s assertion that she was not meeting her
work expectations, and her contention that her disciplinary infractions were a result of sexist
harassment and created a hostile work environment is fatally insufficient, as a non-movant’s failure
to respond to arguments addressed in a summary judgment motion results in a waiver. See Betco
Corp., Ltd. v. Peacock, 876 F.3d 306, 309 (7th Cir. 2017).
Hostile Work Environment
To prevail on her claim for discrimination based on a hostile work environment, Connaway
must show: (1) her work environment was objectively and subjectively offensive, (2) the
harassment she complained of was based on her gender, (3) the conduct was so severe or pervasive
as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment, and
(4) there is a basis for employer liability. Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d
887, 900 (7th Cir. 2018); Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2009). “Courts
look to several factors to determine whether alleged harassment was objectively offensive,
including the frequency of the conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the alleged
victim's work performance.” Id.
Connaway argues the multiple disciplinary actions taken against her beginning shortly after
Bullard became Sheriff, including written reprimands and suspensions and being assigned to the
control room on an indefinite basis, subjected her to a hostile work environment. She maintains
that Sheriff Bullard had an animus against her because she is a woman and that her sex was a
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motivating factor in the actions the County took against her. She points to the sheriff telling her,
“I know how manipulative you are. You’re not going to get away with that here” which she took
as an insinuation that she was manipulative because of her sex. But her perception of this statement
without supporting facts or explanatory details is mere speculation and cannot support an inference
of discrimination. See Nichols v. S. Illinois Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 781-82 (7th Cir.
2007). Connaway acknowledges that other than this comment, Bullard never said anything to her
that she identified as sexist, nor is she aware of him using derogatory terms regarding her or other
females.
“All things being equal, if an employer takes an action against one employee in a protected
class but not another outside that class, one can infer discrimination. The ‘similarly situated’ prong
establishes whether all things are in fact equal.” Filar v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 526
F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir.2008) (internal citation omitted). While Connaway argues the County
was more lenient with male employees when it came to imposing discipline, the evidence on record
does not create a material issue of fact on this point.
Connaway does not dispute that she received discipline for engaging in misconduct
involving inmates, giving false or misleading statements during an investigation, missing
mandatory training, and violating County policies. There is no evidence that the discipline she
received was because of her sex rather than because of her failure to follow procedure. Connaway
does not refute Sheriff Bullard’s testimony that no male correctional officers have a similar
discipline history to Connaway, including prior terminations and suspensions, who have not
received similar progressive discipline for similar offenses. In fact, she admits she cannot identify
a similarly situated male correctional officer with her disciplinary record.
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Viewing the totality of the evidence, Connaway fails to show that she was treated
differently because of her sex or that any unfavorable treatment was severe or pervasive enough
to create a hostile work environment.
ADA
“In order to establish a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he
is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” Bunn, 753 F.3d at 682). “An employer
need only provide a qualified individual with a ‘reasonable accommodation, not the
accommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir.
2012).
The obligation to accommodate a disability also “brings with it a requirement that both the
employer and the employee engage in a flexible ‘interactive process’ and make a ‘good faith effort’
to determine what accommodations are necessary.” Yochim v. Carson, 935 F.3d 586, 591 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “If this process fails to lead to reasonable accommodation of the
disabled employee's limitations, responsibility will lie with the party that caused the breakdown.”
E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005).
There is no dispute that Connaway suffers from migraine headaches or that the County was
aware of her migraines. The question is whether the County failed to reasonably accommodate
her migraine condition. Connaway complained that working in the control room triggered her
migraines and requested the following accommodations: (1) having the lights in the control room
at a brighter setting; (2) finding a job outside of the control room; or (3) reducing the amount of
time that she was required to work in the control room.
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Connaway asserts that keeping the lights at a brighter setting would help with her migraines
and that she was able to keep the lights in the control room turned on at a bright setting prior to
Bullard becoming the sheriff. On April 11, 2019, John Scott the Jail Administrator asked
Connaway why the lights in the control room were on. She explained that having the lights on
helped with her migraines. After speaking with Bullard, Scott sent a message the following day
to all correctional officers stating that having the light on in the control room was a safety and
security issue.
Connaway does not dispute that the lights create a safety and security issue. In lieu of the
lights being turned on, she requested a desk lamp to use in the control room, which the County
provided. The fact that Connaway did not receive the specific accommodation she originally
requested does not render the County’s action unreasonable. See Bunn, 753 F.3d at 683 (explaining
that where an employer provided a reasonable accommodation, plaintiff's “apparent displeasure
with the way in which [the employer] decided on that accommodation, or with its failure to provide
the exact accommodation he would have preferred, [was] irrelevant”).
The ADA may require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a different position
as a reasonable accommodation where the employee can no longer perform the essential functions
of their current position. Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 291 (7th Cir. 2015).
Connaway argues that she could have been moved to other assignments outside of the control
room. However, she has not established that she was unable to perform the essential functions of
her position with the addition of the desk lamp she requested and received. Significantly, other
than working in the control room, there were no other jobs for correctional officers that did not
require direct physical interaction with federal detainees. The County’s decision to exclude
Connaway from direct physical interaction with federal inmates was not unreasonable given her
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disciplinary history and the request made by the U.S. Marshals Service. While Connaway
contends the County should have worked around her limited access to federal detainees by having
another correctional officer relieve her whenever a federal prisoner was around, “an employer is
simply not required to create ... a new position to accommodate an employee under the ADA,
regardless of the amount of hardship involved.” Stern, 788 F.3d at 290.
The County did attempt to accommodate Connaway by allowing her to perform perimeter
checks and take additional breaks if another employee was available to relieve her in the control
room, but the County did not always have staff available to relieve her. Additionally, Bullard
offered to sit down with Connaway to discuss additional ideas she had to accommodate her needs,
but she did not respond to him.
On this record, the jury could not reasonably conclude that the County failed to reasonably
accommodate Connaway’s migraine condition.
Retaliation
A retaliation claim requires proof that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action
because of her statutorily protected activity. Thus, Connaway must prove that she engaged in
protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is a causal link
between the two. Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016); Castro
v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015).
A causal link requires more than the mere fact that an employer's action happens after an
employee's protected activity. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016). In this context,
causation means but-for causation. Lord, 839 F.3d at 563. “[C]ausation can be established by
circumstantial evidence,” such as “suspicious timing, a pretextual explanation for the [adverse
employment action], and evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently.”
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Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018). When the plaintiff has provided
circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive, her employer may then show that the adverse
employment action would have been taken against the employee “even absent her [engaging in the
protected activity]”—undercutting retaliation as the but-for cause of the adverse action. Lord, 839
F.3d at 564. However, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment if she shows that a genuine
dispute of material fact exists as to whether the employer's purported motive is pretextual. Id.
The County maintains that Connaway was terminated for giving false information in a
police report, committing a criminal act, conduct unbecoming an officer, and making false
statements during an administrative investigation stemming from the November 2021 incident,
coupled with her disciplinary history. Citing Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 407
(7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 442 (2008), Connaway asserts that the County had already
concluded she had engaged in improper conduct and that her discharge was warranted before
completing its investigation and before getting her side of the story. In Humphries, the Seventh
Circuit concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could conclude
that plaintiff’s employer had set him up. But Humphries is distinguishable because the employer
conducted no investigation before firing the plaintiff for an alleged minor infraction and there was
no evidence that the employer fired anyone else for similar missteps. That’s not the case here.
Lieutenant Mansker performed an investigation which included interviewing witnesses,
listening to the 911 audio recordings, and interviewing Connaway. Although the decision to
terminate Connaway was made on the same day as her interview, the decision came after her
interview and after a determination was made from the evidence gathered her version of events
was unlikely. Courts intervene in personnel disputes “only where an employer's reason for [an
adverse action] is without factual basis or is completely unreasonable." Nicholson v. City of
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Peoria, Ill., 860 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). Based on the record, the County’s stated reason
for terminating Connaway was neither factually baseless nor unreasonable. Accordingly, it is
entitled to summary judgment on Connaway’s retaliation claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in
its entirety. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 30, 2023
News Ke Goll
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge
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