The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DONALD SMITH, #M52307, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-00689-SMY
)
KAREN S. SMOOT, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Donald Smith filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged
deprivation of his constitutional rights at Shawnee Correctional Center. Following preliminary
review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Smith proceeds on an Eighth Amendment
claim against Karen S. Smoot for exhibiting deliberate indifference to Smith’s serious medical
needs related to injuries from a fall on September 11, 2019.
This matter is now before the Court on Defendant Smoot’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 29), which Smith opposes (Doc. 34). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
FACTS1
In September 2019, Smith was incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center (Doc. 1) and
Smoot was the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”) at Shawnee (Doc. 30-1, p. 1 at ¶ 1).
Smith fell out of his bed onto property boxes injuring his left thumb and left foot on September
11, 2019 at approximately 4:00 a.m. (Doc. 30-2 at 12:13-13:17). He was taken to the healthcare
unit and treated by medical staff at 4:25 a.m. (Id. at 13:5-8; Doc. 30-3, p. 4, 10-11).
1 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
According to Smith, his thumbnail was broken off, his thumb was “pointing out broke like
that and a nurse popped it back into place without his permission, and “they” cut his nail, taped
his wounds, and gave him naproxen and a tetanus shot. (Id. at 14:22-15:5, 17:3-10). The medical
records note that Smith sustained a superficial laceration to his left great toe and his left thumbnail
was bent backward with the nailbed exposed. (Doc. 30-3, pp. 5, 10).
Smith was seen at sick call on September 12, 2019 for injuries from the fall. (Doc. 30-3,
p. 13). He testified that he saw Smoot in the healthcare unit that day and told her that he believed
he had a broken toe and finger, but she refused to give him an x-ray, cane, or crutches. (Doc. 30-
2 at 15:9-19).2
Smith filed a grievance on September 18, 2019 regarding the September 11, 2019 fall.
(Doc. 30-4, pp. 3-4). He marked the nature of the grievance as “other” and wrote in “the way
property boxes are set up under bottom bunk.” (Id., p. 3). The relief requested was for the warden
to “change the way the property boxes are set up under the bottom bunk.” (Id.).
In the summary of grievance, Smith stated that he believed he needed stitches, believed his
finger and toe were fractured and that x-rays should have been taken. (Id., pp. 3-4) He did not
seek any relief regarding those assertions. (Id.). Smoot responded to the grievance in her capacity
as the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”) and noted that Smith was seen for his injuries
in the healthcare unit on September 11, 2019, and at NPSC on September 12, 2019. (Id., p. 8; Doc.
30-1, p. 2 at ¶ 5).
As the HCUA, Smoot was responsible for directing, coordinating, and reviewing the
activities of the healthcare operations at Shawnee. (Doc. 30-1, p. 1 at ¶ 2). Only medical
professionals were able to order a particular treatment for any offender. (Id. at ¶ 3). As the HCUA,
2 Smith’s belief that he saw Smoot is based on the fact that she responded to his grievance and he believes that when
a grievance is filed, it is sent to the person responsible. (Id. at 16:6-15, 19:13-17, 20:7-21:12).
Smoot did not treat patients and was unable to provide patients with a diagnosis, treatment plan,
and/or prescriptions. (Id.). Smoot did not treat Smith on September 12, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 4).
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of
Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)). A genuine
issue of material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence “in the light
reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving (him) the benefit of reasonable,
favorable inferences, and resolving conflicts in the evidence in (his) favor.” Spaine v. Community
Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014). However, the Court may not “assess the
credibility of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative
weight of conflicting evidence.” Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617,
619 (7th Cir. 2010).
Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment
claim of constitutionally-deficient medical care, a plaintiff must first establish that he had an
objectively serious medical need, and then show that the defendant had knowledge of facts from
which they could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and disregarded that risk. Id.
at 476.
“[T]o be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have caused or participated in
a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).
In other words, an individual may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior based on the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
676 (2009). “Personal involvement in a subordinate's constitutional violation requires supervisors
to know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what they might see.” Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “An allegation
that the supervisor had knowledge of a deficiency is not, without more, enough to maintain an
individual liability claim under § 1983.” Id.
It is undisputed that Smoot was not directly involved in Smith’s treatment or the treatment
decisions on September 11 or 12, 2019. As such, she can only be liable if she was aware of
deliberate indifference to Smith’s serious medical needs and facilitated it, approved it, condoned
it, or turned a blind eye to it.
“Deliberate indifference is more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing.”
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Inadvertent error, negligence, misdiagnosis, and ordinary malpractice do not constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). Nor does the
Eighth Amendment entitle inmates to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible” -- it
requires only that “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v.
Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th
Cir. 2003). Deliberate indifference may be found if a medical provider defendant ignored a request
for treatment, substantially departed from accepted professional standards, persisted in an
ineffective course of treatment, or inexplicably delayed treatment. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,
729 (7th Cir. 2016).
Based on the evidence in the record, Smith cannot show that Smoot was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Although he made some complaints about his medical
treatment in the September 18, 2019 grievance, his complaints were nothing more than
disagreement with his medical treatment. There was nothing in the grievance to alert Smoot to
constitutionally deficient medical care. And Smoot’s review of Smith’s medical records for
purposes of responding to the grievance reflected that Smith was seen by medical personnel, his
injuries were treated, and medication had been issued for pain. On this record, Smoot is entitled
to summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Karen S. Smoot and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 13, 2022
s/ Staci M. Yandle_____
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge