Opinion

Black v. Lindsey

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Dec 30, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

“[A]n inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[A]n inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RODNEY EUGENE BLACK, #B86195, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00174-SMY

)

AIMEE LANG, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Rodney Eugene Black filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at Menard Correctional Center. Following

preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff proceeds on an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Aimee Lang for delaying and/or

denying him prescription medication.

This matter is now before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

105), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 111). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

FACTS1

Prior to his entry into IDOC custody, Plaintiff was diagnosed with various medical issues,

including high blood pressure, borderline diabetes, disc problems, heart issues, Hepatitis C,

cirrhosis of the liver, a “bad heart,” and sleep apnea. (Doc. 106-1, p. 4 at 15:16-15:25, 16:1-4).

(Id.). He was on medication for several of his medical conditions. (Id. at 16:12-21).

Upon Plaintiff’s arrival at Menard Correctional Center on April 30, 2019, Plaintiff saw “an

assembly line of people,” including task force, drugs, mental health, and medical. (Id., p. 3 at

1 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

11:16-18, p. 5 at 18:2-11). Plaintiff does not know who he specifically saw that day. (Id. at 18:10-

11). According to his medical records,2 Nurse Tripp performed Plaintiff’s medical intake

screening and noted he was taking Aspirin 81 mg daily, Furosemide 40 mg daily, HCTZ 25 mg

daily, Potassium 10 meq daily, Lisinopril 40 mg BID, Metoprolol 100mg BID, Olanzapine 5mg

BID, Ranitidine 300 mg daily, Terazosin 2 mg daily, Colace 100 mg 2 caps BID, and Metformin

500 mg BID. (Doc. 108, pp. 26-28). She noted the plan was to order intake labs (Id., p. 26) and

to have Plaintiff seen in the DMCC (Diabetes Mellitus Chronic Clinic), HCVCC (Hepatitis C

Clinic), and HTNCC (Hypertension Chronic Clinic). (Id.). Nurse Practitioner M. Zimmer wrote

a progress note ordering labs (CBC, HCV VL, and PT/INR). (Id., p. 28).

Plaintiff told a sergeant that he was having chest pain and issues with his heart on May 2,

2019. (Doc. 106-1, p. 5 at 18:21-19:2). The sergeant brought certified medical technician

(“CMT”) Aimee Lang to see him. (Doc. 106-2, p. 1 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff advised Lang that he had not

received his prescription medications since arriving at Menard. (Doc. 106-1, p. 5 at 19:2-8). As

a CMT, Lang did not have the authority to order prescription medication (Doc. 106-2, p. 2 at ¶ 5)

but was able to provide him with medication available from institution stock based on his current

prescriptions. (Id., pp. 2-3 at ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 106-1, p. 5 at 19:8-9). According to the Medication

Administration Records, Lang gave Plaintiff Furosemide 40 mg, HCTZ 25 mg., Lisinopril 40 mg,

Metoprolol 100mg. Colace 100 mg, and Metformin 500 mg at 8:00 am on May 2, 2019. (Doc.

106-2, pp. 2-3, ¶ 10). Plaintiff testified that the medications Lang gave him helped that day. (Doc.

106-1, p. 5 at 19:12-14). Before May 2, 2019, Lang did not know that Plaintiff had not received

his medications. (Id., p. 3 at ¶ 12).

2 Defendant attached several irrelevant medical and dental records to its memorandum. The inclusion of irrelevant

medical records is a privacy concern and causes a waste of judicial resources. Counsel should avoid the inclusion of

unnecessary documents in the future.

Plaintiff was seen by NP Zimmer for chronic clinic and for a physical examination on May

3, 2019. (Doc. 108, pp. 53-54; Doc. 108-1, pp. 62-65). His prescription medications were noted

and an EKG was ordered. (Id.). According to the Medication Administration Record, he received

the medications currently prescribed to him on May 3, 2019, and consistently received them

through May 29, 2019. (Doc. 106-2, p. 3 at ¶ 13; Doc. 108-1, pp. 89-90).

An EKG was conducted on Plaintiff on May 18, 2019. (Doc. 108, p. 30). No complaints

of pain are documented in the chronic clinic notes or any progress notes in May 2019. (Doc. 108,

pp. 29-32, 53-54).

According to Plaintiff, he had another issue with receiving his medications from May 28

to June 7, 2019. (Doc. 106-1, p. 6 at 21:3-6). After declaring a medical emergency on June 6,

2019, he saw Lang and told her he needed his medication. (Id. at 21:6-23:5). Lang told him that

he would be getting his medication that day and explained that he was given a temporary

prescription when he was seen in receiving and there had not been a follow-up prescription. (Id.).

Lang did not work in Plaintiff’s cell house on June 1, 2, 4, or 5, 2019. (Doc. 106-2, p. 3 at

¶¶ 14-15). She was assigned to his cell house on June 3, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff’s chronic

medications were renewed on June 3, 2019 in conjunction with a jacket review by NP Zimmer.

(Id.; Doc. 108, p. 32). Once prescriptions are renewed, the prescriptions are faxed to the pharmacy

and are filled within two to three days. (Doc. 106-2, p. 3 at ¶ 14). Plaintiff’s medications were

issued to him on June 5, 6, and 7, 2019. (Doc. 108-1, pp. 91-92). There is no medical emergency

documented in the medical records for the month of June 2019. (Doc. 108; Doc. 108-1).

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of

Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)). A genuine

issue of material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence “in the light

reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving (him) the benefit of reasonable,

favorable inferences, and resolving conflicts in the evidence in (his) favor.” Spaine v. Community

Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court may not “assess the credibility of

witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of

conflicting evidence.” Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th

Cir. 2010).

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment

claim of constitutionally-deficient medical care, a plaintiff must establish that he had an

objectively serious medical need and that the defendant had knowledge of facts from which he or

she could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and nevertheless disregarded that risk.

Id. at 476. Serious medical needs include those for which withholding medical care results in

needless pain and suffering, those which a physician has determined require treatment, and those

for which the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d

1364, 1370-1371 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff had serious medical

conditions for purposes of this motion.

“Deliberate indifference is more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing.”

Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Deliberate indifference can be found if a medical provider defendant ignored a request for

treatment, substantially departed from accepted professional standards, persisted in an ineffective

course of treatment, or inexplicably delayed treatment. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th

Cir. 2016). A mere delay in medical care without a showing of substantial harm does not establish

a deliberate indifference claim. Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n

inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must

place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in

medical treatment to succeed.”). Further, failure to administer prescription medicine alone does

not constitute deliberate indifference. Zentmyer v. Kendall County, 220 F.3d 805, 812 (7th

Cir.2000).

Here, Lang was not aware before May 2, 2019 that Plaintiff was without his prescription

medication. When Plaintiff notified her that he had not received his medication since arriving at

Menard, she immediately obtained medication from the institution stock. According to the

Medication Administration Record, Plaintiff consistently received all medications prescribed to

him from May 3, 2019, through May 29, 2019.

When Lang saw Plaintiff again on June 6, 2019, and told her that he was not receiving his

prescription medication, his prescriptions had already been renewed by NP Zimmer on June 3,

2019. At that point, there was nothing further Lang could do for him. According to the Medication

Administration Record, Plaintiff received the renewed medications on June 5, 6, and 7, 2019.

Plaintiff contends he ran out of medication at the end of May because Lang did not give

him a “regular” prescription and instead gave him medication from stock when he saw her on May

2, 2019. (Id.). But as a CMT Lang could not prescribe medication. There is no evidence that she

was personally responsible for the fact that Plaintiff’s prescriptions were not renewed by NP

Zimmer until June 3, 2019.

Based on the evidence in the record, Plaintiff cannot establish that Lang knew he was

without medication and did nothing about it or that she intentionally deprived him of medication.

Additionally, there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered substantial harm from any alleged delay

in medication attributable to Lang. As such, Lang is entitled to summary judgment.3

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Aimee Lang and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 30, 2022

s/ Staci M. Yandle_____

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

3 In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff alleges that Lang failed to treat his complaints of chest

pain on May 2, 2019, and June 6, 2019. (Doc. 111). This claim was not asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Therefore,

it may not be considered in response to the motion for summary judgment.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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