Weston v. Baldwin

FOINR T THHEE U SNOIUTTEHDE SRTNA TDEISST DRIISCTTR IOCFT I CLOLIUNROTI S

TRAVIS WESTON,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 19-cv-01020-SPM

v.

JOHN BALDWIN,

JAMES CLAYCOMB,

LLOYD HANNA,

HOWARD HARNER,

JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,

FRANK LAWRENCE,

ANTHONY WILLS, and

ROB JEFFREYS,1

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment on the issue of failure

to exhaust administrative remedies filed by all Defendants. (Doc. 143). Plaintiff Travis Weston

has not filed a response in opposition. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary

judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Travis Weston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this action for alleged

violations of his First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and state negligence law. (Doc. 1, 49). Weston is

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), for the purposes of Counts 4 and 6, Anthony Wills is substituted

for Frank Lawrence, in his official capacity as the current warden of Menard, and Rob Jeffreys is substituted for John

Baldwin, in his official capacity as the current director of IDOC. (See Doc. 19, p. 8, 10). The Clerk is DIRECTED to

ADD Wills and Jeffreys to the docket as defendants. Because Weston is proceeding on other claims against Lawrence

and Baldwin in their individual capacities, they will remain as parties to this case.

a devout Muslin, and he asserts that while at Menard he has been impeded from adhering to the

tenets of his faith due to the conduct of individual staff members and policies and practices

implemented at the administrative level. He further alleges that there is a widespread practice of

retaliation by staff against Muslim inmates, such as himself, when they complain about the

conditions of their confinement. Weston is proceeding on the following counts:

Count 1: First Amendment claim against Claycomb for substantially

burdening Weston’s practice of religion by prohibiting him from

praying in accordance with his religious faith and denying him

participation in religious services.

Count 2: First Amendment claim against Harner and Lawrence for

substantially burdening Weston’s practice of religion by denying

him participation in Ramadan.

Count 3: First Amendment claim against Hanna, Claycomb, and Lawrence

for denying Weston a diet in compliance with his religious dietary

restrictions.

Count 4: RLUIPA claim against Wills (in his official capacity only as Warden

of Menard) for the denial of participation in religious services,

participation in Ramadan, and a diet in compliance with his religious

dietary restrictions by staff.

Count 5: First Amendment retaliation claim against Claycomb for denying

Weston participation in religious services, denying him a diet in

compliance with his religious dietary restrictions, and placing him

in segregation in response to Weston exercising his religious beliefs.

Count 6: First Amendment claim against Baldwin, Lashbrook, and Lawrence

and RLUIPA claim against Wills (in his official capacity only as

Warden of Menard) and Jeffreys (in his official capacity only as

Director of IDOC) for enacting, adopting, and/or enforcing policies

and practices that substantially burden Weston’s practice of his

religion including the following:

• adorning the chapel with Christian reading material but

placing Islamic reading material under lock and key;

• allotting funds for holiday celebrations for Christian inmates

but denying funds for celebration of two annual feast days

for Muslim inmates;

• denying religious services by conditions created by

overcrowding;

• refusing to allow possession of prayer oils and siwaks;

• creating pressure on Muslim inmates to consume meals that

dmoe nnuo;t conform to tenets of their faith by denying a halal

• locking down facilities during Ramadan;

• providing nutritionally inadequate meals to fasting Muslims

during lockdown;

• retaliating against Muslim inmates who file lawsuits on

matters related to Islam by transferring them to moot their

claims and circumvent RLUIPA; and

• subjecting Muslim inmates to deprivation of Islamic related

activities when they complain about the conditions of their

confinement.

Count 7: State law negligence claim against Claycomb, Harner, Hanna, and

Lawrence for their conduct regarding Weston’s religious rights.

Count 8: State law negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against

Claycomb, Harner, Hanna, and Lawrence.

Count 9: First Amendment claim against Hanna for retaliating against

Weston for filing this lawsuit.

Count 10: First Amendment claim against Baldwin, Lashbrook, Lawrence, and

Hanna for implementing unconstitutional practices and policies of

retaliation.

Count 12: State law negligence claim against Baldwin, Lashbrook, Lawrence,

and Hanna regarding the retaliatory conduct of staff within their

respective departments.

(Doc. 49, p. 12-13).

On May 4, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 143, 144). Along

with the motion, Defendants provided Weston a Rule 56 Notice stating that he had 30 days from

service to respond to the motions and that, pursuant to the Local Rules of this District, failure to

file a response within the deadline may “be considered an admission of the merits of the motion.”

(Doc. 145, citing SDIL-LR 7.1(c)(1)). After Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment,

Weston filed four motions requesting an extension of the response deadline. (Doc. 147, 149, 152,

156). The Court granted the first three motions, and the deadline to respond was set for September

21, 2022. (Doc. 154). The fourth motion was denied, and Weston was given seven additional days,

until October 13, 2022, to file a response in opposition. Weston was warned again that failure to

file a response would be deemed an admission of the merits of the motion and result in dismissal

of this action. (Doc. 158). Weston did not file a response to the motion, despite being advised of

the consequences.

MATERIAL FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS

During the relevant time periods alleged in the Complaint and Supplement to the

Complaint, Defendants were employed in the following capacities:

• Defendant Lloyd Hanna was the Food Services Program Manager for Menard;

• Defendant James Claycomb was a chaplain at Menard;

• Defendant Howard Harner was either a chaplain or chief chaplain;

• Defendant Frank Lawrence was the Assistant Warden of Programs at Menard;

• Defendant Jacqueline Lashbrook was the Warden (Chief Administrative Officer) at

Menard; and

• Defendant John Baldwin was the Director of IDOC.

Weston identifies as a devout Muslim who practices the Islamic religion. As a part of the

practice of his faith, he recognizes and celebrates the month of Ramadan, where Muslims fast for

30 days and do not eat anything from sunup to sundown. As another tenet of his religious practice,

he participates in Jum’ah services, which is a time of group prayer held on Fridays. The teachings

of his Islamic faith also include dietary laws specifying the types of food that a Muslim is allowed

to eat, known as halal, and foods that are forbidden to eat, known as haram. When a halal diet is

not available, Muslims are permitted to alternatively eat a kosher diet, because the diets have

similar laws intended to prevent the cross-contamination of food.

Weston allegations that Defendants’ substantially burdening his practice of Islam concern

his ability to participate in religious services and holidays and to adhere to a halal diet.

I. Religious Diet

IDOC provides different menus to those in custody based on certain criteria: (1) a regular

menu; (2) a vegetarian and/or vegan menu; (3) a kosher menu; (4) a lacto-ovo menu; and (5) a

medical menu. Kosher and halal food items are also available for purchase by inmates at the

Menard commissary.

At Menard, Weston requested and was approved for a kosher diet on April 18, 2017. (Doc.

29, p. 14). Weston testified that there are a lot of similarities between a halal and kosher diet and

that there is no issue with him eating a kosher diet, instead of halal. (Doc. 144-1, p. 56, 69). He

also purchases halal and kosher items from the Menard commissary. Weston testified that inmates

are restricted, however, on the quantity of each item they can purchase. For instance, he could only

buy two bags of cereal each time he visited the commissary. (Id. at p. 84, 88).

Weston believes Defendant Hanna purposefully diminished the nutritional value of the

kosher trays by replacing prepackaged kosher peanut butter with boiled eggs and TVP,2 which

Weston claims were not kosher certified. (Doc. 1, p. 18; Doc. 144-1, p. 86). Because he could not

eat these substituted foods, he asserts that he needed to supplement his breakfast with food items

purchased from the commissary. Because there was a limit on the number of halal items he could

purchase at the commissary, Weston purchased non-halal items to trade for halal items with other

inmates. (Doc. 144-1, p. 84). On June 19, 2019, Weston received notice that he was being

terminated from the kosher diet because he violated the terms and conditions of the kosher diet

contract by purchasing non-kosher items from the commissary. (Doc. 1, p. 19; Doc. 29, p. 17). The

notice informing Weston that his participation in the kosher diet had been involuntarily

discontinued advised him that he could reapply to be placed on the kosher diet in 60 days. (Doc.

29, p. 17).

2 TVP stands for textured vegetable protein. (Doc. 114-1, p. 78).

After filing this lawsuit, on January 10, 2020, Weston was called to the chapel, where

Claycomb talked to him about renewing his kosher diet contract. (Doc. 50, p. 8; Doc. 144-1, p.

90). Weston did not sign the kosher diet contract because the new contract had a list of permitted

food items that could be purchased from the commissary, and the list did not include certain halal

certified products. (Doc. 144-1, p. 90-91).

II. Religious Services and Holidays

Weston claims that on March 11, 2016, he was delivering the Khutbah during a Jum’ah

service. (Doc. 144-1, p. 49). Defendant Claycomb interrupted the service and removed him from

the chapel. He was delivering the Khutbah because there was not an Imam from the “outside

world” to come lead the service. Weston testified that he was reciting portions of Qur’an in Arabic

and believes that Claycomb felt “offended by the remark that I was saying.” (Id.). Following the

incident, Weston was placed in segregation on investigative status. He was also removed from the

Jum’ah services list and could no longer attend.

To participate in Ramadan at Menard, a request must be submitted to the chaplain 45 days

in advance of the holy month. (Doc. 144-1, p. 64). Weston claims he requested to participate in

Ramadan services in 2017 by placing a request slip in the chaplain box. His request, however, was

denied by Defendants Harner and Lloyd because request was made outside of the required

timeframe. (Id. at p. 63-64). Weston alleges Defendant Baldwin also participated in the denial of

his participation in Ramadan because he complained about it in a grievance, and Baldwin affirmed

the decision not to allow Weston to participate. (Id. at p. 63). Weston appealed the grievance, dated

June 7, 2017, to the Administrative Review Board, who rendered a final decision on September

20, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 37). Weston testified that he has no information that Claycomb was involved

in the denial of his participation in Ramadan. (Doc. 144-1, p. 66-67).

III. Retaliation

Weston asserts that he has been retaliated against for filing this lawsuit. In December 2019,

Weston received a job assignment, approving him to work in the inmate kitchen. (Doc. 50, p. 2).

On his first day of employment, after working for only a few hours, he claims he was informed he

was being terminated “because he had a pending lawsuit against Lloyd Hanna.” (Id. at p. 5; Doc.

144-1, p. 36). Weston further claims Defendant Hanna made arrangements to bar him from

receiving another job assignment. (Doc. 50, p. 5). Since Weston was terminated from his

assignment in food services, he has not made any application for another job assignment at

Menard. (Doc. 144-1, p. 103).

In his declaration, Hanna provides that he once it was determined that Weston had a

pending lawsuit against him, he made a request to the placement department to remove Weston

from food services and place Weston in another department, in an effort to avoid further confusion

or issues between himself and Weston. (Doc. 144-2). Defendant Hanna further asserts he did not

fill out an evaluation for Weston. He stated has no role in the process of Weston being evaluated

for or assigned to a new job placement. (Id.).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse

party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson

v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In assessing a

summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

As mentioned, Weston did not file a response to Defendants’ motion. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), “[i]f a party fails…to properly address another party’s assertion of

fact” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Also, under Local

Rule 7.1(c), a party’s “[f]ailure to timely file a response to a motion may, in the Court’s discretion,

be considered an admission of the merits of the motion.” Thus, the Court deems Weston’s failure

to respond as an admission of the merits of the motions filed by Defendants. See Smith v. Lamz,

321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that

a failure to respond constitutes an admission that there are no undisputed material facts); Robinson

v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[e]ven where a non-movant fails to respond to a

motion for summary judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper

given the undisputed facts.”). Upon review of Defendants’ motion, the pleadings, and exhibits in

this case, the Court finds summary judgment to be appropriate.

I. Denial of Participation in Religious Services and Ramadan (Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8)

Defendants argue that there are two events alleged that occurred more than two years prior

to the initial date of filing on September 18, 2019, and are barred by the statute of limitations. In

Count 1, Weston alleges that when Defendant Claycomb had him removed from chapel on March

11, 2016 and taken off of the Jum’ah service list, Claycomb substantially burdened his practice of

religion by prohibiting him from praying in accordance with his religious faith and denying him

participation in religious services. In Count 2, Weston claims that Harner and Lawrence

substantially burdened his practice of religion by denying him participation in Ramadan in May

2017. (Doc. 144-3, p. 4). Defendants contend that these incidences also form the basis of Weston’s

RLUIPA, retaliation, state law negligence, and state law negligent infliction of emotional distress

claims against Claycomb, Harner, and Lawrence. (Counts 4, 5, 7, 8). Therefore, those portions of

Weston’s claims in these other counts are also barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury torts from the state

in which the alleged violation occurred. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Ashafa v.

City of Chi., 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). Illinois’s applicable statute of limitations is two

years. Kalimara v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 879 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1989). Federal law, on the other

hand, determines the date of accrual for calculating the two-year period. Wilson v. Giesen, 956

F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992). “Generally, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason

to know of the injury giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. “Under the continuing violation theory,

however, a plaintiff may obtain relief for a time-barred act when that act is linked with the acts

that fall within the statutory limitations period because the claim accrues on the date of the last

injury.” Smith v. Lind, No. 14-cv-796-slc, 2016 WL 6210688, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 24, 2016)

(citing Kovacs v. United States, 614 F.3d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 2010)).

Finally, there are tolling requirements the Court must consider. The Seventh Circuit has

stated that federal courts must toll the statute of limitations period while an inmate is exhausting

his administrative grievances. Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). The tolling

period starts when the prisoner files his grievance and ends when the administrative review process

is over. Hatch v. Briley, 230 F. App’x 598, 599 (7th Cir. 2007).

The Court agrees that Counts 1 and 2 in their entirety and Counts 5, 7, and 8 in part against

Claycomb, Harner, and Lawrence are barred by the statute of limitations. As for his allegations

against Claycomb, Weston claims that Claycomb: (1) removed him from the Jum’ah service on

March 11, 2016; (2) had him placed in segregation on investigative status, where he remained for

twenty-nine days; and (3) denied his subsequent requests to attend Jum’ah and Ta’aleem services.

(Doc. 144-1, p. 110-111). The accrual of these claims is not entirely clear, as Weston claims he

continued to be denied participation in religious services by Claycomb even after his release from

segregation in April 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 16). Weston testified that after submitting multiple requests

to be placed back on Jum’ah service list, he eventually “got the message” and stopped submitting

requests. (Doc. 144-1, p. 111-112). He further testified that he does not recall the last time he

requested to be placed on the list. Regardless, Weston does not dispute Defendants’ arguments that

his allegations against Claycomb regarding denial to attend religious services is barred by the

statute of limitations, and the Court will treat his silence as agreement of Defendants’ position. See

Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., 477 F. 3d 924, at *926 (7th Cir. 2007) (failure by the

plaintiffs to offer any opposition to the defendant’s statute of limitations argument “constituted a

waiver”). The Court further notes that there is also no evidence that Weston grieved these issues,

tolling the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment as to the

following claims, finding them barred by the statute of limitations: Count 1 in its entirety; Count

5 in part against Claycomb for retaliating against Weston by denying him participation in religious

services and placing him in segregation; and Counts 7 and 8 in part against Claycomb to the extent

Weston asserts that Claycomb’s denial of participation in religious services and retaliation

constituted negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The claims against Harner and Lawrence regarding the allegation that they denied Weston

participation in Ramadan in May 2017 are also time barred, even in light of evidence that Weston

attempted to grieve this issue. There is no copy of the actual grievance in the record, but according

to ARB records, Weston grieved that on May 27, 2017, he was denied participation in Ramadan,

in a grievance dated June 7, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 37; Doc. 144-4, p. 1). The ARB rendered a final

decision on September 20, 2017. (Id.). Accordingly, the statute of limitations was tolled for 105

days while Weston exhausted his administrative remedies. Assuming his claim accrued May 27,

2017,3 Weston should have filed his lawsuit on or about September 9, 2019. He missed this

deadline, however, by nine days and filed his lawsuit too late on September 18, 2019. Summary

judgment is therefore granted as to Count 2 against Harner and Lawrence in its entirety and as to

Counts 7 and 8 in part regarding Weston’s claim that Harner and Lawrence’s conduct regarding

denial of participation in Ramadan was negligent and negligently inflicted emotional distress.

The Court finds that Count 4, Weston’s RLUIPA claim is not barred by the statute of

limitations. Defendants do not provide any law regarding the statute of limitations for RLUIPA

claims, and the Court agrees with the rulings of other district courts in this Circuit that the statute

of limitations for RLUIPA claims is four years, not two. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. See Henderson v. Jess,

No. 18-cv-680-jdp, 2021 WL 1080269, at *4 (W.D. Wisc. Mar. 19, 2021) (apply 28 U.S.C. §1658

to RLUIPA claims and concluding the statute of limitations is four years); Ghashiya v. Wisc. Dep’t

of Corr., 2007 WL 2822005, at *19 n. 25 (E.D. Wisc. Sept. 27, 2007). See also Al–Amin v. Shear,

325 F. App’x 190, 193 (4th Cir. 2009); Congregation Adas Yereim v. City of New York, 673 F.

Supp. 2d 94, 107 (E.D. N.Y. 2009) (“[i]t is undisputed that the four-year catch-all federal statute

of limitations, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), governs claims brought under RLUIPA”). Thus,

Weston’s RLUIPA claim was timely filed.

That being said, the Court will still grant summary judgment as to Count 4, as there appears

3 It is not clear the exact dates of when Weston submitted his request to participate in Ramadan and when his request

was denied. In the Complaint, Weston states he complained to Lawrence about the denial issued by Harner on May 5,

2017. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Weston then alleges he received a memorandum from Lawrence denying his request for

Ramadan participation on May 9, 2017. (Id. at p. 18). The Cumulative Counseling Summary, attached as an exhibit

to the motion for summary judgment, records that on May 11, 2017, Harner documented that the request for

participation was denied on April 25, 2017. (Doc. 144-3, p. 4). Weston testified that Harner received his request 30

days before Ramadan. (Doc. 144-1, p. 65). This would mean Harner received the request around April 26, 2017, as

Ramadan began on May 26 in 2017. The ARB records ruling on Grievance #113-6-17 regarding “participation in

Ramadan denied 5/27/17.” (Doc. 144-4, p. 1). In light of these conflicting dates, the Court will view the evidence in

the light reasonably most favorable to Weston and use May 27, 2017, as the accrual date.

to be no relief for the Court to provide. As stated in the Merit Review Order, “RLUIPA does not

authorize a suit for money damages against defendants in their individual capacities,” (Doc. 19, p.

8) (citations omitted). Under the statue, a plaintiff may only obtain injunctive and declaratory

relief. Grayson v. Schuler, 555 F. 3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). But a “court’s power to grant

injunctive relief only survives if such relief is actually needed.” Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868,

882 (7th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff is entitled to prospective injunctive relief when “there exists some

cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility.” Id. (quoting

United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). A theoretical possibility “supported

only by speculation and not evidence” will not suffice. Id. See also Higgason v. Farley, 83 F. 3d.

807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (applying the capable-

of-repetition doctrine without discrimination between claims for declaratory relief and claims for

injunctive relief).

During his deposition, Weston testified that it was Claycomb who had him removed from

the Jum’ah service in 2016 and denied his subsequent requests to be placed on the list. (Doc. 144-

1, p. 112). Weston further testified that Claycomb is “not over there anymore now.” (Id.). When

Weston was asked if he requested to participate in Jum’ah services after Claycomb “left,” he

answered, “no.” (Id.). It is clear that Weston’s claim regarding denial of religious service

participation is specific to conduct on the part of Claycomb. Based on his testimony that Claycomb

is no longer employed in a position at Menard in which he is authorized to grant or deny

participation in religious services and given the fact that Weston has not requested to participate

in religious services since 2019 at the latest, Weston’s allegations do not suggest he needs

prospective injunctive relief. (Doc. 144-1, p. 112-113). As such, his RLUIPA claim regarding

denial to attend religious services is moot. While there is a theoretically possibility that if Weston

resubmits a request to participate in Jum’ah service the request will be denied by a different

chaplain, “that possibility is supported only by speculation and not evidence.” Nelson, 570 F. 3d

at 882.

Weston’s allegations regarding denial to participate in Ramadan in 2017 also do not

suggest the need for prospective relief. Weston had an issue making the sign-up deadline in 2017,

allegedly because Harner did not frequently retrieve Ramadan requests from the chaplain request

box. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Although, Weston testified that he did not have any evidence that the requests

for Ramadan were not being pick-up in a timely manner. (Doc. 144-1, p. 63). Despite the denial

of his request in 2017, “he does not also allege that the signup deadline will be a problem for him

in the future.” See McIntosh v. Goff, 2021 WL 6134574, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. Dec. 29, 2021) (finding

that the plaintiff failed to state a RLUIPA claim when the defendants did not accommodate his

participation in Ramadan after he missed the signup deadline). Nor does Weston claim that other

than that single occurrence, he has properly requested and been denied the ability to participate in

Ramadan.

The Court further notes that the type of declaratory and injunctive relief sought for his

RLUIPA claim is unclear. Weston testified that he is seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief,

and adequate compensation for his injuries. (Doc. 144-1, p. 117). When asked what type of

injunctive relief he was wanting, Weston referred Defense Counsel to the Complaint and did not

articulate any specific type of relief. (Id. at p. 118). In the Complaint and Supplemental Complaint,

however, Weston also does not request a specific form of injunctive relief4 or ask for declaratory

judgment regarding the alleged denial of participation in religious services and holidays. (Doc. 1,

p. 22, 25). Accordingly, because Weston does not “specify what type of injunctive relief he is

seeking, and his allegations show that he does not need injunctive relief to prevent a similar injury

4 Under Count 1 against Claycomb for denial of participation in Jum’ah services, Weston asks for the Court to award

him “actual, consequential, compensatory, punitive, and any just and equitable relief this court may deem appropriate.”

(Doc. 1, p. 22).

from occurring in the future,” summary judgment is granted as to Count 4 regarding Weston’s

claim he was denied participation in Ramadan and religious services. Kyle v. Goff, No. 20-cv-460-

jdp, 2020 WL 4219838, at *1 (W.D. Wisc. July 23, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff’s RLUIPA

claim was moot where the plaintiff was denied participation in Ramadan on one occasion because

he had missed the signup deadline).

II. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause/RLUIPA

Weston’s ability to practice his religion is protected by the Constitution and by federal

statute. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment “prohibits the state from imposing a

substantial burden on a central religious belief or practice,” unless the burden is “reasonably related

to legitimate penological interests.” Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). “The

Supreme Court has explained that a substantial burden is one that ‘put[s] substantial pressure on

an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Neely-Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, 912

F. 3d 989, 1003 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718) (1981)).

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-1(a), “offers broader protections than the First Amendment.” Williams v. Benson, No. 21-

cv-667-JPS, 2022 WL 671516, at *3 (citing Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F. 3d 450, 451 (7th Cir.

2012)). See also Neely-Bey Tarik-El, 912 F. 3d at 1004. The statute prohibits prison officials from

“impos[ing] a substantial burden on the religious exercise” of an inmate “unless the government

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person…is the least restrictive means of

furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See also Grayson, 666

F.3d at 451.

a. Dietary Practices (Counts 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)

Defendants argue that Weston’s ability to practice his religion has not been substantially

burdened, as it concerns his diet. He was approved for a kosher diet, which the Islamic faith allows

its followers to eat in the absence of a halal diet, and Weston was permitted to purchase kosher

and halal items at the Menard Commissary. Defendants argue that his kosher diet was only

terminated because Weston violated the terms of the contract, which must be followed in order to

receive a religious diet, by purchasing non-kosher food items. There is no evidence to show that

Defendants forced him to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition. Rather,

Defendants contend it has been Weston’s own actions and violations of IDOC policy that caused

him to be removed from the kosher diet.

The Court agrees. “In the context of a religion’s dietary requirements, a ‘prisoner’s

religious dietary practice is substantially burdened when the prison forces him to choose between

his religious practice and adequate nutrition.’” Taylor v. Cook Cty., No. 11 C 7427, 2013 WL

2285806, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2013) (quoting Nelson 570 F.3d at 879). Correctional officials

are allowed to “appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a

requested accommodation, is authentic.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005).

Additionally, courts have consistently held that:

[P]rison officials can evaluate evidence of food purchases that are inconsistent with

a professed religious belief and may use that information to assist in evaluating the

sincerity of an inmate’s religious beliefs before providing an inmate with a religious

diet.

Sharp v. Liebel, No. 20-cv-327-JD-MGG, 2021 WL 4147036, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2021)

(collecting cases).

It is not disputed that Weston’s religious diet was canceled on June 17, 2019, because he

purchased non-kosher food from the commissary. (Doc. 144-1, p. 87-88; Doc. 29, p. 17). Based

on his purchases, it was determined that Weston lacked sincerity regarding his religious beliefs.

(Doc. 29, p. 17). In the Notice to Discontinue Religious Diet, Weston was informed he could

reapply to receive a kosher diet in 60 days. (Id.). There is no evidence in the record that Weston

has reapplied to receive the kosher diet. When he was given the opportunity to resign a contract to

receive a kosher diet, Weston refused because certain halal items he would like to purchase at the

commissary are not on the approved list. (See Doc. 68, p. 16-21; Doc. 73, p. 9; Doc. 144-1, p. 91).

Weston does not contend that consuming the items that are not included on the approved purchase

list are necessary somehow in practicing his religious faith.

Furthermore, Weston’s justification for the non-kosher purchases, that he was forced to

buy and then trade non-kosher items for kosher items because the kosher breakfast tray contained

non-kosher items and was nutritionally inadequate, is also not supported by any evidence in the

record. There is no evidence that the TVP and boiled eggs on the breakfast tray were improperly

prepared, as alleged. (Doc. 144-1, p. 69). In his declaration, Defendant Hanna, the Food Services

Program Manager at Menard, states that a kosher religious diet is a prepackaged meal that is sealed

and approved by the state. His supervisor, the Food Service Administrator, has advised him that

boiled eggs and reconstituted TVP are approved kosher diet items. (Doc. 144-2, p. 2). No kosher

diet items are cooked in the kitchen at Menard, but when an item requires heating, such as the TVP

or a boiled egg, the item is heated while in the sealed packaging in specific pots and using utensils

marked KOSHER and washed separately. According to Hanna, these kitchen items do not have

any contact with non-kosher food items.

Weston has not offered any evidence to rebut Hanna’s declaration. Weston testified that he

knew that the TVP and boiled eggs were cooked in the same pots and pans as non-kosher items

because he saw “how the whole operation of the kitchen worked,” during the morning he was

assigned to work in the kitchen. (Doc. 144-1, p. 77). He does not describe with any kind of detail,

however, what he specifically witnessed regarding food preparation for the kosher trays. Weston

testified that he has documents discussing how the boiled eggs should be prepared to comply with

halal requirements but such documents are not in the record. (Id.). Notably, Wesont was not

assigned to work in the kitchen until after he filed this lawsuit. He first grieved that he believed

the TVP and boiled eggs were not kosher certified in August 2018, his religious diet was canceled

in June 2019, and he was not assigned to work in the kitchen until several months later in December

2019. (See Doc. 29, p. 3, 17).

Weston also testified that he learned the TVP and boiled eggs were not being prepared

properly from other inmates who worked in the kitchen. (Doc. 144-1, p. 70). But the only affidavit

in the record is from an inmate, Jonathan Tolliver, who began working in the kitchen on September

19, 2019, also months after Weston’s religious diet was canceled. (Doc. 68, p. 3-7). In his affidavit,

Tolliver discusses the uncleanly conditions of the kitchen and the lack of supervision of the inmate

kitchen staff by the food supervisors. Tolliver does not state that he witnessed kosher items being

prepared in non-kosher designated pots and pans. Thus, there is no evidence that the breakfast tray

contained non-kosher items, and no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Weston was forced

by Defendants to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition. For these reasons,

summary judgment is granted as to Count 3 in its entirety against Hanna, Claycomb, and Lawrence

and as to Counts 4, 5, 7, and 8 in part.

b. Policies and Practices (Count 6)

In his Complaint, Weston alleges that Baldwin, Lashbrook, and Lawrence ratified,

implemented, and pursued policies and practices that substantially burdened his ability to practice

his religion, such practices included the following:

• adorning the chapel with Christian reading material but

placing Islamic reading material under lock and key;

• allotting funds for holiday celebrations for Christian inmates

but denying funds for celebration of two annual feast days

for Muslim inmates;

• denying religious services by conditions created by

overcrowding;

• refusing to allow possession of prayer oils and siwaks;

• creating pressure on Muslim inmates to consume meals that

do not conform to tenets of their faith by denying a halal

menu;

• locking down facilities during Ramadan;

• pdruorvinidgi lnogc knduotrwitnio; nally inadequate meals to fasting Muslims

• retaliating against Muslim inmates who file lawsuits on

matters related to Islam by transferring them to moot their

claims and circumvent RLUIPA; and

• subjecting Muslim inmates to deprivation of Islamic related

activities when they complain about the conditions of their

confinement.

(Doc. 1, p. 27). Defendants argue that Weston has failed to provide any evidence to support this

claim. He has not demonstrated that any of the alleged conduct which he claims violated his

constitutional rights occurred at the direction of Baldwin, Lashbrook, or Lawrence or that they

were personally involved in the violation of his constitutional rights. Neither has he presented

evidence directly connecting Defendants to the alleged policies.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Count 6. In his deposition, Weston

stated he was suing Director Baldwin and Warden Lashbrook because they were “in charge.” (Doc.

144-1, p. 46-47). When asked about why Weston was suing Assistant Warden Lawrence, he stated

because of Lawrence’s direct involvement in “one of the counts” and his “supervisory authority as

well.” (Id. at p. 47). Other than these statements, there is no other evidence connecting Defendants

to any of the policies mentioned in the Complaint. An individual cannot be held liable under

Section 1983 merely based on their supervisory role under a theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability. Lennon v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 865 F.3d 503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2017)

(“[T]here is no vicarious liability in a suit under section 1983.”); T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583,

588 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no theory of respondeat superior for constitutional torts.”) (citation

omitted). As such, summary judgment is granted as the First Amendment claim in Count 6.

As to the RLUIPA claim, Weston has not met his burden of demonstrating how any of the

practices alleged substantially burdened his sincere religious exercise. (Doc. 144-1, p. 93-100).

Neither has he shown that he is being subjected to ongoing or impending harm warranting

injunctive or declaratory relief. See Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F. 3d 577, 583 (7th Cir.

2018) (a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief “has standing to sue for an alleged future injury only if

the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will

occur.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, summary judgment is granted as to the

RLUIPA claim in Count 6.

III. Retaliation

“An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the

Constitution.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). An inmate has a First

Amendment right to file grievances and lawsuits. Id.; Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 798 (7th

Cir. 2010). In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he engaged

in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such

activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to

impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted). Thus, the plaintiff must set forth a chronology of events and show that his litigation

activities were a motivating factor for an adverse action. DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 618. In this context,

an adverse action is one that would chill or deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising a

First Amendment right. Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982). Once the plaintiff meets

his burden, the burden shifts to Defendants to show that the harm would have occurred anyway,

even without the retaliatory motive. Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2011).

a. Hanna (Count 9)

In Count 9, Weston claims that Hannah retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit by

terminating him from his job in food services and then prevented him from receiving further

employment. (Doc. 50, p. 5). Defendants do not dispute that filing this lawsuit is protected First

Amendment activity or that Weston suffered a deprivation when he was removed from

employment in the food services department. Citing to Holleman v. Zatecky, Defendants contend

that Weston has not presented any evidence creating an issue of fact regarding whether Hanna’s

conduct was motivated by the protected conduct. 951, F. 3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020). In Holleman,

the plaintiff was transferred to a new correctional facility after speaking to the media, and filing

multiple grievances, complaints, and letters about the conditions of the previous correctional

facility in which he was housed. Id. The superintendent of the facility asked for the plaintiff to be

transfers as solution to plaintiff’s issues. In finding that the superintendent did not act with a

retaliatory motive, the Seventh Circuit distinguished between:

[A] transfer motivated by the fact that the inmate sued and one motivated by the

nature of the dispute underlying the lawsuit, even though both would be directly

caused by the prisoner’s protective activity. In other words, a transfer initiated to

punish a prisoner for engaging in protected activity would satisfy the causation

element of retaliation, but a transfer initiated as a rational, justifiable response to

the substance of the prisoner’s complaint would not.

Id. at 878-879 (citations omitted). Based on this reasoning, Defendants argue that Hanna did not

ask for Weston to be reassigned due to the fact he filed a lawsuit or to punish him for doing so but

to avoid any further conflict or confusion with Weston. They further point out that there is no

evidence that Hanna prevented Weston from obtaining any other job at Menard.

As Weston has not presented any evidence opposing Hanna’s non-retaliatory justification

that he requested for Weston to be removed from food services and reassigned to a different

department as a response to this lawsuit in order to avoid further conflict or confusion, the Court

grants summary judgment as to Count 9.

b. Widespread Retaliatory Practices and Policies against Baldwin, Lashbrook,

Lawrence, and Hanna (Counts 10 and 12)

Likewise, there is no evidence on the record that Baldwin, Lashbrook, Lawrence, or Hanna

had any part in retaliating against Weston or implementing or condoning practices of retaliation

against Muslim inmates who file lawsuits and grievances. (See Doc. 50, p. 11-12). Weston has not

even presented any evidence to raise a question of fact regarding his allegation that he was

retaliated against in the first place. Thus, summary judgment is granted as to Counts 10 and 12.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons provided, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendants Baldwin, Claycomb, Hanna, Harner, Lashbrook, Lawrence, Wills, and Jeffreys. (Doc.

143).

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Weston and to close this case.

The Clerk is further DIRECTED to modify the docket in accordance with footnote 1.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 5, 2022

s/Stephen McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge