Mullen v. Easton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NOAH MULLEN, #Y49919, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-01220-JPG

)

TREVOR EASTON, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Noah Mullen, a former inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC),

filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. See Mullen v. Easton, No. 1:22-cv-01161 (C.D. Ill., filed May 5, 2022).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff brought claims against Cumberland County Sheriff’s Deputy Trevor

Easton for his allegedly unlawful stop, search, arrest, and detention of the plaintiff in Cumberland

County, Illinois. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-13). Plaintiff seeks money damages from this defendant for

violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Illinois state law. (Id.

at 13).

The case was transferred to this federal judicial district on June 9, 2022, see Doc. 7, and is

now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section

1915A requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints and filter out non-meritorious claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed. Rodriguez

v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 5-13): Plaintiff

was arrested on December 13, 2021. (Id. at 6). On that date, Cumberland County Sheriff’s Deputy

Trevor Easton drove his vehicle up to a car that the plaintiff was riding in as a passenger. As he

approached, the officer did not activate his lights or conduct a traffic stop. (Id.). Even so, Plaintiff

jumped out of the vehicle and ran. The officer apprehended him, handcuffed him, and searched

him. (Id. at 7-9). Plaintiff was transported to Cumberland County Detention Center and charged

with possession of stolen property and, more specifically, a catalytic converter (a Class 4 felony),

based on Deputy Easton’s false police report. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff’s bond was set at $500, and a

probable cause hearing was scheduled for December 20, 2021. (Id. at 7-8). All charges against

Plaintiff for stolen property were dismissed for lack of probable cause on December 21, 2021, after

evidence established that he did not possess stolen property. (Id.). Plaintiff maintains that Deputy

Easton intentionally and maliciously fabricated the arrest report that resulted in his charges and

detention. (Id. at 9). These events caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. (Id. at 9-11).

Discussion

Based on the allegations, the Court finds it convenient to organize the pro se Complaint

into the following enumerated counts:

Count 1: Fourth Amendment claim against Deputy Easton for the unlawful stop,

search, and arrest of Plaintiff in Cumberland County, Illinois, on or around

December 13, 2021.

Count 2: Fourth Amendment claim against Deputy Easton for the unlawful detention

of Plaintiff at Cumberland County Detention Center for eight days from

December 13-21, 2021.

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Deputy Easton for denying Plaintiff

equal protection of the law.

Count 4: Illinois state law claim against Deputy Easton for malicious prosecution of

Plaintiff.

Count 5: Illinois state law claim against Deputy Easton for his intentional infliction

of emotional distress on Plaintiff.

Any claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein is considered

dismissed without prejudice under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Count 1

The claims for an unlawful stop, search, and arrest are governed by the Fourth Amendment,

which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend IV. Plaintiff

challenges the deputy’s decision to stop him, search him for contraband, and arrest him on

December 13, 2021. The only claim that survives screening is for his arrest.

A. Stop and Frisk/Search

This initial interaction between this officer and private citizen on a public street is governed

by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court held that an officer who has a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may conduct a brief, investigatory

stop. This standard demands a minimal level of objective justification for the stop. The reasonable

suspicion determination must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human

behavior. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.

411, 418 (1981)).

In Wardlow, the Supreme Court held that an officer is justified in suspecting criminal

activity when a person flees without provocation. Id. The officer is also justified in investigating

further. Id. The Court explained that this holding is consistent with its decision in Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983), holding that an individual who is approached by an officer has

the right to ignore the police and go on with his business. Id. at 125. Unprovoked flight, after all,

is the opposite of going about one’s business. Id. Therefore, “[a]llowing officers confronted with

such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right

to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.” Id.

Wardlow and Terry recognize that officers can detain individuals to resolve such ambiguities, and

both decisions accept the risk that innocent individuals may be stopped, arrested, and even detained

on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime. Id. at 125.

This is exactly what happened to the plaintiff. An officer approached an already-stopped

vehicle without initiating a traffic stop or activating his lights. At the time, the plaintiff was simply

a passenger in the vehicle, and he remained free to go about his business. There was no stop and

no seizure that implicated the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434

(1991); see also United States v. Douglass, 467 F.3d 621, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 945 F.2d 192, 195

(7th Cir. 1991). In the moments that followed, however, Plaintiff admittedly jumped out of the

vehicle and fled without provocation. This unprovoked fleeing, alone, could raise a reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The officer justifiably apprehended the plaintiff and

searched him for contraband.

B. The Arrest

An unlawful arrest claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he was arrested without

probable cause. Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 538 (7th Cir. 2009). An officer has

probable cause, if, at the time of the arrest, the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s

knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing

. . . that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Gonzalez,

578 F.3d at 537 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). When an arresting

officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing “even a minor

crime in his presence, . . . [t]he arrest is constitutionally reasonable.” See Virginia v. Moore, 553

U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (citing cases). Probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim of wrongful

or false arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2017);

Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2013). However, the Court may decide

whether probable cause existed at the time of arrest, only if the underlying facts that support

probable cause are undisputed. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 537 (citing Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis,

998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested without probable cause

and based on a fabricated report of Deputy Easton. At this early stage, Count 1 shall proceed

against the defendant as a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful arrest. All other aspects of this

claim, arising from the stop and search, are dismissed without prejudice.

Count 2

Plaintiff claims he was unlawfully detained from December 13-21, 2021, while he was held

in pretrial detention for eight days without probable cause. Following a finding of no probable

cause, he was released from custody on December 21, 2021. This claim is governed by the Fourth

Amendment. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 U.S. 667 (2017) (Fourth Amendment continues to

govern claims of unlawful pretrial detention, in some cases, even after legal process has begun

through probable cause determination or some other comparable procedure); ); Lewis v. City of

Chicago, 918 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2019) (In the post-Manuel-I and -II world, the “Fourth

Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right in a § 1983 claim for unlawful

pretrial detention, whether before or after initiation of formal legal process.”). But see Llovet v.

City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2014) (claims of unlawful pretrial detention are

governed by Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause once legal process has begun).

While there is no constitutional right to avoid criminal prosecution without probable cause,

there is a right not to be held in custody without probable cause. See Manuel, 903 U.S. at 670

(citing Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2013)). The “wrong of detention without

probable cause continues for the duration of the detention.” Manuel, 903 U.S. at 670. Here,

Plaintiff alleges that he was held in pretrial detention wrongfully for eight days as a result of

Deputy Easton’s malicious and erroneous arrest report. Accordingly, Count 2 shall receive further

review against this defendant.

Count 3

A plaintiff bringing a claim for a violation of his right to equal protection under the law

must show that he “is a member of a protected class,” he “is otherwise similarly situated to

members of the unprotected class,” and he “was treated differently from members of the

unprotected class.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McNabola v.

Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186,

189 (7th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff sets forth no allegations that establish any elements of a traditional

equal protection claim.

A class-of-one equal protection claim requires the plaintiff to establish that he was

“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis

for the difference in treatment.” Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). This

type of discrimination typically occurs when “a public official with no conceivable basis for his

action, other than spite or some other improper motive . . . comes down hard on a hapless private

citizen.” Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted)

(citing Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013)). A plaintiff may plead

himself out of a class-of-one equal protection claim if the Complaint sets forth a rational basis for

the treatment a plaintiff received. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff does not allege or suggest that he was intentionally treated differently than anyone else

who was similarly situated when he was arrested, searched, and detained. He has fallen short of

articulating a class-of-one equal protection claim. Count 3 shall be dismissed without prejudice

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Count 4

Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution arises from the same facts as his Fourth

Amendment claims, but the malicious prosecution claim is governed by Illinois state law. This

Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

A plaintiff bringing a claim for malicious prosecution must set forth allegations

demonstrating that: (1) the defendant commenced or continued an original criminal or civil

proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant instituted the

proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously in initiating or continuing

the proceeding; and (5) the plaintiff was injured. Washington v Summerville, 127 F.3d 52, 557

(7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). All of these elements must be present before a plaintiff can

pursue a malicious prosecution claim. Id. The allegations articulate a malicious prosecution claim

against Deputy Easton, who allegedly prepared a malicious and false police report that resulted in

Plaintiff’s charge with possession of stolen property, his detention for eight days, and the eventual

release following a finding of no probable cause. Count 4 shall receive further review against this

defendant.

Count 5

The Illinois state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) arises

from the same facts that give rise to Counts 1, 2, and 4 against Deputy Easton. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a). The allegations in the Complaint also support an IIED claim against this officer at

screening. See McGreal v. Village Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308 (7th Cir. 2017) (articulating

elements of claim). This claim will proceed against Deputy Easton.

Pending Motion

Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d

647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (articulating factors court considers when evaluating motions for counsel).

An indigent plaintiff seeking representation by court-recruited counsel must demonstrate:

(a) reasonable efforts to locate counsel on his own; and (b) an inability to litigate the matter without

representation. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any efforts to find counsel. (See Doc. 4, p. 1, Ex. 1)

(disclosing no efforts to find counsel on his own). Moreover, the only barrier to self-representation

is his lack of education and training in the law, but this puts him in no different position than most

pro se litigants. Further, the Complaint is organized, coherent, and sufficient to survives Section

1915A screening. It articulates four straightforward claims against one defendant. And, at this

early stage, there is little for Plaintiff to do, particularly while the defendant is served with this suit

and prepares an answer. Givens these considerations, the motion is DENIED without prejudice

to Plaintiff filing a new motion when and if it became necessary to do so as the case proceeds.

Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1), including COUNTS 1 (unlawful arrest

claim only), 2, 4, and 5 against TREVOR EASTON survives review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 1 (only the unlawful stop and search claims) and 3

are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.

IT IS ORDERED that as to COUNTS 1 (unlawful arrest claim), 2, 4, and 5, the Clerk

of Court shall prepare for Defendant TREVOR EASTON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and

Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The

Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum

and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign

and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date

the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that

Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay for formal service, to the extent authorized

by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as

directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or

disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs

under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his

application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 11/17/2022

s/J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

United States District Judge

Notice

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit

and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendant will

enter her appearance and file an Answer to your complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendant’s Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. The Court will then enter a Scheduling Order containing important information

on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for

the defendant before filing any motions, in order to give the defendant notice and an opportunity

to respond to those motions. Motions filed before the defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance

will generally be denied as premature. The plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the court at

this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.