Wakefield v. District Attorney's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ERIC L. WAKEFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ) Case No. 22-cv-1769-DWD

PHILLIP BUTLER, )

ABBY DINN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Eric L. Wakefield, a detainee at the Franklin County Jail, brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional

rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that his rights are being violated during an ongoing

criminal matter in state court because evidence is being withheld, witnesses are being

manipulated, and he is not receiving due process. Plaintiff seeks sanctions against the

District Attorney’s Office for prosecutorial misconduct, and various other harms.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for a subpoena (Doc. 9), a motion for counsel (Doc. 10),

and a motion for sanctions or injunctive relief (Doc. 11).

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff’s one-page factual narrative is difficult to follow, though it is legible.

Plaintiff seems to allege that as part of an ongoing prosecution in state court, evidence

has been tampered with, witnesses have been obstructed or coerced, the grand jury

received an incomplete presentation of evidence, and he has not received adequate

representation. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that this all amounts to prosecutorial

misconduct. He argues that he needs evidence to be subpoenaed so that it can be

reviewed in full. The issues listed all apparently relate to a dispute with his wife and her

alleged boyfriend, whom Plaintiff claims assaulted him on September 26, 2019. As relief

Plaintiff seeks a reprimand against the District Attorney’s Office.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from multiple defects, and for reasons explained

below, he has failed to state a valid claim.

First, as to Defendants Butler and Dinn, Plaintiff has not identified any personal

actions taken by these individuals that violated his rights. To state a valid § 1983 claim,

a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation

of a constitutional right. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s

allegations are insufficient to establish a § 1983 claim against Butler and Dinn.

Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed as to Butler and Dinn for failure to state a

claim.

Even if the Court assumed that Plaintiff had sufficiently identified actions by these

defendants in the withholding of evidence or otherwise, Plaintiff would not be able to

secure any civil relief against these parties if his criminal prosecution is ongoing, or if his

conviction has been finalized and has not been overturned. Federal courts generally

abstain from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings that offer an adequate

opportunity for review of constitutional claims. See e.g. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971). A plaintiff may seek federal court intervention in very rare circumstances if he

can demonstrate that “the pending state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or

is conducted in bad faith, or when the federal plaintiff demonstrates an extraordinarily

pressing need for immediate equitable relief to avoid an irreparable injury.” Olsson v.

O’Malley, 352 Fed. App’x 92, 94 (7th Cir. 2009). Even allegations that state actors have

conspired to violate an individual’s rights in a prosecution may not be enough to establish

a need for federal court intervention if it is not clear that state procedures offer no

opportunity for review of the claims raised. Id. Here, the Court does not find that

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to warrant intervention in an ongoing state court

prosecution, because he does not describe individual actions by Butler or Dinn, nor does

he explain any effort to raise his claims at the state court level. A plaintiff cannot simply

abandon efforts in a state court prosecution, and turn to federal court because he is

frustrated, or he is concerned that the state court proceeding is unfair. A plaintiff must

first fully attempt to raise his concerns in state court. The Court could refrain from

hearing Plaintiff’s claims based on Younger abstention.1

To the extent that Plaintiff’s state court proceedings have possibly concluded since

the time that he filed this lawsuit, any claims like those presented in this lawsuit would

be barred if and until he shows that an underlying conviction has been overturned in

state court. See, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Based on Younger and Heck, the

Court finds that it would also be appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims without

prejudice about his ongoing prosecution because those claims must be fully considered

in state court before Plaintiff can raise them in federal court.

Additionally, even if Plaintiff had made proper challenges in state court or

Plaintiff’s underlying conviction had been vacated, he likely could not seek relief against

Butler and Dinn because prosecutors possess prosecutorial immunity for most tasks

associated with their role as an advocate for the state. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409

(1976). Such immunity attaches to activities such as “failure to comply with disclosure

obligations and the suppression of evidence,” Heidelberg v. Manias, 503 F.Supp.3d 758,

779-80 (C.D. Ill. 2020), and can apply even if a prosecutor acts with malice or in an

unreasonable fashion, Smith v. Power, 346 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). In light of these

issues, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Butler and Dinn, and it is unlikely that

he could do so.

1 The Court is mindful that there is a preference for staying claims related to an ongoing criminal prosecution, but

dismissal may be warranted if the claims would also be barred by Heck. See Cichocki v. Foxx, 2022 WL 2915640

(N.D. Ill. 2022) (granting motions to dismiss claims that were barred by Younger because the claims regarding

fabricated or withheld evidence, wrongful detention, conspiracy, etc., would also be barred by Heck). Here, Plaintiff’s

claims also appear barred by Heck.

Finally, Plaintiff has also named the District Attorney’s Office as an entity. As an

entity of the local government, the District Attorney’s Office is not subject to suit under §

1983 unless a plaintiff can prove that an action pursuant to an official municipal policy

caused his or her injury. See e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). Plaintiff

has not alleged that there was any unconstitutional policy that caused the harm he

alleges, so he has not stated an adequate claim against the District Attorney’s Office as a

whole. The claim against the District Attorney’s Office will be dismissed for failure to

state a claim.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to pursue a common law action, such as one for

defamation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary if all federal law

claims are dismissed).

In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed in its entirety because he has failed

to present factual or legal allegations sufficient to state a claim against any named

defendant. Typically, the Court would afford the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his

complaint, but here the Court does not believe an opportunity to amend is necessary

because in addition to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against the three named

defendants, there are many other potential bars to his claims under Younger and Heck.

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. See Always Towing

& Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (courts may deny leave

to amend if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir.

2011) (leave to amend shall be granted where justice so requires, but leave to amend need

not be given if an amendment to the complaint would be futile).

In closing, the Court notes that this lawsuit is one of seven that Plaintiff has filed

in this District in the last year. Wakefield v. Franklin County Jail, et al., 21-cv-867-JPG;

Wakefield v. Christopher Police Dept., et al., 22-cv-1764-JPG; Wakefield v. Franklin County

Sheriff Dept., et al., 22-cv-1766-JPG; Wakefield v. SIU Credit Union, et al., 22-cv-1767-NJR;

Wakefield v. Franklin County Jail, et al., 22-cv-1768-JPG; Wakefield v. Franklin County Courts,

et al., 22-cv-1772-JPG. Plaintiff should be aware that every time he files a lawsuit he incurs

a $350 fine, which he must pay even if his case is dismissed (like this case). Plaintiff might

also incur three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). He should also be aware that if he files

lawsuits that are considered frivolous—i.e., they present overlapping claims, or claims

that have no legal basis—he could be subject to filing restrictions, monetary sanctions, or

a filing ban. See e.g., Matter of Davis, 878 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1989) (federal courts have

inherent authority to protection themselves from conduct which impairs their ability to

carry out justice, this authority may include a filing restrict for frivolous filings); see also,

Phillips v. Redkey Town Board, 2019 WL 5390556 *1 (N.D. Ind. 2019) (collecting cases about

filing restrictions, sanctions, and bans). For all of these reasons, Plaintiff should be very

cautious when deciding if it is appropriate to file a federal lawsuit, and he should ensure

that he has first attempted to utilize other avenues to resolve his disputes.

Pending Motions

In addition to his Complaint, Plaintiff has filed three motions. His motion to

subpoena (Doc. 9), which seeks various documents, is DENIED as MOOT in light of the

dismissal of this case. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and Motion for Injunction (Doc. 12)

will also be DENIED as MOOT. The Court notes that the motion is a mixed bag of

allegations concerning medical care, as well as various aspects of criminal proceedings in

state court. Finally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 11), will also be DENIED. Civil

litigants do not a have a right to counsel, and the Court has found that this lawsuit lacks

merit as pled, so it does not find it appropriate to appoint counsel. The Court does not

believe that with the assistance of counsel a meritorious claim could be crafted based on

the underlying factual allegations.

Disposition

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Subpoena (Doc. 9) and Motion

for Sanctions or Injunction (Doc. 12) are DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff’s Motion for

Counsel (Doc. 11) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action

was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due

and payable regardless of the dismissal of this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v.

Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d

724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff

may incur a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close this

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2022

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge