Craft v. Robert Burns

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT CRAFT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT BURNS (JACKSON CNTY. )

SHERIFF), )

DALE FOSTER (UNION CNTY. ) Case No. 22-cv-119-DWD

SHERIFF), )

LEE KERSTEN, )

KYLE SPRADLING, )

CENTERSTONE, )

KATIE MILEY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Dale

Foster (Doc. 29), Katie Miley (Doc. 31), and Centerstone (Doc. 34). The underlying lawsuit

contains claims about Plaintiff Robert Craft’s confinement at the Jackson County Jail,

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§12001, et seq.. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has responded to all three motions to dismiss, so the

motions are now ripe for review. For reasons explained, Defendant Foster’s motion will

be granted, Defendant Miley’s motion will be denied, and Centerstone’s motion will be

granted.

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on January 12, 2021, the Union County States Attorney filed a

criminal complaint against him, and on the same day he was admitted to the Jackson

County Jail (Jail). The Jail houses detainees for Union County by agreement. Prior to his

admission to the Jail, the arresting officer and the criminal court were informed of

Plaintiff’s serious mental health needs, and the court instructed Plaintiff’s public

defender and the state’s attorney to ensure that Plaintiff received needed mental health

treatment. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 16). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his “mental illness was

known to Defendants from day one,” based on the allegations that he informed various

officials involved in his arrest.

Upon admission to the Jail, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch in a small

isolation cell. Plaintiff engaged in self-harm, which included biting his wrists until they

bled. (Doc. 1 at ¶17). Plaintiff was on suicide watch at least 3 additional times. (Id. at ¶

18). Plaintiff alleges that although he put in “several requests” for mental health

counseling, he was only seen by crisis counselors from Centerstone when he threatened

suicide. (Id. at ¶ 24).

Plaintiff alleges that the Jail failed to provide adequate mental health treatment for

his conditions. He claims the Jail’s mental healthcare “fails at the door,” because he did

not receive an appropriate initial mental health evaluation, nor did the facility create a

mental health treatment plan for him. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 19-20). He alleges that he saw

Defendant Katie Miley every six to eight weeks for only five to ten minutes at a time, to

renew his medications. (Id. at ¶ 22). Miley did not give him information about his

medications. Despite medications, Plaintiff continued to experience problems, including

sleeping 15 hours a day, and crying when awake.

Plaintiff alleges that he spent more than a year in solitary confinement, with few

opportunities for activities or socialization. As a result, he became anxious, and his

relationships with family suffered.

Plaintiff uses a CPAP machine at night. To accommodate for his CPAP machine,

Plaintiff was housed in the booking area of the jail for ten months. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 28). In

the booking area he could not access necessities such as toilet paper, towels, showers,

television, or recreation. (Id. at ¶ 29).

In relation to the factual allegations, Plaintiff identified three enumerated claims.

Claim One is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment against “all Defendants” for

inadequate mental health treatment. Plaintiff alleges with this claim that the Jail “has a

policy or custom of failing to provide appropriate mental health screening, evaluation,

and treatment planning which has resulted in the failure to provide [him] with adequate

mental health care.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 36). Plaintiff further alleges that Centerstone’s “policies

and/or customs fail to provide appropriate mental health screening, evaluation,

treatment planning, and mental health evaluations.” (Id. at ¶ 37). Plaintiff alleges that

the lack of an initial evaluation, the lack of a treatment plan, and the lack of appropriate

treatment and interventions during suicide watch all violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights. (Id. at 39).

In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by unlawful conditions of confinement by “all Defendants” because he was

housed in prolonged isolation. Claim Three alleges violations of the ADA against the

Sheriff of the Jackson County Jail—Defendant Burns.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

The purpose of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure is to decide the adequacy of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chi.,

910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). The federal system of notice pleading requires only

that a plaintiff provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). However, the allegations must be “more than

labels and conclusions.” Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This requirement is satisfied if the

complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of

what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the

plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773,

776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

District courts are required by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to

review the facts and arguments in Rule 12(b)(6) motions “in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged and drawing all possible

inferences in her favor.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). “The

purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide

the merits.” Gibson, 910 F.2d at 1520. A complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Sanders v. Melvin, 25 F.4th 475,

483 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When reviewing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court is generally limited to the allegations within the four

corners of the complaint, along with any exhibits attached to the complaint and any

documents attached to the motion that are referenced in and central to plaintiff’s claims.

See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

A § 1983 claim that a state pretrial detainee has received inadequate medical care

is predicated on the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

See, e.g., Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2018). To establish

inadequate medical care, a pretrial detainee,

[…] bears the burden to demonstrate objective unreasonableness, and he

must make a twofold showing. First, he must show that the defendant

acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when considering the

consequences of his response to the medical condition at issue in the case.

Second, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct was objectively

unreasonable in light of the totality of the relevant facts and circumstances.

James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020). Some panels of the Seventh Circuit use a

four-part test, rather than the two-part test quoted above. Those panels require a plaintiff

to show:

(1) that there was an objectively serious medical need; (2) the defendant

committed a volitional act concerning the decedent’s medical need; (3) that

act was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in terms of

responding to the decedent’s medical need; and (4) the defendant acts

“purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly” with respect to the

risk of harm.

Gonzalez v. McHenry County, Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022).

B. Analysis

Defendant Foster’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29)

Defendant Foster argues that he is entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff failed to

adequately describe his personal involvement or knowledge of unconstitutional

conditions for purposes of a § 1983 claim in Claims One or Two. As to any official

capacity claim, Foster argues that such claims should be dismissed because it is not

reasonable to infer that Foster acted pursuant to a custom or policy on the allegations

presented. Finally, Foster argues that he should not be subject to Claim Three concerning

the ADA because there are no allegations connecting him to this claim, and the ADA does

not allow individual liability.

As to the individual capacity claims, Plaintiff argues that Claim One against Foster

under the Fourteenth Amendment for inadequate mental health care is sufficient because

as a Sheriff, Foster is presumed to have knowledge of and involvement in jail conditions

that are systematically flawed. Plaintiff argues that the jail systematically fails to

adequately screen, evaluate, or plan treatment for detainees’ mental illnesses. As to the

conditions of confinement in Claim Two, Plaintiff argues that the jail systematically keeps

inmates in isolation nearly 24 hours a day, every day. Plaintiff alleges that the Jail was

sued earlier in 2021 concerning inadequate mental health care and isolation—Thomas v.

Burns, 21-cv-187-JPG (S.D. Ill. 2021).1 Plaintiff argues that the existence of the Thomas case

put jail officials on notice of systematic deficiencies. Plaintiff further argues that Foster

had a duty to know about the conditions at the Jail, and his knowledge can be inferred

from the facts pled.

As to the official capacity claims, Plaintiff argues that there are two policies in

question: the express policy of Union County to house its detainees at the Jail, and the

policy or practice of the Jail for failing to provide mental health care. Plaintiff claims that

ultimately he will have to show that Union County policy makers were aware of the risks

present at the Jail and chose to house detainees there despite the risks. He will also have

to show that the policymakers knew about the inadequacy of mental health care at the

jail.

Plaintiff indicates that Claim Three of the complaint, concerning the ADA, was not

pled against Foster.

As Foster correctly states, Section 1983 liability is premised on personal

involvement. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (lawsuits against

individuals require personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation to state a

claim). Considering both the mental health treatment and the conditions of isolated

confinement at the Jail, Plaintiff has failed to allege adequate personal involvement of

Foster in these issues. For example, Plaintiff alleges that a Union County judge, a state’s

attorney, his public defender, and an arresting officer were made aware of his mental

1 The Court notes that the Thompson case appears to have been brought by a Jackson County detainee at the

Jail, so it is not clear that this lawsuit would have imputed any knowledge to Foster, the Sheriff of Union

County.

health needs, but he does not make any mention of this information being relayed to

Foster before he was detained. Additionally, he does not allege that Foster was made

aware of his placement in isolation either immediately or throughout the duration of his

confinement. Without any allegations that directly attribute personal knowledge or

decision making to Foster about Plaintiff’s medical needs or the conditions of his

confinement, the complaint is insufficient to maintain personal capacity claims against

Foster. These defects are similar to those found by the Seventh Circuit in Gonzalez v.

McHenry, 40 F.4th at 828, where the Court found that claims against a Sheriff in his

individual capacity were properly dismissed because the plaintiff did not allege that the

sheriff specifically knew about his detention or made any decisions specific to the

conditions of his detention. A prison warden, or in this case a sheriff, are entitled to

relegate the management of medical issues to medical staff. See Gevas v. Mitchell, 492 Fed.

App’x 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) (personal involvement limited to the handling of grievances

is typically not enough to establish personal involvement of a warden with a medical care

issue).

Plaintiff cites multiple cases that set a different standard for individual liability if

there are allegations of systematic failures at a facility such that any sheriff would know

of the situation.2 Whatever viability a systemic failure theory might have, Plaintiff’s

2 The cases cited describe systemic failures about conditions such as pest infestations, inadequate sanitation

(plumbing and showers), inadequate heat, etc. See e.g., Brown v. Dart, 2017 WL 3219217 (N.D. Ill. 2017)

(collecting cases on systemic failures). The Court finds that these cases are not particularly instructive

because the systemic failures described relate to widespread physical conditions of a facility, rather than

widespread failures in services provided. Unlike a pest infestation that would impact every pretrial

detainee similarly, Plaintiff complains of the systemic handling of medical care and isolated housing. Each

issue is unique to him. See Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished slip opinion

accompanying published decision) (“Sanders’ claims regarding nutritionally deficient food and inadequate

complaint does not clearly and explicitly outline a systemic failure, so the complaint is

not sufficient to put Foster on notice of such a claim. Claim One is generically presented

against all defendants. Although there are legal allegations targeted against individual

defendants, the Jackson County Jail’s policy, and Centerstone’s policy, these legal

allegations do not clearly tie Foster to knowledge of a systemic problem at the jail, so

these legal allegations combined with the factual allegations are insufficient to state a

claim against Foster in his individual capacity. It is important to note that Foster is Sheriff

of Union County, not Jackson County, so it is less obvious how he would be aware of any

systematic problems that may arise.

Claim Two is presented in the same fashion against “all Defendants” for the

conditions of prolonged isolation at the Jail. There are no factual allegations that tie

Foster to this claim based a systematic problem, so he cannot be liable under a theory of

individual liability. With Claim Two—the Court notes that Plaintiff was apparently

housed in isolation in the booking area of the Jail for a significant period of time because

he needed an electrical outlet for his CPAP machine. This unique need suggests that

Plaintiff’s placement in an isolated cell was specific to him, rather than that it was a

hygiene are conceivably systematic conditions that can support a valid claim against [a sheriff and director]

in their personal capacity. However, because Sanders’ allegations regarding health, ventilation, and noise

are confined to conditions in his particular dormitory, they do not support such a claim. Similarly, Sanders’

claim of insufficient psychological treatment also reflects a localized, non-systemic violation[.]”). Although

many pretrial detainees may suffer some kind of mental health need, it is not sufficiently clear that the

needs are the same as Plaintiff’s. As for isolation, although the impacts of isolation on any inmate might

be broadly understood, Plaintiff was apparently kept in an isolated booking cell for quite a while because

he needed an electrical outlet for his CPAP machine. This unique need suggests his housing situation might

have been localized to him rather than systemic. The Court does not find that a theory of a systemic

problem is impossible to establish, but the facts alleged do not clearly establish a theory of this nature.

systemic failure at the jail that was so widespread the sheriff of another county would

know about it.

As to official capacity claims against Foster for either Claim One or Claim Two,

there are not sufficiently clear allegations to tie Foster to any specific policies or customs,

such that he should be considered an express policy maker for official liability purposes.

It is interesting to note, as discussed in Gonzalez, that an official can only be said to set a

policy if he possesses the authority to adopt a rule prescribing conduct on the matter. 40

F.4th at 829. The Gonzalez Court goes on to note that courts, not sheriffs, make pretrial

detention decisions, so a theory that a jail has a policy of accepting anyone regardless of

their medical needs is not a policy at all because sheriffs do not make the decision to

detainee people. Under a similar rationale, Plaintiff’s theory that mental healthcare “fails

at the door” is also inadequate, because there is no suggestion that Foster had any say in

Plaintiff’s confinement. Confinement is a court determination, not a discretionary matter

of policy for a sheriff. Based on the above analysis, Foster’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29)

will be granted in the entirety.

Defendant Miley

Defendant Miley argues that she is entitled to dismissal of Claim One—the

deliberate indifference claim—against her because the allegations against her represent

‘classic examples’ of routine medical judgment, which do not amount to deliberate

indifference. (Docs. 31, 32). Specifically, she argues that the only factual allegations

directed at her were the allegation that every 6-8 weeks she saw Plaintiff for 5-10 minutes

to renew his medications, but during those visits she did not give information about the

medications, nor did she address his concerns that the medications were ineffective. She

also provides arguments about Claims Two and Three, but Plaintiff stated that these

claims were not directed at Miley. (Doc. 36).

Unlike Defendant Foster, whose personal involvement was unclear, Defendant

Miley clearly had an opportunity to interact with and treat Plaintiff. It would be

premature at the Motion to Dismiss stage to say that Miley’s care was or was not within

reasonable standards, and that she did or did not exhibit deliberate indifference, because

it is obvious that there is disagreement about these issues. Additionally, the Court notes

that Miley cites to the incorrect standard for an inadequate medical care claim brought

by a pretrial detainee. Miley indicates that the standard is “the same ‘deliberate

indifference’ standard of the Eighth Amendment,” (Doc. 32 at 2), but this is inaccurate.

The standard for pretrial detainee claims requires an objective reasonableness analysis,

rather than the subjective reasonableness analysis used for the Eighth Amendment

claims. See Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (adopting the

objective reasonableness standard for pretrial detainees claims about the adequacy of

medical care). Accordingly, Miley’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31) will be denied.

Defendant Centerstone

Defendant Centerstone argues that Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify an

express policy or custom possessed by Centerstone that caused harm. (Doc. 34). At most,

Centerstone claims that Plaintiff alleged that he saw Centerstone counselors only when

he was experiencing a mental health crisis, and that he saw counselors on a handful of

occasions. Centerstone alleges that these allegations are not enough to make out a policy

or practice claim, so Claims One and Two against Centerstone should be dismissed.

Centerstone also argues that Claim Three should be dismissed because it does not

expressly mention Centerstone.

In response, Plaintiff states that Centerstone is only named in association with

Claim One—for failure to provide adequate mental health treatment. Plaintiff argues

that because the Jail has delegated at least some authority to Centerstone to provide

mental health treatment, then it is plausible that his complaint states a valid claim against

Centerstone for its role in the provision of mental health services. Plaintiff alleges that

without further discovery, it is impossible to know the exact parameters of Centerstone’s

liability, or its involvement in any aspect of the Jail’s mental health system.

A government entity or corporate contractor cannot be held liable under a theory

of respondeat superior liability, municipal liability exists only when execution of an entity’s

policy or custom causes the injury in question. See e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of the

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). There are three major theories of Monell liability:

(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a ‘wide-

spread practice’ that although no authorized by written law and express policy, is so

permanent and well-settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law; or

(3) a deliberate act from an employee with official policy-making authority. See e.g.

Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff does not identify an express policy, so he must rely on either a wide-

spread practice or a deliberate act by an employee policy-making authority. Plaintiff’s

specific legal allegation against Centerstone in Claim One of the complaint is that,

“Centerstone’s policies and/or customs fail to provide appropriate mental health

screening, evaluation, treatment planning, and mental health interventions, which has

resulted in the failure to provide [Plaintiff] with adequate mental health care.” (Doc. 1 ¶

37). This allegation is threadbare—it amounts to almost no more than a bare unadorned

legal allegation. Plaintiff cites a few cases in support of his policy or practice claim, but

in those cases, the plaintiffs frequently made it known to the alleged policymakers that

they had conditions that were untreated, and they had many examples of missed or

severely delayed treatment. See Neely v. Randle, 2013 WL 3321451 (N.D. Ill. 2013)

(numerous requests made for treatment via grievance procedure for dental issue at

multiple facilities to no avail); Ford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2013 WL 474494 (N.D.

Ill. 2013) (numerous nearly daily requests made for care for serious back injury, followed

by delays in care even after ordered by doctor); Quinn v. Hardy, 2013 WL 4836262 (N.D.

Ill. 2013) (numerous grievances, in addition to hunger strikes and suicide attempts made

to get care, as well as repeated correspondence to Wexford).

Plaintiff’s own allegations are more generic and sparse than the cases he points to

in support of the proposition that he has stated a sufficient claim. Notably, Plaintiff only

entered the Jail one time, so there was only one opportunity for an intake screening, and

he only alleges that he made ‘several requests’ for mental health care. He does not

indicate if he raised complaints about either of these issues in a fashion intended to make

Centerstone aware of deficiencies in care. Although the Court understands that

discovery can be critical to develop the factual underpinnings of claims, Plaintiff’s

allegations against Centerstone concerning a policy or practice are just too sparse at this

juncture to constitute a plausible claim. Centerstone’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34) will

be granted.

DISPOSITION

In summary, Defendant Foster’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) will be GRANTED,

because Plaintiff has failed to plead a sufficient claim against Foster in Claims One or

Two. Defendant Miley’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31) will be DENIED, because Plaintiff

has identified a sufficient claim against Miley in Claim One. Defendant Centerstone’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34) will be GRANTED because Plaintiff has not identified a

sufficient policy or practice held by Centerstone that amounted to a violation of his rights.

The dismissals for Foster and Centerstone are without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2022

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge