Jones v. Wills

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

REGINALD JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-1128-NJR

ANTHONY WILLS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Reginald Jones, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”)

brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He was allowed to proceed on Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims (Counts 1 and

2) and a First Amendment retaliation claim (Count 3).

This matter is now before the Court on Jones’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 285) and

supplement (Doc. 287). Defendants filed a motion to strike or, alternatively, a response to

the motion (Doc. 288). To the extent Defendants seek to strike the motion that request is

DENIED; the Court construes their motion as a response.

BACKGROUND

Jones previously filed several discovery motions, including a motion seeking to

compel additional admissions against Defendant Waterman (Docs. 273, 279). Specifically,

Jones sought to compel Waterman to admit he was not interviewed as a named official

for Grievance No. 162-8-19. The Court denied his motions as they were not related to his

claims in this case (Doc. 284). The Court also found Jones’s request to be a new request

for admission, and Jones already met his limit of requests, even after previously granting

Jones additional requests (Id. at p. 2).

Jones’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 285) takes issue with the fact that the Court’s

Order (Doc. 284) did not cite to his reply brief (Doc. 283), which contained a copy of

Grievance No. 162-8-19 for review. He provides the Court with the history of the

grievance and his claims in Case No. 20-cv-158-SMY. Jones insists that Defendant

Waterman’s answer to the request to admission, indicating that he was unaware of being

named an official in Grievance No. 162-8-19, is suspect because the grievance indicates

that the counselor “contacted alleged staff” (Doc. 1, p. 78), which could have only been

Waterman. He insists that the triers of fact should know whether Menard staff

interviewed Waterman. He argues that Waterman’s answer affects not only this case, but

a pending appeal and his case before District Judge Yandle (Doc. 285, p. 5).

In his motion to supplement, Jones insists that Waterman’s previous answer to the

requests to admit proves that the grievance response was fraudulent (Doc. 287). He

argues that the grievance process was, thus, unavailable to him as to claims related to

that grievance.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Jones does not indicate a basis for his motion to reconsider. The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize motions to reconsider. See Hope v. United

States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1142, n. 2 (7th Cir.1994) (stating that “strictly speaking” a motion for

reconsideration does not exist under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). But the motion

will usually automatically be considered as having been filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) or

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. See, e.g., Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533,

535 (7th Cir. 1994). “[W]hether a motion filed within [28] days of the entry of judgment

should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the

motion, not on the timing or label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493

(7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in the original) (citing Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698,

701-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their

substance, all post-judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment would be

considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”)). Nevertheless, a motion to

reconsider filed more than 28 days after entry of the challenged order “automatically

becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.” Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994)

(citing United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Talano v. N.W.

Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).

A motion to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) may only be

granted if a movant shows there was a mistake of law or fact, or presents newly

discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Matter of Prince,

85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, cert. denied 519

U.S. 1040; Deutsch v. Burlington N. R. Co., 983 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1993). “‘[M]anifest error’

is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale

disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A

movant may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to present evidence that could have been

submitted before entry of the judgment. Obriecht, 517 F.3d at 494 (citing Sigsworth v. City

of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy

and is granted only in exceptional circumstances. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d

319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)).

Rule 60(b) allows a court “to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and

not merely to erroneous applications of law.” Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors

Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). It is also not an appropriate vehicle for rehashing

old arguments or for presenting arguments that should have been raised before the court

made its decision. Russell, 51 F.3d at 749; Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th

Cir. 2000).

ANALYSIS

Simply put, Jones’s motion fails under either standard. Jones argues that the Court

did not consider his reply brief (Doc. 283) in ruling on his motion to compel, but his brief

merely rehashed arguments he raised in his previous filings. He indicates that he attached

a copy of Grievance No. 162-8-19 to his brief, but the grievance was already attached to

his Complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 78-80). Thus, his reply brief added nothing new to his

arguments—and did not require the Court to reference the brief in its Order.

Nor does Jones raise any new argument or evidence that he did not already raise

in his original filings or that could have been raised in his original filings. He continues

to argue that an additional admission from Waterman regarding his knowledge of

Grievance No. 162-8-19, namely was he asked about the grievance by the counselor, is

essential to his claims, but raises no new arguments other than the ones already raised

and rejected by the Court. To the extent he argues that the grievance response is somehow

fraudulent and affects the issue of exhaustion in an appeal and in another case in this

district, the Court does not find that the additional request to admit has any bearing on

the claims in this case. Exhaustion in this case has already been resolved. Jones was found

to have exhausted all of his claims in this case, thus further discovery about the grievance

process is not relevant to Jones’s claims. And Counselor Quick, who Jones maintains lied

in her response to the grievance, is not a defendant in this case. Further, the Court finds

nothing improper about Waterman’s response to the request to admit. Jones’s motion to

compel was just an attempt to obtain further discovery from Waterman, after Jones used

all of his requests to admit. Jones fails to offer any new facts or arguments that changes

the Court's findings.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Jones’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 285) and his

supplement (Doc. 287) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2022

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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