Korunka v. Thompson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LARRY KORUNKA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:21-CV-573-MAB1

)

SCOTT THOMPSON, ANN LAHR, and )

ROB JEFFREYS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on the issue

of exhaustion filed by Defendants Rob Jeffreys, Ann Lahr, and Scott Thompson (Doc. 31;

see also Doc. 32). For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

In June 2021, Plaintiff Larry Korunka, an inmate with the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purported

deprivations of his constitutional rights at Centralia Correctional Center (Doc. 1).

Following a threshold review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff

was permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Thompson, Lahr, and

1 This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §636(c) (see Doc. 25).

Jeffreys for exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs related

to breathing issues (Doc. 9).

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion

on November 22, 2021 (Docs. 31, 32). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievances are not

all full exhausted but also none of the grievances name, describe, or identify Defendants

as the target of the grievances (Doc. 32). After receiving a couple lengthy extensions of

time, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on

April 22, 2022 (Doc. 38). The Court reviewed both parties’ briefs and determined there

are no issues of fact and a hearing is not necessary.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper only if the movant shows that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a). In making that determination, the court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.

Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment.

E.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014) (“[A]

judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). However, when the motion for summary

judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to exhaust, the Seventh Circuit has instructed

courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a

prisoner’s efforts to exhaust. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing

Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008)). Accord Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th

Cir. 2014). Where there are no material factual disputes, an evidentiary hearing is not

necessary. See Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (no hearing required

where there are “no disputed facts regarding exhaustion, only a legal question”). Here,

there is no material facts in dispute and no hearing is required because, in his response,

Plaintiff did not assert any of his own facts or disagree with any of the facts asserted by

Defendants (see Doc. 38).

Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit

about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative

remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). In order

for a prisoner to properly exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the prisoner must

“file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative

rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, which the defendants

bear the burden of proving. Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903 (citations omitted).

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process

outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code to exhaust his claims. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

504.800, et seq. (2017). There are slightly different procedures for non-emergency and

emergency grievances. Here, only the procedure for emergency grievances is relevant.

The regulations provide that an inmate may request that a grievance be handled as an

emergency by submitting the request directly to the warden. Id. at § 504.840. If the warden

determines that “there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious

or irreparable harm to the [inmate],” then the grievance is processed on an expedited

basis. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with the warden’s expedited decision, he or she has

thirty days to appeal to the Director of the IDOC by sending the grievance to the

Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). Id. at § 504.850(a). The ARB submits a written

report of its findings and recommendations to the Director. Id. at § 504.850(d). The

Director then makes a final determination of the grievance. Id. at § 504.850(e). For

grievances that were processed as an emergency, the ARB “shall expedite processing” of

the appeal. Id. at § 504.850(f).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he has difficulty breathing and needs an

oxygen machine (Doc. 1; Doc. 9). Plaintiff alleged that during the COVID-19 pandemic,

Warden Scott Thompson refused to direct the medical department to provide Plaintiff’s

breathing treatments (Doc. 1; Doc. 9). Additionally, Warden Thompson required Plaintiff

to wear an unsanitary face mask that exacerbated his breathing issues (Doc. 1; Doc. 9).

Plaintiff alleged that because he was required to wear an un-sanitary mask and was not

receiving breathing treatments, he suffered from a “lack of air, has a hard time walking

to and from the health care unit, the chow hall, and commissary, and has developed a

very bad cough.” (Doc. 1; Doc. 9). Plaintiff alleged that he filed grievances regarding these

issues that were denied by Ann Lahr (a member of the Administrative Review Board)

and Rob Jeffreys (the Director of the IDOC) (Doc. 1; Doc. 9).

There were purportedly three grievances submitted that were dated March 2, 2020,

February 18, 2021, and March 5, 2021 (Doc. 1, pp. 6–7).

Defendants were unable to find any record of a March 2, 2020 grievance (Doc. 32,

p. 2; see Doc. 32-1; Doc. 32-2; Doc. 32-3; Doc. 32-4; Doc. 32-5). And Plaintiff did not provide

any evidence or argument about this grievance (see Doc. 38).

The grievance dated February 18, 2021 (#21-2-95) was submitted on an emergency

basis (Doc. 32-2, pp. 1–4). Plaintiff indicated that he suffered from various medical

conditions, including C.O.P.D., asthma, Hepatitis C, “PAD,”2 and [Barrett's esophagus],

which he was not being provided adequate treatment for. He stated that his medications

provided little relief and his request for a physical evaluation had been ignored or denied

by the doctor. The warden determined the grievance was an emergency and ordered it

to be addressed on an expedited basis. In order to respond to the grievance, the grievance

officer sought input from the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”), who indicated

that Plaintiff was seen on February 23, 2021, for his request for pain medication and again

the following day for his chronic conditions, and his treatment plan was reviewed and

revised. The HCUA further stated that if Plaintiff felt his needs had not been resolved, he

should request a nurse sick call visit or contact her for further clarifications of his current

orders. Based on the information received, the grievance officer determined that

2 “PAD” may stand for peripheral artery disease.

Plaintiff’s medical concerns were being addressed and recommended that the grievance

be denied. The warden concurred with the recommendation and denied the grievance on

March 8, 2021. The grievance and the warden’s response were returned to Plaintiff (see

Doc. 32-3; Doc. 32-4, p. 2), but Plaintiff admitted he did not appeal this grievance to the

ARB, claiming there was no need to do so because he would be taken care of at nurse sick

call (Doc. 38, p. 2).

The grievance dated March 5, 2021 (#21-3-44) was submitted on an emergency

basis (Doc. 32-1). Plaintiff indicated that he was sent by security staff to the Health Care

Unit on March 2, 2021, because he was having difficulty breathing but he was denied a

breathing treatment again. The warden determined the grievance was an emergency and

ordered it to be addressed on an expedited basis. In order to respond to the grievance,

the grievance officer sought input from the HCUA, who indicated that Plaintiff was seen

on March 2nd by a nurse and his exam was stable. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not have a

nebulizer treatment ordered so the nurse could not give him one. The nurse did not think

she needed to call the doctor given that Plaintiff was stable and she instead scheduled

Plaintiff for a follow-up with the doctor, who saw him on March 4th. The doctor altered

Plaintiff’s treatment plan based on his complaints and he had another follow-up

appointment scheduled in April. Based on this information, the grievance officer

determined that Plaintiff’s medical concerns were being addressed and recommended

that the grievance be partially upheld. The warden concurred with the recommendation.

Plaintiff appealed this grievance to the ARB. The ARB through Ann Lahr asked the

Health Care Unit Administrator for an update. Based on the information she received,

Lahr determined the grievance was moot given that Plaintiff had been see by the medical

staff for the issue and it was resolved. The Director concurred.

DISCUSSION

There is evidence of two relevant grievances: the emergency grievance dated

February 18, 2021, and the emergency grievance dated March 5, 2021. It is undisputed

that the March grievance was fully exhausted. The February grievance was not, but

Plaintiff argues that he did not need to appeal the grievance to the ARB because there

was no further relief available to him (Doc. 38). See White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here was no requirement to exhaust ‘where the relevant

administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action

whatsoever in response to a complaint.’” (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)))

(emphasis in original). Even if the Court assumes Plaintiff is correct, there is another flaw

with the February grievance, as well as the March grievance, that render them insufficient

to exhaust as to Defendants: neither of the grievances name or describe Warden

Thompson, Ann Lahr, or Director Jeffreys or the conduct at issue in this case.

The administrative regulations require a prisoner’s grievance to “contain factual

details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what happened,

when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise

involved in the complaint.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(b). If the offender does not

know the names of the individual, he “must include as much descriptive information

about the individual as possible.” Id. The grievance forms used by Plaintiff likewise asked

for “a description of what happened, when and where it happened, and the name or

identifying information for each person involved” (see Doc. 32-1, p. 5; Doc. 32-2, p. 2).

Contra Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding inmate did not fail to

exhaust even though grievance did not contain any names because, while the regulation

required offender to name or describe the individual, the grievance form itself did not

indicate that a name had to be provided); Conley v. Anglin, 513 Fed. Appx. 598, 601 (7th

Cir. 2013) (“We have held that when a prisoner uses a grievance form asking only for a

‘Brief Summary of Grievance,’ . . . then the omission of names or identifying information

does not necessarily mean that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

so long as he otherwise followed the grievance process.”). In short, the grievance must

provide sufficient information to identify the defendant as the target of the complaint or

to implicate them in the alleged wrongdoing. See Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th

Cir. 2014) (explaining “fatal defect” in grievance was “the absence of anything in it to

indicate that [the defendant] was the target.”); see also Ward v. Hoffman, 670 Fed. Appx.

408, 410 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment based on prisoner’s failure to

exhaust where he complained only about the procedures used by the adjustment

committee and did not mention excessive force or the defendants); Ambrose v. Godinez,

510 Fed. Appx. 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming the dismissal of prison officials where

the plaintiff’s grievance failed to mention the officials by name or otherwise implicate

them in the alleged constitutional violation).

Here, neither grievance contains any reference to Warden Thompson, Ann Lahr,

or Director Jeffreys by name, title, description, or any other identifiers. Nor do the

grievances describe any conduct that can be imputed to Defendants. In fact, the

grievances do not even appear to address the conduct at issue in this lawsuit. In the

February 2021 grievance, Plaintiff complained generally that he was not receiving

adequate treatment for his various medical conditions and his request to be seen had

gone unanswered. In the March 2021 grievance, he complained that he was denied a

breathing treatment in the Health Care Unit. There is no indication in this grievance or

the response that the breathing treatment was denied for reasons related to the pandemic,

or that it was somehow Warden Thompson’s fault. And there is absolutely no mention

in either grievance of Plaintiff being forced to wear unsanitary masks. Instead, Plaintiff

only complained about the actions (or inactions) of the medical staff and the medical care

he received (or did not receive) from them. Nothing in the grievances suggests Plaintiff

was complaining about non-medical prison officials improperly handling

his grievances and turning a blind eye to the inadequate medical care he was

purportedly receiving. A claim that medical staff was providing inadequate treatment is

distinct and unique from a claim that administrators were ignoring Plaintiff’s complaints

about the treatment he received or failing to ensure that he received adequate treatment.

As such, the grievances cannot serve to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. See

Roberts, 745 F.3d at 236; Waldrop v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 646 Fed.Appx. 486, 490

(7th Cir. 2016) (unpublished opinion).

Accordingly, Defendants Thompson, Lahr, and Jeffreys are entitled to summary

judgment and shall be dismissed without prejudice as Defendants in this case.

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendants

Rob Jeffreys, Ann Lahr, and Scott Thompson (Doc. 31) is GRANTED. This case is

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter judgment and close this case on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 21, 2022

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge